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Abstract
An institutional pattern of administrative inertia and resistance has traditionally 
characterised the reform of the Italian State. It is widely held that the historical 
development of the state has contributed to this immobilisme. The effect of the 
Italian system of party government on bureaucratic autonomy is also blamed for the 
failure (until recently) of attempts to reform the Italian state. However, definite 
changes affecting welfare administration in Italy reveal a radical departure from the 
status quo, as a result of particular reform mechanisms and the strategies of elites in 
handling blockages during the process of legislative implementation of delegating 
laws designed to introduce ambitious reform programmes. ‘Dynamic conservatism’ 
is the novel theoretical approach elaborated here to study policy change in such 
stalled administrative systems, and it offers an explanation of how it becomes 
possible to break historically determined immobilisme.
The case of healthcare reforms in Italy in the 1990s has marked an impressive 
departure from traditional administrative practice. The thesis argues that two key 
innovations have been accomplished: first, the emergence of public managers 
charged with extensive policy leadership at the top of regional welfare 
administration, increasingly legitimised by expertise and technical knowledge rather 
than political entrepreneurialism; secondly, the reconfiguration of traditional centre- 
periphery relations, triggered by the territorial disturbance caused by regionalisation. 
The consolidation of policy change, underpinned by the paradigm of the 
entrepreneurial state, was most noticeable at regional level. Such change was 
achieved, however, only by handling beforehand two major blockages: first, the 
opposition of political parties during the parliamentary process to the reconfiguration 
of the relationship between politics and administration; secondly, the adversarial 
response of interest groups to policy change.
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Preface
The scientific debate about the conditions of decay of the modem state is a way for political 
scientists, especially American and neo-Marxists, to create illusionaiy problems. The 
modem state is not in crisis: it is only much more complex, and more difficult to be fitted 
into the abstract models of political scientists (Giannini 1986).
Reshaping of the state by reducing the size, scope and resources of the public sector 
has led observers and scholars to claim that the state is in ‘crisis’. The deliberate 
change to the structures and processes of public sector organisations with the 
objective of improving public services has been one of the most critical issues in 
contemporary government practice and policy reform in advanced industrial 
democracies. Scholars of administrative reforms in the 1980s and 1990s have 
associated the ‘crisis’ of the State with new rules of public authority and 
organisation, introduced with the alleged ‘withdrawal of the state’ from spheres of 
intervention which were previously at the core of its activity and legitimacy (Wright 
and Muller 1994). Most reforms in the 1980s stemmed from economic and financial 
tribulations confronting governments unable to pay for public sector expenditures 
without increasing taxation. However, the problem of the crisis of the state does not 
merely concern its financial capacity, but involves deep-seated ideological disputes 
about its nature and purposes.
Whether this reshaping of public sector functions and processes can be defined as a 
‘crisis’ should follow a careful evaluation of the specific challenges that these new 
arrangements have posed to domestic administrative structures (Wright and Page 
1999). Advocates of the ‘entrepreneurial state’ (Borgonovi 1988; Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992; Rebora 1995), however, have devoted less attention towards 
investigating the different responses of individual administrative systems to their
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ideology.1 Hence, insufficient attention has been drawn to the type of challenge that 
the alleged ‘crisis’ poses to firmly entrenched and historically determined 
bureaucratic traditions. As Wright argued, the general picture of state retreat ‘may 
mask a partial, nationally differentiated, limited reality with perverse displacement 
effects and unintended consequences leading to renewed state activity’ (Wright and 
Muller 1994). As Giannini’s observation, quoted above, suggests, the ‘crisis’ of the 
state has been elevated into a universal phenomenon affecting the modern state, more 
as the result of scholarly debate about the ideology informing administrative changes 
than as an empirical investigation of particular challenges facing national 
administrative structures. This reasonably instils prudence in drawing sweeping 
generalisations about the most recent patterns of administrative reforms, such as the 
entrepreneurial or managerial revolution affecting the public authority tradition of 
the state.
The Italian state has been affected by administrative changes associated with the 
entrepreneurial state, although the scope and intensity of reform programmes have 
varied across policy sectors, pensions being noticeably less affected than health care 
and education policies. In spite of numerous attempts to reform the state and wide 
ranging and ambitious administrative programmes since the late 1970s, the 
distinctiveness of administrative reform activities in Italy has been their immobilisme 
and inertia (Cassese 1994). Committed efforts to reorganise the public sector have
1 The ‘reinventing government’ framework in the United States (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) has 
several notions in common with New Public Management (NPM), a loose term referring to the most 
recent paradigm change in how the public sector is to be governed. C. Hood defines NPM as ‘a 
shorthand name for the set of broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated the 
bureaucratic reform agenda in many OECD group of countries from the late 1970s’ (1991). 
‘Entrepreneurial state’ refers to the doctrinal component of NPM linked to stress on private-sector 
styles of management practice, exemplified by greater flexibility in hiring and rewards, discretionary 
control of organisations from named persons at the top ‘free to manage* (Hood 1991). NPM is related 
principally to the notion of ‘hollowing out of the state’, whereby many activities of the state have been 
reassigned (Rhodes 1994).
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primarily been left ‘on paper’, with the introduction and enactment of a large number 
of reforms rarely being followed by any concrete implementation of the intended 
aims. This has been especially marked in the area of higher education policy (Capano 
2003) and regulatory impact assessment.2 This specificity has been at the core of the 
public administration scholarship in Italy, which has offered thoughtful and complex 
explanations for the historical legacy of immobilisme. Historical and juridical 
accounts predominated over other disciplines. The historical development of the 
Italian state combines with distinctive organisational and cultural traits and with the 
nature of political control of administrative resources to produce an outcome 
resembling Crozier’s bureaucratic phenomenon and vicious circle (Crozier, 1964). If 
one decides to label this pattern of inertia as ‘crisis’, it appears to be not a new 
phenomenon, but a historical pattern.
Against this historical legacy of administrative inertia, significant and impressive 
changes to the modus vivendi of the Italian administration and its rationality have 
recently occurred. Recent reforms have yielded concrete results suggesting a 
departure from the pattern of inertia. The change has been most noticeable with 
respect to the introduction of private-like management arrangements and the 
decentralisation of the state, intended here as the transfer of primarily administrative 
competencies in specific policy areas to subnational governments. The case of health 
care reforms illustrates the pathbreaking change. In no other sectors of the welfare 
state has the entrepreneurial paradigm of administrative activity been so extensively 
adopted, and implemented in Italy, as it has for the national public health care 
system.
2 For recent findings on the regulatory impact assessment in comparative perspective, see: European 
Council. (2004). A comparative analysis of regulatory impact assessment in ten EU countries. Dublin, 
Italian, Irish and Dutch presidencies of the Council of the EU. See also Radaelli (2004).
The paradigm was introduced into health care in 1992 by the Amato government, 
and soon became deeply rooted at subnational level, following regional legislation 
creating the conditions for the emergence of a powerful regional welfare 
administration, inspired by new public management ideas. Despite attempts at policy 
reversal towards the end of the 1990s, the entrepreneurial welfare state is sufficiently 
rooted to offer an alternative administrative model to the Weberian legal-rational 
model of bureaucratic rule. In other policy areas, most noticeably education, similar 
trajectories have been followed, with the establishment of managerial discretion and 
new responsibilities assigned to head teachers o f high schools. Individual schools 
have also been granted greater administrative autonomy from the central 
administration (Brocca 1995; Ferroni 1997). However, the implementation of this 
reform has been slow, ambiguous and problematic, as such impeding considerably 
any fruitful empirical investigation. Furthermore, in this sector there has been no 
comparable decentralisation of administrative functions to the subnational level of 
government, as is the case for health care. Nor has the paradigm of 
entrepreneurialism and managerialism been accepted as readily as in health care. 
Recent public outrage against the Moratti education reform is a clear indication of 
this opposition to NPM.3
Against the backdrop of legacy of inertia and immobilisme, and in the light of
concrete change in health care reform, the thesis aims to offer first an empirical
understanding of how change under inertial conditions becomes possible. It
investigates whether the traditional blockages to administrative reforms have been
lifted or removed, whether elite strategies have changed from resistance to the
3 ‘Rivolta contro la scuola azienda’, La Repubblica, 22 February 2002; ‘Scuola, tagli come per la 
sanitzf, La Repubblica, 28 August 2002.
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embrace of reforms, and whether new instruments have become available to push 
ambitious reforms through an otherwise ineffective policy making and law-making 
process. Secondly, on the basis of the analysis of the case of health care reforms in 
the 1990s, the thesis intends to elaborate a theory of dynamic conservatism that may 
be inserted into a more general model of policy change in stalled societies (Crozier 
1970). A ‘clinical7 approach is one that bears upon particular cases and generalises 
only from an intimate understanding of these cases. Therefore, I do not start with a 
priori definition and general laws, but facts will be analysed to explore and discover 
what theoretical models they fit, or which models need to be built inductively to 
explain them more adequately.
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Chapter I
The Reform of the Italian State: Doomed to Fail or Possible 
Change?
A bureaucratic system is restricted in its possible rate of development, and evolution toward 
large scale organisations is not so unrelenting as Weber thought—it depends, to a large 
extent, on the ability of men to break out of the bureaucratic vicious circle (Crozier 1964).
The problem of change in a bureaucratic system may be posed in dysfunctional 
terms, emphasising the traits of public administration that lead inevitably to a 
pathological state of institutional inefficiency and malaise (Crozier 1970). With 
reference to the administrative reforms undertaken by the Italian Prodi government, 
one informed observer has sounded this warning: ‘we are getting ourselves into a fix; 
we risk going back to the beginning with increased costs and inefficiency’.1 To 
dramatise the effects of the ‘vicious circle’, however, may constrain our ability to 
explain change rigorously, when it does happen, and to explore the mechanisms that 
facilitate the break with the legacy of inertia created by the vicious circle. One may 
stand astonished in front of critical evidence of change, such as the international 
rating of the Italian public national health care system as second best in the world,2 
solving the puzzle of the break of inertia by attributing it to the fortuitous 
circumstances of the ‘accidental logic’ of historical events (Immergut 1992), or just 
favourable exogenous conditions generally defined as ‘crisis’ (Cassese 2002). Why 
is the intrinsic capacity of the administrative system to create change endogenously 
not sufficiently accounted for? The historical legacy of failed attempts at reforming 
the Italian administration indeed justifies in part the centrality of the problem of 
immobilisme in the study of administrative reforms. However, it risks sweeping «
1 With reference to the administrative reforms of the Prodi government, S.Cassese denounced the state 
of inefficiency and crisis of the public administration. See: Cassese,‘La controriforma della 
burocrazia’, II Sole 24 Ore, 21 February 1999.
2 ‘Health Systems: Improving Performance’, World Health Organisation, Geneva, 2000.
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away, with an apocalyptic tone, the concrete recent achievements in the direction of 
modernising the Italian State, in particular in relation to the improvement of public 
services.
The historical development of state building after the unification process in 1861 has 
affected the pattern of institutional reform of the Italian state, which has been marked 
by pronounced inertia and immobilisme (Melis 1996; Pezzino 2002). This tendency 
is more obvious as far as the implementation of reforms is concerned. Yet dynamism 
and impressive legislative activism have characterised administrative reforms in the 
last thirty years, as the first part of this chapter highlights. Although the study of the 
Italian public administration has been dominated by public law scholars (Dente 
1990a), historical studies may significantly advance our understanding of the 
developmental conditions that have created a cumulative hindering effect on the 
progress of reform, such as the feeble commitment to establishing a senior civil 
service and the centrality of the question of public employment. Similarly, the role 
of the doctrine of administrative law can also be appreciated by tracing its 
development through history, from protecting individuals against arbitrary power in 
the liberal state to its transformation in order to adapt to the emergence and 
consolidation of the welfare state, increasingly legitimised by a different rationality 
than merely the legal rule (Giannini 1990). Finally, the question of the arduous 
development of technical knowledge and bureaucratic expertise in the Italian 
administration is examined in relation to the pattern of political control o f the 
bureaucracy, long characterised by clientelism and patronage (La Palombara 1963), 
but more recently moving towards a system of 'personalised trust* (Wright and Page 
1999; Endrici 2000).
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Scholarly work addressing the question of immobilisme in relation to administrative 
reform in Italy is reviewed in the second section of the chapter. This review 
emphasises the explanatory significance of historical development and its legacy in 
influencing the problem of change in the Italian administrative system. However, our 
task needs to take into account recent critical evidence of impressive and remarkable 
change, marked by the introduction of general management into key welfare policy 
areas and the decentralisation of welfare services to regional levels of government. 
This thesis explores an extraordinary case of the concrete possibility of ‘men 
breaking the vicious circle’, to use Crozier’s terms, namely the 1992-93 health care 
reforms.
The exploration of the possibility of reform in practice of the Italian public 
administration does not only respond to the theoretical aim of developing a more 
general approach to the study of reform in stalled political systems, but it has also 
substantive policy significance in terms of the quality of services that citizens 
receive. When one reads accounts of the elderly having to queue for as many as 
eight hours behind the desk of a local health authority to collect their exemption 
stickers for the treatment of chronic and debilitating diseases3, one wonders whether 
the reform of the state may be confined within the realm of institutional reforms or 
whether it pertains also to the core of the welfare state and policy reforms in 
advanced societies. The attention devoted to administrative reforms has been, 
unfortunately, inadequate as far as substantive policy issues are concerned. The last 
part of this chapter sets up the case of health care in order to advance our 
understanding of whether change in the Italian state is possible and, if so, by what 
mechanisms inertia can be broken and eventually defeated.
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From the Giannini Report to Bassanini’s Decentralisation: a History of 
Incomplete Achievement
A striking paradox runs through the Italian administrative reforms of the last thirty 
years. Ambitious programmes to reshape the state have been enacted by the 
adoption of various legislative initiatives. In substantive terms, reforms have 
repeatedly challenged the traditional models of public authority, by obfuscating the 
borderline between the public and private sectors. For instance, the privatisation of 
public employment has been pursued consistently since the mid-1970s as an attempt 
at introducing private sector management practices into public administration.4 
However, most reforms remain incomplete and unimplemented. This first part of the 
chapter aims to highlight the difficulty of reforming the Italian state by briefly 
describing the most significant attempts at introducing external and innovative 
models of public administration and their failure. In particular, attention is drawn to 
two themes: the administrative decentralisation of the Italian state and the 
introduction of private sector management associated with the ‘managerial 
revolution’ (Wright and Muller 1994). The administrative question in the 1990s was 
not only a matter of liberating civil servants from political control, as the separation 
of politics from administration constituted its leitmotiv (Dente 1999), but also 
addressed the transfer of administrative competencies from the central administration 
to subnational authorities in general and regional governments in particular (Falcon 
1998; Furlong 2003).
3 ‘Usl, dopo i bollini un altro calvario’, La Stampa, 17 February, 1993.
4 In the legislation and in the literature, the term ‘privatisation’ is used interchangeably with 
‘collective bargaining’. However, privatisation is not equivalent to collective bargaining because the 
former includes the latter and not vice-versa. Privatisation is a wider term and it implies that the 
entire system of public sector employment contracts, including pay and conditions, is brought under 
the realim of private law. More importantly, it implies the abandonment of rigid rules, and privileges 
for civil servants. See: Battini and Cassese (1997).
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In the 1970s and 1980s, administrative reforms in Italy were piecemeal and ad hoc, 
triggered by immediate contingencies rather than a wider reform programme. It was 
not until the beginning of the 1990s that public management reforms became a more 
prominent theme of comprehensive and ambitious packages, such as those of 
Cassese and Bassanini, which took place in the years 1992-94 and 1997-99 
respectively.5 Although the Cassese and Bassanini reforms were the landmarks of 
administrative reform in the 1990s, they were part of a much larger set of 
government programmes to improve the delivery of public services, which included 
changing the system of administrative controls, public access to the administration, 
and other measures summarised in Table 1.1. below, which provides an overview of 
the large scope of reforms in the 1990s.
5 The Cassese reforms were about improving the relationship between the citizen and the public 
administration; simplification of administrative procedures; improved efficiency and productivity; and 
the introduction of effective performance monitoring and control. From 1992 to 1994, Italy undertook 
its most extensive and incisive reform of public administration. The period witnessed a wide range of 
change: from the introduction of Public Services Charters, on the British model of the Citizens’ 
Charter, to the simplification of administrative procedures, the reorganisation of central departments, 
the reform of civil service employment contracts and the creation of regulatory agencies. See: Cassese 
(1994). The Bassanini reforms refer primarily to the decentralisation of the State, aimed at die 
transfer of administrative responsibilities in certain policy areas from the centre to local authorities. 
Article 1 of Bassanini Law no.59 of March 15,1997 authorises the executive to promulgate a number 
of decrees transferring responsibilities from the central administration to regions. Law no. 112 of 
1998 (Bassanini Two) has also decentralised a wide range of responsibilities to the regions and local 
authorities. For example, Article 138 has given the regions the power to organise and rationalise the 
distribution of schools and responsibility for professional training. Article 139 confers on the 
municipal authorities responsibility over the use of facilities and control over ‘collegial boards’, 
education of professionals and other activities, all of which would seem better served by individual 
schools. For an analysis of the implications of the Bassanini reforms, see Gilbert (2000) and Dente 
(1999).
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Table 1.1. Administrative Reforms, 1992-2001
Reform Programmes Type of reform Legislation
Reduction in size and 
resources
Personnel cuts
Reduction of administrative 
structures and procedures
Finance Law 1994 
Law no.241/1990
Reduction in scope Decentralisation
Autonomy to local 
authorities
Law no. 59/94 and no. 
127/1997
Law no. 142/1990
Dismantle statutory 
framework of civil 
servants
Privatisation of 
employment contract
Reform of higher civil 
service
Executive Decree no. 29 
/1993 and Law no.537/93
Executive Decree no. 
29/1993 and Law no. 
145/2000
Monitoring Tightening financial 
controls
Role of Court of Accounts
Executive Decree no. 
143/1993 and Law no. 
20/1994
Executive Decree no. 
470/1993 and 143/1993
Management Managerial autonomy to 
public managers
Law no. 59/1997 
Law no. 142/1990
Reorganisation of 
administrative structure
Merger of ministries Executive Decree no. 
281/97
Transparency Access to information Law no.241/1990
Source: Author’s elaboration
The introduction of alternative models of public administration to the predominant 
legal-rational one (Weber 1991) has been debated since the late 1970s. The paradigm 
of efficiency deriving from the obfuscation of the public-private juridical 
demarcation was at the core of the 1979 Giannini Report.6 It was inspired by a 
reform-driven advocacy that owed much to the work of Giannini himself. 7 In the
6 Ministero per la Funzione Pubblica (1982), ‘Rappoito sui piincipali problemi dell ’ Amministrazione 
dello Stato’.
7 M.Severo Giannini was one of the major public law scholars in Italy. He extended the investigation 
of administrative law to the questions of public finance and public management Thanks to his 
contribution, scholars have investigated issues such as the constitutional aspects of public
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report presented on 16 November 1979 in Parliament, Giannini, then-Minister of 
Public Services, urged a redefinition of the reform of the State from the focus on 
public authority to the management and delivery of more efficient public services.8 
For this purpose, he established within each department special administrative units 
for the analysis of organisational issues, so-called Uffici orgcmizzazione e metodo. 
Moreover, the 1979 Giannini Report proposed the ‘alternative option of 
privatisation’ of public sector employment.9 He intended to exclude from the 
jurisdiction of public law all public employment contracts except those of the 
dirigenti, that is, the higher civil service. This was soon to become the ‘manifesto’ 
of a radical upheaval of the traditional bureaucratic and hierarchical model of the 
administration, associated with traditional public employment (Melis 1996).
The Giannini Report and the 1983 reform of public employment10 did not produce 
the expected results (Melis 1996), but reform activism, however, continued unabated. 
For example, administrative reform was a major aim of different governments in the 
1990s, but the 1992-94 programme of reforms, under the Amato and Ciampi 
governments, was extraordinary and, thus, merits special attention. What was 
distinctive about this period was that reforms were part of a comprehensive 
programme of political and institutional change.11 The objectives of reform included
administration, the administrative organisation, and comparative administrative law. See Giannini 
(1970).
8 Ministero per la Funzione Pubblica (1982: 733).
9 Ministero per la Funzione Pubblica (1982:738-9).
10 Law no. 29/1983. This was an attempt to provide a homogeneous framework for the fragmented and 
specific statutes of public employment. For the first time this law applied to the entire public sector, 
and not to just ministerial departments. A central aspect of the reform was the division between 
matters to be regulated by law (the organisation of offices, for instance) and those to be regulated by 
collective agreements (salaries).
11 Under the eleventh legislature of the Italian Parliament (1992-94), administrative reforms became a 
political priority for the government, for the first time in the histoiy of the Republic. During those 
years, when a radical reform of the Republic looked very near, the governments, led by Giuliano 
Amato and then Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, introduced radical reforms as part of wider political change. 
In particular, the Minister of Public Services under the Ciampi Government, Sabino Cassese, a public 
law professor, produced a remarkably large legislative output, considering the short length of his 
tenure. He proposed to solve the urgent problems of inefficiency, waste and corruption, and the lack
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the reduction of the public expenditure and of the deficit in political legitimacy, 
following the 1990s corruption scandals (Della Porta 1993). The ideas informing the 
reforms marked a great discontinuity from the past and from the traditional model of 
public administration (D'Albergo and Vaselli 1997). Moreover, the mode of reform 
distanced itself from the traditional method of ‘accumulation’ -  creating new 
structures and administrative bodies without altering or removing old ones (Melis 
and Cassese 1990). By contrast, administrative reforms at the beginning of the 1990s 
emphasised ‘reduction’ and simplification.
The scope of traditional public authority has been reduced sharply by two reform 
trajectories: decentralisation and the introduction of private sector management 
practices (Wright and Muller 1994). As far as the former was concerned, the 
beginning of the 1990s marked the commitment to greater autonomy of regional 
governments and local authorities, such as health care authorities,12 from central 
administrative supervision. However, the most active period for the decentralisation 
of the Italian State, since the establishment of regions in the 1970s, coincided with 
the 1997 and 1998 Bassanini reforms (Newell 1998; Gilbert 2000; Furlong 2003). 
This period was characterised by the intention to abandon any lingering state control 
over legislation in the policy areas constitutionally reserved to Italian regions. It also 
fully activated the power conferred by Article 118 of the Italian constitution upon the 
central government to delegate administrative powers to regions in other areas, such 
as education.13 Beginning with Law no. 59/1997 and continuing through to
of public confidence in the public sector. In June 1993, in a famous ‘Report on the Condition of 
Public Administration’, Cassese identified the fundamental problems of the Italian administration: 
lack of attention to citizens; predominance of a rigid statutory framework; inadequate distribution of 
ministerial responsibilities; length and complexity of administrative rules and procedure; inadequacy 
of traditional financial monitoring; and the lack of attention to European issues.
12 Executive decree no. 502/1992, discussed in details in chapter n  of this thesis.
13 The longest article in the Law 59/97 was Article 21 which dealt with the reform of high schools, 
which were given greater autonomy over the curriculum, methods of teaching course organisation,
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executive decree no. 112/98, a series of legislative acts named after the minister of 
public services, Franco Bassanini, outlined a new framework of centre-periphery 
relations in Italy. Law no. 59 delegated to the executive the legislative authority to 
‘confer functions and tasks to the regions and other local institutions with the goal of 
reforming and simplifying the public administration’.14 A second Bassanini Law, no. 
127/97, addressed ‘urgent measures of streamlining administrative activities and 
procedures of decision and control’, as stated in its preamble.13 On 31 March 1998, 
legislative decree no. 112 implementing the delegating law was enacted.16
The second most important trajectory of reform activity in the 1990s has been 
changing the traditional management arrangements of the administration. This 
trajectory has developed as part of a wider management ‘revolution’ in governance 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000), driven by new public management ideas originally 
developed in the British and American context.17 D’Albergo and Vaselli provide a
extracurricular activities and teacher training. It also provided the head teachers with managerial 
autonomy.
14 Article 1 of Law no. 59/1997.
13 In May 1997 the second Bassanini Law, no. 127/1997, was passed in Parliament This is a hugely 
complex piece of legislation pursuing the reform of local government and further administrative 
efficiencies. For instance, article 6 authorises both the mayors of towns over 15,000 inhabitants, and 
also the presidents of the provinces, to employ a ‘city manager’ with the task of increasing efficiency. 
Another important article, no. 16, dealt with the reform of universities. It granted individual 
universities the freedom to regulate their own teaching and courses. For more details, see Gilbert 
(2000).
16 Legislative decree no.l 12 issued on March 31,1998.
17 The prescriptions of NPM (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) include; the separation of the purchaser role 
of public services from the provider role; the growth of contractual or semi-contractual arrangements; 
accountability for performance; flexibility of pay and conditions; the separation of the political 
process from the management process; the creation of internal markets or quasi-markets; an emphasis 
on the public as customer; the reconsideration of the regulatory role of the state; and a change in the 
general intellectual climate. The new approach separates policy-making, in the hands of politicians 
and the higher echelons of the public administration, from the delivery and production of public 
services, which can be devolved to independent agencies or even the private sector. In other words, 
the role of the public administration becomes not to manage the daily provision of public services but 
to provide general guidelines and standards in the interest of the citizens or ‘clients’. One of the most 
important consequences of this distinction between ‘steering’ and ‘rowing’ is the extension of 
privatisation and the growth of contractual arrangements (Lane 2000). In contrast to the traditional 
hierarchical control of public organisations, internal contracts or semi-contractual arrangements are 
established. Many NPM prescriptions can be understood as attempts to change the culture of public 
services, dominated by the traditions of centralisation, hierarchy and regulation. The models of the 
market and commercial and private culture are influential. For recent theoretical analysis of public 
management reforms see: (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000).
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sociological framework to analyse the borrowing of new public management 
practices from the British experience, with particular attention to the problems of 
policy learning (D'Albergo and Vaselli 1997). Incentives to enhance the autonomy 
of public managers from political control have been introduced in many sectors, 
including education and health care. For instance, greater managerial discretion has 
been granted to individual head teachers of high schools.18 The head teacher was 
granted managerial responsibilities and greater discretion over the budget and overall 
administration. The purpose of granting autonomy was to reorganise education in 
order to improve efficiency and quality of service. Local management of resources 
is assumed to enable the achievement of specific targets and performance reviews. A 
head teacher, so the argument goes, can allocate resources more efficiently than a 
remote central administration (Butera 1994). Autonomy was claimed to eliminate 
the fragmentation of responsibility for personnel management between the state and 
local schools produced by a complex system of public law regulations (Ventura 
1998).
The empirical investigation undertaken by this thesis into the introduction of public 
management into health care in Italy is centred around a landmark reform of the 
national health care system enacted by the Amato government in December 1992, 
called ‘Restructuring the National Health Care System’. This reform can be broken 
down into two major elements: the introduction of general management, and the 
regionalisation of administrative and policy functions from central to regional 
governments. One of the most noticeable innovations introduced in the 1992 reform 
was the introduction of general management as a result of a paradigm shift from a 
politico-representative to a technical-managerial type of health care administration. 
When the Italian health care system was created in 1978, it became immediately
18 Articles 4 and 5 of Law no. 537/1993.
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entrenched in the predominant administrative culture. Local health authorities 
became the fiefdom of local ‘notables’ who would establish their power base by 
distributing social benefits. This practice was perpetrated through management 
committees composed of local elected officials, doctors, and trade union 
representatives. Since political parties used management committees as an arena for 
party competition in local electoral politics, they have responded to the challenge of 
the creation of the new rank of the general manager with scepticism, at best.
Despite the thin parliamentary majority and public unrest, managerialism and 
entrepreneurialism were the aspects of reform that the Amato Government was most 
determined to pursue.19 Managerialism was an idea that the Minister of Health was 
particularly committed to ‘being very knowledgeable of the British reforms of the 
National Healthcare Service (NHS)’.20 Although the introduction of general 
management is something transferred from the British experience,21 the peculiar 
rationale for transferring it into the Italian politico-administrative system, to 
depoliticise management and to improve the transparency of the administration, 
determines its interpretation and the interests of actors involved within it. The 
Minister of Health explained to the Senate the need to abolish all types of collegial 
bodies from the management of health care authorities in order to clearly separate 
politics from management22 Therefore, the central rationale for introducing general 
management into the administration of health care was to overcome the collusion of 
interests and resulting distortion in the distribution of health care services.
19 ATomassini, interview with author, Rome 25 July, 2002; Lucchina, interview with author, Varese 
12 September, 2001.
20 Nicola Falcitelli, Interview with author, Rome 23 September, 2002.
21 The 1983 Griffiths Report marked the beginning of NHS’s managerial change. The report states that 
NHS suffers from ‘institutional stagnation’. Health authorities are not given policy guidelines and 
consensus decision-making leads to long delays in the management process. The Griffiths report’s 
importance lies as much in the philosophy which shaped its recommendations as in the 
recommendations themselves.
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Furthermore, managerialism is embraced by the government as a moralising mission. 
In this respect it becomes a rhetorical policy discourse to regain citizens’ trust in 
political institutions. Most parties used the rhetoric of bringing politics back into the 
sphere of transparency and morality. During the 1980s, the health care sector was 
the most affected by corruption scandals (Della Porta 1999b). As a solution to this 
problem, executive legislative decree no. 502/1992 strengthens the auditing function 
and the role of the Board of Accountants, giving individual members the ability to 
exercise administrative and financial controls independently at any time on any 
administrative acts.23 The claim for the private market’s greater efficiency in 
delivering health care services would help the government in their purpose of 
regaining citizens’ trust. According to Giuliano Amato, ‘from competition we cannot 
draw anything else but benefits. Competition will transform the user from a state 
subject to a real citizen’.24
Central to new public management practices was the embrace of an output oriented 
administration (Hood 1991). Attention shifted from processes to results, with 
rewards linked to performance. Evaluation of results became a key element. 
Accordingly, the reform of administrative controls25 has been inspired by the 
increasing dismantling of ex ante procedural controls in favour of cost-performance 
and cost-benefit analysis. The Cassese reform programme created internal control 
units to evaluate policies using cost-benefit analysis and strengthened the supervisory 
role of the Court of Accounts over these new units. The Court, more generally, 
expanded its controls over public management by the creation of a new control
22 F. De Lorenzo, speeches to the Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 10 and 15 December 
1992, and F.De Lorenzo, interview in La Stampa, 19 October 1992.
23 Article 3, Executive Decree no.502/1992.
24 G. Amato in La Stampa, 4 December, 1992.
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function in 1994.26 Moreover, financial control over collective employment 
agreements was strengthened.27 The Court retained ex ante control only of executive 
acts.28
In the case of Italian public management reforms in the 1990s, a distinct and crucial 
part of this wider programme was the ‘privatisation’ of public employment,29 as we 
mentioned earlier in relation to the Giannini reforms at the end of the 1970s. Yet, it 
was the Amato government in 1992-93 that pushed this project further and more 
convincingly.30 The decision to merge the system of national collective agreements 
for the public and private sectors reflected a political will to inject the methods and 
techniques of the private sector into public administration. It has been claimed that a
25 Executive decrees no. 470 and 546 of 1993 and Laws no. 19 and 20 of 1994.
26 Law no. 20 of 14 January 1994 introduced a new type of control on management, so-called 
controllo gestionale. In exercising this new function, this Law establishes that ‘the Court controls the 
legality and transparency of management. Accordingly, it monitors whether administrative targets are 
met by concrete results, analysing and benchmarking costs, instruments and tuning of the 
administrative activities’. This control function applies throughout the administration and it is a direct 
function of it. The Court can require any type of administrative and other information from the 
internal control units of any administration, central, regional or local. This control over management 
applies also to autonomous local authorities.
In addition to control over management, the Court is responsible for two other types of controls: the 
ex ante legality control over administrative acts, and financial and economic control. These two are 
defined by Article 100 of the Italian Constitution
27 Article 51 of Legislative Decree no.29/1993.
28 Legislative decrees no. 470/1993, no.546/1993, and Laws no. 19 and 20/1994. In general this 
legislation reduced the administrative control on procedures, which was the predominant type in the 
Italian administration By contrast, this reform programme introduced controls on outcomes. See 
Cassese (1994).
29 The reform of public sector employment contracts has been debated since the beginning of the 
1980s. However, it has gained more impetus and salience in the 1990s. Two reasons for the timing of 
the reform can be identified. First, as Cassese has mentioned, the crisis of the political parties, 
resulting from the widespread corruption and bribery scandals, and the de-legitimisation of the entire 
political system, have created a window of opportunity for trade unions. They have exploited this 
opportunity successfully by taking the entire matter of employment contracts away from parliament 
and political parties. Secondly, Italy’s public deficit became visible in the 1990s. The fiscal crisis 
was one of the most important circumstances to influence the reform of public administration The 
problem of public sector employment and personnel management was also a problem of wasted 
financial resources. For the literature on the privatisation of public employment, see Cassese, 
Dell’Aringa, et. al (1991), Vandelli, Bottari, et. al (1995), Capano (1993), Battini and Cassese (1997).
30 Executive Decree no.29 of 1993 and amending decrees no.470 and 546.
In 1992-93, the interests of the Amato Government and of the three major trade unions coincided on at 
least the first stage of the reform programme. Both government and unions encouraged the move 
from administrative law to national collective agreements as far as pay and conditions of employment 
were concerned. This move is sometimes referred to as ‘privatisation’ in the text of the legislation. 
The basic expectation of the reform was that the counterpart of collective bargaining would cease to 
be a fimctionally-irresponsible parliament, who had a strong electoral incentive to grant generous 
wages and working conditions.
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public administration that aims to be more decentralised, more flexible, and 
financially more transparent and more accountable at different decision-making 
levels, needs to be governed by flexible employment contracts rather than rigid legal 
procedures (Rebora 1999). The precondition for this is the dismantling of the 
traditional statutory framework for civil servants. Since the 1957 Statute of Civil 
Servants established the privileges of civil servants, the public sector has been 
regulated by administrative law. Executive decree no. 29/1993 instituted a radical 
change: the transfer of public sector employment contracts from the realm of 
administrative law to that of national collective agreements. However, despite this 
legislative output there are few civil servants on short-term contracts,31 it is not now 
easier to dismiss civil servants, and performance related pay has not replaced equal 
pay for people of the same rank.
Most of the scholars who have written about the reform of public sector employment 
have stressed the fact that no other European country has felt the need to privatise the 
employment contracts of civil servants so radically (D'Antona 1997). A possible 
explanation is that in the 1990s this system became financially unsustainable. 
Executive decree no. 29/1993 was introduced in the context of fiscal crisis and 
budget constraint. The government’s priority was to cut public expenditure and to 
reduce financial distortions related to public sector employment. The ‘privatisation’ 
of employment contracts, with its emphasis on collective bargaining, was the policy 
instrument used to keep salaries under control. On one hand, the formal 
‘privatisation' of public employment has been successful to the extent that the
31 The labour market for public sector employees is still highly rigid in Italy compared to other OECD 
countries. Only 2.5% of total civil servants had a part-time job in 2000. See: ‘Innovazione e 
valorizzazione delle risorse umane’, Forum Pubblica Amministrazione, May 2003, Rome.
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necessary legislation was issued.32 On the other hand, their implementation has not 
occurred, so they have remained in reality ‘reform on paper’ (Cassese 1995a). 
S.Cassese, when stepping down from the office of Minister of Public Services in 
1994, expressed his frustration: ‘the work I have started is mostly unaccomplished’ 
(Cassese 1995a).
The Constitutional Court has approved the ‘privatisation’ process for employment 
contracts. In 1996 it rejected the claim that public law-based employment contracts 
for dirigenti were necessary to ensure impartiality.33 Therefore, the court has judged 
the ‘privatisation’ of their employment contracts to be constitutional. The court’s 
decision implies that dirigenti can no longer defend their privileges by appealing to 
Article 3 and Article 97 of the constitution, regarding the ‘impartiality’ of the public 
administration. The Court’s decision reconciles the practice of collective bargaining, 
typical of the private sector, with the constitutional and legal obligations of civil 
servants, namely, impartiality and good management. Some scholars have 
emphasised the innovation of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation that law and 
contract are not necessarily antithetical (D'Antona 1997).
To summarise, the attempts at reforming the Italian state discussed so far were 
mainly defeated by the difficult task of putting them into practice. The effort to grant 
senior civil servants greater areas of discretion and managerial autonomy had been 
the core trajectory of reform programmes in the 1990s. It was aimed at running 
services more efficiently, but also at avoiding the collusion between parties’ interests 
and reform objectives, a point developed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
Political control of the administration has been characterised by a high level of
32 Law no. 29 of 1993, ‘Rationalisation of organisations in the public administration and revision of 
public sector employment’.
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politicisation in the upper echelon of the civil service, as set out by the scholarship 
on the Italian version of party government (Katz 1987; Vassallo 1994). 
Decentralisation reforms, especially at the end of the 1990s, represented the second 
most important reform of the Italian state. Local authorities, such as local high 
schools and local health authorities, were granted more managerial responsibilities 
and self-government by the central departments. Both trajectories constituted a 
critical part of wider reform programmes to move the Italian state away from the 
tradition of legal-rational public authority and closer to that of public service. Yet, 
most efforts were defeated in practice. The next section reviews the explanations for 
this immobilisme as set out by other authors.
The Inertia of the Administrative System
The historical pattern of development of the Italian state reveals certain 
characteristics that continue to affect the outcome of reforms. These are the 
centrality of public sector employment for promoting social cohesion, the lack of a 
long-established senior civil service, and the constitutional position of the 
administration as defined by the Constitutional Assembly in 1948, which favoured 
parties over the administration as instruments of democratic consolidation (Morlino 
1986). Moreover, the history of the Italian public administration has been interwoven 
with the evolution of the doctrine of public law, and administrative law in particular. 
At the core of this doctrine there is a theory of the state which encourages legal and 
procedural formalism against arbitrary power (Giannini 1986). Administrative law 
has developed and changed to a remarkable degree in light of the process of 
democratisation in the 1970s and the introduction of economic planning (Melis 
1996). The significance of this tradition for the modernisation of the state not only
33 Judgement no. 313/1996, Corte Costituzionale.
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rests in its rigid formalism, but also in the fact that it supports the shared values of 
the tightly bound policy community of administrative reformers (Dente 1990; Dente 
1999). As such, it provides the administration with a formidable means of resilience 
and continuity in the face of social and political change.
The explanations offered by the historical pattern and by the development of 
administrative culture reveal the propitious conditions for the distinctive usage of 
state resources and structures by political parties and political elites (Zuckerman 
1975). Italian political parties do not compete on policy programmes, but on 
opportunistic office holding, guaranteed by the distribution of state resources among 
parties’ factions. These practices defeat innovation and change, which are usually 
only enacted at the beginning of a new coalition government to respond to electoral 
demands. The problem of political control of the administration, though, is not 
merely related to the ‘use’ of administrative resources by parties. It also pertains to 
the role and status of civil servants in the politico-administrative system (Page 1992; 
Wright and Page 1999).
Historical State Development
From historical studies of public administration it is possible to extrapolate some 
main features of the Italian state’s development since political unification in 1861.34 
The growth of the public sector in Italy has acted to integrate social and economic 
functions during the development of a capitalist economic structure.35 Unlike other
34 Until the 1970s the juridical formalist approach had impeded an autonomous development of 
historical studies about public administration. The work of G.Melis is a successful attempt to establish 
the centrality of a detailed historical account of Italian public administration See Melis (1994).
35 In the early years of political unification public sector employees made up less than 1% of the 
population. At present they represent approximately 10% of the population. The number of ministries 
has increased from 9 in 1861 to 22 in 1992.
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European countries, administrative growth, that is the increase in the size, functions, 
and resources of the public sector, was not concurrent with the process of political 
unification, but started four decades later. Yet, its simultaneous development with 
rapid industrialisation meant that public administration internalised all the 
contradictions and difficulties of industrial development (Cassese 1974). Thus, 
public administration did not govern the process of economic development, as in 
France, but it remained at the margins (Pezzino 2002). The growth of the public 
sector played a key social function as a remedy for the gap between an industrialised 
North and a rural South. In particular, public sector employment in the central 
administration became an instrument of social cohesion (Pezzino 2002).
In Italy, administrative expansion was closely intertwined with the ‘southern 
question’ (meridionalizzazione). The pace and timing of public sector growth 
coincided with the recruitment of employees from the agrarian South. In the late 
nineteenth-century liberal state two thirds of senior civil servants came from 
Piedmont, but during the twentieth century, the proportion of northerners and 
southerners in the central administration reversed (Cassese 1974). The implication of 
the process of ‘southemisation’ was that public administration was exclusively 
perceived as a source of public employment and job security (posto) for young, 
middle class, and otherwise unemployed southerners. The consequences were far 
reaching because aspirations were for status and security rather than risk-based 
opportunities. Cassese argues that the resulting cultural model was the antithesis of 
Weberian rationality. Rather, it was based on a rural and proprietary conception of 
public sector employment (Cassese 1994).
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The analysis of the historical development of public administration (Calandra 1978; 
Melis and Cassese 1990; Romanelli 1995) also reveals that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the Italian public administration has not remained attached solely to the 
original Cavour organisational model. The original model suggested by Cavour in 
1853 was structured around departmental ministries headed by ministers responsible 
to Parliament. The minister had the power to appoint his own cabinet. The 
organisational units of the ministries were in a descending order of hierarchy: general 
directorates, divisions, and sections. Originally ministries had a secretary general, 
but in 1888 this office was abolished. The central administration had its own field 
services that remained in place even after the establishment of regions in 1970. The 
structure was based on the French model of public administration. Unlike the French 
model, the institution of the ‘grandes ecoles’ was not present.
Other types of public organisations, such as state-led enterprises, public authorities, 
local administrations, and, more recently, independent regulatory agencies have 
paralleled the departmental ministries. However, the multiplicity of organisational 
models has never been conducive to the simplification and rationalisation of the 
existing structures. The final result is the coexistence of different organisational 
models within an uncoordinated and highly fragmented system. ‘Everything is 
created and nothing destroyed’ (Melis 1998). Similarly, an historical investigation 
reveals the existence of a plurality of administrative cultures. The development of 
the predominant administrative culture of administrative law during the period 
between 1885 and 1923 should not be taken for granted (Cassese 1976). Until the 
fascist period, the administration had a relatively strong technical element, including 
engineers and technical experts (Cassese 1976). The conflict between the original 
technical expertise and pluralism, and the increasing predominance of administrative
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law reflects the conflict between reformists, on one hand, and supporters of the status 
quo and formalism on the other (Cassese 1976).
One of the most striking features of the Italian administration, compared with the 
French and British administrations, is the absence of an intentional effort to create a 
senior ‘caste* of civil servants (D'Alberti 1990; D'Alberti 1994). Thus, for many 
years the structure of the administration resembled a pyramid without a head. The 
first major attempt to create an administrative elite occurred only in 1972 through 
Legislative Decree no.748. The 1972 reform has been defined as the most significant 
organisational change made to the Italian public administration in Republican history 
(Meoli 1995). A new administrative elite was juridically created from the existing 
upper level of the public administration, the so-called dirigenza, formally responsible 
for the financial and administrative management of partially legitimated offices.36 
The reason was to unburden the minister of a range of decisions, in particular 
approval of contracts and spending plans. Unfortunately, the original intention of 
creating a functional role, the dirigenza, has become entrapped within a formal 
career grade system. Originally, the aim was to create an autonomous higher civil 
service (Cerase 1999). Yet, the dirigenza has become a rigid and formalistic 
definition of status, pay scale and responsibilities (Cerase 1999).
Therefore, it was not until 1972 that public managers acquired their own, distinct 
areas of competency. There have previously been instances of autonomous 
responsibility but they were exceptional. In accordance with the 1972 reform, 
management functions were allocated a posteriori. The specification of newly 
defined responsibilities was of secondary importance to the paramount priority of 
formally positioning public managers in a pre-existing organisational structure.
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Public managers have the role of ‘guiding, co-ordinating, and monitoring their 
offices, in order to ensure the legality, impartiality, efficiency, and responsiveness of 
the administrative activity to the public’.37 With regard to efficiency, despite the 
predominance of the traditional paradigm of administrative law, public managers 
were made responsible for the achievement of results. In the case of poor 
performance, higher civil servants were forced into early retirement. From 1972, 
autonomy was defined in comparative terms with the management functions of the 
private sector. For instance, the reform envisaged the possibility of negotiating short­
term employment contracts for the achievement of specific objectives, so-called 
incarico speciale. However, in practice this remained an exception. The Minister 
retained the prerogative to override acts and decisions taken by higher civil servants 
and to call their administrative responsibilities back upon himself. Although this 
power has rarely been used, it has strong anticipatory effects (Plutino 1999). The 
strictly hierarchal relationship between the senior civil service and the Minister 
continued, though in a tempered and more mitigated way than before 1972.
There are two reasons for the difficulty experienced in creating a powerful senior 
civil service within the Italian administration. On one hand, the highly political 
implications of personnel questions inside the public sector have made ministers 
reluctant to relinquish control over such issues. Secondly, the role of the trade 
unions has been crucial in opposing the creation of an administrative elite 
(Panebianco 1991). In fact, the 1972 legislation coincided with the start of a period 
of increased unionisation in the public sector (Cammelli 1995). Even today, there is 
strong resistance to pyramidal organisational structures with power concentrated at 
the top. In particular, representatives of trade unions contended against the
36 Article 2, Legislative Decree No.748/1972.
37 Article 2 of Legislative Decree No.748/1972.
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recruitment of outsiders with proven management skills and experience into the 
senior civil service (Panebianco 1991; Dente 2001).
The failure in creating a unified top civil service transcending departmental loyalties, 
combined with the fact that the administrative elite in Italy is largely closed and 
compartmentalised, enhanced the process of cloisomement, literally 
compartmentalisation, of different administrative units and worsened the problem of 
coordination and communication between them (Cassese 1983). Therefore, another 
obstacle to effective reform of the state is the high level of fragmentation of the 
public administration, which in Italy is particularly high. Government beyond the 
departmental ministries consisted of autonomous administrations, such as the Ente 
Nazionale per le Strode (ANAS, National Road-Building Agency), the 
Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato (State Monopolies Agency), the 
postal service (Poste Italiane) and the railways (Ferrovie dello Stato). Another 
group was the so-called ‘state-holding’ corporation, for example the Istituto per la 
Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI, Institute for Industrial Reconstruction). Its purpose 
was to facilitate state-led industrial development in areas where private industry was 
slow in achieving it. There is a full range of non-departmental agencies, some 
having a social security function, such as the Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza 
Sociale (INPS, National Institute for Social Security, being the most notable), and 
others having supervisory functions, like the Bank of Italy.
The marginal constitutional role of public administration, combined with conflicting 
definitions in the Constitution about what its role should be contributed to its 
subordinate position vis-^-vis political parties (Franchini 1994). Not only does the 
Italian public administration lack an administrative elite like the British
37
establishment or the French grand corps, but also it does not enjoy any distinctive 
place in the Constitution (Cassese 1974a). Its constitutional role is defined with 
ambiguities and contradictions that exacerbate its institutional weakness. Whereas in 
France the state structure has been built upon public administration, in Italy public 
administration was remarkably not emphasised by the Constituent Assembly in 1948, 
unlike the judiciary and political parties (Cassese 1974a).
The different definitions found in the Constitution reflect the conflicting positions 
attributed to public administration by the Constituent Assembly: an institution 
dependent on the executive, an impartial and autonomous structure, and an institution 
in the service of society (Hine 1993). As part of the executive,38 public 
administration is dependent ultimately on political parties. Yet the principle of 
impartiality (Article 97) requires the administration to act as an independent body, 
relieved from the political control presupposed by its executive function. Thirdly, the 
Constitution emphasises the link between society and public administration,39 which 
ultimately responds to popular sovereignty. Therefore, the Italian constitution reflects 
multiple and conflicting conceptions of public administration, being simultaneously 
dependent on the executive and exempt from its political control. These conceptions 
have all coexisted and none has prevailed at the expense of the others, as Franchini 
argues (Franchini 1994).
Administrative Law and Culture
‘Administrative culture’ as an explanation for the difficulty of reforming the Italian 
State has two dimensions. One refers to the ‘internal’ culture, that is the culture
38 Article 95 of the Italian Constitution applies only to departmental ministries.
39 Article 98 of the Italian Constitution states that: ‘public sector employees serve the State’.
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produced by the administration’s rules and procedures, and the other to the ‘external 
culture’, that is the image that members of the policy community of reformers have 
of public administration (Dente 1999). In the Italian case what characterises the latter 
is not necessarily a common representation of interests on specific policy issues, 40 
but a common sense of trust and affinity owing to their common legal background 
(Dente 1990b). The distinction between internal and external culture is important 
because the interaction between them contributes towards determining the degree of 
change and continuity, as we will go on to elaborate. Dente writes that: ‘public law 
constitutes the predominant culture of public administration. Its principles are based 
on the ideology of administrative reform, and the fortune of public law is that of 
Italian public administration’ (Dente 1995).41
In Italy, the internal administrative culture coincides with the external one. This 
homogeneity is claimed to be one of the reasons for the difficulty of reforming the 
state (Capano 1992). The administrative culture is shaped by the doctrine of 
administrative law to the extent that it is difficult to disentangle the two. Public law 
has been the hegemonic academic discourse for the reform of the State, as Dente 
argues (Dente 1990b). Economics, political science and sociology have been of 
secondary importance and have not been given equal recognition. The policy 
community of public lawyers shares the same system language in a hegemonic way 
(Dente 1990b). This language is dominated by an emphasis on the technical details 
of legislation. Thus, law has a profound impact on Italian politics and administration,
40 Heclo suggests that the interest of policy community is to strengthen the sense of closed 
‘community’ rather than their position on specific policies. See Heclo and Wildavsky (1974).
41 Political scientists in Italy have a marginal role in the debate of the reform of the State due to a 
mixture of factors: academic division, the problem and rigidity of the empirical methods, lack of 
interest in the research questions that social scientists pose about the administrative system, and 
probably the unwillingness to be in the uneasy position of giving policy recommendations. See the 
argument set out by Dente (1990).
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and administrative law, in particular, becomes the backbone of the administrative 
culture of the Italian bureaucracy.
What characterises the Italian public administration is an organisational structure of 
French origin, upon which a doctrinal development of German administrative law 
imposed itself after political unification (Cassese 1995a). The essence of 
administrative law is the relationship between public authority and society. 
Functional, organisational and financial aspects of public administration have been of 
secondary importance (Cassese 1995a). The major task of droit administratif was 
the limitation of the political and administrative power of the executive in order to 
protect citizens from its arbitrary action. The predominance of liberalism and 
positivism at the end of the nineteenth century and the dualistic split between the 
executive and legislature influenced the view that the ‘law* was the strongest 
constraint upon administration.42 Consequently, administrative law was imposed 
upon the administration rather than being the product of it. Hence, administrative 
procedures themselves came to be regulated by a complex series of laws, decrees, 
and regulations.
The existence of a separate judicial system for administrative matters is a central 
element backing up the system of administrative law. The presence of a distinct 
judicial code for administrative matters was criticised in certain countries as creating 
privileges and being ultimately illiberal.43 The distinctiveness of administration from 
society was further enhanced by the development of institutions for dispensing
42 The origin of this constraint rests in the concept of the stato di diritto -  the rule of law- which came 
to replace the state based on feudal privileges. See: Giannini (1986).
43 De Tocqueville, whose influence on Dicey was evident, expressed his doubts about die 
development of French administrative law in two respects: the incompatibility of centralisation of 
command with representative institutions; the existence of a justice retenuet by which the conflicts 
between the administration and the citizens were resolved by the Conseil d ’Etat, which was only a 
consultative body of the executive (De Tocqueville 1966).
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administrative justice, such as the Consiglio di Stato (council of state) and the Corte 
dei Conti (court of accounts). They are separate from the ordinary court system. In 
addition to its consultative role, the council of state, since 1971, has been the court of 
appeal of a system of regionally based administrative courts of first instance 
(Tribunali Amministrativi Regionali, or TAR). The court of accounts has a more 
direct impact on proceduralising the administration. Its control functions are both 
‘preventive’ (giving approval in advance) and ex post facto. The court also produces 
annual reports to Parliament which offer advice not just on legal aspects but also on 
government policy. This procedural administrative justice has been increasingly 
supplemented in the 1990s by the intervention of the criminal justice system, with 
regard to the investigation of corruption (Della Porta 1999a).
The centrality of administrative justice characterises the entire development of 
administrative law from its inception (Giannini 1970). This development reflects a 
profoundly Weberian rule that is based on the notion of legitimacy in the form of 
procedural legality, the distribution of functions by the law (the principle of 
‘competence’), the administrative hierarchy and the pervasiveness of preventive 
controls (Weber 1991). These bureaucratic rules were so entrenched in the doctrine 
of administrative law that it adapted only painfully to the modem welfare state 
(Giannini 1970). For instance the creation of new ministries, a necessary 
consequence of the expansion of welfare services, was accepted with scepticism by 
administrative law scholars, who argued that, according to the Italian Constitution, 
the number, competencies, portfolios and organisation of departmental ministries 
must be defined strictly by law (Giannini 1970).
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The doctrine of administrative law is influenced by two main traditions. The first 
one, deriving from a lack of trust in public authority, advocates the centrality of the 
administrative law judge and his formal control of the legality of administrative 
procedures (Giannini 1970). Administrative law of this kind is not concerned with 
public administration as a whole, but with the control of its activities. This is the 
more liberal aspect of the original doctrine. On the other hand, the focus is less on 
safeguards against the executive but rather on ensuring the effective provision of 
public services. In accordance with this second tradition, administrative law extends 
to all the rules defining the organisation and internal functioning of public 
administration (Giannini 1990). The coexistence of these two traditions, the liberal 
and the social-democratic, has been overlooked by the critics of administrative law, 
who have stressed the dichotomy and conflict between private law, imbued with 
liberal and market values, and public law, which is the bastion of state authority 
(Giannini 1970).
The doctrine of administrative law, however, does no longer adequately account for 
the changes in the nature of the state. This is firstly because the activities of public 
administration are geared towards the delivery of public services. Thus, the dialectic 
between public authority and society no longer represents a normative problem. 
Secondly, administration by departmental ministries has lost the centrality that public 
law scholars continue to attribute to it. The growth of ‘parallel administrations’ and 
the decentralisation do not support their perspective (Dente 2001).
The descriptive inadequacy of the original doctrine of administrative law became 
more evident in the political context of the centre-left governments of the 1970s, 
when a new model of governmental activity emerged -- the economic planning
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model (programmazione). It is difficult to exaggerate the effect of the new planning 
model on the Italian administrative culture. Dente argues that the economic planning 
method represented a watershed (Dente 1990a). The most important implication of 
the use of ‘plans’ was that administrative law had to reconfigure the problem of 
political control of the bureaucracy in terms of ensuring effectiveness and 
coordination. Since economic planning implies policy coordination and centralised 
decision making,44 with the creation of new collegial bodies, interministerial 
committees, and offices within departmental ministries, it presupposes political 
leadership and control of the bureaucracy. The creation of the national health care 
system in 1978 is an example of the new method of planning. National and regional 
health care plans are integrated in a vertical and hierarchical system of administrative 
planning, for defining the organisational arrangements of health care services.45 The 
health care system was, then, to be administratively coordinated by the centre.
The old politicisation of the bureaucracy by the DC slipped during the 1970s into a 
newer and less controllable assemblearismo, as one scholar argues (Di Palma 1980). 
Trade unions proposed ‘a new model of economic policy’: they demanded not only 
representation for labour issues, but also for the management and delivery of public 
services like housing, health care and education. The new model had to be 
participatory. By the end of the 1970s the unions had become a privileged 
negotiating counterpart to government policies at the highest level, with the effect of 
transforming democratic participation into ‘an assembly system for permanent 
agitation’, the so-called potere assembleare (Sartori and Ranney 1978).
44 As Giannini explains, the adoption of a ‘plan’, so-called piano, has become an inevitable tool in the 
case of many-years administrative and activity. He emphasises the juridical complexity of drafting an 
internally coherent system of laws. Planning requires institutional capacity such as centralised 
administrative units in charge of co-ordination, like the Comitato Interministeriale Programmazione 
Economica (CIPE), interministerial committee for economic planning. See Giannini (1996).
45 Law no.833, 23 December 1978, established the Italian National Health Care System. Article 53 
deals with the National Health Care Plan, die Piano Sanitario Nazionale.
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The effect of the introduction of the economic planning model and democratisation 
was a doctrinal revirement of administrative law (Giannini 1986). If classic 
administrative law was guided by the need to ensure impartiality of administrative 
activity and the independence of the administration, to be subject only to Parliament 
and popular sovereignty, the ‘new’ administrative law of the 1970s had to 
concentrate on the problem of political control for facilitating the effective delivery 
of public services. For the first time, the possibility of direct political appointment of 
senior civil servants was envisaged. This new condition was introduced by the 
Giannini Report of 1979.
Despite the challenges of planning and democratisation, administrative law showed a 
high degree of resilience. On the one hand, the reason for the survival of 
administrative law as the predominant culture of the Italian administration was the 
lack of alternative models that could more readily accommodate the new economic 
and social demands. On the other, the leftist and the trade unions opposition 
contrasted reforms driven by the rationale of economic efficiency because they 
contended against a strong executive and coherent technically oriented bureaucracy, 
in their view a plan of neo-capitalist inspiration (Di Palma 1980). As Di Palma 
maintains, ‘there was leftist opposition to anything smacking of modernisation from 
the top’ (Di Palma 1980).
Whereas the 1970s were characterised by the primacy of politics, the 1990s reforms 
were marked by the restoration of a more technically oriented administration. The 
debate about the need to strengthen the administration, however, did not sufficiently 
take into account that the policy community of reformers had always tended to
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choose traditional organisational and cultural models. Challenged by new economic 
and social forces in the 1970s and again in the 1990s, defenders and supporters of the 
status quo associated with administrative law have tended to create new bodies 
(participatory bodies), new acts (participatory acts), and new procedures, without 
replacing the old with the new and without opening up to alternative perspectives and 
academic disciplines.
Political Control o f the Administration
What distinguishes the Italian reform of the state in the 1990s from reforms 
introduced in the United Kingdom and USA under Thatcher and Clinton, which were 
based mostly on economic efficiency and cost considerations, is the political strategy 
to reintroduce the separation between policy and administrative functions as a way o f 
defeating clientelistic relationships. The purpose of the reform programmes was to 
reconfigure the dichotomy between politics and administration by adopting new 
public management arrangements (Dente 1999). Reform programmes46 have tried to 
strengthen the managerial autonomy of senior civil servants, by devolving to them 
the task of defining objectives and identifying required financial resources 47
The problem of political control is defined by Weber and the public administration 
literature that builds upon his work as the question of how the bureaucracy relates to 
political leadership (Weber 1991; Page 1992). Politicians and political parties are 
important in preventing bureaucratic dominance (Page 1992). According to Page 
and Wright, three distinct approaches to political control can be discerned (Wright
46 Legislative Decree No.748 of 1972, Legislative Decree No.29 of 1993, Legislative Decree No.80 of 
1998 and Law No. 145 o f2002.
47 For a discussion of the reform of the Italian senior civil service, see D’Alberti (1990), D’Alberti 
(1994), Cerase (1999), Cerase (2000).
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and Page 1999). The first approach reflects the normative theory developed in the 
ancien regime of the political neutrality of the civil service. Non-partisanship is a 
fundamental feature of this type of administration. Despite the fact that empirical 
evidence does not support the claimed separation between politics and 
administration, research into public administration in Italy is still culturally bound to 
the normative question of how to control the bureaucracy so that democratic 
government can be ensured (D*Alberti 1994). Effectively, it is widely accepted that 
professional civil servants have an active role in policymaking (Dogan 1975; Page 
1992).
The second approach, the ‘commanding heights approach’, is characterised by senior 
appointments within national bureaucracies that are subject to direct partisan 
influence. This is the system predominant in France, Sweden and Germany. Page 
and Wright argue that it is possible in Europe to detect a trend of political control in 
this direction (Wright and Page 1999). Taken further, this approach characterises the 
Austrian and Belgian administrations, where party affiliation is the basis for 
recruitment and career progression within the administrative elite. In the Italian case, 
rigid legalism has ensured that senior civil servants are the reluctant guardians of the 
dichotomy between policy and administration (Cassese 1983). Senior civil servants 
prefer to avoid overt partisan involvement because this can interfere negatively with 
the seniority-based promotion systems (Cassese 1983).
On the whole, Italy has opted for political neutrality (Wright and Page 1999). Senior 
civil servants have traded job security for policy-influence, so that they have a 
relatively modest influence on policymaking (Cassese 1995b). It is claimed that 
senior civil servants are appointed on the basis of seniority and ministers rarely
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interfere with this internal system (Cassese 1995b). The impartiality of the Italian 
administration is also sanctioned by the Constitution. Yet, it is tempered by a 
cabinet system of ministerial advisers largely drawn from the civil service.
In the 'parastato' the reality of impartiality is quite different.48 Overt politicisation of 
senior civil servants in non-departmental administration is the rule. The state 
provided the ruling party of the Christian Democrats with innumerable opportunities 
to ally itself with important sectors of society through its ability to manage the 
targeted distribution of resources. The partisan management of the ‘parastato’ 
allowed the hegemonic party to control its internal exasperated factionalism by 
distributing posts (Vassallo 1994). At the local level, local health authorities were 
subject to party influence in purchasing and hiring decisions. For this reason, local 
health authorities’ management committees proved to be profoundly ineffective 
institutions (Torchia 1997). They were colonised by political parties, who filled 
them with people with little managerial skills, but a voracious appetite for the 
exercise of political patronage (Maino 2001). Thus, there is little tradition of non­
partisan public agency management outside the formal ministerial bureaucracy in 
Italy, where party influence is difficult to eradicate.
How much autonomy, then, does the bureaucracy have in governing itself and its 
functions independently from political parties? According to La Palombara’s 
analysis of parentela 49, the bureaucratic autonomy is limited (La Palombara 1964). 
During the 1960s bureaucrats tended to be more receptive to the demands of groups 
that were closely allied to the party in power, the Christian Democrats. Until 1992
48 The parastato refers to the administration beyond the departmental ministries.
49 Parentela, which in Italian means kinship, is the second major pattern of interest-group 
intermediation with the bureaucracy. It characterises in particular the relationship between a group
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the hegemony of the Christian Democrats until 1992 and its parentela groups on 
bureaucratic recruitment and promotion extended considerably beyond commanding 
heights and involved administrative levels that are supposed to be staffed strictly on 
merits and seniority. A group like Catholic Action could remove uncooperative 
bureaucrats or could have them transferred to an unattractive position (La Palombara 
1964). The issue was not whether a party was ready to intervene, but how far it was 
willing to push for having its particularistic interests adopted.
The ability of a group to utilise the dominant party to make its influence felt in the 
bureaucracy will also depend on certain salient structural characteristics of the latter. 
The Italian ministerial bureaucracy has been characterised formally by an extreme 
organisational centralisation of authority (Rebora 1999; Dente 2001). The director 
general is at the apex of formal authority and there may be as many as fifteen 
categories of civil servants between a junior bureaucrat and the Minister. However, 
while authority is highly centralised, real power is somewhat dispersed. Thus, a 
considerable amount of de facto decentralisation of decision-making exists within a 
department. The rigidity of the administrative hierarchy increases the discretionary 
power of the lower-level official who formally would have very little. Thus, lower 
level officials can have a considerable amount of discretion that makes them the 
target of group pressures.
The cost to be paid for the partisan penetration of the bureaucracy was that the state 
remained largely unreformed. The success of party control over interests and 
factions with blackmailing power relied heavily on keeping institutions as they were: 
permeable, large and incoherent. Moreover, a crucial factor has contributed to the
and a hegemonic party. Where parentela exists, interest groups that enjoy special access to institutions 
can exercise considerable influence over policy.
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inertia of the Italian public administration, namely the system of clientelism. This is 
based on the logic of reciprocal exchange between civil servants, private interests 
and political parties. It is this particular feature that highlights most the deviation of 
the Italian public administration from the Weberian ideal type. J. La Palombara, in 
his seminal work on the structure of interest group relationship with the bureaucracy 
in Italy (La Palombara 1964), defines clientela as the type of access and influence 
that exists when an interest group succeeds in becoming the natural expression and 
representative of a given social sector in the eyes of an administrative agency or a 
ministry. He describes the various branches of the Italian public administration as the 
feudal holdings of the various interest groups.
Clientelism increased the institutionalised dependency of the administration on 
information provided by interest groups, aggravating the existing problem of lack of 
corps techniques. However, the technical weakness of the administration was not 
only the consequence of clientelism but was also a condition favouring its 
development (Cassese 1992). It was in the area of public works that this deficiency 
was particularly detrimental. Civil servants would delegate to public work 
contractors the critical stage of contract definitions, requirements and standards. 
Accordingly, over the time, private interests would succeed in establishing their 
‘respectability’, which was a function of their power and leverage on the 
administration (La Palombara 1964).
Another consequence of clientelistic relationships is based on the value-oriented 
consideration that the administration exists, in part, to help or assist particularistic 
interests and its objects of regulation. This is a critical issue because it implies that 
in the clientela relationship something more is at work than merely the need to
49
regulate. La Palombara suggested that the Ministry of Industry in the 1960s defined 
its core institutional mission as serving the demands and needs of Italian 
industrialists rather than society at large. The clientela-induced distorted ethics of 
public administration is obvious also as regards the delivery of public services.
Although clientelism should not be confused with corruption, the conditions 
determining them are remarkably similar: technical weakness of the administration, 
inefficiency of internal control mechanisms, well organised interest groups which 
enjoy access through the committee system (Cammelli 1980), legislative hypertrophy 
and lack of simplification, and the process of regionalisation. A certain degree of 
collusion between politicians, civil servants and private groups had always been 
endemic. However, in the 1970s the phenomenon of corruption was aggravated and 
involved local government even more than central administration.
The regionalisation process in the 1970s enhanced clientelism by opening up 
opportunities to bargain over the allocation of state resources that were transferred 
from the centre to the periphery. Political parties certainly did not miss the 
opportunity. In this decade, political parties were becoming institutionalised and 
started to manage and distribute state resources to their clientele. The administration 
was not able to become the channel of mediation between the centre and the 
periphery and to govern the process of regionalisation. This process gave a de facto 
recognition to the role of political parties as distributors of resources and 
consequently highlighted the relative weakness of central administration. Despite the 
costs at the national and local level,30 the clientelistic centre-periphery relations have
50 S.Tarrow’s analysis emphasises the cost of clientelism. The clientelistic system is veiy expensive to 
operate because it spends and distributes a lot of resources. Besides encouraging inflation, clientelism 
also establishes a number of vested interests with veto power when reform programmes are
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been essential to the administrative system operating successfully. Local politicians 
are obliged to become political entrepreneurs with a variety of contacts at different 
levels and in different bureaucratic organisations.31 Clientelism is a way of 
overcoming, through the politics of distribution, the stalemate at the centre and the 
blockages of the bureaucracy.
The inefficiency of internal control mechanisms represents another propitious 
condition for the development of clientelism in the public administration. Excessive 
legalism and formalism has privileged formal control, that is checking the 
compliance of administrative acts with the legal rules. Thus, legal internal controls 
have concentrated on procedures and neither on outputs nor performance.52 The 
economic cost-benefit analysis was introduced by the Cassese reform only in 1993. 
Besides formalism, internal controls were often organised and carried out by internal 
committees made up by partisan appointment. The inefficiency of internal control 
mechanisms is another case of the incapability of the Italian administration to govern 
itself independently from the influence of political interests. In 1993, an attempt was 
made to solve this problem by strengthening the role of the Court of Accounts, which 
now includes direct control of procedures and careful examination of internal control 
mechanisms.
To conclude, the Italian state has developed without a strongly positioned and 
empowered senior civil service, despite a well developed doctrine of administrative
considered. Clientelism also decreases the legitimacy of institutions among the public. See Tarrow 
(1977).
1 Whereas French local officials know exactly where to go for support for their projects, Italian ones 
have to find their way in the maze of central administration. Moreover, clientelism uses up an 
enormous amount of energy and political credit in order to gain policy benefits that ought to be 
routine. As Tarrow (1977) argues, ‘political entrepreneurship is the correlative at the individual level 
of a clientelistic system of policy allocation flowing through the party system’.
52 Law, legal categories, and most fundamentally, legal controls dominate the culture and training of 
senior civil servants.
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law that has provided a system of shared values and perceptions of the administrative 
role. The administrative elite’s deficit has been supplanted by political parties’ 
control of state key resources to distribute to their clienteles, or of offices that can be 
filled with their political appointees. It is not surprising that the efforts to reform the 
public administration came from within the administration rather than being pursued 
by political elites’ strategies. The ‘available’ state served the interest of political 
elites in mobilising consensus through occupation of the administration. Against this 
backdrop of an administrative system that is permeable and incapable of resisting 
parties’ penetration, few reforms achieved concrete results.
The Case of Health Care Reforms
As Paul Pierson suggests, ‘hemmed in by popular sensitivities, powerful interests, 
and economic realities, governments generally find health care to be a cause of 
political headaches rather than a target for successful retrenchment’ (Pierson 1994). 
In few policy areas has the debate about the reform of public services, influenced by 
the logic of the market and competition, been as contentious as in health care. Health 
policy discussion in Europe reflects the clash between the moral imperative of 
maintaining solidarity and the fiscal one of cost control (Ferrera 1998). In the 1990s 
efficiency has been the leitmotiv of health care reforms around the world (Moran 
1998; Marmor and Hacker 1999). Productivity and efficiency imperatives originate 
from the search for ways of meeting rising health care demands while limiting public 
expenditure.
The Italian national health care system is no exception to the trend towards 
marketisation in health care. Despite different meanings attributed by different 
countries to ‘markets’, ‘competition’ and ‘private sector’ (Ranade 1998), the
52
underpinning logic of the major Italian health care reforms at the beginning of the 
1990s was that market competition would contribute to optimal allocation of 
resources (Mapelli 1999). As we will see, the Amato government enacted an 
ambitious programme of health care reforms, strongly inspired by the 1989 Thatcher 
government’s White Paper, ‘Working for Patients’. There were three major aspects 
of change: first, the introduction of the internal market in a predominantly public 
integrated health care system created in 1978, second, the introduction of general 
management in hospitals and local health care authorities and the abandonment of 
participatory and consensual decision-making;54 third, the devolution of 
administrative, planning and legislative functions regarding health care policy from 
the state to regional governments.
This single case study is used as a pre-theoretical exercise, leading to a generalisation 
to theory rather than to other events. This strategy is what R. Rose calls the 
‘extroverted case-study’.55 The purpose of empirically investigating the case study of 
health care reforms is to explore fully a single case-study, with the existing theories 
in mind, expecting to elaborate and advance an alternative model of change 
associated with the reform of the state. Health care is the policy area, compared with 
other sectors, in which the adoption and implementation of change has gone furthest. 
It would be empirically tautological to analyse cases of immobilisme in order to 
conclude that change has not occurred because change was resisted. Those cases
53 When created in 1978, the national health care system, Servizio Sanitario Nazionale (SSN), was 
intended to be financed entirely from general taxatioa Instead, until the late 1990s the SSN was 
financed by compulsoiy employer, employee and self-employed contributions (around 50%), general 
taxation and borrowing (42%), patient co-payments (4%) and other revenue sources.
54 An important feature of the pre-92 health care system was ‘democratic participation’, whereby local 
health authorities were governed by management committees whose membership was to reflect the 
representation of political parties in the local government council where the local health authority was 
located.
55 With the strategy of the ‘extroverted case-study’ the researcher has identified an important 
exception to the prevailing theory, or a case which demonstrates a phenomenon that previously had 
been excluded from the literature. The single case study, in this context, becomes a pre-theoretical 
exercise, leading to a general statement about the phenomenon. See: Rose (1991).
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would not be critical tests for the proposed theory of dynamic conservatism, which I 
will develop in Chapter VII.
In addition to this case selection on theoretical grounds, health care is also a good 
case for methodological reasons. This case allows us to maximise variance by using 
subnational units from within a single country, that is regional governments in Italy 
(Yin 1994). Although the major policy episodes of health care reform were pursued 
by national and centralised programmes, the analysis also includes the regional 
dimension as implementation was left to regional legislation. Hence, regional 
governments’ legislative implementation of national laws constitutes embedded units 
of analysis. However, the purpose of this research design is not to conduct a 
comparative analysis of the outcomes of change in different Italian regions. This 
would change the nature and objectives of this analysis which remains firmly 
anchored to the question of the modernisation of the State. I am concerned with 
regions as far as regional legislation was needed in order to put into effect the 
national framework programme, and as far as neutralising instruments were 
introduced or removed at the subnational level.
Another reason why health care is a good case relates to the intrinsic nature of this 
sector. Health care is at the core of the welfare state. Involving matters of life and 
death, it is often the site of heated controversy. Because it is also an area of extensive 
economic activity, representing the largest part of regional budgets, a staggering 
array of powerful interests compete over reforms. It has a fairly crowded policy 
arena in which a wide and extremely diversified range of interest groups form policy 
monopolies (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), traditionally linked to the state by 
neocorporatist arrangements (Freddi and Bjorkman 1989). Given the high degree of
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bias in this policy sector, conflict is a continual latent possibility and is likely to be 
easily triggered by policies aimed at increasing residualism or removing entitlements 
(Ferrera 1995).
The introduction of market-type mechanisms to contain health care rising costs and 
regulate demand had also a great impact on the political system as a whole. Three of 
these were the more contested issues in the health care policy debate at the beginning 
of the 1990s: the introduction of high co-payments, the opt-out clause, and the 
creation of the internal market. These were policy tools aimed at containing cost and 
redefining entitlements. Co-payment, where people have to pay, has changed the 
relationship between citizens and the national health care system. It has yielded an 
increasing degree of selectivity, affecting the perception that citizens have of the 
state. This instrument of demand regulation has undermined universalism, based on 
moral solidarity, which has traditionally been an integral part of the Italian political 
culture. For instance, due to popular resentment the Amato government was forced to 
abandon the plan to design different layers of users based on income in favour of 
more politically acceptable age and risk (Ferrera 1995). With the opt-out clause, the 
government envisaged the exclusion of a large sector of the population from the 
national health care system. The decree encourages more autonomy from public 
provision for those56 who have an income above 20,000 Euros. This was achieved 
through the opt-out clause by which citizens could voluntarily opt out from the 
national health care service. However, high-income strata protested against their 
exclusion from the national health care service57. There was no other European state 
that, at the beginning of the 1990s, had adopted this provision and excluded such a 
wide section of the population.
56 In 1992 the population above this level was approximately 15 million.
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The internal market belongs to the ‘marketisation’ category of public management 
reforms because it does not imply selling public sector assets to private providers 
(privatisation), but rather ‘privatising from within’, namely adopting organisational 
arrangements and management systems tested and developed in market conditions 
(Le Grand, Bartlett et al. 1998). The logic behind the internal market is to separate 
strategy, planning and purchasing functions from execution, administration and 
provision. The internal market transforms the public integrated health care system in 
three ways: granting hospitals autonomy from local health authorities’ planning and 
management; introducing contractualism and competitive tendering, which are 
practices outside public law; and mobilising private providers. With respect to the 
first aspect, an important precondition for the successful implementation of the 
internal market was to correct the distorting collusion between local health 
authorities and their public hospitals, which usually received cross subsidies.58 
However, in Italy, health care authorities lacked the capacity to exert leverage 
against providers’ dominance in negotiating service agreements (Zanetta and 
Casalegno 1999). Second, the policy instrument o f ‘contracts’, which is at the core of 
the internal market, is not juridically applicable by public law. For this reason, local 
health authorities became ‘hybrid’ organisations, namely juridically public bodies 
but subject to private law. As a government official explained: ‘we wanted to 
introduce a competitive environment, but not competition. We believed that 
competition would only drain resources away from the public sector. Public 
hospitals were not ready to compete with private providers’.59
57 Deductibles established for high-income strata were annual charges up to 52 Euros for 
pharmaceuticals and specialist care, and up to 44 Euros for primary care services.
This raised complaints from the Italian Competition Authority, which in 1998 urged the government 
to address the issue of unfair competition in health care between private and public providers (Zanetta 
and Casalegno 1999).
59 Nicola Falcitelli, Interview with author, Rome, 23 September 2002.
56
The determination to marketise health care is not only motivated by the priority of 
cost containment,60 which certainly triggered the introduction of pro-competitive 
ideas, but also in part by a deregulatory and neo-liberal ideology. The underpinning 
philosophy is that when dirigiste regulation of the welfare state is particularly heavy, 
consisting in imposing constraints on the behaviour of civil servants to limit their 
discretion and responsibility in order to ensure formal procedures rather than 
effective results, then public services are necessarily of low quality and inefficient 
(Amato 2002). G.Amato uses the following analogy to describe the crisis of the 
state: ‘Once there was the sovereign state. It was ungrateful and inefficient, but he 
was like a prince. Today the prince is without a crown, and even worse he risks 
exile’ (Amato 2002, p.54).
In addition to the introduction of pro-market ideas, another major innovation 
introduced by the 1992 reform was the transfer of health care competencies from the 
central state to regional governments. This included granting regional governments 
policy-making power over the organisation and finances of regional health care 
systems. Health care became the pioneering sector for a steady stream of 
administrative reforms to decentralise the Italian state in the 1990s, aimed at 
reducing the size, resources and scope of the public sector (Meny and Wright 1994). 
The beginning of the 1990s marked the start of continual commitment to greater 
autonomy of local government and health care authorities.61
60 Amato moved decisively in tackling Italy’s impending financial crisis. The national debt had risen 
by 10.5% of GDP just in 1992. Sweeping cuts to public spending and an emergency budget were 
introduced.
61 Executive decree no. 502/1992, discussed in details in chapter II of this thesis.
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The 1992 reform is path breaking with respect to the decentralisation of the state, a 
process which has been consistently sustained throughout the 1990s. M. Keating, 
however, argues that regionalisation in the Italian case is merely a manoeuvre by 
political parties to retain control rather than a real intention to reform the state 
(Keating 1998). Thus, he argues, Italian regions do not have much scope for 
independent action, but must work closely with national departments within tightly- 
defined national sectoral programmes. Keating writes that ‘Italian regions have been 
a disappointment to those who thought they could democratise and transform the 
state* (Keating 1998).
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s regional government was seen in Italy as a 
contribution to the administrative and political modernisation of the state. 
Decentralisation was a strategy to enhance functional efficiency and to diminish the 
administrative and political burden on the centralised state. Conversely, the 
significance of the 1992 health care reform rests in the redefinition of regionalisation 
from merely an administrative and functional process into a political one. Although 
the process of decentralisation has been a piecemeal transfer of functions from the 
central administration to its regional counterpart, inhibiting cross-sectoral 
coordination, the outcome has been the emergence of a new ‘decision space’, not 
only functionally but also territorially defined (Sharpe 1993). The 1992 reform of 
health care breaks with the traditional course of regions being only the outgrowth of 
functional decentralisation with an elected element, the ‘weakest form of 
regionalism’ (Keating 1998).
By analysing the 1992 reform of health care from an administrative reform 
perspective, rather than its welfare policy implications only, it is not merely an
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immediate and budgetary response to conjunctural factors62. Contrary to the widely 
accepted labelling of the reform as a ‘public finance measure* (Reviglio 1999; Olla 
and Pavan 2000), the 1992 reform is a structural change of the state and represents 
one of the greatest challenges to the administrative tradition. It aims at reducing the 
scope and the direct leverage of the State. Nicola Falcitelli, Director General of the 
Ministry of Health from 1992 to 1996, revealed that ‘we wanted to privatise 
everything. Our was not only a measure of financial rigour and austerity, but a 
structural reform of the health care administration and of the state’.63 The structural 
significance of the reform was also publicly admitted by the Prime Minister himself. 
He presented the reform as the ‘privatisation of the health care system’.64
Chapter Outline
Following this introductory chapter of the thesis, Chapters II to V analyse 
empirically the case study of health care reforms in the 1990s in Italy. The time 
boundaries of the narrative span from September 1992, when the Amato government 
introduced an omnibus bill in the Italian Parliament to delegate legislative authority 
to the executive for comprehensive reforms in health care, pension, local finance and 
civil service, to December 1999, when the then-Minister of Health Care, Rosy Bindi,
62 Administrative reform had been one of the priorities of the XI th Legislature (1992-94). The need 
for reform stemmed from:
-financial difficulties: public expenditure had grown faster than taxatioa In 1991, public debt was at 
103 per cent of GDP, the budget deficit was at 9.9 pa- cent, and inflation was at 6.9 per cent 
-ethical crisis: corruption and illegal party funding;
-institutional gap: modest performance of public services and political instability; and 
-European integration and the Maastricht convergence criteria.
63 Nicola Falcitelli, Interview with author, Rome, 23 September 2002.
64 The term ‘privatisation ‘ is used improperly in the Italian debate of the reform of health care with 
reference to:
-the change of the administrative structure and juridical status of local health care authorities, from 
public authorities to public firms;
-the introduction of greater flexibility in public sector employment.
‘Privatisation’ refers also to the limitation of the use of ‘law’ as an instrument to regulate the state- 
society relationship.
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was replaced in a Cabinet reshuffle, thus irreversibly halting the implementation of 
her 1999 health care reform, a policy reversal of the earlier 1992 reform episode.
In Chapter II the parliamentary process of enactment of the 1992 reform is analysed 
to assess how the executive was able to adopt a radical change and push the reform 
through parliamentary blockages. The empirical data focus on the parliamentary 
debate to extrapolate the parliamentary majority’s degree of cohesion and individual 
parties’ positions with respect to the themes of general management and 
regionalisation of the health care administration. The mechanisms used by the 
executive to secure the enactment of the reform are discussed as provisional 
indicators for the latent difficulties and fragile consensus on an overly ambitious 
reform programme. The challenge posed by the creation of the new post of general 
manager to political elites is elicited from the way political elites framed the issue in 
Parliament. A detailed analysis of the legislative work of parliamentary committees 
is carried out, as obstacles are built in the law-making process. Empirical data 
include a considerable high level of legal technicalities and interpretation of 
legislative clauses, and legislative techniques.
The impact of the state-groups system of intermediation on the consolidation of 
policy change enacted in 1992 is then assessed. Chapter HI studies a second 
legislative process, that is the amendment of the 1992 Amato reform, according to 
the rule by which an executive legislative decree can be amended only by a new 
executive legislative decree, to be politically approved by parliamentary committees. 
The major difference between these two distinct but interlocked legislative processes 
is the active role of interest groups in the policy making process and the 
repoliticisation of juridified issues which leads to the re-emergence of political and
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social conflict in 1993. During the process of legislative amendment of the Amato 
decree in 1993, professional groups were able to influence the final outcome of the 
process more effectively than with the original 1992 decree, as far as their 
particularistic requests were concerned. However, in the face of mounting 
opposition, the government responded to vigorous direct action by deepening 
commitment to the two major reform themes of the Amato reform, namely the 
introduction of general management and the regionalisation of health care 
policymaking. The system of interest mediation is a key contributory factor towards 
understanding the way in which the original process of reform, triggered by the 
adoption of radical change, was consolidated rather than halted, against any 
expectation, through the enactment of a second legislative decree.
Following the discussion of changes associated with administrative reforms in the 
1990s at the national level in Chapters I and II, Chapters IV and V go on to consider 
the regional experiments and instruments put in place to block the emergence of 
rising general managers. This second empirical part of the thesis relies heavily on 
data gathered at the regional level because the health care reforms were put into 
effect there. Chapter IV concentrates on the policy instruments and solutions adopted 
by three regions, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy and Tuscany, to reassert the primacy 
of politics over technocracy, while legislatively complying with the reforms of health 
care, between 1993 and 1999. Empirical data and interviews contribute towards 
comparing regional differences in the solutions adopted to create opportunities for 
general managers. Following a discussion of change, the analysis shifts to the 
reappraisal of the centrality of the role of the mayors in health care policy, which was 
legally corroborated at the end of the 1990s. After a brief discussion of the 1999 
general national framework, we compare the differences across selected regions to
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assess the overall degree of departure from the status quo and the real transformation 
of the relationship between political and administrative elites at the subnational level 
of government.
Chapter V considers another type of resistance against change, that of the central 
government and administration against emerging regional elites and their 
increasingly autonomous role in shaping health care policy in light of the territorial 
disturbance. The 1999 health care reform episode is also discussed in the context of 
conserving the traditional public authority tradition of the Italian state in the 
provision of public services. The chapter does not intend to analyse politics about 
the territory but rather politics about health care issues that are fought across 
territories and different institutional levels of government. Empirical data drawn 
from the position of the parliamentary opposition, during the debate over the Bindi 
reform in both chambers of parliament, are particularly revealing of the issues at 
stake in the recentralisation of health care organisation and planning. A detailed 
investigation of the legislation itself also contributes to evaluating the instruments 
used to curb administrative autonomy, such as centralisation of control functions and 
vertical administrative arrangements. The outcome of this process of neutralising 
regional autonomous capacity is assessed as a possible indicator of the final outcome, 
produced at this secondary stage of the process of reform.
Chapter VI draws upon the empirical analysis of policy change in the health care 
sector in Italy from 1992 to 1999 to assess the relationship between the introduction 
of private sector management arrangements and regionalisation. The two themes are 
examined in their interaction and how they reinforce each other. The chapter also 
highlights the most impressive traits of change in health care, given the existing
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blockages, and reflects upon what type of change this represents. This is achieved 
first by reviewing the main empirical innovations and secondly by applying the 
existing theories of policy change to the Italian case to assess their usefulness, and 
their limitations. As regards the theoretical conclusions of the thesis, chapter VII 
proposes an explanation of how change became possible by focusing on the 
mechanisms of the process. A novel approach that advances our understanding of the 
process of policy change under inertial conditions is offered. Dynamic conservatism 
is an explanation for the most recent pattern of institutional reforms in Italy, 
conducive to a departure from the status quo. In this final chapter I consider also the 
external status of the theory, that is the possibility o f using the model of dynamic 
conservatism as a vehicle for further future investigation of other countries.
Policy change in Italy is pursued primarily by the force of law. Were the reforms 
only announced, but not enacted, or were paradigms embraced by policy makers only 
as policy ‘labels’, then change would not create credible threats to the equilibrium. 
In order to analyse dynamic conservatism at work and in operation, case studies of 
concrete legislative adoption offer the best explanation. Paradoxically, to study 
dynamic conservatism in operation one needs to look not at cases of stability but at 
cases of big change. This design will be persistent throughout the thesis. Otherwise, 
Hayward’s claim that a dynamic conservative resistance is difficult to observe 
remains indisputable (Hayward 1976).
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Conclusions
The Italian state remained largely unreformed for a long period of time and rather 
impermeable to administrative changes resulting from the committed effort of few 
enlightened technocrats, whose diagnosis and cure of the Italian malaise has been 
frequently supported by the most complex and resourceful analyses. Three main 
explanations for these blockages tend to dominate the academic literature. First, 
historical accounts of the development pattern of the Italian state have emphasised 
the social and economic integration function of the central administration, which was 
the response to the problem of unemployment in the agrarian South. This implied a 
proprietary and paternalistic conception of the state and the centrality of the question 
of public sector employment for reforms. Another important factor emerging from 
historical studies is the deficit of the elite which characterised the development of the 
Italian administration, lacking an administrative establishment at the top who could 
guide reforms. Secondly, public law scholars have argued that the implications of the 
legacy of administrative law go much beyond procedural legalities and include 
cultural values and civil servants’ perception of their role. Administrative law is the 
predominant culture of Italian civil servants, who define their role and functions 
accordingly, making the acceptance of alternative service-driven paradigms very 
difficult. Thirdly, the system of parentela and clientela, characterising the nature of 
political penetration and control, or better ‘occupation’, of administrative resources 
rendered the Italian state ‘available’ to the distribution of particularistic benefits as a 
way of mobilising political consensus. The use that parties have made of the 
administration has significantly constrained the reform of the Italian state.
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In the last ten years the reform of the Italian state has been pursued along two main 
trajectories: the reform of management arrangements so as to provide greater 
autonomy to senior civil servants, and the decentralisation of administrative, political 
and, most recently, legislative functions from the centre to subnational levels of 
government, most noticeably regions. Both directions point to the common goal of 
running public services with greater efficiency and liberating the bureaucracy from 
the traditionally high level of partisan control. Thus, the wide programmes of 
administrative reforms in the 1990s respond mainly to the redefinition of the doctrine 
and practice of political control of the bureaucracy. However, the historical legacy 
of inertia and failed attempts would not seem to offer promising prospects. Against 
the backdrop of political elites and parties eager to distribute state resources to 
particularistic clienteles, of the senior civil service hardly autonomous to partisan 
interests, and of an administrative culture imbued with rigid formalism, the radical 
change embraced by the Amato government in 1992 would not seem to enjoy a 
brighter future than earlier attempts.
Notwithstanding the legacy of administrative inertia associated with an unreformed 
state, change in the health care sector was pervasive and had a concrete impact. By 
the end of the 1990s, not only had the organisation of health care services changed 
from central to regional control, but the tradition of public authority had been 
severely challenged by alternative ways of conceptualising and legitimating 
administrative activities. Local health authorities and hospitals have become self 
standing public enterprises with managerial freedoms and control of financial and 
human resources, increasingly open to public scrutiny and citizens’ higher demands. 
General managers of these administrative structures have acquired the highest level 
of status and discretion in the administrative system. On the political level, regional
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governments have firmly established centrality and responsibility for health care 
policy, which was only ten years ago the bastion of national and centralised health 
care planning. Regions have gained ample scope for discretion.
The following empirical core of the thesis, Chapters II to V, traces the process of 
how change has become possible under inertial conditions. As a first step, the next 
chapter aims to discuss how the Amato government was able to enact through the 
parliamentary process a radical reform, being debated in parliament since 1989 but 
always failing to see the light because of the political elites’ resistance. The analysis 
of the law-making process and of the issues associated with health care policy 
change reveals the commitment and instruments used by the executive. It also 
highlights the overall resistance by the parties to the introduction of general 
management.
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Chapter II
The 1992 Amato Reform of the Italian National Health Care System
E debbesi considerare come non t  cosa piu difficile a trattare, ne piu dubia a riuscire, ne piu pericolosa 
a maneggiare, che farsi capo a introdurre nuovi oidini. Perch6 lo introduttore ha per nimici tutti quelli 
che dclli ordini vecchi fanno bene, e ha tepidi difensori tutti quelli che delli ordini nuovi farebbono
bene. * (Machiavelli, II Principe)
The challenges posed by the 1992 health care reform were not substantially different 
from those posed by other administrative reforms, being part of a wider political and 
institutional change. But this reform attempted to go much further than other similar 
reforms. After a failed attempt in 1989,1 the Italian Parliament passed a law 
delegating legislative authority to the Amato executive to carry out structural reforms 
of the health care administration. The enactment of this reform is particularly 
impressive, given the small size of the legislative majority enjoyed by the Amato 
Government and the structural impediments put in the way of ambitious reforms by 
the parliamentary process. This chapter examines how the executive was able to 
defeat the parliamentary blockage.
Two major themes run through the 1992 health care reform. The first is the 
introduction of private-sector management practice, which has led to the creation of 
the new post of general manager to head the administration of local health care 
authorities and public hospitals and the ‘privatisation’ of the public sector
* And it should be realised that taking the initiative in introducing a new form of government is very 
difficult and dangerous, and unlikely to succeed. The reason is that all those who profit from the old 
order will be opposed to the innovator, whereas all those who might benefit from the new order are, at 
best, tepid supporters of him. (N. Machiavelli, D Principe, Capitolo VI, translation by Russell Price, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
1 During the Xth legislature (1987-1992), a large number of bills were introduced in Parliament to 
make the health care services more efficient. See: ‘Modifiche alle legge 23 dicembre 1978, no. 833, 
concementi alcune strutture del SSN’, parliamentary act no. C0245, introduced on 2 February 1987; 
‘Conversione di decreto legge no. 382 del 25 Novembre 1989 recante disposizioni alia spesa sanitaria 
e sul ripiano dei disavanzi alia USL\ parliamentary act no. S1979 or C4458.
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employment contract. The second is the decentralisation of administrative 
responsibilities to regional levels of government, which has been conducive to a 
restructuring of relationships between different levels of government, to the 
emergence of regions as a new political locus of power, and to a fundamental 
reshaping of local politics. What might at first appear to be an incoherent and 
fragmentary legislation is much more consistent when the overall purpose of the 
reform -  to reconfigure the division between politics and management in health care 
administration, traditionally characterised by political patronage and clientelism 
(Ferraresi 1980; Ferrera and Zincone 1986)- is considered.
In addition to discussing the substantive issues of the 1992 reform and the major 
policy change it introduced, this chapter explains how it was possible for such a 
reform to become law, in the light of the institutional constraints of the Italian 
parliamentary process (Furlong 1990), and the general opposition from political 
parties. Despite the procedural characteristics of the Italian legislative process, 
which are conducive to institutional ineffectiveness (Manzella 1991), the 
fragmentation of the party system, which leads to coalitions that are not cohesive 
(Pasquino 2002), the historical legacy of policy failure, and the deeply rooted 
rational-legal model of public administration (Weber 1991; Page 1992), the Amato 
Government was able to introduce an ambitious reform, with formal parliamentary 
approval. This reform still forms the core framework of the organisational and 
managerial arrangements for the national Italian healthcare system. Following 
analysis of aspects of the 1992 legislation associated with the introduction of general 
management and regionalisation, and of the challenge posed to the old system of 
health care management, this chapter examines the parliamentary blockage and how 
the executive strategy was able to defeat it through the parliamentary process,
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including the use of procedures such as the question of confidence.2 The arguments 
and positions of political parties in parliament are a primary focus, as they offer an 
indication of the fragile consensus and the resulting difficulties which would follow 
during the implementation process.
The Introduction of General Management
The greatest novelty of the 1992 reform was the shift from a politico-representative 
to a technical-managerial type of health care administration (Rebora 1999). When 
the Italian national health care system was created in 1978, local health authorities 
became a fiefdom of local ‘notables’ who would establish their power base by 
distributing social benefits. This practice was perpetrated through management 
committees composed of locally elected officials and trade union representatives 
(Ferrera 1989; Hine 1993; Maino 2001). Since political parties used these 
management committees as an arena for party competition in local electoral politics, 
they have generally opposed the introduction of general management and the 
creation of a new executive post at the head of local health authorities and public 
hospitals, claiming that the rise of powerful bureaucrats would undermine 
supposedly democratic representation. However, as political parties decreased their 
‘veto power’ (Immergut 1992), the fiscal and political crisis of 1992-1994 created 
propitious conditions for pushing through a ground-breaking reform affecting the 
public management of health care.
2 According to Article 116 of the Lower Chamber’s Regulations, modified last on 24 September 1997, 
the Government may call for a questione di fiducia, literally question of confidence, on the 
parliamentary approval of any amendment or article of a government bill. If the question is called on 
an article of the bill, the final vote is taken after the presentation of all amendments to the article. If 
the question is approved, all amendments are considered defeated. If the bill is made of one single 
article, then the Government may call the question on the entire bill. The vote on the question of 
confidence is a roll-call vote and takes place no earlier than 24 hours after the Government's 
presentation of the question of confidence. The President of the Chamber gives the right of speech to 
only one Member of Parliament per parliamentary group.
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The Political and Administrative Context in 1992
The political context in which the healthcare reform was introduced was marked by a 
severe delegitimisation of the political system, due to widespread corruption scandals 
(Della Porta 1993). The context was an 'ethical and moral crisis of the state' (Della 
Cananea 1996). Voters were discontented with the excessive power of political 
parties and the ineffectiveness of the party system (Pasquino and McCarthy 1992). 
In response, the Amato and Ciampi Governments were determined to close the 
distance between the administration and the citizens. Economically, there was a 
severe financial crisis, with a soaring budget deficit as its most evident aspect.3 At 
the same time, the Government decided to commit Italy to European Monetary 
Union. The need to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria and the resulting 
pressure on public expenditure was one of the key factors that revealed the need for 
budget cuts and geared administrative reform in that direction (Ciampi 1996). 
According to Prime Minister G. Amato, who had been directly sponsoring health 
care policy change, the 1992 reform represented ‘the reform of the reforms’, 
consisting of a departure from politicised management of health care and lack of 
financial discipline.4
3 The public debt amounted to 102.5% of the countiy’s GDP in 1992, in contrast with the 60% 
convergence criteria set out by the EU Maastricht Treaty (Article 109J). The budget deficit was 
10.7% against the Maastricht requirement of 3%. Moreover, the lira came under strain and was 
devalued by 7% in September 1992. For an account of the financial context and the impact of the 
Maastricht financial convergence criteria on Italy see Monti (1992).
4 In its 1991 Annual Report of the State, the Court of Accounts launched an urgent invitation to the 
Government and Parliament to address the very serious mismanagement of local health care 
authorities and their alarming budget deficit. Despite 3 billion Euros increase in the size of the 1990 
national health care fund (32 billion Euros), health care authorities had accumulated a total budget 
deficit of 6 billion Euros. Personnel costs had increased by 16% from 1990, health care procurement 
by 11%, and public resource to finance private providers by 10%. (Parliamentary Act, XI Legislature, 
Doc. Xm, no.2-quinquies).
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The April 1992 general election signalled a noticeable decline of established parties. 
Although the electoral support for the Christian Democrats, the largest party of the 
government coalition in the post-war period, had been slowly eroding since 1983, it 
was not until 1992 that the party achieved the lowest support ever by losing as much 
as 4.6 per cent of the vote.5 The Socialist Party lost 0.7 per cent of the vote. The 
Northern League’s strong showing was at the expense of these two parties.6 This 
newly formed party was the beneficiary of the people's disenchantment with the 
party system. The local elections in September and December 1992 consolidated the 
decline of the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party and the breakthrough of 
the Northern League (Leonardi and Kovacs 1993). Despite the electoral shift, the 
results did not deliver a different government from the old four-party coalition, so- 
called quadripartite?, which consisted of the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the 
Liberals and the Social Democrats. The quadripartito had a bare majority of 15 seats 
in the Lower Chamber and five in the Senate.7 Giuliano Amato was appointed leader 
of the coalition for his economic background and expertise on institutional reforms. 
He was then vice-secretary of the Socialist Party.
The narrowness of Amato’s majority constituted a paramount obstacle to gaining 
parliamentary approval of the 1992 health care reform. It is clear that such a 
coalition government, based on ‘instrumental goals’, such as office seeking (Laver 
and Schofield 1990)8, would encounter legislative paralysis and run a high risk of 
defeat. But the risk posed by the Northern League to the traditional parties made the 
potential political costs of bringing down the Amato Government higher than usual.
5 ‘II tcrremoto elettorale’, II Sole 24 Ore, 8 April 1992.
6 ‘L’effetto Lega sprona i partiti’, Mondo Economico, 25 April 1992.
7 For the 1992 upheaval see: Pasquino and McCarthy (1992); Cotta and Isemia (1996); Fabbrini 
(2000).
8 In the absence of a workable parliamentary majority for any individual party, government in Italy 
has invariably been based on coalitions.
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This is why it became slightly more realistic to expect that such a radical reform 
could be pushed through the parliamentary process.
On 23 December 1992, after the formal approval of the parliamentary committees, in 
the middle of unrest and threats to bring the provision of health care services to a 
complete halt by medical staff,9 the Council of Ministers finally issued the 
‘legislative decree of the discord’.10 The vehement protest11 and unrest of many 
professional associations and trade unions12 did not make for optimism about the 
chances of the reform being implemented smoothly. Nevertheless, the Amato 
Government exhibited remarkable determination and policy leadership throughout 
the legislative process. In particular, the Government showed the greatest degree of 
determination in abolishing the executive boards of public hospitals and local health 
care authorities, despite the vast opposition of the majority of parties involved in the 
policy making process.13
9 ‘In trentamila hanno manifestato ieri a Roma per protestare contro la riforma della SanitA, il giomo 
della piazza’, II Sole 24 Ore, 17 December 1992.
10 G. Amato in // Sole 24 Ore, 22 December 1992.
11 These were the most contested issues in the health care policy debate at the beginning of the 1990s: 
the introduction of high co-payments, the opting out clause, and the creation of the internal market. 
These were policy tools aimed at containing cost and redefining entitlements. Co-payment has 
changed the relationship between citizens and the national health care system It has yielded an 
increasing degree of selectivity affecting the people's perception of the state. This instrument of 
demand regulation has undermined universalism. Yet, due to popular resentment, the weak coalition 
government was also forced to abandon the plan to design different layers of users based on income in 
favour of the more politically acceptable age and risk. See Donatini and Rico (2001). For an 
institutionalist discussion of the transformation of the welfare system in Italy see Ferrera (1998) and 
Ferrera (1995).
12 Chapter HI analyses the societal conflict and influence of interest groups.
13 The executive board is retained in both the Senate and Lower Chamber’s legislative proposals.
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Managerial Autonomy and the Creation o f a New Post: the Direttore Generate
The reform embraces private sector managerialism in order to debureaucratise and 
depoliticise the health care administration. One of the deficiencies of the 1978 law14 
was the creation of a health care system which did not give clearly defined 
responsibilities to individual managers (Borgonovi 1988). The preferred decision­
making process was ad hoc collegial co-ordination. Article 3 of the 1992 decree 
creates the post of direttore generate, literally general manager, of local health care 
authorities and public hospitals. The Minister of Health describes the introduction of 
general management in this way: Public hospitals and local health care authorities 
will become public firms. It will be possible to identify a person responsible for 
outputs. Management committees will disappear, so will all executive boards made 
up of politicians. Finally local health care authorities and public hospitals will have a 
direttore generate who is not involved in politics.'15
The review of management arrangements had been debated since the introduction of 
law no. 111/1991, which first created the new post of amministratore straordinario, 
or special manager. This signalled the initial challenge to collegial management 
practice by introducing single executive posts. In addition to the amministratore 
straordinario, the 1991 law established an executive board invested with policy
14 Difficulties and poor administrative performance emerged immediately after the creation of the 
National Health Care Service in 1978. The 1978 reform was a response to the clientelistic system of 
health care of the 1960s and 1970s, based on 100 health care funds with huge indebtedness. See 
Mapelli (1999). Law no.833 of 1978 offers universal access and democratic participation to all 
citizens. The reform is also the expression of the participatory culture supported by the unions and the 
Communist Party at the time. The law was passed by tiie National Solidarity Coalition which 
included Communists in government for the first time. The creation of the national health care system 
was concurrent with regional reforms. Yet law no.833 was not clear about the division of 
responsibilities between different levels of government, especially between municipal and regional 
ones.
15 F. De Lorenzo in La Stampa, 19 October 1992.
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functions16 and an accounting committee for internal auditing. Departing from past 
practice, the 1992 decree eliminated the executive board and all the residual 
mechanisms for collegial decision-making.17 It was claimed that the Government’s 
proposal to concentrate all management functions in one single post would improve 
the efficiency of decision-making by reducing the democratic representation of local 
interests, and by diminishing the political control of local politicians over managers 
(Borgonovi 1988; Rebora 1999). Municipal councillors, trade unions and medical 
representatives made up the management committees in order to represent the 
demands and interests of the local community. But this wide representation of local 
interests compromised the efficiency of management and decisional mechanisms 
(Zanetta and Casalegno 1999).
In order to give managerial discretion to the direttore generate, two preconditions 
were introduced: the ‘privatisation’ of the director’s employment contract18 and the
introduction of the aziendalizzazione, literally enterprise formula, the transformation 
of local health care authorities into ‘public enterprises’, independent from the 
municipal administration. With regard to the first precondition, the ‘privatisation of 
public sector employment contract1,19 the range of powers granted by a private
16 Executive board responsibilities include: general policy guidelines, approval of the budget and of 
the closed budget, oversight of administrative activities, division of local health care authorities in 
districts (law no. 111 and law no. 412 of 1991).
17 An executive board of five members appointed by the local councils was included in the delegating 
bill proposed by the Government The Senate maintained this provision. But in the final draft of the 
executive decree no.502/1992 presented to the parliamentary committees the executive board is 
abolished and the direttore generate remains the only decision-making authority of the local health 
care authorities.
18 The phrase ‘privatisation of public sector employment contracts’ is used in the context of Italian 
administrative reforms to indicate the change of jurisdiction from public to civil law. This includes 
the possibility of having fixed term contracts, or dismissing staff more easily or measuring results and 
performance.
Article 2 of the delegating law no. 421,23 October 1992, is devoted entirely to the reform of public 
sector employment and civil service. It is stated that the purpose of the reform of public employment 
is to 'increase the efficiency of the administration to European standards, rationalise personnel costs, 
and slowly integrate public and private law*. This reform is not as radical as the health care reform. 
There is no explicit reference to the possibility of using fixed term contracts for other sectors, or
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contract20 is wider than the more limited ones of public employment. For instance, 
administrative decisions by senior civil servants can always be overturned by any 
elected official (Papadia 1993). Although general managers of local health care 
authorities were to be employed with a fixed term contract, under civil law, this new 
type of contractual hybrid raised some issues of incompatibility with public law. For 
instance, some jurists have highlighted the incompatibility of being appointed by an 
administrative act while being responsible for job specifications set out in a private 
contract21
Although the objective of the ‘privatisation’ of the employment contract22 was to 
increase managerial discretion and responsibilities, the appointment procedure 
appeared to weaken the autonomy of the direttore generate, who depended on the 
regional executive for the offer and renewal of his their fixed term contract, by 
means of a relationship of trust.23 Luciano Azzolini, Under-Secretary of Health from 
1992-1993, admits that 'the debate about the appointment procedure of the direttore 
generate turned into a quarrel'.24 The parliamentary debate reveals the concern of 
some MPs about what appears to be a great risk and perhaps an incentive for a new
flexibility in hiring, or performance related pay. Access to all managerial positions remains firmly 
anchored in public competitioa The health care reform seems to go further with regard to the highest 
level of medical managerial positions. Article 15 of the legislative decree regulates the functions and 
access to managerial positions for medical staff. Managerial levels are reduced from three to two, 
dropping the position of ‘assistant doctors'. The highest level of doctors is appointed on the basis of a 
curriculum vitae and an interview by a committee chaired by the director general of the local health 
care authority. Unlike all the senior positions in other sectors, for this highest category of doctors 
access is not through public competition.
20 Private sector contracts are regulated by the Civil Code, Volume V, Title II, Part 1, Sections n  and
m .
21 The incompatibility is between the method of appointment, by an administrative act, and the 
employment contract regulated by private law. Since the appointment occurs through an 
administrative act, the content of the contract cannot be agreed between the two parties, as it would be 
the case in the private sector. The content of any contract for which an appointment is made is 
decided by a ministerial administrative act, upon the proposal of the Minister of Health. See: Papadia 
(1993).
22 A.Tomassini, interview with author, Rome, 25 July 2002.
23 Carlo Lucchina, interview with author, Varese, 12 September 2001.
24 Luciano Azzolini, interview with author, Rome, 19 September 2002.
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type of subordination of the administration. One MP expresses his fear in relation to 
this: How can we guarantee the autonomy of senior civil servants? Not with private 
contracts, I think. The 1980s scandals of corruption prove that we need a 
bureaucracy which is recruited according to its merits and not partisan appointments. 
The bureaucracy must be proud of serving the state and needs to be autonomous, 
loyal only to the laws of the Republic, and an effective counterweight to the power of 
political parties, which will end up controlling directly appointed public managers.'25
The 1992 decree opted for the so-called intuitu personae method of appointment26 
The President of the Region appoints the direttore generate by choosing from a 
national list of candidates drawn by an ad hoc committee of experts and senior civil 
servants at the Ministry of Health.27 The decree does not specify the conditions for 
inclusion on the list. Alternative proposals for the appointment included a regional 
rather than national list of candidates, a ranking system, a public competition system, 
appointment by a committee made of doctors from the competent local health 
authority, and contracting out the recruitment process to private headhunting firms. 
Even the latter option, arguably the most depoliticised, invites the scepticism of 
Antonio Tomassini, current President of the Health Care Committee in the Senate, 
who is convinced that: 'in Lombardy they use head-hunters to recruit directors. I 
think this is a good idea that helps meritocracy. In truth, political control is still 
possible though.'28
The second precondition for bringing general management into effect is the 
establishment of the ‘enterprise formula’, the change in the juridical status of local
25 Mr Bertoli, DC, Constitutional Affairs Committee Meeting, Lower Chamber, 25 September 1992.
26 Article 3 sections 6 and 9 and Article 4 Section 1 of Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
27 Article 3 section 10 of Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
28 Antonio Tomassini, interview with author, Rome, 25 July 2002.
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health care authorities and public hospitals from public bodies to public firms.29 The 
1992 reform granted all local health care authorities and selected public hospitals 
juridical autonomy. They were given organisational, administrative, and accounting 
discretion from municipal administration.30 The enterprise formula aims to shift the 
health care administration from a rigidly legalistic to a managerial one, moving away 
from formal controls, and introducing efficiency criteria. Public firms plan their own 
activities according to local demands, allocate their budget without municipal 
participation, and establish rigid accounting systems.
The significance of the introduction of the enterprise formula does not rest only in its 
juridical implications, but also in its underpinning model, characterised by a view of 
public administration based on the private sector.31 The paternalistic state (Cassese 
2001), from which citizens derive their social rights, such as health care,32 is now 
challenged by the process of ‘customerisation’ (Self 1993). The introduction of a 
new system of public management in health care inevitably led to the redefinition of 
the relationship between citizens and the administration by transforming them into 
‘clients’. This entails a radical change in the administrative culture of civil servants, 
from a self-referential to a public service one (Pipan 1995).
To summarise, the central aspect of management reform of the health care sector is 
the replacement of management committees with a single executive post covered by
29 Article 3 Section 1 of Executive Decree no. 502/1992. The Italian term is azienda con personality 
giuridica, literally ‘firm with juridical personality’. According to public law, a public body can only 
exist as an autonomous firm with respect to its economic and financial autonomy, but not with respect 
to its juridical autonomy. Thus, a public firm is constrained by the principles of legality of acts, 
impartiality and good administration.
30 Article 6 of Law no. 111/1991 anticipated the change established by the Executive Decree no. 
502/1992.
31 See Chapter I for discussion of new public management ideas.
32 Article 32 of Italian Constitution: ‘The Republic safeguards health as a basic right of the individual 
and as an interest of the community, and grants free medical assistance to the indigent’.
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a high status and powerful general manager. The representation of local interests 
was sacrificed in favour of the concentration of executive power into one post. This 
was claimed to speed up decision-making procedures and to ensure greater 
transparency, as only one person was responsible and accountable for performance. 
Thus, the general manager was granted considerable discretion and managerial 
autonomy by the legislation. However, there was some scepticism regarding the 
system of appointment. The political trust relationship established between the 
manager and the regional executive caused some concern about the possibility of 
renewed politicisation (Endrici 2001). The departure from the traditional practice of 
political control depends on the commitment of regional executives and leaders to a 
reformed health care system, which will be discussed later. This is facilitated by the 
new role played by the regions in providing, organising and financing health care 
services.
The Regionalisation of Health Care Policy: from Administrative to Political
Process
The regionalisation of health care -  that is the transfer of administrative 
competencies to regional governments -  is a remarkable programme to reshape the 
state.33 Article 2 of legislative decree no. 502/1992 grants regions authority to plan, 
organise, finance and deliver health care services. Previously, health care was 
entirely the responsibility of the municipal administration and the Ministry of Health. 
Although the involvement of regions in this sector was not a novelty, as it is 
sanctioned by the Constitution and law no. 833/1978, the aim of the 1992 reform is
33 Analysis of the regionalisation of health care reflects the focus of this thesis on the implications for 
the modernisation of the Italian state. The purpose of regional reforms in Italy was to modernise and 
transform the state. Regional governments were a means of removing patronage and clientelism from 
the local administration.
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to activate the formal powers of regional government in health care. This process 
entails tighter regional control over local health authorities.34
The Government’s plan was to transfer administrative and financial responsibilities 
to the regions, at the expense of municipalities and provinces. This strategy was 
pursued in two different ways. First, administratively, by establishing regional 
control over local health care authorities and public hospitals.35 In the executive 
decree local health care authorities become ‘public bodies of regions’, that must re­
draw their territorial boundaries according to the area of provinces.36 Secondly, 
politically, by investing the directly elected President of the Region with the power 
to appoint all general managers of local health care authorities.37
Interviews38 have suggested that managers are indeed ‘political’ appointees.39 One 
interviewee offered this picture: 'the regional government wants to control the 
general managers because in this way they can manipulate the appointment of the 
heads of hospital divisions and increase their political legitimacy. Regionalisation is 
a way to mobilise political consent.'40 Investing regional governments with some of 
the mechanisms of political appointment suggests that regionalisation was something 
more ambitious than merely a functional decentralisation.
34 Article 3 section 5 of the Executive Decree no. 502/1992 establishes that 'regions are responsible for 
the organisation and financing of local health authorities'.
35 Article 2 of Executive Decree no. 502 establishes the regional competencies.
36 Article 3.5 Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
37 Article 3.4 Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
38 Renato Botti, interview with author, Milan, 21 June 2001, 24 July 2003; Gianni Giorgi, interview 
with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
39 ‘Political appointees’ refers to the practice of ‘trust’ and personalised appointments, which goes
beyond partisan criteria. For a discussion of the tendency to ‘personalised’ appointments in the
administration, see Wright and E. C. Page (1999).
40 Rosy Bindi, interview with author, Oxford, 25 October 2002.
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In fulfilling the delegating law, the executive decree creates the conditions for the 
regional government to become a space for political decision making.41 The regional 
assessore becomes the political leader of a complex network of regional, provincial 
and municipal health care authorities. The regional assessore of health care is the 
regional minister, who is a member of the regional council, directly appointed by the 
president of the regional Giunta, which is the executive. It is the regional minister's 
responsibility to propose the regional reorganisation of health care services and 
health care plan to the regional council, as well as to distribute financial resources 
among local authorities, define the accounting and financing procedures, authorise 
purchasing, and negotiate contracts of public procurement.
One of the major logical fallacies of law no. 833/1978 was the definition of local 
health care authorities according to their territorial area rather than their functions: 
they are defined as 'the aggregation of all health care offices, including the municipal 
administrations, over a particular territory'42 The division of responsibilities 
between different subnational levels of government is unclear in the 1992 reform and 
is likely to become an obstacle during the implementation of the decree, especially 
considering that communes fear the closer control of regions more than they do the 
central state43 The decree provision on territorial mergers exacerbates 
intergovernmental conflict, as Chapter IV shows. The decree envisages the merger 
of local health care authorities and public hospitals by redrawing their territorial
41 L. J. Sharpe defines the meso as a ‘derision space’ rather than a level of government This 
definition is useful in bridging the traditionally separated functional and territorial definition of the 
region. See Sharpe (1993).
42 Articles 10 and 15 of Law no. 833/1978.
43 S. Cassese suggests that by the end of the 1990s municipalities had started to strengthen their links 
with the central administration to bypass regional control. See Cassese (2001).
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boundaries.44 The reduction was from 659 to 228 local health care authorities, each 
including approximately 400,000 to 600,000 inhabitants.45
In addition to decentralising administrative competencies and granting regions new 
political opportunities, regionalisation was designed to make central planning more 
efficient. Planning was to remain the predominant style of policy-making. The 1992 
decree establishes that the regional government should define the organisation of 
health care services with a regional health care plan.46 However, regional planning 
was the logical extension of national planning (Keating 1998). The national health 
care plan during the 1980s had always been nothing more than a list of broad policy 
objectives. I t  was a book of dreams', as one interviewee describes it.47 In order to 
avoid this shortcoming, the decree established that the national health care plan 
should contain specific policy priorities, a clear definition of the uniform levels of 
care, thematic priorities in biomedical research, and a clear indication of personnel 
training policies.48 Notwithstanding, planning continues to isolate regional 
bureaucrats from the managers of health care authorities because it is a highly 
political function reserved exclusively for administrative and political elites 
(Ricciarelli 1992). Planning reinforces the division between policy and management 
and the isolation of operational concerns from policy making.
44 Article 3 section 5 of Executive Decree no.502/1992 establishes that regions must reduce the 
number of local health care authorities and redraw territorial boundaries so that the area covered by a 
local health care authority coincides with that of a province.
45 Article 3 section 5 and article 4 section 1 of Executive Decree no.502/1992.
46 By the end of 1992 only 12 regions had adopted a regional health care plan. Among the reasons for 
the incredible delay in drafting regional health care plans is the tension between central administration 
and regional governments. The central administration was using a huge number of ‘administrative 
acts of co-ordination and policy’ to regulate health care (atti di indirizzo e coordinamento). For more 
details see Maino (2001).
47 A. Tomassini, interview with author, Rome, 25 July 2002.
48 Article 1 of Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
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The decentralisation of administrative competencies was accompanied by new 
financial responsibilities for the regions, and this part of the reform raised the 
greatest controversy among regions.49 The executive decree indicated that the 
national health care plan should establish the minimum standard levels of health care 
provided by each region. The central and northern regions were already providing 
services above these levels of care and did not want to see their share of the national 
funds reduced.50 The decree established that the regions had to pay for everything 
that was not financed by the per capita allowance transferred to them.51 The 1992 
decree also placed the burden of financing the budget deficits of local heath care 
authorities and public hospitals entirely on regional governments, where this was 
previously the responsibility of the central state.52 This is a huge financial burden.53 
With this provision, the decree aimed to make regional governments more financially 
responsible for health care expenditure in order to prevent chronic overspending of 
centrally set budgets. In addition to financing local health authorities’ budget 
deficits, regions must pay up to 80 per cent of the total costs of public hospitals with 
their share of the national fund transferred from the centre.54 But the 1992 reform, 
for the first time, gave regions their own resources.55 The reform also established 
that compulsory health contributions should be assigned to the region of residence of 
insurees. This was an important concession of the state to the regions and a first
49 Chapter m  considers in part the institutional response of regional governments and their appeal to 
the Italian Constitutional Court
50 Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 15 December 1992.
51 The decree established that compulsory health care contributions were assigned to the region of 
residence of medical insurees. The region’s entitlement was equal to the gross entitlement (per capita 
allowance) minus revenues from compulsory contributions.
52 The Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the transfer of the entire financial responsibility 
to finance budget deficits to regional governments, suggesting instead a gradual implementation of 
this change. (Constitutional Court’s Decision no. 355 of 1993).
53 The annual aggregate deficit averaged 20% of the expenditure ceilings in 1990. See: ‘Relazione 
sulla spesa sanitaria’, Doc. XXVII, no. 3, Parliamentary Act, Lower Chamber, December 1992.
54 Article 4 Section 7 of the Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
55 Article 13 of the Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
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move towards granting them some fiscal autonomy, albeit limited, in 1992.56 A 
recent decree-law no. 347/2001 has launched the process of ‘fiscal federalism’ in 
health care.57 It gives regions the power to raise taxes and introduce co-payments for 
pharmaceuticals.58
The Amato Government was criticised for what appeared to many politicians to be a 
‘centralising’ reform.59 The recovery of the national health care plan,60 the creation 
of national candidates lists,61 the centrally set minimum standards of care and 
entitlement,62 suggest that central government intended to keep a strong hold on 
planning and co-ordination. One interviewee said: 'as the Amato Government was in 
favour of regionalisation, it was also defining the rules and conditions of how to do 
i t '63 The parliamentary debate of regionalisation is thus characterised by severe 
criticism of the Government’s ‘centralising’ approach.64 The Democrats of the Left 
are particularly critical. The party accuses the Government of ‘disguised’
regionalisation for what, in their opinion, is only a transfer of the burden of budget 
deficits unaccompanied by the necessary financial resources.65 For instance, the 
party points to the legislative prescriptions by which regions can redraw territorial
56 Executive decree no. 56 of 2000 establishes that from 2001 the financing of the health care system 
will no longer be based on the transfer of central grants. Regions are given a pre-established share of 
revenues raised in their jurisdictions from value-added tax, individual income tax and fuel tax.
57 Decree Law no. 347, converted into law and enacted by Parliament on 15 November 2001. See 
‘Sanita, le spese passano alle Regioni’, II Sole 24 Ore, 16 November 2001; ‘Cura dimagrante per la 
mesa sanitaria’, II Sole 24 Ore, 5 November 2001.
5 ‘SanitA, vertice da Tremonti. No dei sindacati ai ticket: e come aumentare le tasse’, La 
Repubblica,\l June 2002.
59 Formal Opinion, Constitutional Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 17 December 1992. The 
majority spokesman, Mori, was also critical of the centralisation (Social Affairs Committee, Lower 
Chamber, 10 December 1992).
60 Article 1 of Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
61 Article 3 of Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
62 Article 11 of Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
63 L. Azzolini, interview with author, Rome, 19 September 2002.
64 See plenary meetings of Lower Chamber on 7, 8, 9 October 1992, when discussion was focused on
the delegating law no. 412 enacted on 23 October 1992. For a comprehensive and complete collection
of parliamentary acts regarding the 1992 reform of health care, see Delega in materia di sanita, 
pubblico impiego, previdenza e finanza territoriale. Lavori preparatori alia Camera dei Deputati1. 
Rome, Camera dei Deputati, 1992.
65 Trupia Abate (PDS), Lower Chamber, plenary meeting, 7 October 1992.
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boundaries of local health care authorities only according to national criteria.66 The 
creation and maintenance of a national, rather than a regional, list of candidates, 
suitable for appointment as managers of local heath care authorities, confirms tight 
central control.67
But zealous parliamentary rhetoric in favour of regionalisation has not been 
substantiated by legislative decisions. Most parties in Parliament declare that they 
support the regionalisation of health care, with the Democrats of the Left being the 
most enthusiastic advocates 68 But the Lower Chamber put a maximum ceiling on 
regional own resources, amending the Senate’s text which was more inclined to grant 
regions fiscal autonomy.69 The regionalisation rhetoric appeared to be motivated 
more by the need to provide an urgent political response to the electoral success of 
the Northern League in 1992, and the strong fear that the League could eventually
•  •  70join a new government.
In addition to the discrepancy between the publicly held support for greater 
regionalisation and the legislative decisions to retain central involvement, political 
support for the new regional level of government is contradicted by the resentment 
felt for the lost powers of municipal and provincial governments.71 The opinion 
expressed by the Constitutional Affairs Committee in the Lower House confirms 
parliamentary criticism of the Government for not pursuing regionalisation as 
established by the delegating law.72 In particular, the Committee calls for greater
66 Battaglia (PDS), Lower Chamber, plenaiy meeting, 7 October 1992.
67 Battaglia (PDS), Lower Chamber, plenary meeting, 7 October 1992.
68 Finocchiaro, PDS, Lower Chamber, plenary meeting 7 October 1992.
69 Saretta (DC), Lower Chamber, plenary meeting, 9 October 1992.
70 Occhetto and D’Alema, PDS, Lower Chamber, plenaiy meeting 9 October 1992.
71 Ciaffi (DC), President of Constitutional Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 29 September 1992.
72 Formal opinion of the Constitutional Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, on the draft legislative 
decree, 17 December 1992.
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respect for articles 117 and 118 of the Italian Constitution and suggests that the 
heavily centralising approach of the decree be reconsidered. But the Committee’s 
opinion condemns disrespect for the delegating law, which defined local health care 
authorities as 'local public firms',73 whereas the executive decree defined them as 
'instrumental public bodies of the regions'.74 The Committee’s argument for 
criticising the ‘centralising’ government approach also contradicts the public rhetoric 
of support for regions when it calls for more participation by elected officials in the 
policy making process of local health care authorities. It is clear that democratic 
representation is best sought at local rather than regional level. Also the Social 
Affairs Committee’s opinion on the draft decree emphasises the need for mayors to 
retain centrality in the policy making.75 Some MPs suggest that regions should have 
a planning role, but not managerial or organisational competencies, which should be 
left to municipal governments76
Had parties in Parliament been genuinely in favour of regionalisation, as they 
publicly claimed,77 they would not have voted against amendments to propose that 
regions be granted full legislative and administrative functions not reserved for the 
state, to create a new institution at regional level for the policy co-ordination of 
health care, and to give regions exclusive responsibility for defining the territorial 
boundaries of local health care authorities or selecting public hospitals to be granted
73 Article 15 of Law no. 833/1978 established that local health care authorities were ‘public bodies of 
the municipalities’ and Article 10 of Law no. 421/1992 (delegating law) establishes that they are 
‘public firms’.
7 Article 3 Section 1 of Executive Decree no. 502/1992.
75 Formal opinion, Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 17 December 1992.
16 Ciaffi (DC), President of Constitutional Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 29 September 1992.
77 For the position of the parties, see the parliamentary debate at the plenary meetings (note 63). 
Plenary debate is less technical than that in committees, giving scope to political rhetoric and overall 
partisan arguments. For example, for the position of the Christian Democrats, see the speeches by 
Iodice, for the PDS see D’Alema, Finocchiaro, Trupia Abate, for the Communists see Sestero 
Giannotti, for the Greens see Bettin and Pecoraro Scanio, for the Northern League see Formentini, for 
the extreme right (MSI), see Gasparri, for the Socialists see Renzulli, for the Republicans see 
Pannella.
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‘enterprise’ status.78 The many contradictions and incoherencies so far disclosed 
make the support of political parties for the regionalisation process unconvincing. 
Parties, in general, lack commitment to reform of the state that would greatly 
challenge the political power base of clientelistic ties between bureaucrats and local 
politicians, by dismantling management committees and marginalising mayors and 
municipalities in favour of a new level of government (Maino 2001).
As is shown by analysis of the main issues associated with the introduction of 
general management, the second most important reform theme, there were problems 
of implementation at the regional level, such as limited financial autonomy. The 
legacy of failure in the emerging regions dating from the 1970s, when they were 
created, did not augur well for the transfer of administrative responsibilities from the 
central to the regional administration. But the organisational opportunities offered 
by giving responsibility for local health care authorities to regions, and taking it 
away from municipalities and mayors, while creating geographically vast authorities 
to serve the territory of the province, provide institutional incentives for increasing 
regional capacity. The regional level of government has been entrusted with 
considerable scope for influence in health care policy making, at the administrative 
level and as an autonomous political entity, as has been highlighted, especially with 
regard to the appointment of general managers directly responsible to the presidents 
of the regions or to the regional ministers of health. Parliamentary criticism of the 
Amato programme of regionalisation of health care as excessively centralising does 
not seem credible, because legislative amendments that would have enhanced
78 Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, meeting on 17 December 1992 for final opinion on the 
draft legislative decree and final voting. The result of voting was: Christian Democracy and Socialists 
(in favour), Northern League (against), and all other parties gave a vote of abstention (Social 
Democrats, Democratic Party of the Left, Communists, Republicans, Extreme Right, Greens, Network 
Party).
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regionalisation were neither approved nor supported by the same parties that labelled 
the reform as ‘centralising’.
The Challenge to Political Parties and their Opposition to the Reform
This section addresses the problem of parliamentary blockage of the executive 
decisions and strategies outlined earlier. This derives from partisan opposition on 
substantive issues and procedural constraints associated with the Italian legislative 
process. An analysis of parties’ positions during parliamentary debate of the 1992 
reform reveals the issues of contention, especially the challenge to local politics. 
After discussion of the parties’ interests in maintaining the status quo, procedural 
constraints related to the legislative process of the Italian parliament are briefly 
examined. In 1992 the legislative majority was the governing one in the sense that 
the executive had difficulties in managing party discipline in Parliament.79 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the executive could not easily secure 
parliamentary support. The Amato Government was able to secure parliamentary 
support by the use of the question of confidence, an instrument which alters the 
relationship between the executive and legislature and that merits special attention.
Parties * Positions in Parliament
With regards to specific parties’ positions, the parliamentary debate suggests that the 
Christian Democracy, the largest party in the majority, was against the abolition of 
management committees and complained about the marginal role played by the
79 For a discussion of the difference between the governing and legislative majority and the changing 
relationship between majority and opposition in the Italian parliament see Lippolis (2001).
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mayor and municipal administration under the new system.80 Its resistance resulted 
in the provision of an ‘executive board’ in the delegating law,81 which the 
Government later abolished when issuing the final executive decree. One Christian 
Democrat MP argued: 'we need to avoid the director of the local health care unit or 
public hospital becoming a powerful regional bureaucrat. We cannot think of a 
national health care system without politics. We must all agree that the director does 
not enjoy any democratic accountability. For this reason, only the mayor must be 
responsible for health care policy.'82
The party was not solidly positioned against the enterprise formula, however. The 
introduction of this formula, namely the transformation of local health authorities 
into ‘public enterprises’, was a divisive political issue within the Christian 
Democracy (DC). The majority spokesman represented the faction of the party that 
seemed more inclined to support the Government’s plan to drive reforms of public 
services by the efficiency rationale.83 Another MP supported this view by saying: 
•Privatising public services is a response to the need to regain efficiency. This is the 
underlying criterion of this delegated legislation. If there is one thing Italians ask of 
the Government, when they are protesting on the street, as is happening now, it is to 
improve the efficiency of public services. This is the rationale of this reform.'84 
However, a large part of the party was extremely sceptical about 'plagiarism of 
Anglo American models, which have already shown their limits'.85 Another MP was 
critical of the 'myth of privatisation' and declared himself 'satisfied' that the DC was
80 Iodice (DC), Lower Chamber, plenary meeting 7 October 1992.
81 Article 1.3 of Law no. 421/1992.
82 Saretta, DC, Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 15 December 1992.
83 Mr Iodice, DC, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 7 October 1992.
84 D’Qnofrio, DC, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 7 October 1992.
85 Casilli, DC, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 7 October 1992.
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able in the Senate to 'oppose the simplification of the logic of the market, which 
creates a false illusion'.86
Divisions within the DC about support of the 1992 reform did not help coalition 
cohesion.87 But fragmentation of the parliamentary majority was an even more 
serious problem. The Socialist Party, which had the premiership, was a zealous and 
unambiguous advocate of the bill. The divergence between the two parties was 
exemplified in the vehement exchange of opinions between the President of the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee and one Socialist MP, who made the most 
convincing appeal for the introduction of the enterprise formula. To the Socialist 
argument that 'health care is the most important business of the State. As any other 
private business, it must be competitive and need frequent modernisation 
programmes',88 the President of the Constitutional Affairs Committee in the Lower 
Chamber responded by emphasising the public authority tradition of the state. His 
speech was imbued with an etatiste spirit: 'the public function is an authoritative 
function and it should remain this way'.89
On the other side, there was a great difference between the ‘constructive’ opposition 
of the Democrats of the Left, the largest Opposition party, and that of Communist 
Refoundation.90 The analysis of committees’ work manifests a remarkable degree of 
collaboration between the majority and the Democrats of the Left,91 which is also
86 Saretta, DC, Lower Chamber, plenaiy session, 9 October 1992.
87 L. Azzolini, interview with author, Rome, 19 September 2002.
88 Landi, Constitutional Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 24 September 1992.
89 Ciaffi, DC, Constitutional Affaire Committee, Lower Chamber, 29 September 1992.
90 The Communists contested the constitutionality of executive delegated authority. See Brunetti, MP, 
Lower Chamber, 7 October 1992.
91 As already noted, the Democrats of the Left abstained and did not vote against the formal opinion 
formulated by the Social Affairs Committee. See the speech of Battaglia (PDS), which suggests that 
there was collaboration between the majority and Opposition during the meeting of the Social Affairs 
Committee, Lower Chamber, plenaiy session, 7 October 1992.
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confirmed by one interviewee: 'we got along really well with the Democrats of the 
Left. Their opposition was mild.'92 One MP argues that 'the Left supports the 
Government instead of policy change'.93 Another openly refers to 'an opening to the 
Christian Democrats because Italy is a Christian state and we need to find 
agreements with those parties that support the solidaristic values'.94 The fact that the 
opposition to the enterprise formula was not as fierce as expected can be explained in 
four ways. First, the ideological distance between the Government majority and the 
Left was somewhat reduced after the break of the Democrats of the Left (PDS) from 
the Communist Party in 1991 (Sassoon 2003). Secondly, given the weakness of the 
Amato Government, they might have been ambitious to enter the next government, 
as the extreme right party (MSI) argued.93 Thirdly, the PDS enjoyed a powerful base 
of political support in many regions, mostly in Tuscany and Emilia Romagna. 
Introducing the enterprise formula, which was associated with neo-liberal ideology, 
was a costly political decision for the PDS. If it was decided by the centre it could 
only be blamed upon the central government. Fourthly, collaboration between the 
legislative majority and opposition had been a crucial element of the Italian policy 
making process (Furlong, 1990).
The clearest and most unequivocal opposition to the enterprise formula came from 
the Communist Refoundation party (RC). Its opposition to the introduction of the 
efficiency paradigm focused around three claims. First, the bill violates Article 32 of 
the Constitution: 'the Republic safeguards health as a basic right of the individual and 
as an interest of the community, and grants free medical assistance to the indigent'. 
RC argued that by introducing private insurance and the possibility of opting out
92 N. Falcitelli, interview with author, Rome 23 September 2002.
93 Mr Ravaglia, PRI, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 8 October 1992.
94 Feni, PSDI, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 7 October 1992.
95 Plenary session of the Lower Chamber on 7 October 1992.
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from the national health care system the Government was transforming a social right 
into an income-based one.96 Secondly, the party accused the neo-liberal ideology of 
the Government. One MP clearly pointed to the 'Thatcher ideology that is driving 
the Government'.97 Thirdly, the Communists were convinced that the introduction of 
general management would never solve the problem of extensive politicisation of 
managers in the Italian public administration. One MP mentioned the example of 
Sicily where the discussion between parties for the allocation of their candidates as 
managers of local health care authorities had been so inconclusive that eventually 
they decided to hold a draw.98
Some parties did support the reform. The Republican Party and the Northern League 
claimed that the bill was too timid in introducing market-type mechanisms and were 
thus in favour of ‘privatisation’. However, a Republican MP said: ' the 
Government’s announcements that they want to depoliticise health care are pure 
rhetoric'.99 The Northern League was in a similar position with respect to the reform 
of public employment. Although it supported the introduction of general 
management, it also expressed scepticism about the possibility of depoliticising the 
health care system. In the vivid language typical of this party, one MP suggested: 
'the aim of the 1978 creation of the health care system was to create at local level a 
political fiefdom in the periphery. Local health care authorities are centres of 
clientelistic recruitment. The logic of the 1978 reform was to contract out health care 
to political parties.'100 This scenario was also confirmed by an interviewee, who
96 The Communist party was preoccupied that the 1992 reform would alter the universal provision of 
health care services by creating a two tier system with different access according to the financial 
position of patients. See the speech of Crucianelli, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 8 October 1992. 
For a discussion of changes affecting universalism see: Saraceno and Negri (1994).
97 Sestero Giannotti, RC, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 7 October 1992.
98 Lento, RC, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 7 October 1992.
99 Poggiolini, PRI, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 7 October 1992.
100 Petrini, Northern League, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 7 October 1992.
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stated that: 'public managers of local health care authorities are continuously stressed 
by politicians. This is the reality.'101 The Greens were also in favour of the enterprise 
formula, but did not expect that politicisation would be eliminated.102
There are various reasons for the lack of commitment to the 1992 reform by the 
majority of political parties. The failure to modernise the public administration of 
many reforms in the past produced the expectation that the 1992 health care reform 
would to share a similar outcome.103 Politicians were convinced that the political 
subordination of civil servants was so entrenched in the administrative system that 
any change would be difficult.104 Some influential MPs also genuinely defended the 
public tradition of the state, viewing the private and public sectors as incompatible 
and the introduction of private-sector management practices as challenging civil 
servants’ impartiality.105 The Council of State’s opinion supports this point because 
it sets the limits for the privatisation of public employment and establishes 'an 
ontological and insurmountable difference between private and public 
employment'.106
However, the thrust of criticism of the 1992 reform is the marginalisation of local 
government, which the parties consider a potential constraint on their ability to 
‘occupy* local health care authorities (Ferrera and Zincone 1986). These are key 
political arenas for a party's local power base. As one interviewee explains: 'the
101 A.Tomassini, interview with author, Rome, 25 July 2002.
102 Bettin, Greens, Lower Chamber, plenaiy session, 7 October 1992.
103 Giuntella, MP, La Rete, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 9 October 1992, argues that the Amato 
Government’s plans to depoliticise health care administration are not credible because the local health 
authorities’ predators are in government now'. See also the speech of Petrini (Northern League), 
Lower Chamber, plenary meeting, 8 October 1992.
104 Asquini, Northern League, Lower Chamber, plenary meeting, 8 October 1992.
105 Ciaffi, MP (DC), Speech to the Constitutional Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 17 December
1992.
106 Council of State Decision no. 10,31 August 1992.
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administration of local health care authorities has been constantly composed and
1 f!7 • *recomposed according to party competition and parties’ influence'. Political 
parties in Parliament were not against the creation of the new post of direttore 
generate as such, but rather its implications, such as the marginalisation of local 
elected officials from the policy making process.
The Amato Government's proposal to abolish management committees raised serious 
concerns for a technocratic management of health care undermining democratic 
mechanisms of political control and representation. The Minister of Health, a 
member of the Liberal Party, explains the reform’s aim in this way: 'our objective is 
to "purge" the entire health care sector from the germs of partitocrazia and 
lottizzazione, and to liberate the system from bureaucratic ties and paternalistic 
protection'.108 Accordingly, the bill introduced in Parliament in September 1992 
established the incompatibility rule for public managers of local health care 
authorities with political offices.109 Despite the Lower Chamber’s amendments to 
keep the management committees in place, the final executive decree issued 
disregarded them, demonstrating the Government’s determination to introduce 
general management in the health care sector.
Parliamentary Process and the Question o f Confidence
Opposition from political parties was not the only type of parliamentary blockage. 
The institutional ineffectiveness of the Italian Parliament forced the executive to
107 N. Falcitelli, interview with author, Rome, 23 September 2002 and B. Leone, interview with 
author, Rome, 24 September 2002 and ATomassini, interview with author, Rome 25 July 2002.
108 Minister De Lorenzo, interview in II Sole 24 Ore, 13 August 1992.
109 Bill no. 1568, Art. 3, Section 9 establishes that general managers cannot be elected to local, 
regional or national offices, unless they resign 180 days before the election.
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exercise fully its prerogatives. The following analysis of the procedural instruments 
used by the executive to overcome this institutional blockage is particularly helpful 
when assessing the feeble consensus generated by the reform of health care. The 
procedural mechanism to overcome the parliamentary blockage was the question of 
confidence, which will be covered in detail. Before investigating the implications of 
its use, the legislative process associated with executive legislative authority is 
briefly discussed.
Article 70 of the Italian Constitution attributes legislative authority mainly to the 
Parliament. The conception of the legislative function embodied in the Constitution 
reflects the value attributed to the ‘law’ to maintain democratic safeguards, or 
garantismo, rather than regulation. Parliament must ensure the legislative co­
ordination of all the bodies with the constitutional power to initiate legislation, such 
as the Government, regions, trade unions, and the people. It was only with the 
expansion of state involvement in the economic sphere that the function of the ‘law’ 
changed, from general and abstract to detailed and technical (Manzella 1985). The 
unresolved tension between these two conceptions of the legislative function, the 
legal principle that the law is the safeguard of the legislative autonomy of all players, 
and the political principle that the law regulates policy sectors, does still affect 
executive-legislature relationship (Di Ciolo and Ciaurro 2003). The use of delegated 
legislation increased substantially during the 1980s (Morisi 1988), and the use of 
delegated legislation to push through redistributive and controversial reforms reached 
a particularly high level during the years 1992-1994.110
110 The total number of legislative decrees increased throughout the 1990s. In the Xth Legislature 
(1987-1992) the total number of legislative decrees issued by the executive was 129, and in the Xmth 
(1996-2001) it raised up to 425 (of which 242 derive from enabling laws not connected with the 
implementation of European directives). This quantitative increase is combined with their increased 
centrality as mechanisms for implementing far reaching and complex reforms. The reforms of the
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The executive primarily submits two types of legislation to Parliament. The first 
type is represented by government bills initiated by a single ministry, without the 
interference of the Cabinet. The second type is represented by delegated legislation. 
Under exceptional circumstances, the Constitution allows emergency legislation111 to 
take the form of government decree-laws; their force of law ceases if Parliament does 
not approve them within 60 days. Thus the Constitution grants the executive scope 
for legislative initiative. In the case of the 1992 health care reform, a bill was 
presented by the Prime Minister's office to Parliament requesting the authority to 
legislate on four areas with direct public finance implications: health care, pensions, 
civil service, and local finance. The result of the parliamentary debate was a law, the 
legge di delega, delegating to government the authority to issue legislative decrees, 
decreti legislativi, on each area. The legge di delega is a framework type of 
legislation, which does not prescribe detailed recommendations about the 
implementation process. The Amato Government had 60 days to present an
executive draft of the legislative decrees to the competent parliamentary committees 
for a compulsory, non-binding, and formal opinion. After the amending process of 
the draft decree and the formal approval of the competent committees, the 
Government issued the legislative decree in December 1992, after only 15 days of 
committee debate. Once issued, any legislative decree can be amended within a
welfare state, of public employment, of administrative decentralisation have mainly being pursued by 
delegated legislation instead of ordinary legislation and government bills. See Capano and Giuliani 
(2001).
111 Articles 76 and 77 of the Italian Constitution sanction the use of delegated legislation as follows: 
Article 76: the exercise of the legislative function may be delegated to the Government only after 
having established principles and criteria, for a limited period of time and for specified objects.
Article 77: the Government may not, unless delegated by the House, issue decrees having the value of 
ordinary law. When, in exceptional cases of necessity and urgency, the Government issues on its own 
responsibility emergency decrees having the force of law, on the same day it shall submit them to the 
Houses for conversion into laws.
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period of one year, but only by a new legislative decree which goes through the same 
process of parliamentary approval.
Despite the use of delegated legislation, Italian executives' capacity to steer the 
parliamentary process has always been poor (Manzella 1991; Chimenti 1992). In 
addition to the constraints attributed to the party system, the Italian Parliament has 
traditionally been considered an ineffective institution (Di Palma 1976; Di Palma 
1977) as regards the enactment of ambitious and wide ranging reforms. This 
decisional ineffectiveness owes much to the inability to reach agreement on content, 
and also on decisional rules. However, according to Polsby’s distinction between 
transformative and arena parliament (Polsby 1971), as far as the amending powers o f 
draft executive legislation are concerned, the Italian Parliament is a transformative 
Parliament, with a strongly institutionalised committee system and a high level of 
decentralisation (Di Palma 1977).
Committees of the Italian Parliament are decisional autonomous spaces in the sense
that they have extensive power as regards enacting legislation without referring it to
the assembly (Furlong 1990). The most interesting aspect of standing committees is
their authority to pass laws without approval by the floor. According to Article 72 of
the Constitution, Parliament may, with few exceptions,112 give such authority to
committees. According to the standing rules, the president of each house, upon
assigning a bill to a committee competent by reason of subject matter, decides at his
complete discretion whether the committee shall be empowered to enact it with the
force of law or shall report to the floor for final approval. Committees examine a bill
in three types of sessions: in sede delibercmte (decentralised procedure), consultiva
112 Exceptions concern die budget, ratification of international treaties, laws on constitutional and 
electoral matters, and the delegation of law-making power to the Government
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and referente. According to the first, a standing committee has the power to legislate 
without reporting back to the floor. In sede consultiva, a bill is referred to a standing 
committee which has limited power to formulate a non-binding opinion. In sede 
referente, the most common procedure, a committee analyses a bill in great detail, 
amending it and then referring it back to the assembly for a final vote. Another 
characteristic of the Italian parliament is that, under any of these procedures, the 
legislation reported to the floor may bear little resemblance to the original bill 
because of the extensive powers of amendment of Italian parliamentary committees 
(Chimenti 1979; Cotta 1994; Della Sala 1998).
The 1992 government bill was assigned to the V Committee, the Budget Committee, 
under ordinary procedure {sede referente) for amendments, and to the I and XII 
Committees, respectively Constitutional Affairs and Social Affairs, for a non-binding 
opinion only {sede consultiva). According to the subject matter, the 1992 bill should 
have been referred to the competent committees for amendment, the Social Affairs 
Committee in the Lower Chamber and Health Care Committee in the Senate. 
However, the Government secured with the presidents of the houses that the bill be 
assigned to the Budget Committee, which would be more concerned with reducing 
budget deficits and cutting costs. The committees are not only the place where 
legislation is enacted, but they are the place where smaller parties and opposition 
parties have the greatest opportunity to influence government legislation through 
amendments (Rebuffa and Raiteri 1995). Not only was the bill assigned to the 
Budget Committee for amendment, but also the decentralisation procedure was 
avoided. In fact, the decentralised procedure would have weakened the 
Government’s legislative leadership by leaving the Opposition a good margin of 
initiative and influence within committees. This is not surprising, because the
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decentralised procedure is used mostly for micro-sectional legislation, for producing 
leggine, the technical legislation on minor issues most likely to find easy support in 
the committees.
The Government has no power of veto over private bills and amendments, unless it 
raises a question of confidence, which was precisely the instrument the Amato 
Government had to use to force the legislation through Parliament. This implies that 
all amendments are no longer examined. The use of the question of confidence alters 
the executive-legislature relationship, distorting the constitutional balance and 
undermining the centrality of the parliamentary legislative function because the 
debate is blocked by the executive. Among the reasons for the use of this instrument 
the most prominent are the existence of an incohesive parliamentary majority, the 
legislative opposition strategy of obstructionism, and generally ineffective 
parliamentary procedures (Manzella 1991).
In the specific case of the 1992 reform, the Amato Government, supported by the
opinion of the Court of Accounts, calling for urgent austerity measures, decided to
use the instrument of the question of confidence because of the expectation that
parties would not be solidly committed to the unpopular reform of health care and
the fear that the parliamentary debate would carry on for a long time in an ineffective 
1
way. The question of confidence was a procedural mechanism reflecting an 
attempt to overcome the effects of the structure of party competition on 
parliamentary coalition cohesion.
113 Speech of Minister Reviglio, Budget Minister, calling for a question of confidence, Lower 
Chamber, plenaiy session, 9 October 1992. See also speech of Bianco, MP, who argues that the 
question was called for the obstructionism of the Opposition, Lower Chamber, plenaiy session, 9 
October 1992.
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On one hand, the question of confidence made the reform of health care possible. In 
the previous legislature (Xth Legislature), a bill introducing general management in 
health care was discussed but defeated by partisan conflicts and by the early end of 
the legislature.114 On the other hand, the question of confidence built in deep-seated 
resentment for the reform. The decision to call for a question of confidence 
presupposes the difficulty of the executive in gaining a cohesive parliamentary 
majority and the high degree of opposition to the Amato reform, coming mostly from 
the largest party in the majority, the Christian Democrats.
On 18 October 1992, when the heated debate in the Lower Chamber was almost 
coming to a close, the Minister of the Budget, Reviglio, called for the question of 
confidence. It was received with a mixture of surprise, anger, and relief according 
to each party’s internal political divisions and positions.115 The Opposition became 
more vociferous and mounted an attack on the Government’s abuse of executive 
prerogatives and challenge to the centrality of the Italian Parliament. One MP’s 
remarks summarise the opposition: 'The Government fears its own majority. The 
Government accuses Parliament of being the victim of lobbies and parties. It is 
trying to delegitimise Parliament. In truth, the real problem lies within the 
parliamentary majority.'116
The implications of the question are more political than formal. There are four 
plausible reasons why the executive decided to control the parliamentary process in 
this way and did not wait for the final vote, which was due only two days after the 
question had been called. Parliamentary debate had advanced according to the
114 The 1989 reform of health care proposed by Minister De Lorenzo (see note 1) was approved by 
the Senate, but failed to go back to the Lower Chamber for the anticipated end of the legislature.
115 Lower Chamber, plenaiy meeting, 9 October 1992.
116 D’Alema, PDS, 8 October 1992, Lower Chamber, plenaiy session.
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agreed schedule and tight timescale, and there was no apparent need to put on further 
time pressure. First, the executive faced insurmountable obstructionism from the 
Opposition. Secondly, the executive wanted to challenge the centrality and 
legitimacy of Parliament, thus addressing the citizens’ revolt against the party 
system. Thirdly, the executive feared a Cabinet crisis and wanted to avoid it. 
Fourthly, the executive imposed coalition cohesion on undisciplined members of the 
political majority in order to pass the bill.
First, the objection to the constitutional question raised by the Communists117 
suggests that obstructionism was a real concern of the executive. An interviewee 
said: I f  we waited for Parliament to decide on the bill, it would have taken us years 
to pass it, given the great number of amendments.'118 The party of Communist 
Refoundation presented almost 300 amendments to the bill. The party was accused 
of being particularly irresponsible given the public finance emergency.119 On the 
whole, the obstructionism explanation is not entirely convincing for three reasons. 
First, when the question was called, the agenda of parliamentary work was on 
schedule and the Communists had withdrawn most of their amendments already 
during the plenary session in the Lower Chamber.120 Secondly, the ideological 
resistance of the Communist Party was expected and anticipated by the Government 
from the outset, given that the bill under discussion was delegating legislative powers 
to the executive to reform the core of the welfare state, including pensions. Thirdly,
117 The Communist parly raised a question of constitutionality before the plenary debate of the 
delegating law no. 421 of 1992, Lower Chamber, plenary session, 7 October 1992. The party’s claim 
was that the bill no. 1568, by which the executive requested the delegation of authority, violated article 
76 of the Italian Constitution as it achieved an unconstitutional level of details and prescriptions. It 
also supposedly violated article 117 as it encroached upon regional legislative functions.
118 L. Azzolini, interview with author, Rome, 19 September 2002.
119 Bianco, MP, Lower Chamber, plenary meeting, 8 October 1992.
120 Parliamentary Act no. 1568, plenary session, Lower Chamber, 8 October 1992.
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interviews confirm the original executive strategy to 'get the bill out of Parliament as 
soon as possible'.121
The second explanation for the use of the question is suggested by MPs during the 
Parliamentary debate.122 She argues that the question was raised as the result of an 
institutional conflict, to enhance the executive’s autonomy from Parliament and to 
challenge the latter’s centrality in the Italian political system. This claim could be 
supported by the authoritarian style of the Government’s participation to 
parliamentary work.123 The Minister of Health rarely participated in parliamentary 
work to respond to questions and was not keen on participating in parliamentary 
debate, as one majority MP said.124 But there is not sufficient evidence to suggest 
that the Government intended to undermine parliamentary prerogatives for an 
institutional conflict. Although there are signs of executive determination, these are 
the result of the expectation that this reform was likely to share the unfortunate 
destiny of the one defeated in the previous legislature.
A possible third explanation for the use of the question of confidence is the attempt 
to avoid a Cabinet crisis. Considering the size of the majority in Parliament this was 
a realistic risk. Yet, according to interviews, 'nobody thought the Government was 
going to fall'.125 Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that the Opposition would have 
supported the Government, had it feared that it was going to fall causing the 
Northern League to enter the next coalition. Paradoxically the fact that the 
Opposition voted solidly against the Government suggests that the question of
121N. Falcitelli, interview with author, Rome 23 September 2002.
122 Finocchiaro, PDS, Lower Chamber, plenaiy session, 7 October 1992.
123 On October 9, 1992, when the question of confidence was raised, the Minister of Health was not 
present.
24 L. Azzolini, interview with author, Rome, 19 September 2002.
125 L. Azzolini, interview with author, Rome, 19 September 2002.
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confidence was not used to avoid a Cabinet crisis. The fall of the Amato 
Government was not realistic in December 1992. The fourth and most convincing 
reason suggests that the question was used to force coalition cohesion on the 
parliamentary majority, otherwise fragmented across party lines and within party 
factions.
To summarise, the parliamentary blockage can be attributed to the combined effect 
of institutional ineffectiveness to enact wide-ranging reforms and political parties’ 
opposition to the challenge to traditional partisan control of the administration. 
Notwithstanding, the Amato Government was committed to using the question of 
confidence to pass the 1992 reform of health care. The legislative decree was issued 
by the executive in a difficult climate of institutional resentment, partisan opposition, 
and civil society direct action, as the next chapter shows. Although the Government 
was able to pursue its programmes, the real significance of enacting policy change 
with such a fragile political consensus remains to be assessed. The question of 
confidence allowed for a short-term opportunity, but in the long term consensus 
would need to be built on different grounds if an ambitious reform is to be sustained.
Conclusions
The parliamentary process of enacting a reform of the national health care system 
alongside a major review of the predominant administrative structures and processes 
seemed an insurmountable task to the Amato Government from the start. The small 
legislative majority supporting the four-party heterogeneous government coalition 
was dominated by the Christian Democracy, who had promoted and created the 
national health care system in 1978 and generally opposed any major retrenchment
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of the welfare state. In addition to diverging political preferences within the 
majority, the structural properties of the Italian Parliament did not facilitate grand 
schemes of reforms, but rather technical minutiae. Although the legislature granted 
ample delegated legislative powers to the executive for the reform of health care, 
civil service, pensions, and local finance, it soon tried to get it back by extensive co­
legislation in relation to implementing legislative decrees. Parliamentary committees 
were very involved in drafting the executive draft of implementation legislation of 
the 1992 health care reform. The amending powers of parliamentary committees put 
the commitment of the Amato Government to radical change at risk. Despite these 
blockages, the executive was able to push its own draft legislative decree through the 
parliamentary process, with little consideration for parliamentary amendments and 
mounting opposition, owing to the use of procedural devises, such as the question of 
confidence. The result was that change was enacted successfully, but could not 
enjoy wider political consensus.
The reform of management arrangements was at the core of the 1992 legislation. 
Collegial decision-making mechanisms were radically substituted by a single general 
manager entrusted with a greater degree of autonomy from political interests and 
pressures of interest representation. Powerful regional technocrats, appointed by the 
regional executives, were to be positioned at the top of all health care administrative 
structures and public hospitals transformed into juridically public enterprises. These 
were put under the administrative supervision of regional governments and thus 
removed from municipal administration, which had traditionally managed local 
health authorities and the delivery of health care services. The merger of 
administrative structures offered considerable opportunity for heightened regional 
administrative scope and eventually capacity, especially in those regions with a
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tradition of relatively high standards of administrative activity. But the process of 
regionalisation of health care policy included the possible emergence of an 
autonomous political space represented by the representative territorial level of the 
region. Regional elites were directly engaged in the policy making process, the 
appointment of general managers being a significant means of political control and 
leverage on the health care administration.
As Macchiavelli claimed, the more radical the reforms, the greater the resistance 
expected. The Amato Government’s commitment to an alternative mode of 
operation for the administration, driven by concrete results and targets rather than 
formal rules and abstract procedures, was met with wide and deep opposition in the 
parliamentary arena. The parliamentary blockage was not only a function of 
institutional constraints, but also specific policy positions. National political elites 
contested both the emergence of powerful technocrats at the head of the 
administration and the emergence of new alternative intermediate arenas of political 
representation and mediation. The 1992 reform was about introducing new 
mechanisms of political control of the senior level of the administration, departing 
from traditional patronage and clientelism, and also about restructuring local politics 
so as to curb traditional patterns of political mobilisation. Such a radical challenge 
was met not only with the scepticism of political parties, but also with the vehement 
protest of civil society outside the parliamentary arena. Professional groups and 
pressure groups exerted a considerable and prominent influence in the aftermath of 
the issuing of the legislative decree. The next chapter examines their influence, 
action, and effects on the policy making process of change.
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Chapter III
Interest Groups9 Blockage to the Amato Reform and its Legislative 
Amendment
The far reaching change introduced by the 1992 reform of the national health care 
system, imposed by the Amato government on a divided and recalcitrant 
parliamentary majority, achieved with limited political consensus and produced 
without comprehensive consultation of the affected medical groups, backfired 
against the new Ciampi government in 1993 because of vehement and disruptive 
protest by professional groups. The implementation of the reform was temporarily 
halted by outright opposition and the groups’ lack of cooperation with the 
government. Immediately after the decree was issued, the majority of medical 
associations met in Rome to launch the proposal for a referendum to abrogate the 
reform entirely.1 The reform of the Italian health care system had rarely generated 
such a vociferous and potent clamour as at the beginning of 1993. The opposition of 
the medical profession took the form mainly of direct action and endemic conflict, 
especially immediately following the Amato decree. On December 17, the Minister 
of Health, De Lorenzo, was confronted by 30,000 general practitioners who blocked 
his car in Piazza Colonna and stopped him walking to Parliament.2 Such protest 
represented the second most important blockage, after the parliamentary one, against 
the reform of the national health care system. Consultants’ opposition threatened to
1 On December 30, 1992, the majority of medical associations, led by FTMMG, Federazione Italiana 
Medici di Medicina Generate, which was made up of 60,000 general practitioners, agreed to take 
every action to abolish the Amato decree. The creation of an abrogative referendum committee was 
launched then. For further details, see: ‘A1 via il referendum contro la riforma sanitaria; I medici di 
famiglia minacciano il blocco’, II Sole 24 Ore, 30 December 1992.
2 The demonstration on 17 December represented the climax of many days of strikes and 
demonstrations. 30,000 doctors convened in die centre of Rome and were screaming slogans such as 
‘buffone’, literally ‘fool’ or ‘dimissioni’, literally ‘resign’ and ‘sei come il mago di Napoli’, literally 
‘you are like the wizard of Naples’, alluding to underhand practices in the Minister’s city of origin. 
See ‘Bloccata l’auto, insulti a De Lorenzo; in piazza 30 mila camici bianchi’, La Stampa, 17 
December 1992.
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throw the reforms off course and posed a real obstacle to the new Ciampi 
government and the new Minister of Health, Maria Pia Garavaglia, appointed in May 
1993, the second woman from the Christian Democratic Party to hold the position in 
the history of the Republic.3
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it analyses the influence of interest 
groups on the policy making process of the 1992-93 reforms. This impact has 
different dimensions: it refers to the effect on substantive issues and legislation, to 
the strategic choice of ‘pressured’ institutional venues and to the effect on the 
government’s strategy and response to civil society’s opposition. Groups’ influence 
on the process was most evident in their ability to trigger a new legislative episode, 
that of the amendment of the Amato reform through a new legislative decree. 
Executive Decree no. 517 was issued by the Ciampi Government in December 1993 
after a lengthy parliamentary discussion and amendment process. The second 
purpose of the chapter is to analyse how the executive handled this blockage and 
eventually succeeded in avoiding the policy reversal of the Amato reform, threatened 
by interest groups’ adversarial mode of action. In fact, the Ciampi government was 
also committed to the underpinning programmes on regionalisation and the 
introduction of general management. Legislative activism and the formalistic 
response to interest groups’ demands is hereafter assessed, though, against the real 
changes introduced by Executive Decree no. 517/93 to the original Amato reform.
The chapter firstly analyses the medical associations and trade unions’ demands to
the Amato government after the decree was issued. The most sensitive issues were
those related to pubic sector employment since the public health care sector was the
3 ‘I ministeri che cambiano -  La responsabile della Sanita punta al ritomo alio Stato sociale’, II Sole 
24 Ore, 5 May 1993.
106
third largest employer after education and local government.4 An investigation of the 
positional strategies of groups and their modes of action contributes to understanding 
how far groups have shaped the parliamentary process of the amendment to the 
Amato reform, undertaken by the new Ciampi government in 1993 in the context of 
financial austerity.5 This is important for the overall thesis because groups’ activism 
has triggered a new legislative process. Pressure groups’ demands are systematically 
compared with the legislative amendments proposed by parliamentary committees at 
the end of 1993 in order to evaluate their influence on the policy process. The last 
part of the chapter considers governmental strategies in handling groups’ demands to 
secure policy continuity and minimal modification of the original reform. These 
include gaining wider political consensus and political legitimacy through 
parliamentary approval, engaging in wider and more open consultation with trade 
unions and all medical associations, and eventually making public concessions to the 
medical profession over employment legislation. This strategy led to a policy 
making process geared towards consultation with groups rather than adversarial 
politics.
Interest Groups’ Demands
This first part of the chapter aims to elicit from the political debate generated during 
the amendment of the Amato reform the key issues of controversy and the demands 
of the professional groups and trade unions, which were at first conveyed by outright 
conflict. The Amato executive decree laid out the sequence of administrative steps 
to be taken to bring the health care reforms into effect. These included the
4 In 1991, the national health care system employed 657,438 public employees, compared with 
education with 1,073,468 employees and local governments with 727,718 civil servants. See: 
‘Relazione sullo Stato della Pubblica Amministrazione, Doc. XIII n.2-quinquies, 10 November 1993.
5 Financial austerity was one of the priorities of the Ciampi Government.
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formulation of the 1994-96 National Health Care Plan, the definition by the regions 
of the geographical boundaries of newly merged LHAs, the selection of hospitals to 
be given public enterprise status, the definition of entitlements by means of the so- 
called ‘minimum levels of care’, the formulation of regional health care plans, and 
the identification of quality and efficiency indicators. The implementation of the 
Amato reform was suspended by the launch of a new legislative process aimed at 
amending Executive Decree no. 502/92, which sought to introduce the enterprise 
formula and regionalisation in the health care sector, and producing a new decree. 
From December 1992, when the executive decree detailing the delegating law no. 
421, which delegated legislative authority to the executive for the reform of health 
care, civil service, local finance and pensions, was enacted by the Amato 
government, until November 1993, when an amended version of the decree was 
issued by the Ciampi government,6 health care reform gained a prominent position7 
in the political agenda of reforms associated with financial austerity and in the public 
debate.8 As regards the centrality of health care on the government reform agenda, one 
interviewee suggested that the drafting and groups’ consultation took place at the Prime 
Minister Office.9
6 The new Executive Decree no. 517 was issued by the Ciampi Government on 24 November 1993.
7 The Minister of Health De Lorenzo declared that ‘the decree has been drafted at four hands’, La 
Stampa, 22 December 1992. Another reason for the predominant place of health care over other 
sectors was the financial non-sustainability of soaring public deficits. One of the priorities of the 
Ciampi Government was financial austerity. The 1992 Court of Accounts estimates clearly indicate 
the alarming financial situation of local health authorities. Real expenditure exceeded the 1991 budget 
by 4.5 billion Euros. The Court blames for the deficit the lack of implementation of national minimum 
standards. It does also lament the fact that cost containment had been achieved through higher co­
payments rather than structural and programmatic change. For instance, the fixed cost of prescriptions 
to be paid by patients had gone up by 50 per cent in 1992, according to law 412/1991. See: ‘Decisione 
e Relazione della Corte dei Conti sul Rendiconto Generate dello Stato’, Corte dei Conti, 1993.
8 An analysis of media coverage from December 1992 to November 1993 of three national 
newspapers, that is II Sole 24 Ore, La Stampa, La Repubblica, has shown that health care reforms 
made the headlines almost every day over a prolonged time.
9 Falcitelli, interview with author, 25 November 2003.
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The protest of the professional groups representing the medical profession 
contributed significantly to raising public interest for the health care reform. As soon 
as the Amato reform was enacted by the government, the medical profession 
mounted fierce opposition. Protest was characterised by street demonstrations,10 by 
general strikes,11 by the disruption of health care services, such as general 
practitioners’ threat of prolonged surgery closure,12 by the refusal to negotiate with 
the government and in particular with the Minister of Health, De Lorenzo, whose 
style was criticised for being authoritarian.13 FNOM, Federazione Nazionale degli 
Ordini dei Medici, the peak association representing all the different categories of 
doctors, took up the fight against the Minister.14
The medical profession was most sensitive to three issues: public employment and 
renewal of contracts;15 the institutional representation at different levels of various 
decision making processes,16 such as in the composition of the selection committees
10 Among the demonstrations, ANAAO, Associazione Nazionale Aiuti e Assistenti Ospedalieri, went 
on strike on the 18, 21 and 22 December 1992. See: ‘La DC: eccesso di delega’, La Stampa, 24 
December 1992.
11 On December 16, 150,000 doctors went on strike against the government. All the medical 
associations supported the strike. See ‘In trentamila hanno manifestato ieri a Roma per protestare 
control la riforma della Sanita, il giomo della piazza’, II Sole 24 Ore, 17 December 1992.
12 FIMMG, Federazione Italiana Medici di Medicina Generate, threatened to close down general 
practice ambulatories for a couple of weeks from mid-January 1993. See: ‘ I medici di famiglia 
minacciano il blocco’, La Repubblica, 30 December 1992.
13 Mr Sizia, Secretary of CIMO, Confederazione Italiana Medici Ospedalieri, attributed the reason for 
such a fierce opposition to the exclusion of the medical profession from any contribution to the 
drafting of the reforms of the national health care system. See ‘In trentamila hanno manifestato ieri a 
Roma per protestare contro la riforma della Sanita, il giorno della piazza’, Q Sole 24 Ore, 17 
December 1992. For additional evidence, see the hearing of CIMO to the Social Affaire Committee, 
Lower Chamber, 3 February 1993.
14 ‘La Federazione nazionale decide su referendum ahrogativo e nuovi scioperi’, II Sole 24 Ore, 
December 29,1992.
15 ‘La Federazione nazionale decide su referendum abrogativo e nuovi scioperi; e oggi summit 
sindacale anti-decreto’, II Sole 24 Ore, 29 December 1992.
16 It is possible to extrapolate the centrality of the issue of the institutional representation of the 
medical profession by the demands made to the parliamentary committees by the majority of medical 
associations. This is discussed in greater detail in the following part of the chapter. For the hearings 
given to the medical associations in Parliament see: ‘Audizioni del 28.1.1993 and del 3.2.1993, del 
4.2.1993 and 17.2.1993,’ Camera dei Deputati. For attention to the issue of representation, see the 
hearing of FNOM, Federazione Nazionale Ordini dei Medici, 3 February 1993.
109
for recruiting heads of hospital divisions and evaluating committees;17 and access to 
the highest level of dirigenza in the medical profession. The request for formalised 
representation was also made in relation to the formulation of the regional health care 
plans and the negotiation of fees for service.18 As for employment policy more 
generally, the entire medical profession opposed the reform,19 and some categories of 
doctors were more hardened than others, such as the general practitioners.20 Also, 
hospital practitioners, ambulatory care specialists, and primary care practitioners, 
organised respectively in Confederazione Nazionale Medici Ospedalieri (CIMO), 
literally National Association of Hospital Practitioners, Sindacato Unico Medici 
Ambulatoriali Italiani (SUMAI), literally United Syndicate of Italian Ambulatory 
Care Practitioners, and Federazione Italiana Medici di Medicina Generale 
(FIMMG), literally National Association of General Practitioners, were dissatisfied 
with the changes with regard to terms and conditions of employment. These 
categories of doctors also feared the non-renewal of their employment contracts 21 
The Amato reform implicitly indicated that some categories of doctors would no 
longer receive public sector salaries and would be forced to become independent 
contractors with the public sector or self-employed 22 Not only public employment
17 Hearing of FNOMCeo, FNOM-Chirurghi ed Odontoiatri, at Social Affairs Committee, Lower 
Chamber, 3 February 1993. This association asked for the participation of representatives of the 
medical profession in the selection committees for recruitment, in the employment negotiations at 
national level, and in determining the organisational plans of hospitals.
18 Hearing of CIMO at Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 3 February 1993.
19 The medical profession in Italy is represented by a diffuse system of independent unions. Doctors 
in Italy must belong to regional semi-public organisations, so-called ordini, organised in a national 
top-level association called Federazione Nazionale degli Ordini Medici, or FNOM. This body has 
two roles: self-regulation of the profession, regulating registration and licensing, and political 
representation and lobbying. Despite the privileged position that FNOM has traditionally secured 
with the Ministry of Health, representation of the medical profession since the 1980s has been 
increasingly fragmented along the divisions of general practitioners vis-a-vis specialists, specialists 
against each other, ambulatory and local care consultants vis-a-vis hospital practitioners, junior vis-a- 
vis senior doctors.
20 Dr Milillo, interview with author, Rome, 31 July 2003.
21 The number of doctors risking their job was approximately 45, 000. Seei’Bloccata l’auto, insulti a 
De Lorenzo; In piazza 30mila camici bianchi’, La Stampa, 17 December 1992
22 This was the case of hospital emergency doctors and local ambulatory care specialists, analysed 
later on in this section of the chapter. Doctors in public hospitals are salaried civil servants.
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and institutional representation, but also access and promotion to the higher levels of 
the dirigenza were issues of controversy, especially for the younger generation of 
doctors who found insurmountable difficulties in achieving a fast and rewarding 
career within public hospitals.23
Given that the different categories of doctors were affected differently by the reform 
and were organised in separate unions, their requests and proposed amendments 
varied. For instance, CIMO, Confederazione Italiana Medici Ospedalieri, which 
represents hospital practitioners in public hospitals, who are salaried civil servants, 
generally contested the Amato government’s refusal to accept the parliamentary 
committee’s amendments.24 More specifically, it criticised the lack of representation 
for the profession on the committees for recruiting and evaluating the heads of 
hospital divisions, so-called primari, belonging to the second and higher level of 
dirigenza.25 CIMO sought to have a second-level doctor as member of the expert 
committee selecting the primari, who was also an official representative of the 
association. It also wanted an official representative of the profession to be included 
on the doctors’ performance evaluation committee.26 CIMO also asked for a greater
23 According to the press coverage, the majority of doctors demonstrating against the government in 
December 1992 were young. See: ‘Bloccata l’auto, insulti a De Lorenzo; In piazza 30mila camici 
bianchi’, La Stampa, 17 Decemebr 1992. This is quite understandable because the position of hospital 
assistant doctors was taken up by young entrants in the medical profession. Moreover, most doctors 
on duty in Italian hospitals are young entrants. These two categories were those threatened by the 
reform. See Article 8, ‘Erogazione delle prestazioni, Legislative Decree no. 502/1992.
24 Lower Chamber Hearing, 3 February, 1993. For the policy position of CIMO, see: ‘Decreto 
legislative 502/92 sulla SanitA in attuazione dell’art. 1 della legge delega 421/92’.
23 Hospital doctors are divided in two levels, each representing an economic and legal category of 
dirigenza. The first level, the lower one, includes assistant doctors, and more generally all junior 
positions. The second level comprises all doctors with managerial responsibilities of specialist 
divisions within hospitals. The doctors in charge of the divisions are called primari and they represent 
the highest level of the hierarchy of the hospital practitioners. At all levels hospital doctors have 
public sector employment contracts.
26 Article 15 of executive decree no.502/1992 establishes the method of recruitment to the higher level 
of hospital doctors. The Expert Committee draws up a list of candidates for the position of ‘primari’. 
It is composed by the Direttore Sanitario of the hospital and by two experts: one is chosen by the 
Region and the other is chosen among the second level doctors by the Consiglio dei Sanitari, the 
elected consultative body of doctors in the hospital. The selection of the primari is based on an
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role in the preparation of regional health care plans and the negotiation of fees for
27service.
The demands of the ambulatory care specialists28 were not much different as far as 
lack of institutional representation of their unions was concerned. SUMAI, 
Sindacato Unico Medicina Ambulatoriale Italiana, represented the specialists 
working in local health care out-patient units, supplementing the specialist services 
and diagnostic treatment offered in public hospitals. This function was maintained 
and its role confirmed by the Amato reform.29 Whereas the 1992 executive decree 
explicitly provided for the renewal of the general practitioners’ contract with the 
public sector, it did not address ambulatory care specialists.30 Consequently, SUMAI 
represented the concern of this entire category for the government’s plan not to 
renew their employment contracts. They would have to become self-employed and 
would be paid on a fee-for-service basis,31 and they would lose the job security and 
privileges associated with public sector employment. SUMAI claimed that the 
exclusion of their category from the decree could be interpreted as the government’s 
plan to privatise ambulatory care in general.32 Considering the crucial supplementary 
function that ambulatory care has always performed for the local hospitals, and the
interview. The employment contract is for five years, renewable after their performance evaluation by 
an Evaluation Committee.
27 Dr Zucchelli, interview with author, Rome, 18 July 2003.
28 In 1993 there were approximately 20,000 ambulatory care specialists.
29 ‘Richieste del SUMAI in merito alia modifica del Decreto Legislativo 502/1992’, Social Affairs 
Committee, Hearing on 3 February 1993.
30 Article 8, Legislative Decree no. 502 /1992.
31 In most other European countries, such as Germany and France, ambulatory care practitioners are 
either independent contractors with the public sector or self-employed. In Italy only general 
practitioners and general paediatricians are independent contractors, namely they earn their income 
from capitation and service payments (Freeman 2000).
32 The policy position of SUMAI can be found in the written proposal ‘Richieste del SUMAI in merito 
alia modifica del Decreto Legislativo 502/1992’, Social Affairs Committee, Hearing on 3 February
1993.
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government’s plan to encourage a cost-efficient dehospitalisation process33, the 
demand for local ambulatory care services was expected to rise. SUMAI was not 
against competition and privatisation of the service per se, but contested the 
exclusion of its doctors from the public sector.34
The ambulatory care specialists were not the only category of doctors ‘neglected’ by 
the 1992 executive decree reforming the national health care system. Emergency 
doctors were also excluded from any clear definition of their contractual 
arrangements with the public sector. The omission of the 30,000 ‘emergency 
medicine’ doctors was particularly problematic for the general practitioners because 
there was the risk that emergency doctors would be included in the same contract as 
general practitioners,35 thus enlarging the supply of doctors in this category. 
FIMMG, Federazione Italiana Medici diMedicina Generate, claimed that the lack of 
distinction between general and emergency medicine meant that the latter would 
soon ‘invade’ the job market of the former, as the general secretary claimed. 36 Not 
only did FIMMG reveal its discontent with the undifferentiated status granted to 
general practitioners and emergency doctors, but it was also vigorously against the 
establishment of health care private funds.37 FIMMG has traditionally been the 
union most committed to defend the publicly integrated and universal national health
33 Law no. 412 of 30 December 1991, anticipating many aspects of the Amato reform, launched a 
major restructuring of the network of public hospitals and encouraged vigorously a dehospitalisation 
process by fostering day hospital service and limiting long stays in hospitals. This was also 
consolidated by the delegating law n.421/1992, Article 1, comma 2, letter n).
34 ‘Richieste del SUMAI in merito alia modifica del Decreto Legislativo 502/1992’, Social Affairs 
Committee, Hearing on 3 February 1993. The exclusion not only reflected a fear of job losses, but 
also the denunciation of an illegitimate governmental strategy, because SUMAI had originally signed 
the existing national collective agreement
35 In 1993 there were approximately 60,000 general practitioners.
36 Mario Boni, General Secretary of FIMMG, explained that ‘it is not true that emergency doctors will 
remain; these doctors will be included in general medicine’, interview in 11 Sole 24 Ore, 27 December
1992.
37 Dr Milillo has explained that FIMMG has been always supportive of the public national integrated 
system and traditionally opposed to the introduction of private insurance, interview with author, 
Rome, 31 July 2003.
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care system from the introduction of private insurance.38 More recently, FIMMG 
demonstrated against the Berlusconi government on 26 April and 4 June 2004 for 
much the same reasons.39
With reference to the assistant doctors in public hospitals, their public sector 
employment was not at risk. The problem was rather the exclusion of this category of 
younger doctors and new entrants from the level of dirigenza^ with its associated 
economic and legal privileges. Promotion to the higher level of the hierarchy of the 
medical profession within hospitals, that is to heads of divisions, has been always 
rigidly determined by the bureaucratic rule of seniority rather than meritocracy.41 
The Minister of Health, Garavaglia, suggested that the Department of Public Services 
was trying to end the seniority principle, which is the automatic promotion due to 
length of service.42 For example, seniority was proposed in the legislative 
amendment of the Senate’s Health Care Committee, which sought to promote all 
doctors with 10 years of service to heads of divisions.43 Yet, in practice, partisan 
appointment to the highest level of the hospital hierarchy has been very common,44 
undermining the career prospects of many young doctors. Mr Poggiolini, Member of 
Parliament and also then Secretary of FNOM, attributed partisan appointment of 
heads of hospital divisions to the composition of selection panels, which were made
38 For the policy position of FIMMG see the paper presented by its General Secretary, Dr Falconi, to 
the annual congress in 1998, available at www.finimg.org.
39 On 26 April 2004, 30,000 doctors took the streets of Rome in the most important episode of direct 
action since 1992. The rate of participation of FIMMG members was 90%. See: press release on 26 
April and 4 June available at www.fimmg.org.
40 Article 18, Legislative Decree no. 502/1992 eliminates the functional level of hospital assistants 
(previously XII), leaving in great uncertainty the jobs of 40,000 assistants.
4 The Amato decree established that, after five years of employment, doctors could be promoted to 
heads of hospital divisions. As one Senator reminded, 'this method is entirely unacceptable, that is the 
possibility to be promoted to head of division without the necessary qualifications, only on the basis 
of seniority’ (Senator Garafia, Partito Repubblicano Italiano, Health Committee, Senate, 20 October 
1993).
42 Minister of Health, Maria Pia Garavaglia, Lower Chamber, 7 July 1993.
43 Health Care Committee, Senate, 21 October 1993.
44 Dr Botti, Interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
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up of members chosen by political parties, frequently not using any ranking system— 
appointment was not based on how candidates performed.45 For this reason, 
ANAAO, participated in the strike on 16 December 1992.46
Besides these most combative independent interest groups, the FNOM, the 
compulsory top-level association of the medical profession, challenged its marginal 
formal role in the various levels of decision-making 47 FNOM demanded the right to 
participation in collective bargaining around employment contracts, the 
establishment of fees for services, and to be consulted in decisions over the 
organisational structure of private hospitals48. Regarding the introduction of general 
management, FNOM was against ‘an authoritarian conception of management’.49 It 
expressed its objections to any financial constraints imposed on doctors, whose 
medical freedom and professional autonomy were unconditional. Accordingly, 
FNOM was also against rewards to doctors who successfully remained within their 
budget limits because it was strongly against any evaluation of doctors’ 
performance’.50 Despite this criticism of the autocratic figure of the general manager 
and his control over medical autonomy, FNOM welcomed the creation of this new 
post in so far as it could depoliticise the health care system. In fact, this association 
was critical of the partisan appointment of the higher level of hospital doctors. 
FNOM, however, was concerned that the method of appointment of the general
45 Poggiolini, Partito Repubblicano Italiano, Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 21 October 
1993.
46 ‘A1 via il referendum contro la riforma sanitaria; I medici di famiglia minacciano il blocco’ in II 
Sole 24 Ore, 30 December 1992.
47 FNOM, ‘Proposte e Suggerimenti Decreto Legislativo di Attuazione della Legge Delega 23 Ottobre 
1992, a  421’, Lower Chamber, Hearing, 3 February 1993.
48II Sole 24 Ore, 27 December 1992.
49 FNOM (1993).
50 FNOM (1993).
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manager could lead to politicisation because there was no ranking system in the 
national list of candidates.51
The introduction of general management and the regionalisation of health care were 
secondary concerns for the medical profession.52 By contrast, trade unions focused 
their opposition not only on the material effect on members, but also on ideological 
issues and defending the national and universalistic health care system and opposing 
measures that might create greater inequality.53 Accordingly, CGIL, Confederazione 
Generate Italiana Lavoratori, objected to the exclusion of large strata of the 
population from the national health care service54 as an incentive to enter the private 
insurance funds market. This would form the basis of a two-tier health care system.55 
Yet, CGIL was internally divided on the issue of establishing supplementary health 
care funds to the public provision of services, which would play the role of brokers. 
The General Secretary of CGIL was in favour of health care funds, whereas CGIL- 
Funzione Pubblica, representing the public administration sector, was strongly 
opposed to this provision. More generally the position of CGIL-Funzione Pubblica 
was of unconditional rejection of the 1992 reform.56
As far as the introduction of general management and the enterprise formula was 
concerned, CGIL opposed neither the introduction of the new post of general
51 FNOM (1993).
52 The analysis of the reports and proposals of medical associations prepared for the parliamentary 
hearings in January and February 1993 does not mention any particular requests regarding the 
introduction of general management or regionalisation.
53 ‘Decalogo della Nuova SanitzF, Congresso Annuale UIL SanitA, February 1993.
54 The original Amato plan was to exclude from the national health care service all citizens with an 
income above 20,000Euros.
55 Nuova Rassegna Sindacale della CGIL, no. 7,1 March 1993.
56II Sole 24 Ore, 29 December 1992.
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manager nor the abolition of the local management committees.57 It supported the 
infusion of greater flexibility and competitiveness, claiming that bridging private and 
public sector employment had always been its own priority. One official emphasised 
the need at the beginning of the 1990s to contain soaring budget deficits and health 
care costs by introducing new management systems and transforming LHAs and 
hospitals into public enterprises.58 However, CGIL remained in favour of the 
introduction of general management as long as this was not an organisational model 
and remained only a cost management system. As Betty Leone, Health Care Policy 
Director, CGIL, claimed: ‘the organisational model reflects one’s professionalism. 
At present instead, the entrepreneurial culture of the administration is changing 
everything.’ 59
The opposition to the introduction of voluntary private insurance and health care 
funds, as designed by Amato and embodied in Article 9 of the executive decree, was 
shared by all the three major trade unions, CGIL, CISL, and UIL.60 CISL claimed 
that the government had violated the principles of the delegating law in three ways: 
by introducing voluntary private insurance; by introducing the opt-out clause for 
those on high incomes; and the introduction of co-payments.61 FISOS-CISL, the 
health care category within CISL, supported without the reservations of CGIL the 
introduction of management by objectives, performance evaluation, quality 
evaluation, and performance related pay. It declared itself in favour of the review of 
employment contracts to infuse flexibility into health care administration.62
57 All three of the top-level associations of trade unions, CGIL, CISL and UIL, were in favour of 
abolishing the local management committees as a means of cleaning up local health authorities from 
distorted behaviour which led to corruption.
58 Betty Leone, interview with author, Rome, 24 September 2002.
59 Betty Leone, interview with author, Rome, 24 September 2002.
60 Betty Leone, interview with author, Rome, 24 September 2002.
61 Co-payments had increased by 500% from 1987 to 1993. See: La Stampa, 22 November 1992.
62 FISOS-CisI, ‘II Riordino della SanitA e la Nuova Disciplina del Rapporto di Lavoro’, January 1993.
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Groups9 Strategy and Influence on the Parliamentary Process
The substantial and legislative changes to the Amato reform, following the work of 
the parliamentary committees, provide the background for systematic comparison 
between the groups’ requests and the extent to which they were accepted and 
included in the parliamentary amendments to the draft executive decree. 
Accordingly, it is possible to assess the degree of influence of the medical 
associations in the policy making process and the outcome of their attempts to block 
the reform. The core of this second part of the chapter deals with issues related to 
doctors’ terms and conditions of employment, as they represented the predominant 
concern of groups: from recruitment procedures and access to promotion to the 
primari level, and from renewal of employment contracts to institutional 
representation of the medical association in selection and evaluation committees. The 
last part of this section aims to shift the discussion from public employment issues to 
further changes introduced by the new Ciampi government with regard to general 
management, the enterprise formula and regionalisation. I investigate how far the 
1993 reform of health care represented an innovation or if it was consistent with the 
Amato reform.
Groups * Strategy: the Referendum
From the issuing of the Amato decree in December 1992, the predominant strategy 
of groups was public protest, such as mass demonstrations and strikes,63 as well as
63 On 16 December 1992, approximately 150,000 doctors went on strike and on the same day 30,000 
doctors demonstrated on the streets of Rome. See: ‘A1 via il referendum contra la riforma sanitaria; I 
medici di famiglia minacciano il blocco’ in II Sole 24 Ore, 30 December 1992.
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more disruptive measures, such as the petition for a referendum to abrogate the 
decree. This was launched by FIMMG and supported by CIMO and SUMAI. The 
parties in opposition, namely the Communist Party, the Social Democrats, the 
Democrats of the Left, the Greens, and the Republican Party, supported the 
referendum and contributed to a nationwide collection of signatures.64 In February 
1992 two referendum proposals were presented to the Corte di Cassazione:65 one 
seeking to repeal the entire executive decree, the other only selected parts of it, 
including Article 3, introducing the enterprise formula and general management, and 
Article 9 on the introduction of private health care insurance.
The referendum to stop the Amato reform and the associated mobilisation of public 
opinion created real pressure on the government during the legislative process o f 
amending the decree in Parliament, as acknowledged by the Minister of Health 
herself, Pia Garavaglia.66 This instrument remained highly destructive, as it would 
scrap the entire decree, permanently. For this reason, the threat of the referendum to 
abolish the reform as whole and thus to bring a halt to the modernisation of the 
health care system was one that the government could not ignore. The purpose of the 
referendum was not only to block the reform but also to gain public support. During 
the campaign, issues were broadened to include protest against administrative 
problems that citizens were experiencing with the introduction of a new system of
64 Approximately 774,000 signatures were collected up to July 1993.
65 The so-called ‘abrogative referendum’ is regulated by article 75 of the Italian Constitution. There 
are three stages in the process. First, a proposal to abrogate either partially or totally an existing law 
must be put forward by 500,000 people or five regional councils. Secondly, the Constitutional Court 
examines whether the proposals can be accepted. If they are, the third stage is putting the proposal to 
popular vote.
66 On 25 May 1993, Pia Garavaglia, newly appointed Minister of Health of the Ciampi Government, 
presented to the Social Affairs Committee in the Lower Chamber of Parliament her proposal to 
change the 1992 executive decree. She defined the existing policy context as ‘a window of 
opportunity’ for changing the Amato reform, given the petition for the referendum and direct action.
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exemption.67 The main thrust of the Amato reform -- new managerialism and 
regionalisation -- was far from being debated in public.
Citizens were more readily mobilised on those issues which affected them and their 
health immediately. The administrative burden of the Amato reform’s early 
implementation was painful for many.68 Trade unions were particularly responsive to 
citizens’ dramatic experiences with health care administration in the aftermath of the 
reform.69 In many cases, the administrative forms to complete for exemption were 
not available. Public employees were not able to handle 14 million requests for 
exemption under the new system.70
Those groups which petitioned for the referendum were excluded from consultation 
with the Amato government. Access was granted only to those which were 
expected to be more cooperative, such as FNOM, the peak association of consultants, 
though not necessarily the most representative one. This reflects a political culture 
which does not expect the public interest to emerge from the competitive and 
pluralist interaction of private interests. The Ministry of Health did not consult the 
medical profession until after the Amato reform was enacted. The authoritarian style
67 In order to be exempted from paying for prescribed drugs, patients had to claim so-called bollini, 
literally stickers, from the local health authority. They could not use more than 16 per year, 
corresponding to 16 prescriptions only. This was a way to control the demand for drugs, but it did not 
take into account different age groups or chronic disease. This system of exemption was based on 
personal income. The elderly were particularly adversely affected by the sticker system. The 
Democrats of the Left asked for the abolishment of this system (‘La tassa sul medico’, La Stampa, 4 
August 1993).
68 The situation was described as a very painful process because patients had to wait days in line to 
claim their stickers. Public employees were insulted and overwhelmed by protest and complaints. It 
was the ‘war of stickers’. See: ‘Usl, dopo i bollini un altro calvario, La Stampa, 17 February 1993.
69 ‘Costa, oggi il vertice decisivo per awiare la sua rivoluzione. Polemica: la guerra dei ticket’, La 
Stampa, 30 March 1993.
70 ‘Le Usl temono il caos: entro il 28 in arrivo 14 milioni di domande’, U Sole 24 Ore, 12 February 
1993.
71 Poggiolini, MP, Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 10 March 1993.
72 FNOM was not representative because it was so internally highly fragmented that its president had 
to resign in June 1993. ANAAO, the biggest association of hospital doctors, did mount an attack on 
then on FNOM. See: ‘Si dimettono i vertici FNOM divisi tra sigle e correnti’, June 15,1993.
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of the government can be explained not only as seizing the opportunity to introduce 
change in the context of weakened parties and political legitimacy, but also as the 
legacy of a public authority tradition of the state, much stronger than expected.
In contrast to the medical associations, an adversarial strategy against the 
government was not pursued as systematically and as intensively by the trade unions. 
On the contrary, Cazzola, Secretary General of CGIL, criticised vehemently the use 
of the referendum to oppose the reform as ‘criminal in its declared objectives’ 73 
because it mobilised public opinion against the reform on the basis of the current 
administrative difficulties in implementing the policy of co-payments and exemption 
rather than the more needed structural changes. Also CISL opposed the head-on 
opposition to the government ‘by the separate unions that are only keen on 
preserving their privileges’.74 This organisation criticized the Democrats of the Left 
for cultivating a populist and demagogic position putting at risk the reform of the 
health care system. It claimed that the consequence of a strategy of adversarial 
conflict was the isolation of interest groups from policy making. CISL proposed to 
use more constructive instruments of interest intermediation, despite the 
acknowledgement that the government was not that flexible during the negotiation.
As far as more constructive instruments were concerned, the trade unions favoured 
the popular bill,76 which was approved by the management of CGIL on 20 April 
1993, then sent to the Corte di Cassazione, and followed by the sign-in. CGIL and
73 La Stampa, 17 February 1992.
74 FISOS-CISL, ‘II Riordino della Sanita e la Nuova Disciplina del Rapporto di Lavoro’, 1993.
75 FISOS-CISL (1993).
76 Article 71 section 2 of the Italian Constitution gives the power to initiate legislation to the people. 
In order for the Parliament to consider a popular bill, 50,000 signatures of voters must be collected, 
and a bill divided in articles must be proposed. The Parliament has the prerogative to accept or refuse 
the discussion and examination of the popular bill.
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the UIL launched separate popular bills, despite the attempt more generally to 
achieve unity of action. CISL complained about the other two unions for playing 
demagogic politics only. CGIL in particular was blamed for breaking the unity with 
the initiative of the popular bill for the reform of health care.77 According to Trentin, 
leader of CGIL, ‘we cannot unite three trade unions in a single association, but we 
need to build one organisation which negotiates for all workers’.
Contrary to any scholarly expectation about the endemic conflict of Italian trade 
unions (Ross, Lange et al. 1982), they pursued a concerted strategy. Most coalition 
governments at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s needed the support 
of trade unions to survive. They could certainly not risk compromising this 
favourable situation by supporting the case of recalcitrant professional groups. To 
become involved in someone else’s battle was politically too costly for CGIL, the 
largest trade union, and the benefits in return very limited, given their low 
representation in the health care sector.79
CGIL, CISL and UIL had a limited membership in the health care sector. 
Nonetheless, all three unions played an active role in the policy-making process of 
health care reform, due to the formal arrangements for consultation with the 
executive.80 They did so in a very constructive way, deploring the professional 
groups’ petition for a referendum, even though the Democrats of the Left and
77 ‘SulTunite sindacale gelata dei tre segretari’, 11 Sole 24 Ore, 30 April 1993.
78 ‘Sull’unite sindacale gelata dei tre segretari’, 11 Sole 24 Ore, 30 April 1993.
79 CGIL Funzione Pubblica has a section for the health care sector, but only 5% of total employees in 
the national health care system are members, compared with 30% who are members of CIMO (Betty 
Leone, interview with author, Rome, 24 September 2002).
80 The trade unions appreciated the greater openness of Minister Costa. See: "Dal 22 Marzo un tavolo 
a quattro con il Govemo’, 11 Sole 24 Ore, 10 March 1993.
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Communists supported it.81 The unions were formally consulted by the Amato 
government82 and thus did not have to resort to direct action as extensively as the 
medical profession. Moreover, the unions all supported the need to infuse the public 
sector with private sector management systems, albeit with different levels o f 
commitment.83 In fact, the original initiative of bridging public and private sector 
employment contracts came from CGIL.
Therefore, there were two simultaneous systems of intermediation corresponding to 
two different groups’ modes of action, in turn determined by the governmental 
strategy, structure of the state and politico-administrative system. The 
intermediation between the government and the trade unions was one of ‘concerted’ 
politics, which characterised the more ‘private’ arena of negotiation. The 
parliamentary focus on public employment issues alone at the expense of others, 
which the executive considered more central, did end up serving the government’s 
interests as well, not only those of the groups. In fact, this ensured that some issues 
were politicised and publicly debated, whereas others were not brought to public 
attention to avoid dissent.84 The two themes of managerialism and regionalisation 
were purposively kept within the frame of concertation,85 which did not extend to
81 This is a remarkable illustration of political autonomy for CGIL, which was linked to the 
Communist party and still represents the leftist union.
82 Falcitelli confirmed that Amato and the unions had a profitable relationship (interview with author, 
Rome, 23 September 2002).
83 CISL was the more inclined towards this move.
84 For instance, the problem of regionalisation was only occasionally addressed by the parliamentary 
debate, although seven regions had appealed against the Constitutional Court in 1993. Similarly, the 
trade unions mobilised public opinion on the administrative problem of handling stickers, but much 
less on the introduction of general management The politically sensitive issues for the people were 
neither regionalisation nor general management For instance, CGIL launched the initiative of a 
popular bill on 21 April 1993, campaigning on the abolition of the stickers system and the 
abolishment of the fee of 40 Euros for GPs. UIL also did not seem to mobilise citizens on 
regionalisation or general management See: ‘Costa, oggi il vertice decisivo per awiare la sua 
rivoluzione’, 30 March 1993, La Stampa. Also see: ‘Depositate in Cassazione due richieste 
abrogative; per la riforma sanitaria e gia aria di referendum, 16 February 1993.
85 Nicola Falcitelli, interview with author, Rome, 23 September 2002. He was responsible for drafting 
the Amato reform. He suggested that trade unions did not oppose the reform and that agreement was
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any professional groups, not even the powerful top-level association of doctors, 
FNOM.86 On the other hand, the ‘public’ arena was occupied primarily by 
professional groups, supported by public opinion and parliamentary committees. 
The relation between the state and these groups was remarkably different from the 
tendency for corporatist arrangement of doctors in many European countries.87
Despite the parliamentary opposition’s attempt to focus attention also on other 
aspects of welfare policy, such as the high level o f co-payments,88 or the 
pharmaceutical policy,89 professional groups were successful at narrowing the scope 
of the parliamentary debate on those employment issues which affected them 
directly. Although the priorities of the government and the groups differed 
significantly, their strategy of appreciating the role of parliamentary committees in 
the drafting of the legislative decree was remarkably similar, serving their different 
interests. The centrality of Parliament in the policy making process was key to the 
effective influence of groups. Although the governmental priority areas were distinct 
from the groups’ ones and one could presume that parliamentary debate would 
primarily address the core of the government’s priorities, the parliamentary 
committees’ legislative work concentrated instead on the changes affecting 
employment conditions of the medical staff.90
reached on the introduction of general management with them. Similarly, Betty Leone, Director of 
the Welfare Department, CGIL, confirmed that the unions accepted the need to make the health care 
administration more efficient (interview with author, Rome, 24 September 2002).
86 For a discussion on concertation, see: Giugni (2003).
87 For a discussion of the challenges that the medical profession is facing to respond to government's 
increasing concern for costs and quality of health care service, see Johnson, Larkin & Saks (1995); 
Freddi and Bjorkman (1989).
88 Giannotti, MP, Social Affairs Committee, 13 October 1993.
89 Tiupia Abate, MP, Social Affairs Committee, 12 October 1993.
90 If one analyses the final amendments of the Social Affairs Committee in the Lower Chamber and 
the Health Care Committee in the Senate, one can extrapolate that the greatest number of amendments 
refers to changes of articles 15 and 18, regarding public employment. For instance, in the Senate, 
article 18, dealing with assistant doctors, had in total 10 proposals for amendments, whereas article 1, 
on the national health care plan, received only three. The full text of amendments can be found in the 
parliamentary acts: 26 October 1993, Senate and 4 November, Lower Chamber.
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Direct action of the medical profession was eventually replaced on 22 February 1993 
by more frequent and open consultation of medical associations with the 
government,91 when, after the resignation of De Lorenzo because of corruption 
scandals, a new Minister of Health, Raffaele Costa, took office.92 Quadripartite 
arrangements93 were established for the negotiation of co-payments and citizens’ 
participation in health care expenditure in general and involved the government, the 
regions, the trade unions and the employer’s association, Confindustria. Also the 
professional groups were relatively more involved in the negotiation,94 though in a 
less institutionalised and formal way. Despite the seemingly greater openness of the 
government,95 the medical profession continued to focus its lobbying activity on the 
Social Affairs Committee in the Lower Chamber,96 who had already expressed 
serious reservations on the Amato executive decree in December 1992.97 According
91 On the same day that the new Minister of Health, Mr Raffaele Costa, took office, an administrative 
act was approved by the Council of Ministers that established for assistant doctors a gradual move to 
the level of dirigenza. This was ‘the gift De Lorenzo left to the medical profession before leaving and 
the greatest headache for the coming Minister’. See: ‘L'accordo con i medici per modificare in modo 
rilevante la riforma;da Costa la prima bozza sulla pax nella Sanita', II Sole 24 Ore, 23 February 1993.
92 On 22 February 1993, Raffaele Costa replaced De Lorenzo as Minister of Health in the Amato 
Government.
93 On 22 April 1993, the minister of Health, Costa, agreed with the medical profession the so-called 
pax sanitaria, literally health care peace. Yet, the fragmentation between groups threatened the 
stability of the pax. The most important aspects of the agreement were: granting dirigenza status to 
assistant doctors by public competition; granting dirigenza status to aiuti doctors, literally aides, after 
three years of seniority, for ambulatory care specialists a move to self-employment; possibility of 
inclusion in public sector employment for emergency doctors. See: II Sole 24 Ore, 23 April 1993.
94 On 20 April 1993 the minister of Health Costa met with the FNOM; on 23 April he met with all 
medical associations. See: ‘Ministro della Sanita e medici cercano 1’ accordo sulla riforma’, 21 April 
1993, II Sole 24 Ore.
95 The trade unions appreciated the greater openness of Minister Costa. See: ‘Dal 22 Marzo un tavolo 
a quattro con il Govemo’, 10 March, 1993, II Sole 24 Ore.
96 The Social Affairs Committee in the Lower Chamber launched extensive consultation with the 
groups for four days. For the medical association hearings in Parliament, see: ‘Audizioni del 
28.1.1993 and del 3.2.1993, del 4.2.1993 and 17.2.1993,* Camera dei Deputati.
97 As we investigated in Chapter n, the parliamentary committees in both Lower Chamber and Senate 
had expressed their opposition to the Amato legislative decree. They had proposed amendments which 
were not accepted by the government.
125
to the MP Bicocchi, the political group of the Christian Democrats ‘declared war on 
the Amato executive decree’.98
Direct action affected public opinion and contributed to raising the issue of health 
care reforms up the Ciampi government agenda. Groups also shaped the earlier 
stages of the implementation of the Amato reform, which was halted by the new 
legislative process of amendment under examination. The opportunity for civil 
society’s more constructive contribution to the policy making process came with the 
new Ciampi government’s decision in May 1993 to amend the Amato executive 
decree and to engage more fully with parliamentary committees, as strongly 
requested by Parliament and by the Christian Democrats. The positional strategies of 
the medical profession changed, between December 1993 and March 1994, from 
initial adversarial politics to negotiation and bargaining during the parliamentary 
process of approval of Legislative Decree no. 517, which took place from September 
to November 1994." Hence, another significant effect of groups on the policy 
making process was evident as parliamentary committees regained their lost 
centrality, after the Amato government had largely ignored their activities.
The 1993 Legislative Process o f Amendment
The most evident impact of the medical groups’ active shaping of the parliamentary 
process was on the substantive drafting of the parliamentary opinion on legislative 
decree no. 517. The process of legislative amendment of an executive decree can be 
at least as cumbersome and intricate as that of the original decree, especially if it is
98 Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 17 March 1993.
99 Wide consultation was reported in the press: see II Sole 24 Ore, 8 October 1993, and 29 October 
1993.
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not the product of consensus and negotiation, as we have illustrated in Chapter H  
What follows is an examination of the substantial changes to the original Amato 
executive decree as they were discussed and drafted in the relevant parliamentary 
committees in both houses of the Italian Parliament before the final enactment of the 
amended executive decree no. 517 in December 1993. The major purpose of this 
section is to understand how far groups’ demands, investigated earlier, have shaped 
the parliamentary process and final legislative output.
The amending powers of parliamentary committees presented groups with an 
opportunity to influence the executive draft of the decree. As far as the medical 
profession’s request for greater institutionalised representation was concerned, the 
government did not accept most parliamentary amendments. The demands for an 
institutional and representational role for the medical profession100 were met by the 
parliamentary ‘rescue’ of all those categories of doctors that had been excluded from
public sector employment by the 1992 Amato reform. For instance, on the issue of 
exclusion of the category of ambulatory care practitioners from the public sector, the 
Lower Chamber’s Social Affairs Committee proposed not only to reintroduce this 
category, but to do it in the first level of dirigenza, according to the detailed
100 For instance, the Health Care Committee in the Senate, on 27 October 1993, proposed that ‘regions 
can identify areas of activities for ambulatory specialists who require a public sector employment 
contract, after having consulted the major interest groups affected’. The government did adopt this 
amendment partially, maintaining the possibility for regional governments to identity new areas of 
health care services as necessary (Article 8, Legislative Decree, no. 517/1992), but the consultation of 
interest groups was not formalised in the final executive decree. Similarly, the Senate proposed an 
amendment to Article 15, regarding the dirigenza in the health care sector, for including an official 
member of FNOM in the Committee recruiting the higher level of doctors, but this was not accepted. 
Another illustration of the governmental rejection of professional organisations’ demands for greater 
institutional representation was the refusal to adopt the Lower Chamber Social Affairs Committee’s 
amendment for the inclusion of FNOM at the negotiating table for bargaining employment contracts. 
The new decree allowed only trade unions to be present at the bargaining table, thus excluding 
professional associations.
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application process.101 The government adopted this parliamentary recommendation 
by adding a new section to Article 8 stating:
LHAs can employ ambulatory care specialists as established by already existing 
contracts[... Jregions can identify areas of health care services which require the adoption of a 
public sector employment contract with ambulatory care specialists; for this purpose, those 
ambulatory specialists who on 31 December 1992 had been working for five years as 
independent contractors may apply to the first level of dirigenza, prior to an evaluation of the 
necessary requirements.
In this respect the new decree adopted the parliamentary committees’ amendments, 
which reflected the professional groups’ proposals, with the exception of those issues 
which involved the representation of interest groups at collective negotiations.
Minister Garavaglia, intended the same solution for emergency doctors, had the 
Council of Ministers not blocked her amendment.102 According to the amendment 
proposed by the Ministry of Health, in accordance with the opinion of the 
parliamentary committees, LHAs could employ emergency doctors for existing 
vacancies.103 The amended decree also reflected the Minister of Health’s positipn 
that ‘it is not admissible that there is no scope for bargaining the inclusion of 
emergency practitioners in the public sector employment’.104 She suggested that 
regions would be able to include these doctors in their health care planning and 
organisation. This was in clear contradiction with the announcement by the Treasury 
that in 1994 cost containment would primarily have to affect personnel costs.105 Her 
position, however, was not entirely convincing, but rather ambivalent. In fact, on a 
different occasion,106 she criticised the Parliament for ‘making every doctor by
101 Article 8, Section 8, Decree no.517/1993.
102 La Stampa, 25 Novembre 1993.
103 Article 8, Section 1-bis, Decree no.517/1993.
104 Speech of the Minister of Health, Maria Pia Garavaglia, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs 
Committee, 25 May 1993.
105 In 1992 personnel cost was 40% of total health care expenditure and amounted to 19.8 billion 
Euros.
106 The Minister of Health, Garavaglia, addressed the Lower Chamber on 7 July 1993. She, then, 
admitted the difficult relationship with the Department of Public Services.
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definition a dirigente\ in contrast with the concurrent reform of the dirigenza 
proposed by the Department of Public Services.107
Article 15 of the executive decree regulated the roles and functions of doctors, as 
well as their access to the higher levels of the medical profession in the public sector. 
In this it followed the delegating law’s provision to identify the different levels of 
dirigenza according to efficiency criteria, namely without increasing staff allocation 
plans and establishing fixed-term contracts, renewable on the basis of performance 
evaluation. The Amato reform, as we have illustrated in Chapter n, identified two 
levels which differed in their functions and methods of access.108 As far as the latter 
was concerned, the first level, the lower one, was recruited by public competition, 
and the second one formally by appointment by the local health authority’s general 
manager on the basis of an opinion formulated by an Expert Committee.
There were two highly significant differences between the original and the amended 
decree. First, the ranking system required to appoint the second level of doctors, the 
higher one, was abolished. Poggiolini, MP and President of FNOM, lamented that 
the appointment of primari would remain highly politicised because the Expert 
Committee’s members were chosen by political parties, without the meritocratic 
ranking system.109 Many MPs realised that political parties in fact controlled the
107 Executive Decree no.29 of 1993 reforming the Italian civil service.
108 Prior to the 1992 reform there were three levels of dirigenza of the medical profession, as 
established by Law no.761 of 1979: the first level included assistant doctors (assistenti); the second 
one was composed of junior doctors (aiuto); and the third and higher one was made of heads of 
hospital divisions (primari). The reduction from three to two levels, established by the 1992 
executive decree, meant in practice the exclusion of the first level, namely the assistant doctors, from 
dirigenza.
109 Poggiolini, MP, Republican Party, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 13 October 1993.
129
appointment of prim ari110 The marginal role of the general manager in appointing 
the second level of dirigenza was deplored by MP Petrini: ‘the general manager does 
not have any power to appoint public managers, nor can he alter the staff allocation 
plans; he can effectively only disinvest to contain costs’.111 As far as the 
appointment of primari was concerned, SIDIRSS, Sindacato Dirigenti Servizio 
Sanitario, the Health Care Public Managers Union, also noted that the general 
manager is not a member of the Expert Committee selecting the primari and more 
generally that his power is constrained.112 The second change to the original decree 
was that the amended decree incorporated the provision for results-oriented 
management, introduced by the reform of the civil service.113 Arguing against this, 
the Lower Chamber Social Affairs Committee called for an opt out of the health care 
sector from the general framework of civil service reform.
With respect to the particularly controversial and sensitive issue of hospital assistant 
doctors, medical groups were also able to influence the parliamentary process and 
push their demands through. The reduction from three to two levels of dirigenti, as 
established by the original decree, would have excluded the entire category of 
assistant doctors114 from the legal and economic category of dirigenti. This was 
widely deplored both in the Senate and in the Lower Chamber as a response to 
stringent financial requirements with no consideration for the real needs of patients. 
The government was criticised for attempting to flatten the different levels of
110 Senators Perina and Garaffa lamented the continuation of clientelistic practice in the appointment 
procedures, Health Care Committee, Senate, 19 October 1993. The amendments to the Amato 
legislative decree were discussed in the Senate from 19 to 28 October 1993.
11 Petrini, MP, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 7 July 1993.
112 S.LDir.S.S., “Considerazioni e proposte sui decreti legislativi di attuazione della legge di delega 
23.10.1992, a  421 in materia di Sanita e di Pubblico Impiego limitatamente alia Dirigenza del 
S.S.N ”, Lower Chamber, Hearing, 3 February 1993.
113 Article 20 of the Executive Decree no.29/1992 establishes that public managers (dirigenti) are 
responsible for the results of their activities, for which they must present a yearly report
1,4 The ‘assistant doctors’, so-called assistenti, were approximately 40,000 in 1993.
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dirigenti, according to an approach typical of the 1970s, when unions hindered the 
process of establishing the senior civil service.115 In response to these critics, the 
Minister of Health Garavaglia reported her battle with the Department of Public 
Services, which was strongly against any reservation of public competition quotas 
for insiders based on a rigid hierarchical sequence.116 She informed the committee of 
her intention to propose to the Public Services that regions could review their staff 
working plans so that assistant doctors could retain their position.117 Despite the 
resistance of other relevant ministries, Article 18 of the amended decree established 
that, during the implementation, the first level of doctors be articulated in two 
economic, not legal, sub-levels, (a) and (b). The lower of these two economic levels, 
(b), included the assistant doctors, who maintained their existing pay. However, 
after five years of service, depending on open applications, job vacancies, and an 
evaluation by an ad hoc committee, assistant doctors could be promoted to the higher 
level, namely economic treatment (a). The Health Care Committee in the Senate 
proposed to leave the matter of transfer from (b) to (a) to collective bargaining rather 
than legislation. This was not accepted. The same Committee also suggested that, 
after ten years of service, assistant doctors could even access the second and higher 
level of dirigenza, but again the government did not accept this amendment. In the 
Lower Chamber, the Social Affairs Committee suggested unsuccessfully an 
automatic transfer of all doctors to level (b) after five years of service.
The legislative work of the parliamentary committees had thus been influenced by 
the demands of the medical profession in such a way that endemic conflict was
115 Perina, Health Care Committee, Senate, 19 October 1993.
116 Speech of the Minister of Health, Garavaglia to Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 7 July 
1993.
117 Speech of the Minister of Health, Garavaglia to Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 7 July 
1993.
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significantly reduced and accommodation temporarily replaced confrontation 
between interest groups and the government. Despite the general cross-party support 
for the requests of the professional groups, the parliamentary Opposition in the 
Lower Chamber voted against the final opinion of the Social Affairs Committee. 
Also the Communists and the Northern League voted against it. The rejection by the 
Democrats of the Left of the legislative text proposed by the Committee was in 
marked contrast to their earlier abstention during the committee's resolution on the 
Amato decree.118 During the parliamentary debate in October and November 1993 
on the health care reforms, the Democrats of the Left were dissatisfied with the 
government's maintenance of high co-payments as instruments to finance health care 
rather than only as a means of controlling demand. The party also opposed the 
definition of the minimum levels of health care entitlements on the basis of financial 
availability instead of health care needs. Moreover, criticisms were raised over the 
government’s obfuscation about the financial resources available for the 
implementation of the new executive decree. Since regions were not given the 
authority to levy regional taxes, it was not clear how they were going to finance their 
budget deficits, especially if the old practice of underestimating costs continued.119
The success of groups was particularly noteworthy in view of their fragmentation 
and the differing strategies of medical associations and trade unions. The effects of 
their lack of a monopoly on representation within the policy-making process, ceteris 
paribus, did not appear to diminish groups' effectiveness. The very limited concerted 
action between independent unions representing different categories of doctors and
118 Vasco Giannotti, MP, explained to the author that the Democrats of the Left had a difficult time in 
justifying why they voted against the Garavaglia reform, in light of their earlier abstention on the 
Amato reform (interview with author, Rome, 16 July 2003).
119 Trupia Abate, PDS, and Giannotti, PDS, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 13 October
1993.
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the peak associations enhanced the autonomy of professional groups in bargaining. 
The autonomy of an interest group is a key factor in assessing its influence because it 
implies the ability to retreat from negotiation, to threaten to retreat from negotiation, 
and to mobilise those members who are against symbiotic relationships with the 
institutions. Autonomy is a favourable condition for increasing the militancy of an 
interest group, especially against the peak association. In contrast with much 
scholarly literature about Italian interest groups and their relations with the 
bureaucracy and political parties (La Palombara 1964),120 the way groups shaped the 
parliamentary process suggests also that professional groups are relatively 
autonomous from political parties, which, unable to aggregate demands themselves, 
become instruments of the demands made by groups.
As far as the reform of the dirigenza of doctors and the inclusion of specific 
categories within public sector employment were concerned, professional groups’ 
influence on the process determined the final parliamentary output. Their influence 
was most remarkable in light of the high level of fragmentation of the representation 
of the medical profession and their unpredictable access to the government. As for 
the former, the fragmentation was exacerbated by the conflict between FNOM, the 
peak organisation of doctors, and the independent groups representing specific
120 The major contribution of La Palombara in the analysis of the relationship between interest groups 
and the bureaucracy is the assessment of the key role played by political parties, such as the Christian 
Democracts in the 1970s (La Palombara 1964). From empirical research he derives two main types of 
interactions between groups and the bureaucracy in Italy: clientela and parentela. In the first case an 
interest group succeeds in becoming the natural and exclusive representative of a given social sector. 
These variables constitute the conditions that affect whether and to what extent a clientela relationship 
can be established: a technical need for information from the groups; a political need to control the 
object of administrative regulation; a value orientation implying that the administrative agency exists 
in part to help or assist the object regulated; structural deficiencies in the administrative agency that 
make it impossible or unlikely that it can secure information on its own; and finally the socio- 
psychological need of maintaining an orderly and reasonably predictive relationship between the 
agency and the groups affected by its actions. The second type of relationship is parentela, which 
involves a relatively close and integral relationship between certain associational groups and the 
politically dominant parties. Pressure groups gain access and legitimacy through their attachment to 
that particular party rather than through their ability to represent effectively a sector of the society.
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categories.121 Paradoxically, the diffuse and fragmented representation of the medical 
profession did not affect the legislative fulfilment of their demands. On the contrary, 
despite the attempt of the government to divide the groups, their particularistic and 
highly technical demands were accepted.
The Introduction of General Management and Regionalisation: Change and
Continuity
The amendments to the Amato executive decree clearly brought about big changes as 
far as employment terms and conditions are concerned, but they had less obvious 
effects on the move to general management and regionalisation. With the provisions 
related to the general manager, three changes are most visible. First, in the original 
decree, the general managers of LHAs and hospitals were to be appointed by the 
President of the Region. As amended, the legislation established more generally that 
general managers be appointed by the Region, without specifying by whom.122 
Secondly, the Permanent Conference for State-Regions Relations acquired a 
consultative role in shaping the employment contract of the general manager. 
Thirdly, the office of the general manager was made incompatible with any type of 
existing employment or consulting contract with the relevant LHA,123 so that internal 
candidates were excluded from eligibility. In the original legislation the 
incompatibility existed only for independent contractors with the LHA, but not for its 
public sector employees. In its final resolution, the Health Care Committee in the 
Senate proposed to the government that an appointment to the post of general
121 Due to the internal conflict between rival independent unions representing different categories of 
doctors, the management board of FNOM, the peak association of doctors, resigned on 15 June 1993.
122 Article 3, Section 6, Executive Decree no.517/1993.
123 Article 3, Section 9, Executive Decree no.517/1993
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manager should remain compatible with already being a public employee of the LHA 
concerned.124
The ambiguities in the original legislation regarding the politicisation of the general 
manager remained unresolved. Some Senators suggested the reintroduction of 
management committees as a way of overcoming the risk of directly politicising the 
appointment of the general manager, who would be otherwise controlled by political 
parties.125 Minister Costa assured them that the committee at the Ministry in charge 
of drawing up the list of potential candidates would also establish specific 
requirements for guaranteeing meritocracy and expertise.126 By contrast, some MPs 
emphasised the need to maintain political control over technocratic decision­
making.127 The final decree maintained the autocratic management figure of the 
general manager and abolished management committees.
Regarding the second major theme that I analysed in Chapter n, the regionalisation 
of health care, the Minister of Health, Pia Garavaglia, on various occasions reiterated 
the new government’s continuity with the Amato government’s plan to regionalise 
health care.128 The new legislation emphasised the legislative functions of the regions 
in the determination of the organisation of local health care services. The amended 
Article 2 of the Decree indeed set out the legislative power of the regions. However, 
the Democrats of the Left complained no progress had been made in giving regions 
the financial autonomy to cover budget deficits. The system of health care finance
124 Health Care Committee, Senate, 27 October 1993.
Garaffa, and Zappasodi, Health Care Committee, Senate, 19 October 1993.
Speech of the Minister of Health, Raffaele Costa, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 17 
March 1993.
127 Saretta, DC, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 10 June 1993.
128 Speech of Minister of Health Garavaglia to the Committee for Regional Affairs, Senate, 10 June 
1993 and 26 May 1993; speech of Minister of Health Garavaglia to the Committee for Social Affairs, 
Lower Chamber, 25 May 1993 and 7 July 1993.
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was not altered by the transfer of the National Health Care Fund based on population 
from the centre to the regions.
Despite the cross-party agreement for a greater role for the regions and for the 
Permanent Conference for State-Regions relations, the amended decree diminished 
the control of regional government over LHAs by changing the definition of the 
LHA from ‘a regional public body’ to ‘public body’, as requested by the National 
Association of Municipalities, ANCI.129 This implied that LHAs were freed from 
regional control, at least in formal terms. The Socialist MP Renzulli expressed his 
serious concern over the implications of this provision for the prospects of the 
enterprise formula. He claimed that ‘this amended decree creates a relationship 
between the LHA and the region which is not coherent because it abolishes the 
provision that the LHA is a regional public body’.130 In practice, though, regions 
retained a firm grip on the LHAs. For instance, regions had to establish the 
procedures to determine the allocation of staff before 31 March 1994.
Other provisions in the amended decree revealed the government’s unconvincing 
commitment to regionalisation. In addition to the rephrasing of the definition of 
LHAs, Article 1 of the amended decree granted the authority to the central 
administration to include in the National Health Care Plan, the so-called Piano 
Sanitario Nazionale (PSN), specific indicators to monitor costs and measure targets 
of the health care services provided by the state.131 Article 10 of the amended decree 
provided for an administrative act to be issued by the Ministry of Health setting out 
quality indicators and how to use them. The regions strongly objected to the
129 ANCI, ‘Prime valutazioni sul decreto legislativo 502/1992 in materia di sanita, attuativo della 
legge delega 421/1992’, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, Hearing, 28 January 1993.
130 Renzulli, PSI, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 4 November 1993.
131 Article 1, Section 4, Executive Decree no.517/1993.
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definition of indicators of efficiency and quality designed by the central 
administration. Moreover, a new section was added to Article 1 establishing the 
possibility that the Ministry of Health could promote forms of collaboration between 
regions and provide policy guidelines to ensure the ‘co-ordinated application of the 
regional health care plans’.132 This suggested a strengthened policy-coordination role 
for the central administration.
Regions objected by appealing to the Constitutional Court, which ultimately upheld 
the government decision. 133 They contended that the legislative decree was too 
detailed with regard to the organisation of local health authorities and hospitals.134 As 
the local health authority was defined as a ‘regional public body’, they complained 
that the central government had encroached upon regional administrative 
competencies. For instance, the decision to grant ‘trust’ status to public hospitals 
rested with the Ministry of Health. Yet, the most problematic issue was that the 
decree obliged the regions to pay for the financial deficits of local health 
authorities.135 The regions raised various objections: that they would not have any 
control over public employment contracts or national agreements with self-employed 
specialists and that they were also denied participation in the definition of uniform 
levels of health care provision; that the central government would calculate the share 
of the national health care fund to be divided among regions on abstract models not
132 Article 1, Section 7, Executive Decree no.517/1993.
133 ‘Sentenza no. 355 della Corte Costituzionale’, 28 July 1993. The attached report to the Court’s 
judgement refers to the constitutional appeals of some Italian regions. Eight regions (Toscana, 
Lombardia, Liguria, Umbria, Veneto, Campania, Emilia Romagna, Valle d’Aosta) appealed to the 
Constitutional Court against article 1 (national health care plan), article 3 (organisation and 
management of local health authority), article 4 (hospitals and trusts), article 6 (Universities and 
health care), article 8 (service delivery), article 9 (introduction of insurances), article 10 (quality 
control), articles 12 and 13 (financing health care), and article 14 ( citizens’ rights and participation) 
of the executive decree no.502/1992.
134 Report attached to ‘Sentenza no. 355 della Corte Costituzionale’, 28 July 1993.
135 Probably the most significant decision of the Court was the recommendation to opt for a gradual 
approach to the transfer of all financial responsibilities to pay for local health authorities’ deficits. The 
Court supported the concern of regions that they would not be able to pay for the huge accumulated 
deficits, even with the additional revenue of their own resources.
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taking into account the different quality of health care services in different regions. 
There would be a gap between the resources necessary to maintain the uniform levels 
of health care and the resources transferred from the centre to the regions.
As far as the national health care plan was concerned, the parliamentary Opposition 
expressed dissatisfaction that the PSN did not include a three-year budget or any 
specific indication of the annual health care budget. Also some separate hospital 
doctors unions went on strike against the lack of financial coverage for the renewal 
of their employment contract.136 The 1994-96 PSN, which was being discussed in 
Parliament at the same time as the amendments to the Amato reform, did not contain 
any indication of financial resources because these were to be set out by the 1994 
Financial Law instead.137 Without the budgeting provisions, the PSN became an 
instrument without concrete planning potential. The disjointing of the process of 
establishing health care priorities from their finance risked underestimating the 
financial resources needed to cover expenditure. These would then be incurred in the 
form of high budget deficits, for which regions had become accountable. Despite the 
request of the parliamentary Opposition to include in the last part of the 1994-96 
PSN the financial resources available,138 the government enacted it without 
legislative and administrative co-ordination with the provisions made in the 1994 
Financial Law, which only months later established the health care budget.139 Since
136 See: ‘Medici, anche nella SanitA comincia l’autunno caldo’, II Sole 24 Ore, 15 October 1993.
137 Piano Sanitario Nazionale, 1994-96.
138 Tmpia Abate, PDS, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 13 October 1993.
139 The so-called Finanziaria, literally ‘Financial Law’, is the group of laws aimed to realise the 
national budget according to the long term objectives of the economic policy. It was introduced in the 
Italian system by Law no. 468 in 1978 in order to overcome the excessive rigidity of the budget 
procedures. The Finanziaria establishes, among other things, the financial resources of special funds 
intended to cover the financial requirements of bills to be approved within the year. The Financial Bill 
must be presented together with the Budget Bill and must be approved by 31 December. The 
Finanziaria had always encountered procedural difficulties in Parliament deriving from the inclusion 
in the bill of heterogeneous provisions not closely related to the yearly budget. In 1983 a major reform
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there were no financial provisions with the enactment of the 1994-96 national health 
care plan, Trupia Abate noted that there is ‘great distance between the Minister of 
Health’s national health care plan and the one of the government, which ultimately 
decides without her’.140 However, as the Undersecretary for the Treasury explained, 
the PSN provisions are financed by the National Health Care Fund, which amounted 
to approximately 42 billion Euros in 1993.141 Hence, the purpose of the PSN was not 
to provide for additional resources to be given to the National Health Care Fund. 
The PSN was not designed to set out additional expenditure, but was an instrument 
of planning the already allocated public resources.142
On the one hand, the Minister of Health Garavaglia suggested to the Lower 
Chamber’s Social Affairs Committee on 25 May 1993 that she intended to re­
establish the centrality of the role of the mayor, as indicated in the delegating law. 
She expressed dissatisfaction that there was no intermediate level of decision-making 
between the general manager of LHAs and the regional minister of health. On the 
other hand, delivering a speech to the same parliamentary committee on 7 July 1993, 
she defended the enterprise formula from the interference of local politics. She 
argued that: ‘we cannot have a plethora of bodies made of 140 mayors to take 
decisions. The LHAs will be very large after merging.’143 Despite the contradiction 
in her speeches, it was the latter argument which prevailed in the final decree. The 
mayor’s role in local health care policy continued to be extremely marginal and 
negligible. Both parliamentary committees in the Senate and in the Lower Chamber
tried to improve the parliamentary procedures for examining the financial bill by the end of the year 
and to avoid the overloading of the bill.
140 Trupia Abate, MP, Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 12 October 1993.
141 Speech of the Undersecretary of Treasury, Malvestio, to the Lower Chamber, Social Affairs 
Committee, 13 October 1993. He provides the following figures for the 1993 health care financial 
requirements: 42 billion Euros for the National Health Care Fund; 500 million Euros for general 
medicine; 1.6 billion Euros for co-payments; 2.36 billion Euros for LHAs own resources.
142 Fronza Crepaz, MP, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 13 October 1993.
143 Minister of Health, Garavaglia, Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, 7 July 1993.
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proposed amendments against the marginalisation of mayor in order to accept the 
demands of ANCI (National Association of Italian Communes). ANCI was 
concerned that the municipalities should retain control over LHAs and general 
managers.144 This organisation demanded a central role for the municipalities in 
redrawing the geographical boundaries of LHAs as they were merged. It also 
suggested the creation of a new body, which could dismiss the general manager as a 
last resort and would also provide compulsory and binding decisions over the 
municipalities. The Lower Chamber’s Social Affairs Committee proposed that 
Article 3 be modified so that the mayor had policy, planning and monitoring control 
over the LHAs. The government did not accept it. The Senate Health Care 
Committee proposed a similar amendment which was also rejected. Moreover, the 
Senate proposed that municipalities should be able to request that LHAs provide 
health care services not originally planned by the regional health care plan. This was 
also not accepted by the government.
Although we have focused on the two themes of the health care reform that have 
most affected the administration of health care, it is worth noticing briefly that one 
significant change to the 1992 reform was the abolition of the introduction of private 
insurance and private health care funds.145 The major criticism against it, levelled 
primarily by the trade unions,146 was the financing of private insurance with public 
resources. It has been also noted that the Italian private insurance market was not 
sufficiently developed to support the demand.147 In order to remedy this, CNEL, the
144 ANCI, Lower Chamber Hearing, 28 January 1993. See also: ‘In una audizione in commissione alia 
Camera anche l’ANCI dice no a De Lorenzo’, II Sole 24 Ore, 29 January 1993.
145 Artiche 9, Forme integrative di assistenza sanitaria, Legislative Decree no. 517/1993.
146 Betty Leone, interview with author, Rome, 24 September 2002. She suggested that the issue of 
private insurance was one of the most acrimonious in the negotiation between trade unions and the 
Prime Minister, especially because Amato was very keen on it and not ready to compromise.
147 Maurizio Ferrera, ‘Welfare state piu all’europea ma sanitd senza paracadute, interview in Mondo 
Economico, 10 October 1992.
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National Economic and Labour Council, suggested that the amount of resources 
redirected towards voluntary private health insurance be clearly specified. 148 The 
new minister of Health Garavaglia stated that she was against the health care funds 
as planned by Amato because they were distortedly absorbing public resources in 
order to compete with the public sector. She was against the privatisation of health 
care, although she declared herself in support of introducing greater 
‘competitiveness’ in the sector.149 Accordingly, the amended executive decree 
pursued the differentiation of the provision of health care services in order to break 
the state monopoly by transforming ‘substitute’ heath care funds into 
‘supplementary’ ones. Article 9 established that health care funds could be created 
by collective agreements and managed by trade unions, by employees or the self- 
employed, and non-profit organisations and charities. The decree envisaged 
additional administrative acts to regulate the creation, organisation, composition, 
financial contribution, and control of these supplementary health care funds.150
To conclude, the professional representation of consultants was highly fragmented 
into different independent unions representing specific categories. Yet, most of the 
groups focused their lobbying activity narrowly on the part of the reform dealing 
with personnel policy, namely the type of employment contract within the public 
sector, the recruitment and promotion of hospital doctors, the structure and access of 
the dirigenza, and so on. The peak association of the medical profession, FNOM, 
was also actively involved in policy making but in a rather more constructive way, 
compared with the independent unions, such as SUMAI, which petitioned for a 
referendum to abrogate the reform and organised strikes and street demonstrations.
148 CNEL, ‘Parere sullo schema di decreto legislative di attuazione della legge delega 23 Ottobre 1992 
sulla sanitA’, Lower Chamber, January 1993.
149 Speech of Minister Garavaglia, Lower Chamber, Social Affairs Committee, 7 July 1993.
150 Artiche 9, ‘Forme integrative di assistenza sanitaria’, Legislative Decree no. 517/1993.
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FNOM was not merely concerned with particularistic demands about terms and 
conditions of employment, but broadened its lobbying to issues such as the power of 
the medical profession after the introduction of general management and the problem 
of politicised appointments at the top level of the medical hierarchy. Not only the 
medical profession but also the trade unions participated in the process of health care 
reforms. The three confederations of trade unions supported the Amato reforms, with 
the exception of the introduction of private insurance, which was scrapped by the 
amended decree no. 517. In response to these professional groups’ demands and 
lobbying, the parliamentary committees transmitted to the government their final 
opinion proposing legislative amendments to the reform which reflected almost 
entirely the medical profession’s interests. The Social Affairs Committee expressed 
its favourable opinion on 4 November 1993151 after one month of debate.152
The Ciampi Government Strategy to Avoid Policy Reversal
In contrast with the conflict which characterised the system of interest groups’ 
intermediation under the Amato reform, the most significant innovations in the 
policy-making process under the Ciampi government were wide and open 
consultation with the medical profession, including peak associations and the 
majority of separate unions and full participation of parliamentary committees in the 
drafting process of the amended legislative decree. This new approach reflected the 
governmental strategy to re-establish a productive working relationship with the
151 Among the amendments proposed by the parliamentary committees to the executive: increasing 
public funding for the national health care system up to 6.5 per cent of GDP; mayors' involvement in 
the identification of public hospitals to be granted autonomy; and strengthening the opportunities of 
engagement in providing health care services for charities and non-profit organisations. The 
parliamentary opinion was passed with the support of the majority. The Democrats of the Left voted 
against See: ‘Riforma Garavaglia: favorevole con riserve il parere della Camera’, II Sole 24 Ore, 5 
November 1993.
152 The executive draft of the Garavaglia reform was transmitted to Parliament on 30 September 1993.
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medical profession, indispensable for the implementation of the reforms.153 The 
Ciampi government was also favourably disposed towards the parliamentary control 
functions of executive decrees. The Minister of Health, Garavaglia, was seeking 
parliamentary support against the Amato reform, which she had firmly opposed 
when she was a member herself of the Social Affairs Committee in the Lower 
Chamber in 1992.154 The Ciampi government ultimately accepted the changes 
proposed by the parliamentary committees as far as public employment was 
concerned, and incorporated them in the new amended decree.155 The government 
decided to renew the ambulatory care specialists’ public contract156 and provided 
assistant doctors with the option of accessing dirigenza, albeit only juridically and 
not financially.157
Despite these many attempts at widely consulting the groups and engaging them in 
the drafting process,158 and ultimately making concessions, the end of 1993 showed a
renewal of direct action and groups’ dissatisfaction.159 The allocation of financial 
resources for the employment amendments accepted by the government remained a
153 ‘La responsabile della SanitA punta al ritomo alio Stato sociale abbandonando del tutto le logiche 
dell’assistenzialismo’, IISole 24 Ore, 5 May 1993.
154 Ms Garavaglia declared her most convinced opposition against the Amato reform, in particular 
against the introduction of private insurance. She also despised the Amato government for ignoring 
the amendments proposed by the parliamentary committees in 1992. See: ‘II ministro Garavaglia 
dichiara guerra alia riforma De Lorenzo’, La Stampa, 10 May 1993.
lss‘Modifica al decreto legislativo 30 dicembre 1992 n. 502 “Riordino della disciplina in materia 
sanitaria, a norma dell’articolo 1 della legge 23 ottobre 1992 n. 421”, approved by the Council of 
Ministers on 24 November 1993.
156 Ambulatory health care specialists became dirigenti and as such remained in the public sector. See: 
Legislative Decree no.517/1993.
157 The final decree established that the assistant doctors could become dirigenti, at first only 
juridically, awaiting economic promotion on the basis of vacancies. See: ‘II Govemo rilancia la 
scommessa della riforma-bis della sanita; per le Usl e gli ospedali il rimedio b l’impresa’, II Sole 24 
Ore, 25 November 1993.
158 The press coverage mentions ‘hundreds of meetings with the medical associations’. See: 
‘Impoitanti prowedimenti all’esame del Consiglio dei Ministri; la riforma sanitaria bis al varo di 
Palazzo Chigi’, II Sole 24 Ore, 24 November 1993.
159 There was a general strike of the entire health care sector on 30 November 1993 against the 1994 
Financial law budget cuts. II Sole 24 Ore, 30 November 1993.
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problematic and controversial issue among interest groups.160 Trade unions declared 
that they were not sufficiently satisfied with the changes made to the Amato reform, 
and the association of hospital doctors, CIMO, was also highly sceptical.161 The civil 
servants at the Ministry of Health and at the Department of Public Services were 
working together at an agreement with the medical associations until the very last 
minute.162 The problem was the uncertainty that the 1994 Financial Law could 
allocate sufficient funding to the employment provisions in the Garavaglia executive 
draft, given the absolute necessity to contain personnel costs and the disastrous 
financial situation of LHAs presented by the Court of Accounts in 1992.163 Not only 
the Treasury but also the Minister of Public Services, Cassese, had many reservations 
about the dirigenza in the health care sector and ‘wanted to be more strict than the 
final legislative decree drafted by the Ministry of Health Care’.164 Ultimately the 
1994 Financial Law cut approximately 2.3 billion Euros from the health care 
budget,165 against the anticipated 1.2 billion Euros. The Financial Law also blocked 
the filling of 50 percent of vacancies to save 400 million Euros.166
As we have noticed in the discussion of the influence of groups on the parliamentary 
process, the executive under the Ciampi government demonstrated a different type of 
institutional collaboration with parliamentary committees than had been displayed by 
the Amato government. This has been documented by the approval of an ample
160 On 29 October 1993, FIMMG and FIMP, Federazione italicma medici pediatri, went on strike to 
protest against the 1994 Financial Law. See: ‘Si fermano medici e pediatri’, 29 October 1993.
61 ‘II testo dello schema di decreto legislative) di modifica del D.Lgs 502/1992 approvato dal 
Consiglio dei Ministri; riforma bis per le Usl-azienda’, II Sole 24 Ore, 8 October 1993.
162 ‘II Govemo rilancia la scommessa della riforma-bis della sanitA; per le Usl e gli ospedali il rimedio 
£ l’impresa’, II Sole 24 Ore, 25 November 1993.
163 In 1991, for instance, the total budget deficit for local health care authorities was 6 billion Euros, 
almost double than in 1989 (3.9 billion). See: Corte dei Conti, Decisione e Relazione sul Rendiconto 
Generale dello Stato per l’eserdzio finanziario 1992, Volume n, Tomo II.
164 ‘Important! prowedimenti alTesame del Consiglio dei Ministri; la riforma sanitaria bis al varo di 
Palazzo Chigi’, II Sole 24 Ore, 24 November 1993.
165 Minister of Health, Garavaglia, interview in La Stampa, 11 September 1993.
166 La Stampa, 23 July 1993.
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range of parliamentary amendments, the willingness of the executive not to push the 
process by calling for emergency measures, such as debate timing restrictions or the 
question of confidence, as was the case under the legislative episode discussed in 
Chapter H  Overall, the Ciampi government showed a greater degree of compliance 
with constitutionally established parliamentary prerogatives in the case of legislative 
control of delegated legislation.167 The text of the parliamentary opinion on 
Garavaglia’s legislative draft began by acknowledging the successful attempt of the 
Ciampi government to re-establish a collaborative institutional relationship between 
the executive and parliamentary committees.168
The greater executive openness to parliamentary co-legislation reflected the 
governmental strategy to secure political legitimacy for health care reform for which 
there was little political consensus. The referendum initiative to abrogate articles 8 
and 9 of the Amato reform was still under way when Minister Garavaglia was 
working at the amended text. The referendum was fully supported by the major 
parliamentary opposition party, the Democrats of the Left. Public opinion was also 
turning bitterly against the government for its anticipated health care cuts and higher 
co-payments.169 As D’Alema claimed: ‘health care is the sector in which we have the 
most serious fracture between citizens and the State. It is not a welfare question, but
167 During the parliamentary discussion of the Garavaglia reform, many MP admitted that the 
executive had adopted a radically different relationship with parliament than under De Lorenzo. Mr 
Giannotti, PDS, acknowledged the ‘innovative approach of Garavaglia compared to De Lorenzo’, 
Lower Chamber, 10 March 1993. Another MP, Poggiolini, PLI, admired the executive for the 
collaboration with parliament, although he disagreed on substantive matters, Lower Chamber, 10 
March 1993.
168 ‘Parere sul testo di modifica al Decreto Legislativo n. 502/1992’, Lower Chamber, 21 October 
1993.
169 La Stampa, 18 June 2004.
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most of all a moral question’.170 In this context of public dissatisfaction, the minister 
of Health attempted to gain the political support of parliament to overcome it.
Therefore, the executive under the Ciampi government tried to rehabilitate the role of 
parliamentary committees in an attempt to secure wider political consensus in 
support of the Amato reform. However, the legislative concessions to groups’ 
demands regarding public employment amounted to rather nominal and legalistic 
changes with a meagre concrete possibility of being implemented. On the one hand, 
the government was willing to grant concessions on aspects of public employment 
because these would not alter the new organisational structure of the national health 
care system, the major thrust of the 1992 reform. On the other, it is not entirely 
convincing that the Minister of Health, Garavaglia, expected to overcome the 
Department of Public Services’ reservations about the medical staff reforms. Not 
even the Amato government was able to overcome the Department of Public 
Services’ resistance.171 Moreover, the Financial Law of 1994 forced a budgetary 
squeeze on the employment pay of doctors.172 The second wave of direct action,173 
after the enactment of the amended decree in November 1993, confirmed that the 
government’s adoption of most of the parliamentary committees’ amendments 
regarding personnel was not convincing enough.
170 ‘II PDS presenter^ due mozioni alle Camere; riforma sanitaria: cure a confronto, II Sole 24 Ore, 15 
July 1993.
171 The Department of Public Services would not make an exception for the health care sector and 
forced the Ministry of Health to subsume the health care sector’s employment contract into the 
general framework of public sector employment
The 1994 Financial Law provided: approximately 516 million Euros for the whole civil service; a 
freeze on new appointments; a new tax of 25% on social security funds of doctors.
173II Sole 24 Ore, 30 November 1993.
146
Conclusions
The resistance of the medical profession to the 1992 health care reform posed a 
credible threat to the further development of the governmental programme to 
modernise the health care administration. Not only were the instruments chosen to 
pursue the strategy of outright opposition of the most destructive type, such as an 
abrogative referendum, but also the legislative process was characterised by a firm 
coalition between the professional groups and the parliamentary committees to block 
the Amato reform. This activism triggered the enactment of a new executive decree 
which amended significantly the original one as far as medical employment was 
concerned. Thus, professional groups exerted such an influence on the policy 
making process as to trigger a new legislative process which eventually resulted in a 
new legislative act. However, this change was not sufficiently prominent to reverse 
structural innovation to the organisation and management of the health care system.
The analysis of the policy making process of the legislative episode of amendment to 
the 1992 reform has revealed that the Italian Parliament was a formidable source of 
access to groups, with the parliamentary committees contributing to repoliticising 
and reopening the political debate after the issuing in December 1992 of the Amato 
decree. Rather than being independent mediating arenas, committees were 
‘pressured’ institutions, highly permeable to groups’ demands and incapable of 
politicisation of the macro level issues involved in the health care reforms. This, 
however, favourably served the strategy of the government of avoiding lengthy 
debate in parliament about the core changes affecting regionalisation and 
management arrangements.
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As the change introduced by the new Ciampi government with executive decree 
no.517/1993 was neither radical nor substantially innovative, compared with the 
1992 reform, the amendments amounted to nothing more than a legislative 
sophistication with legal technicalities. With regards to the introduction of general 
management, the enterprise formula, and regionalisation, the 1992 and 1993 reforms 
represented two distinct episodes of the same reform programme. Furthermore, we 
have also argued that the concessions of the government to the professional groups 
on their terms and conditions of employment were not convincing because hardly 
sustainable in the long run. The financial constraints placed on the 1994 Financial 
Law curtailed the possibility of groups successfully blocking the 1992 and 1993 
reforms. Despite much work and effort on the part of the departmental 
administration, the radical change introduced in 1992 remained almost intact. Policy 
activism resulted in ‘conservatism’, but in this particular case, it implied the 
consolidation and continuity of far reaching change.
At the end of November 1993, after a convoluted legislative process, another reform 
of the national health care system survived groups’ blockages and consolidated the 
move towards a long-awaited modernisation of the Italian health care services and 
administration. Legislative Decree no. 517/1993 was a legislation providing the 
broad institutional, financial and organisational design. The formulation of the 
operational details was left to regional implementation legislation, enacted by 
regional councils. Regions were granted considerable discretion in designing their 
own local health care systems. The next two chapters of the thesis, Chapters IV and 
V, investigate respectively the emergence of regional managers and the opportunities 
offered by the regionalisation process to regional elites.
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Chapter IV
The Rise of General Managers and the Challenge to Local Political 
Elites
The introduction of general management and the transformation of local health care 
authorities into autonomous public enterprises have challenged the Italian way of 
mobilising political consensus at the local level. Local elites have traditionally based 
their political support on the firm control of administrative channels of distribution of 
welfare services (Dente 1990). The peculiarity of Italian local government, 
compared with the highly integrated French administrative system, is widely 
believed to be its diffuse administrative integration and the central role played by the 
‘political entrepreneurialism’ of local elites ~  mayors in particular -- and party 
channels in facilitating the intergovernmental relationship between centre and 
periphery (Tarrow 1977). Scholars characterised Italian local government as a form 
of ‘political localism’, compared with northern European countries, in which 
clientelistic patterns of centre-periphery relations do not exist, or are much less 
relevant to the national network of political power (Page and Goldsmith 1987). The 
reorganisation of administrative structures and management arrangements represents 
a potential challenge for local elites, who find it increasingly difficult to preserve the 
traditional use of local health care authorities. Clientelism is significantly 
diminished by the increasing influence that managers have acquired in the local 
policy making process.
Political elites have responded to the rise of managers and technical expertise by re­
establishing political control with different instruments and mechanisms. This
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chapter investigates the tension between technical decision-making in public 
administration and political consensus. The problematic relationship between rising 
regional technocrats and local political elites, such as mayors, is of primary interest. 
The significance of the relationship between managers and politicians ultimately 
depends on their relative influence in shaping local decisions regarding the 
organisation, delivery, and management of health care services. This chapter 
concentrates first on the creation of opportunities for managers to become key policy 
makers in health care policy, and then on the instruments and solutions which have 
been adopted to reinstate the primacy of politics over technocracy, as far as regional 
legislative compliance with health care reforms is concerned. The 1999 attempt at 
policy reversal is examined as a remarkable illustration of how national political 
elites have supported local ones in their resistance to emerging powerful regional 
bureaucrats.
The resistance of political elites to the emergence of powerful regional technocrats is 
characterised by the production of new legal acts and institutional experimentation. 
This chapter draws attention to regional legislative activism regarding two aspects of 
implementation of the 1992 reform: the merger of local health authorities and the 
establishment of the enterprise formula. The aim is to understand the effects of these 
changes on the relationship between general managers and local political elites, 
rather than to assess the new organisation of regional health care delivery 
arrangements per se. The second section of this chapter analyses the recovery of the 
role of the mayors in health care policy, restored to prominence by national executive 
decree no. 229 of 1999 — the so-called Bindi reform, named after the Minister of 
Health of the centre-left Prodi Government (April 1996-October 1998). After a 
discussion of the general national framework for reappraising the role of mayors in
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health care policy, the regions of Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and Lombardy are 
compared with regard to the differences between participation by mayors in the 
regional health care planning process and evaluation of general managers.
The Rise of General Managers
Regional implementation legislation offered managers opportunities to build up 
administrative power and a central position in local health care policy. Two aspects 
were of primary interest: the territorial regrouping of local health authorities and the 
introduction of ‘bureaucratic autonomy’, due to introducing the enterprise formula 
into all local health care authorities and selected public hospitals. First, the impact of 
regional implementation legislation in Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Lombardy 
from 1994 to 1996 is analysed, with regard to the territorial reorganisation of local 
health authorities and the problematic relationship between political consensus and 
technocratic management. These regions have been selected as cases because, as in 
the health care sector, change is being introduced. There is no sufficiently prominent 
evidence of change in other regions, which belong to Putnam’s category of low 
institutional performance (Putnam 1993). Furthermore, case selection depends also 
on the purpose of the case study. In order to infer hypotheses from the empirical data, 
a heuristic or hypothesis-generating case is more useful. This is the usefulness of 
‘outliers’, cases that cannot be explained by other alternative theories, especially 
those discussed in Chapter I of this thesis, which focus on immobilisme.1 The
1 It could be argued that the selection of these cases does not allow for a sufficient variation of socio­
economic conditions and ‘institutional performance’. Certainly the selection of regions which are less 
administratively and institutionally efficient, such as Calabria or Sicily, would have offered greater 
variation and minimised the effect of intervening variables. Conversely, available theories reviewed in 
Chapter 1 for the difficulties of the modernisation of the Italian state cannot explain change in the 
regions we have selected, that is Emilia Romagna, Lombardy and Tuscany. Such atypical cases teach 
us the most, and explaining change is theoretically more demanding. Regions have been selected on 
the basis of the ‘most different method’: they have similar background conditions such as 
homogeneous institutional performance, economic and political structures, but sharply different values 
of the study variables, i.e. the outcome of adopting the 1992 reform. See Lijphart (1975).
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second section of this part of the chapter focuses on the enterprise formula and the 
scope for concrete implementation of the formal autonomy granted by law to local 
health care authorities as ‘public enterprises’. The discussion of the different role of 
local health authorities in different regional health care systems reveals the character 
of the relationship between the autonomous local authorities, their general managers, 
and the regional bureaucracy.
Territorial Mergers o f Local Health Authorities
The first wave of regional laws implementing the 1992 reform addressed the problem 
of redrawing the territorial areas of local health authorities. The national legislation 
had indicated that regions ought to comply with the merger’s provision by law and 
not by administrative regulation. This issue was debated by regional councils and 
proved to be highly controversial, for it affected the scope of political control over 
local health authorities exercised by municipalities. In some cases, ad hoc laws were 
enacted by regional councils; in others, this specific issue was subsumed in more 
general regional laws — leggi di riordino or laws of reorganisation ~  regarding the 
organisation of the regional health care system.2 In Lombardy, for instance, an ad 
hoc regional law regarding the ‘Ridefinizione degli ambiti territoriali delle Unita 
sociosanitarie locali’ was enacted as early as 15 September 1993.3 Lombardy was 
one of the first regions to implement the national provision of redefinition of the 
boundaries of local health authorities. However, the broader reform of general 
reorganisation of the health care system was passed only in 1997.4 This can be
2 ‘Legge di riordino’ refers to regional general framework law aimed to define the organisational 
arrangements of regional health care systems.
3 Regional Law no. 28, Regione Lombardia, 15 September 1993.
4 Regional Law no. 31, Regione Lombardia, 11 July 1997, ‘Norme per il riordino del Servizio 
Sanitario regionale e sua integrazione con le attivita dei servizi sociali’.
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attributed in part to scandals affecting the regional administration — from 1994 to 
1995 the regional Giunta was accused of ‘abuso d ’ufficio\ literally ‘abuse of office’, 
for the appointment of general managers.5 Fifteen of the 59 appointments made by 
the then-President of the Giunta, Paolo Arrigoni, were annulled by the 
Administrative Court. In 1995 the centre-right, led by Formigoni, won the regional 
elections and introduced a bill to reform the regional health care system taking into 
account the internal market and competition. Moreover, the legislative process 
introducing this law was protracted for two years before being finally enacted in 
1997. This contrasts with Tuscany and Emilia Romagna, where a ‘legge di riordino’ 
was enacted as early as 1994.6 These laws formed a comprehensive framework for 
implementation of the 1992 reform and, as such, included the enlargement of the 
local health authorities.
In most Italian regions the merger of local health authorities was taken up by 
regional councils and administrations fairly soon after the enactment of the 1992 
reform and the 1993 amendment. Table 4.1 shows the decrease in the total number 
of local health authorities after the 1992 reform.
5 For the scandals affecting Lombardy, see ‘Nei giomi scorsi uguali ricorsi hanno fatto scattare otto 
dirigenti’, II Sole 24 Ore, 22 July 1995; ‘La lottizzazione e reato. Chiesto il processo per il Presidente 
della Giunta e l l  Assessori’, La Stampa, 26 February 1995.
6 Tuscany enacted Regional Law no. 49 on 26th June 1994, ‘Norme per il riordino del Servizio 
sanitario regionale’. This law was abrogated by Art. 139 of Regional Law no. 22 in 2000. In Emilia- 
Romagna, two implementing laws were passed: Regional Law no. 19 of 12th May 1994, ‘Norme per 
il riordino del Servizio sanitario regionale’, and Regional Law no. 50 of 20th December 1994, ‘Norme 
in materia di programmazione, contabilitd, contratti e controllo delle Aziende sanitarie locali e delle 
Aziende ospedaliere’.
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Table 4.1 Regional distribution of LHAs after the 1992 reform
Regions Pre-
1992
LHAs
After-
1992
LHAs
Number of Provinces 
and Municipalities 
per Region
Difference pre- 
and after-1992 
LHAs
% of pre- 
1992 of 
total 
LHAs
Difference after- 
1992 LHAs and 
no. of Provinces
Piemonte 63 22 6(1209) 41 65.07 16
Valle 
d’Aosta
1 1 1(74) 0 0 0
Lombardia 84 44 9(1546) 40 47.61 35
Provincia
Autonoma
Bolzano
4 4 1(116) 0 0 3
Provincia
Autonoma
Trento
11 1 1 (223) 10 90.9 0
Veneto 36 22 7(582) 14 38.88 15
Friuli
Venezia
Giulia
12 6 4 (219) 6 50 2
Liguria 20 5 4 (235) 15 75 1
Emilia
Romagna
41 13 8(341) 28 68.29 5
Toscana 40 12 9(287) 28 70 3
Umbria 12 5 2(92) 7 58.3 3
Marche 24 13 4(246) 11 45.8 9
Lazio 51 12 5(375) 39 76.4 7
Abruzzo 15 6 4 (3 0 5 ) ..................... 9 60
Molise 7 4 2(136) 3 42.8 2
Campania 61 13 5(549) 48 78.6 8
Puglia 55 12 5(257) 43 78.1 7
Basilicata 7 5 2(131) 2 28.5 3
Calabria 31 11 3 (409) 20 64.5 8
Sicilia 62 9 9(388) 53 85.4 0
Sardegna 22 8 4(366) 14 63.6 4
TOTAL 659 228 95(8086) 431 65.4 133
Author’s elaboration from ‘Compendio del Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, Anni 1991-95’, Ufficio 
Statistics Ministero Salute
The enlargement in the size of local health authorities reveals a remarkably high 
degree of regional compliance, in terms of promptness and legislative activism.7 This
7 Regional laws usually contain an appendix with the newly regrouped local health authorities with 
evidence of enlargement For example see: Regional Law no. 19, 12 May 1994, Emilia Romagna;
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becomes even more evident when compared with other national provisions contained 
in the 1992 reform, such as the accreditation procedures of private providers, and the 
implementation of the nationally set fees-for-services. For instance, as regards the 
latter, regional compliance was so poor that the national administration had to 
intervene by enacting a decree-law in 1995. According to a senior civil servant, 
'regions had the administrative and technical capacity but they did not want to 
implement the national policy on fees-for-service'.8
The variation in timing of implementation of different aspects of the 1992 reform 
suggests that, overall, regions were particularly inclined to remove local health 
authorities from the jurisdiction and supervision of municipalities. On the one hand, 
the financial contingencies were a triggering factor. The 1992 reform had given 
regions financial responsibility to cover the local health authorities’ budget deficits. 
For instance, mergers aim to cut costs and rationalise the network of health care 
providers by rationalising the hospital network.9 Yet the closure of small hospitals 
raises public objections.10 For example, a seven-months pregnant woman announced: 
'I have promised my child that it will be bom in my home town. If they close the 
hospital I will give birth in the office of the municipal council.'11 On the other hand, 
the increase in size of local health authorities also reflects a political strategy as it 
allows regional political elites to build consensus through the delivery of health care
Regional law no. 2,2 February 1994, Campania; Regional Law no. 39,22 September 1994, Piemonte; 
Regional Law no. 22 of 28 June 1994, TRidelimitazione degli ambienti territorial! e norme per la 
gestione transitoria delle USL’; Regional Law no. 42 of 1994, Liguria; Regional Law no. 38, 30 
December 1994, Puglia.
8 Nicola Falcitelli, interview with author, Rome, 23 September 2002.
9 Small hospitals represented the greatest proportion of the total number of hospitals: 31 per cent of 
total hospitals had fewer than 120 beds, 28 per cent had from 121 to 200 beds, and only 11 per cent of 
all the hospitals had more beds than 600. See: Pennazza (1996). The rationalisation of the hospital 
networks has met strong public dissent, also more recently. The regional plans to reduce hospital beds 
are most likely to affect small hospitals. See: ‘Piccoli ospedali, cresce la protesta’, La Repubblica, 28 
August 2002.
10 ‘Fitto: 'Sono il Berlusconi del Sud, mi dicono buffone ma non mollo', La Repubblica, 30 August 
2002.
11 ‘Domodossola, 8000 in piazza per difendere l’ospedale’, La Repubblica, 28 August 2002.
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services, and carve out a sphere of influence in health care policy making. This 
theme will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
Despite the rapid enactment of regional laws concerned with redrawing geographical 
boundaries, these were not generally accompanied by mergers to reduce the size of 
local health authorities to that of the province. The 1992 reform had established that 
the geographical area corresponding to the territory of the local health authority 
should be that of the province.12 The area of the province was characterised by the 
existence of a large public hospital in the main provincial city, with the capacity to 
deliver the widest range of medical specialities. The enlargement in size of local 
health authorities originally decreased the total number in Lombardy from 84 to 44, 
when Arrigoni was President of the Giunta in 1994. Later, under the Formigoni 
presidency, the number of local health authorities was further reduced to 14, after 
two years of heated political debate and opposition by the association of 
municipalities. In Tuscany the number of local health authorities was cut from 40 to 
12. In Emilia Romagna the original 41 local health authorities were merged into 
13.13 In practice, the outcome of the regrouping process was that, in most regions, the 
number of local health authorities was doubled compared to that of provinces, as 
Table 4.2 shows. In Veneto, for instance, there are seven provinces compared with 
21 newly regrouped local health authorities.
12 Article 3, Section 4, Comma a), Legislative Decree no. 502 of 30 December 1992.
13 Regional Law, Emilia Romagna no. 19/1994.
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Table 4.2 Regrouping of local health authorities
Emilia Romagna Tuscany Lombardy Veneto
No. of Provinces 8 9 9 7
Pre-1992 no. of 
LHAs
48 40 84 42
Post-1992 no. of 
LHAs
18 12 14 21
Post 1992 no. of 
Districts
40 56 62 43
Source: Regional Law Emilia Romagna no. 19/1994, Regional Law Tuscany no. 49/1994, Regional 
Law Lombardy no. 31/1997, and Regional Law Piemonte no.39/1994.
The increase in size of local health authorities has many implications for service 
delivery arrangements, organisational design and infrastructure, and impact on local 
demand, but here we are primarily concerned with the effects on the relationship 
between general managers and local political elites. The first effect of mergers is the 
dilution of individual mayors’ influence in determining local health care policy and 
decisions affecting the local communities. This is a consequence of the much larger 
number of mayors in the representative bodies of local health care authorities. As 
shown in Table 4.3, the average number of municipalities, and respective mayors, in 
each individual health care authority in Lombardy rose from 18 before 1992 to 110 
after the merger. In Tuscany the average number of municipalities increased from 
seven to 23, and in Emilia Romagna from eight to 26. The increase in the number of 
municipalities within each health authority creates higher fragmentation of territorial 
representation. This is compensated for by strengthened associational forms of 
municipalities only in exceptional cases. Dilution and heightened fragmentation have 
not been as detrimental to mayors of large cities as to small and peripheral 
communes. Most often the mayor of a big city, where the local health authority or
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major public hospital is located, enjoys a ‘direct access’ relationship (Page and 
Goldsmith 1987) to the general manager.14
Table 4.3 Concentration of municipalities per local health authority after the 
1992 reform
Average no. of 
Municipalities per LHA
Emilia Romagna Lombardy Tuscany
Pre-1992 8 18 7
Post-1992 26 110 23
Source: Regional Law Emilia Romagna no. 19/1994, Regional Law Tuscany no. 49/1994, Regional 
Law Lombardy no. 31/1997, and Regional Law Piemonte no.39/1994.
The second implication of the merger of local health authorities for the relationship 
between general managers and local elites is a greater co-ordination role for general 
managers. This derives from the heightened need for co-ordination between the 
smaller units of each health care authority, such as health clinics, prevention centres, 
local out-patients’ departments and districts. The risk that local health authorities 
might remain internally fragmented into multiple units was addressed by centralised 
managerial functions.15 Territorial services, servizi territoriali, are locally rooted and 
give political legitimacy to local elites because of their visibility. As one interviewee 
suggested: 'every mayor wants his own health care centre for providing public health 
and social services, like family planning clinics. They are very small, and very 
inefficient.'16 It became increasingly urgent to integrate health and social services 
because of the duplication of services provided by different administrative units in 
the same local health authority, owing to the responsibility of communes for the 
provision of social but not health care.
14 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
15 Aldo Taroni, interview with author, Bologna, 22 July 2003.
16 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
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The tension between territorial demands and functional centralised management was 
mitigated by the division of local health authorities into the distretti. These are 
organisational, functional and territorial units reporting to their parent local health 
authorities. They are primarily aimed at providing general medicine services and out­
patient local care.17 In the case of Emilia Romagna, the distretti have managerial and 
technical autonomy, although they remain under the supervision and control o f the 
parent local health authority. 18 Democratic and political representation is displaced 
to the distretto. Regional laws established institutional channels of representation for 
mayors at this level, such as committees or collegial bodies. For instance, in Emilia 
Romagna the establishment of the distretti19 was accompanied by the creation of a 
‘Comitato di Distretto\ a consultative body made up of mayors of the area of the 
distretto. This committee is involved in formulating proposals to the general manager 
and monitors the planning activities of the distretto, its budget and resource 
allocations, performance assessment, and organisational structure. In particular, the 
territorial distribution of the delivery of services in the area of the competent distretto 
must be approved by the Comitato di Distretto20
The territorial representation in Tuscany was safeguarded from the merger of local 
health authorities by being split into smaller administrative and relatively 
autonomous units, so-called zona. These zones are subdivided into distretti, the 
smallest administrative and operational units for the delivery of health care services. 
The size of the distretti is potentially much smaller in Tuscany than in Emilia 
Romagna. In terms of population, the size of a distretto in Tuscany can by law be
17 Article 3, Section 5, Letter b), Legislative Decree no 502/1992.
18 Deliberation of Region, no. 39 of 1 March 2000, Emilia Romagna, ‘Linee guida per l’assistenza 
distrettuale’.
19 Regional Law no. 19,12 May 1994, Regione Emilia Romagna.
20 Article 9, Section Five (d), Regional Law no. 19,1994, Regione Emilia Romagna
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anything over 15,000 inhabitants,21 whereas in Emilia Romagna a distretto must have 
a population of at least 60,000 inhabitants.22 In Lombardy, the minimum number of 
inhabitants required in a distretto is generally 40,000, and 100,000 in metropolitan 
areas.23 The management arrangements and organisation of a distretto are established 
by the parent local health authority. Managers in the distretto are appointed directly 
to their posts by the general manager of the local health authority, who determines 
the responsibilities and resources of each individual unit. 24
In Tuscany, managerial responsibilities are devolved to smaller administrative units, 
such as the zone, more than in other regions. In compliance with the 1992 reform 
and in order to minimise the effects of mergers on territorial and political 
representation, Tuscany has created this intermediate level between the local health 
authorities and the smaller distretti. As Table 4.4 shows, the total number of zones is 
33, only slightly fewer than the number of local health authorities before the 1992 
reform. As far as the relationship between managers and local political elites is 
concerned, the zona in Tuscany give the conference of mayors and individual mayors 
an opportunity to influence the delivery of health care services and shape local 
decisions. The Regional Law no. 49 of 1994, in establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the regional health care system, separated management and support
functions from the delivery and production of health care services. The zona was in
charge of these latter responsibilities, being the operational branch of the local health 
authority at street level. The general manager of the local health authority delegates 
managerial authority to the ‘co-ordinator of the zona\ Given the duplication of 
services between the 56 distretti and the thirty three zona, Tuscany's regional health
21 Article 3, Section 2, Regional Law no. 49 of 1994, Regione Toscana.
22 Article 9, Section 2, Regional Law no. 19 of 1994, Regione Emilia Romagna.
23 Article 9, Regional Law no. 31 of 1997, Regione Lombardia.
24 For example, see Article 36, Section 3, Letter a), Regional Law, Toscana, no. 22 /2000.
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care plan 2002-2004 has established that the area of the distretto must be enlarged to 
correspond to that of the zona, significantly further reducing the number of 
distretti25
Table 4.4 Local health authorities and ‘zone’ in Tuscany
LHAs No. of Zona per LHA Number of Municipalities per LHA
USL Massa Carrara 2 17
USL Lucca 3 35
USL Pistoia 2 22
USL Prato 1 7
USL Pisa 4 32
USL Livorno 4 27
USL Siena 4 36
USL Arezzo 5 39
USL Grosseto 4 28
USL Firenze 3 33
USL Empoli 1 11
Total 33 287
Source: Regional Law no.22 /2000, Regione Toscana
Whereas local political elites were marginalised from the management of local health 
authorities at the macro level, they continued to influence the planning activities of 
the distretti, and zones. For instance, a ‘Comitato di Distretto’, literally District’s 
Committee’, was established in Emilia Romagna, Lombardy and Tuscany. The 
Comitato was formed by elected members from local political elites and 
representatives of interest groups (Salvadori 2004). Moreover, regional law in
25 The deliberation of the regional Giunta of Tuscany no. 155 of 18 March 1992 had established that a 
distretto be of the size of a municipality. Regional Law no. 49/1994 had established that the size of a 
distretto should not be smaller than 15,000 inhabitants. This value has been increased to 45,000 by the 
most recent regional health care plan 2002-2004 (Section 6).
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Tuscany established that the manager of the zona was responsible for handling 
‘contacts’ with mayors.26 In Lombardy, the ‘Assemblea dei Sindaci del Distretto’, 
literally Assembly of District’s Mayors, has representational and planning 
functions.27
The Enterprise Formula: Planner and Third Party Payer Models
Managerial autonomy is inextricably linked with the institutional autonomy 
conferred to local health care authorities since the change in their legal status from 
public bodies, controlled by the municipal administration, to self-managing, 
independent public enterprises, so-called azienda di diritto pubblico. Accordingly, 
the local health care enterprise is a new institutional player with exclusive 
management responsibilities for health care services in its area of competence.28 The 
local health authority's formally defined autonomy creates a framework, which 
enables general managers to resist pressure from local political elites more 
effectively. The institutional autonomy of local health authorities allows general 
managers to use greater discretion in decisions regarding the use and allocation of 
resources and administrative supervision of other institutions. Ex ante controls on 
administrative acts are recommended only for budget planning and three-year 
planning activities of local health care authorities.29
25 Regional Law no. 22/2000, Regione Toscana. In general, the role of the manager of the zona was
strengthened by this law. It gives the manager budget autonomy, co-ordinating responsibilities of all 
health care services of the zona, including hospitals, appointment of people in charge of local services 
and units.
27 Regional Law, no. 31/1997, Regione Lombardia, Article 9, II Distretto.
28 Article 3, Section 1, Legislative Decree no. 502/1992.
29 ‘Orientamenti per il nuovo assetto organizzativo e gestionale delle strutture sanitarie’, 8 June 1995, 
Ministero della Sanita, p. 46.
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Administrative formalism has also been challenged by the extensive use of 
instruments typical of the private sector, such as the atto aziendale which belongs to 
the jurisdiction of private law (Balma 2000). This has been legally introduced by the 
1999 Bindi reform as a new instrument of governance for local health authorities. 
The atto aziendale is used by general managers of local health care authorities to 
define their internal organisation and functions. It is also used to regulate public 
procurement (Balma 2000). Its significance rests in the scope for greater discretion it 
offers to general managers, since they can take action under it without consultation 
(Perrella, Cicchetti et al. 2002). The atto aziendale does not need formal approval 
from the regions. It can be adopted unilaterally by the general manager and cannot be 
referred to an administrative court.
According to the guidelines of the Ministry of Health, the local health care 
enterprises, Aziende Sanitarie Locali, enjoy ex lege organisational, accounting and 
managerial autonomy from all other institutions of both the municipal and regional 
administration.31 As far as managerial autonomy is concerned, ministerial guidelines 
suggest that the general manager should establish the objectives of the enterprise, 
plan activities, define the means to achieve the objectives, decide on the allocation of 
human and financial resources, determine the organisation of the administrative units 
and staff allocation, and monitor the results achieved. In particular, the ministerial 
paper emphasises the importance of organisational autonomy for the full 
development of managerial autonomy.32
30 Article 3, comma 1 bis, Legislative Decree no. 229/99.
31 ‘Orientamenti per il nuovo assetto organizzativo e gestionale delle stmtture sanitarie’, Ministero 
della SanitA, 8 June 1995, p. 14.
32 Ministero della SanM (1995:55-57).
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But the regional interpretation of this juridical autonomy contributed to define in 
practice the scope for general managers to take autonomous action. The 1995 
ministerial guidelines for the implementation of the 1992 legislation seemed to 
acknowledge the risk of regions encroaching directly on the management of local 
health authorities, rather than confining their activities only to overall planning 
functions. Regions should determine only the ‘general principles’ of local health 
authorities' bureaucratic autonomy.33 In particular, the guidelines emphasised the 
exclusive responsibility of general managers with regard to human resources, such as 
establishing staffing levels, allocation, and organisational plans: 'it should not be the 
region’s responsibility to define the allocation of staff.34
The scope for managerial autonomy depends on how regions have defined the role of 
local health authorities in the broader framework of the regional health care system. 
This affects the opportunities of general managers for exercising their influence. In 
Emilia Romagna, where regional health care plans have emphasised the regulatory 
and planning activities of local health authorities, the general manager is more able 
to influence health care policy locally than in Lombardy, where local health 
authorities were given a passive third-party payer responsibility. In the former type 
of local health authority, the ‘planner’, general managers have greater opportunities 
to determine priorities, activities and the allocation of resources. They enjoy 
relatively more independence in negotiating contracts with external providers and 
bargaining on the prices, quantity and quality of services produced by public
33 ‘Orientamenti per il nuovo assetto organizzativo e gestionale delle strutture sanitarie’, Ministero 
della Sanita’, 8 June 1995, p. 43.
34 ‘Orientamenti per il nuovo assetto organizzativo e gestionale delle strutture sanitarie’, Ministero 
della SanitA’, 8 June 1995, p.47.
35 The instrument of planning of the local health authority is called ‘Piano delle Attivita Locale’, 
literally Local Plan of Activities'. The PAL is formulated by the general management of the local 
health authority but inputs are received by the Conference of Mayors and the regional administration.
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hospitals or private providers of health care services. They negotiate annual service 
agreements with the internal units of LHAs, such as hospitals or health care centres 
or clinics. This type of local health authority, the planner, is engaged in greater 
regulatory and administrative activities than the ‘insurer type’ (Mapelli 1999; 
Reviglio 1999). The planner local health authority has highly integrated production 
and purchasing functions within its own structure. These give the general managers 
greater power over the different units of the organisation.
Conversely, where regional health care plans and legislation have opted for a third- 
party payer responsibility, the local health authorities’ role in planning and 
controlling demand is severely curtailed and fulfilled instead by the regional 
administration. For instance, it is clearly stated in Regional Law no. 31 of 1997, 
Regione Lombardia, that 'the autonomy of local health care enterprises must be 
exercised within the constraints posed by regional planning'. 36 In regions such as 
Lombardy the stated priority of the regional health care system is to give unlimited 
freedom to patients to choose between private and public providers.37 Unlike the 
‘planner’ type, the possibility of collusion between the local health authority and its 
own hospitals is very much reduced, because this third-party payer model entails the 
separation of purchasers and providers. Regardless of the different models chosen, in 
the period 1995-199938 regions significantly tightened their financial grip on local 
health authorities because these were running huge deficits.39
36 Article 7, ‘Natura ed organi delle ASL’, Regional Law no. 31 of 1997, Regione Lombardia.
37 The problem with this system is that local health authorities find it problematic to remain within the 
budget constraints of their per capita financial grant
38 The year 1995 is considered a ‘new beginning’ of the Italian health care system because the central 
state levelled off all local health authorities budget deficits. Thus one could argue that the 
implementation of the 1992 reform in practice started in 1995, although as we have noted regional 
legislation has been enacted since the beginning of 1994.
39 ‘Health Care systems in transition: Italy’, European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 5 
December 2001.
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To recap, the regrouping of local health authorities, combined with the opportunities 
offered to general managers by the institutional predominance of the planner model, 
created the conditions for the emergence of powerful general managers as key policy 
makers in the definition of local priorities and decisions affecting these localities, 
which were previously dominated by local political elites. This tendency was 
consolidated by a widespread and consistent pattern of introduction of outcome and 
performance measurement, which has largely replaced formal controls on legal and 
administrative acts (Del Vecchio 2002). In addition to these primarily economic 
indicators of local health care authorities, there has been a consistent tendency from 
1995 onwards towards strengthening the introduction of quality indicators, for 
instance, of delivered health care services. In 1996 a ministerial decree introduced 
159 qualitative indicators for the level of personalisation, humanisation, access to 
information and prevention activities. Self-evaluation mechanisms have been 
introduced more recently to monitor the performance of medical teams within 
hospitals.40
The relative power of regional managers and political elites is not a zero sum game. 
Most of the public managers interviewed acknowledged the opportunities given to 
them by legislation, and described concrete cases in which they had used them, but 
had also witnessed the interference of political elites and regional administrative 
officials in their management41 One of these managers, for example, said: The 
situation has deteriorated. The general manager has to follow his political master, 
who is not necessarily the regional minister of health, but the party who has 
sponsored him. The general manager is not free to appoint senior consultants and
40 ‘Le Carte di Controllo. Strumenti per il govemo clinico’, Collana Dossier, no. 66, 2003, Regione 
Emilia Romagna.
41 ‘Manifesto per la rinascita della sanitd’, Corriere della Sera, 8 February 2004.
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heads of departments.'42 Another public manager who had been working for ten years 
as general manager of Parma's local health care authority openly expressed his 
resentment of 'the diminishing power of general managers'.43 He continued by 
suggesting that: 'it is not true that mayors have been marginalised. The mayor still 
has a lot of power against the general manager. A weak bureaucracy serves partisan 
interests much better than a strong one and the real problem in Italy is the weakness 
of the bureaucracy, unable to resist partisan pressure.' But he also admitted that: 
'when I was general manager in Parma I fired many senior consultants -- one was 
even an MP'.
To conclude, the regional implementation legislation introducing general 
management has shown a high degree of efficiency as regards the timing of its 
implementation, but has been slightly more cautious regarding the merger of local 
health authorities. The size of local health authorities was increased overall and this 
led to a dilution of the representation of individual municipalities and mayors in the 
organisation of the local health care authorities. Another consequence associated 
with the merger was the subsequent territorial and administrative articulation of local 
health authorities into districts, the smallest units. Democratic mechanisms of 
representation were introduced at this level, but their management was firmly 
controlled by the general manager. Overall, general managers have gained power at 
the expense of local elites, with reference also to the new planning role of local 
health care authorities. The extent to which regional managers influence health care 
strategy depends on the type of local health care authority chosen by regional 
governments. The planner model offers managers greater impact. Therefore, the
42 Renato Both, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
43 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
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administrative and functional reorganisation which followed the 1992 reform has 
offered managers a great opportunity to have a pervasive influence in local decisions.
The Recovery of Mayors: the 1999 Reform and National Elites Political Strategy
Towards the end of the 1990s, general managers came under fierce attack by 
professionals and elected officials for their autocratic management of local health 
care authorities and hospitals.44 The introduction of fee-for-service led some 
managers to increase consumption of the most profitable services in order to pay for 
budget deficits. Managers were severely criticised for their excessive financial 
concern for the budget and cost-effectiveness, while paying only secondary attention 
to clinical management and quality of services.45 They were also criticised for their 
excessive power over consultants. As one official of the largest hospital doctors’ 
association said, 'the general manager is very powerful in relation to doctors, 
including senior consultants, whom he can dismiss without any performance 
assessment. Doctors in hospitals have never been so frustrated because they are 
stressed by citizens, by the public manager and by economic performance targets.'46
The professionals’ objection is combined with that of politicians, who realise that 
differently from them -- as most local elected officials are professional politicians in 
Italy and are recruited through political parties (Randelli 2000) ~  public managers 
have acquired technical expertise and knowledge. Excessive technocracy was 
despised by political elites in particular. As one politician suggested, 'we need to
44 R. Bindi, interview with author, Oxford, 25 October 2002, and Vasco Giannotti, interview with 
author, Rome, 16 July 2003 and Serafino Zucchelli, interview with author, Rome, 18 July 2003.
45 This criticism is partially unjustified because public managers’ performance is evaluated primarily 
on the basis of the achievement of an annual balanced budget, which is a justified requirement given 
the recurrent situation of budget deficits and the regional responsibility for covering them.
46 Serafino Zucchelli, interview with author, Rome, 18 July 2003.
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reintroduce the management board because the management system of local health 
authorities is excessively monocratic and technocratic. This runs against the 
democratic governance of the system. We need to restore the role of the mayors in 
organising health care services.'47 Very recently, the present Minister of Health has 
attacked private sector management in the health care system.48
This second section of the chapter presents the legal context created by the 1999 
Bindi reform, leading to the re-establishment of the centrality of Italian mayors in the 
health care sector,49 a measure primarily defined as a ‘political counterbalance’ to the 
allegedly excessive technical power of general managers. National executive decree 
no. 229 of 1999, known as the Bindi reform, formalised the participation of mayors 
in the regional planning process and in the performance evaluation of general 
managers. This decree was preceded by the parliamentary enactment of the 
Delegating Law no. 419 of 1998, by which the Italian Parliament delegated 
legislative power to the executive and set out the general principles to follow in order
47 Vasco Giannotti, interview with author, Rome, 16 July 2003.
48 Girolamo Sirchia, ‘Concorrenza e quality cosi guarird Asl e ospedali,’ II Sole 24 Ore, 8 January 
2003.
49 Italian mayors have been mainly political entrepreneurs, unlike their French counterparts, who have 
been more integrated within the administrative system (Tarrow 1977). The channel of recruitment of 
mayors has primarily been partisan involvement or militancy in interest groups such as the trade 
unions. Political entrepreneurialism refers to the fact that the Italian mayor is forced to cultivate 
political contacts at the centre to capture resources for the community (Tarrow 1977). Consequently, 
the most frequent contacts are those with national politicians rather than bureaucrats, and integration 
between centre and periphery occurs more readily at the bottom of the system than at the top of the 
administration. However, this system is time and energy consuming for Italian mayors who tend to 
despise their role. The combination of partisanship and entrepreneurialism determined a high level of 
frustration until the beginning of the 1990s, when local government reforms introduced significant 
changes aimed at transforming the role of the mayor from a partisan agent to ‘administrator’ (Law no. 
81 of 1993). The introduction of the direct election of Italian mayors, combined with a different 
pattern of recruitment which extended to candidates from civil society, created a new generation of 
mayors more careful about service delivery. Nevertheless, the frustrations of mayors are compared to 
Sisyphus (Vandelli 1997). The Budget Law 2003 and 2004 has reduced further the financial resources 
granted to municipalities (3% in the 2004 Budget Law, see ‘Dalla Finanziaria sempre meno soldi’, IL 
Sole 24 Ore, 6 October 2003). Mayors are most recently enthusiastic about the strengthened 
legislative powers transferred with the constitutional reform no. 3/2001: most mayors (90%) say they 
are in favour of using the legislative power to enact ad hoc rules and regulation, whenever needed (see 
‘II sindaco vota si al cambiamento’, 11 Sole 24 Ore, 6 October 2003).
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to amend the 1992 Amato legislation.50 After examining how the recovery of mayors 
was set out by the delegating law in 1999, different regional experiments in 
redefining the balance between political representation and functional needs are 
analysed.
The Mayor's Participation in Regional Plans and in the Evaluation o f General 
Managers
Two important reforms in 1999 helped the recovery of the mayor's role in health care 
policy: the reform of participation in regional planning activities, and the rules 
governing performance evaluation and dismissal of appointed general managers. 
Letter 1) of Article 2 of Law no. 419/1998, as approved by the Lower Chamber, 
states that 'in the legislative activities, delegated by this Parliament, the executive 
must strengthen the role of municipalities and of their representative institutions in 
the planning procedures at regional and local levels and in the evaluation of 
performance of local health authorities and hospitals [...] although they must remain 
excluded from functions and responsibility of direct management of health care'.51 
The Senate amended this text substantially by suggesting the creation of a new 
institution of policy co-ordination at regional level to ensure the participation of 
municipalities in the planning process.52 When the bill returned to the Lower House 
of Parliament for final enactment, this amendment was fiercely criticised, mainly for
50 The government bill, regarding ‘Delega al govemo per la razionalizzazione del Servizio Sanitario 
Nazionale e per l’adozione di un testo unico in materia di organizzazione e funzionamento del 
Servizio sanitario nazionale. Modifiche al decreto legislativo 30 December 1992, no. 502’, was 
approved by the Lower Chamber on 26 May 1998, then amended by the Senate on 22 September 
1998, and finally enacted after the final revision of the Lower Chamber on 10 November 1998.
51 Dossier Prowedimento, ‘Delega per il riordino del Servizio sanitario nazionale’, Iter alia Camera, 
A.C. 4230-B-, no. 612/2, XIII Legislature, November 1998, Camera dei Deputati, Servizio Studl
52 The problem of co-ordination and integration between regions and municipalities has been 
acknowledged as the key variable of future development by President Ghigo, President of Piemonte, 
in ‘Le regioni in difesa sui fondi non erogati’, II Sole 24 Ore, 29 September 2003.
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two reasons. First, new institutions would be a burden on regional public finance.53 
Secondly, the participation of municipalities in regional planning could, as some 
MPs claimed, adversely accentuate the conflict between mayors and regional elites, 
with the risk of creating a stalemate rather than improving effective planning 
activities.54
New institutional and formal channels for the participation of mayors were set up by 
regional legislation. The delegating law, which was enacted as amended by the 
Senate, and the executive decree, issued by the Ministry of Health in June 1999,55 
provided that a Permanent Conference for Health Care and Social Services Planning 
be established by regional law, to ensure co-ordination between different local actors 
and levels of government. Members of this Conference are the mayors of the 
competent municipalities, in cases where the area covered by the local health 
authority overlaps with the municipality, or the President of the Conference of 
Mayors in all other cases, along with representatives of regional associations of local 
government.56 The responsibilities of the Conference are to approve the regional 
health care plan and to control implementation of hospitals' local implementation 
plans, according to the procedures established by regional law.57
As far as the formal mechanisms of policy co-ordination are concerned, Emilia 
Romagna, in compliance with the national framework, introduced permanent
53 The bill majority rapporteur in the Budget Committee of the Lower House, Mr Sergio Chiamparino, 
Democrats of the Left, raised some concerns about the new financial burden resulting from the 
creation of the new regional co-ordinating institution. (See Meeting of the V Permanent Budget 
Committee in the Lower House, 29 September 1998).
54 Domenico Gramazio, MP, Plenary Session of the Lower House of Parliament, 2 October 1998, 
A.C. 417.
55 Decreto Legislativo 19 Giugno 1999, no. 229, regarding ‘Norme per la razionalizzazione del 
Servizio Sanitario nazionale, a norma delTarticolo 1 della legge 30 Novembre 1998, no. 419*.
56 Article 2 ,2-bis, Executive Decree no. 229/1999.
57 Article 2 ,2-ter, Executive Decree no. 229/1999.
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conferences with Regional Law no. 3 of 21 April 1999. These conferences are given 
policy co-ordination and planning functions at local level, often corresponding to the 
area of the local health authority. The participation of mayors, who are members of 
the conferences, is also emphasised in the 1999-2001 Regional Health Care Plan.58 
Similarly, regional law in Tuscany has created a permanent Conference for Health 
Care and Social Services Planning in 2000.59 Regional Law no. 31 of 1997 had 
already introduced this institution in Lombardy,60 but the definition of functions and 
composition is established by administrative regulation and not specified by regional 
law. The latest 2002-2004 Regional Health Care Plan of Regione Lombardia 
contains no reference to the participation of mayors and municipalities in regional 
planning activities, or to the co-ordinating institutions of conferences.61 Arguably, 
the role of these formal conferences was primarily consultative and implemented at 
the discretion of the regional executive. As one MP has claimed: 'Conferences do not 
count much and municipalities are left out because they do not have financial 
resources. Their role is only of consultation ex post.'62 The scope of mayors’ 
participation in the process of regional planning thus remains more formal and legal 
than substantial.
58 Section 2, ‘Le politiche della Regione’, 1999-2001 Regional Health Care Plan, Emilia Romagna, 
states: 'regional laws emphasise a strong orientation towards making more valuable the role of local 
government, not only as regards functions of control, but also general policy and evaluation of the 
activities of local health authorities1.
59 Article 15 of Regional Law no. 22 of 2000, Regione Toscana, establishes that the Permanent 
Conference of Health and Social Services Planning is a consultative body of the regional executive. It 
expresses an opinion on the proposal of the regional health care plan, on all bills regarding health care, 
on acts of concerted action between local health authorities, on guidelines produced by the regional 
Giunta for the formulation of implementing hospital plans and local plans.
60 Article 6, comma 9-bis of Regional Law no. 31 of 1997, Regione Lombardia, introduced the 
Permanent Conference as first established by the 1992 reform, which did not specify the functions and 
centrality of this institution. The 1997 regional law provides that the Conference’s functions and 
composition be set out in deliberations of the Giunta.
61 Regional Health Care Plan, 2002-2004, Regione Lombardia.
62 Maria Grazia Labate, interview with author, Rome, 21 July 2003.
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The second most important aspect of mayors’ reappraisal is the evaluation of the 
activities of local health authorities and the performance of general managers, 
resulting in the renewal or annulment of their appointment. According to one 
interviewee, Minister Bindi decided that the mayor had to control the general 
managers'.63 Another elected official in Tuscany suggested that 'the general manager 
is crucified by the mayor'.64 He also revealed the political significance and 
fundamental unresolved problem of mayors’ participation in health care policy: 'the 
problem of mayors’ participation is an open wound, also considering that the 1999 
reform did not give them back substantial powers'.
Delegating Law no. 419 of 1998 established that 'regions have to ensure that 
municipalities and their representative institutions are involved in the procedures of 
annulment of the appointment and performance evaluation of general managers, as 
far as the general performance of local health authorities and hospitals are concerned, 
in relation to the targets set out by regional planning'.65 It is interesting to note that 
the original bill66 presented by the executive to Parliament on 9 October 1997 had 
emphasised that the performance evaluation be based on the broad health care policy 
objectives set out by regions, and not exclusively on the economic goal of balanced 
budget. The text adopted by the Lower Chamber did not foresee the evaluation of 
performance on the basis of regional objectives and seemed to favour evaluation ad
63 Renato Botti, interview with author, Milan, 21 June 2001.
64 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
65 Article 2, letter u), Law no. 419 of 1998.
^Article 2 comma a) of the original bill (A.C. 4230) proposed to  strengthen the role of municipalities, 
in particular referring to regional health care planning activities, in the evaluation of the activities of 
general managers of local health care authorities, and also their dismissal'. Article 3 of the same bill 
proposed 'regions to establish general criteria for the performance evaluation of general managers of 
local health care enterprises, with particular attention to the achievement of targets of regional 
planning'.
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personam.61 However, the Senate amended the text, which then conformed more 
closely to Minister Bindi's original bill. Eighteen months after the appointment of 
general managers, regional governments assess their performance in order to confirm 
their appointment, prior to consultation with the mayors or the conference of mayors, 
and, in the case of hospitals, with the Permanent Conference for Social and Health 
Care Planning.68 Mayors or the conference of mayors must also be consulted if 
regions decide to dismiss general managers.69 In the case of poor management, in 
particular the lack of implementation of the Local Implementing Plans or 'Piani 
attuativi localf, the mayors or the conference of mayors can request annulment of the 
appointment and the dismissal of the general manager by the regional government. 
The direct and personal participation of the mayor becomes even more tangible in the 
case of public hospitals, where the dismissal and confirmation procedures for general 
managers must involve the mayor of the city — often capital of the province -- in 
which the hospital is located. The centrality of individual mayors of cities which are 
capitals of the provincial area, where the local health authority is usually located, is 
confirmed by an interviewee who reveals that ‘the President of Mantova Province, 
who is incidentally a senior consultant, has great influence, even on the President of 
the Region, Formigoni'.70
To sum up, the 1999 reform restores the role of the mayors in health care policy, a 
role which was severely curtailed in 1992 so as to isolate partisan politics from 
public management. National law strengthens the participation of mayors or their
67 Social Affairs Committee, Lower Chamber, meetings of 29 and 30 September 1998. Also Plenary 
Sessions, Lower Chamber, 1,2,4 and 5 October 1998.
68 Art 3-bis, comma 6, ‘Direttore generale, direttore amministrativo e direttore sanitario’, Executive 
Decree no. 229 of 1999.
69 Art 3-bis, comma 7, ‘Direttore generale, direttore amministrativo e direttore sanitario’, Executive 
Decree no. 229 of 1999.
70 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
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associations during the regional planning process to ensure ’better co-ordination 
between inter-institutional levels'71 and their political control over the activities of 
local health care authorities and evaluation of general managers to 'reintroduce 
political control of health care which cannot merely be reduced to an economic and 
financial problem'.72 However, Bindi’s arguments in favour of more coherent 
planning functions, democratic accountability of mayors to compensate for non­
elected general managers, and increased territorial representation within an otherwise 
functionally dominated regional centralisation, are not empirically convincing for 
two reasons.
First, public finance obligations implemented by the 1998 Budget Law made the 
‘participation’ of municipalities unrealistic because they did not have own resources. 
For instance, the legal possibility that municipalities could provide services which 
exceeded minimum national standards was not an actual possibility unless 
communes received additional grants from the centre or from regions.73 The second 
major consideration regarding Bindi’s strategy is that its real objective, beyond 
rhetorical statements, was not only to foster local democracy and the democratic 
governance of health care authorities, but also to preserve key access points of 
partisan competition offered by ‘direct access’ (Page and Goldsmith 1987).
The results of local elections and the recovery of the centre-right, which had been 
consistently defeated since 1993, corroborate this argument. The centre-left 
coalition, due to its greater internal cohesion, defeated 70 per cent of Italian mayors
71 Minister Bindi, speech to the XII Committee of Social Affairs, Lower Chamber, 30 September 
1998.
72 Rosy Bindi, interview with author, 1 August 2003.
73 This point is made by many Senators of the opposition, such as Tomassini, Pardini, Bruni, XII 
Committee of Health Care, Senate, 16 June, 17 June, 23 June, 24 June, and 7 July, 1998.
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in the first direct elections (Baldini and Legnante 2003). Given the collapse of old 
parties such as the Christian Democrats, and considering that Forza Italia had still to 
consolidate its presence, the centre-left coalition found few obstacles in its way. The 
1995 regional elections confirmed this trend (Di Virgilio 1996). However, after 
1997, the year in which the first directly elected mayors were subject to electoral 
scrutiny of their performance, the party system had restructured itself and new parties 
had emerged, most noticeably Forza Italia (Baldini and Legnante 1998).
In 1997 most mayors in the big cities were confirmed in their positions, but in 1998 
the centre-right did win more than 12 mayors' positions from the centre-left (Baldini 
and Legnante 2000). The centre-right was gaining electoral support at local level, a 
traditional bastion of the centre-left. This situation could have become more 
alarming if directly elected centre-right presidents of regions and appointed regional 
ministers of health care had controlled this sector, which the centre-left has 
traditionally found difficult to penetrate.74 The personalisation of politics at the 
regional level, combined with functional regional centralising measures justified by 
efficient planning, was conducive to a one-party, or better one-coalition, regional 
political system, which Bindi tried to undermine by restoring the mayors' role as the 
most effective channel of political representation at local level.
Bindi has effectively defined the problem as follows: 'the real question, as far as the 
return of politics to the health care sector is concerned, is that regions have a conflict 
of interest when they appoint and simultaneously control the appointed public 
managers and when regions pretend to manage health care instead of only confining
74 Chiara Rinaldini, interview with author, Rome, 17 July 2003.
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their activities to planning'.75 Rather than curtailing the power of public managers 
per se, Bindi was primarily concerned with the possibility of region creating a 
decisional space removed from national political competition, which would 
undermine opposing political parties at the centre and reduce the access points for 
political competition. In her strategy to restore the role of mayors, she was 
legitimised by the electoral success of the partito dei sindaci, literally ‘party of the 
mayors’, represented by the mayors of big cities. These became political figures of 
national relevance, such as Cacciari in Venice, Rutelli in Rome, Bassolino in Naples, 
Orlando in Palermo and Bianco in Catania (Baldini and Legnante 1998). The partito 
dei sindaci emerged as a response to the public's disenchantment with party 
government. It was the only political institution capable of gaining citizens’ trust and 
approval, as confirmed by the high number of winning incumbents.76 Bindi argues 
that mayors are the only legitimate and democratically elected actors in local 
government.77 She makes the case for ‘democratic’ governance of health care as the 
necessary underpinning principle of combining efficiency and equity. But she 
ignores the fact that regional presidents enjoy the same direct accountability and 
democratic legitimacy as mayors. Thus, the argument of democracy does not appear 
to be sufficient reason for restoring the role of mayors.
75 Rosy Bindi, interview with author, Rome, 16 July 2003.
76 70 per cent of incumbents was confirmed in 1997 and 1999 local elections (Baldini and Legnante 
2000).
77 Before the 1993 reform of local government, mayors were selected by local councils elected by a 
pure proportional representation electoral system. They were appointed after long and convoluted 
distribution of offices among political parties. In the same way the local members of the Giurtta, the 
executive structure of the municipality, represented different factions and delegations of political 
parties. The collegiality of the Giunta and cohesion was extremely low. Most of the local political 
class was recruited through political parties and local councillors were professional politicians. This 
system was highly unstable and came under attack during the general crisis of the political system in 
1992. In order to provide greater stability and goveraability to local politics, in 1993 Law no. 81 
introduced the direct election of the mayor and the president of the province. Concurrently the Law 
introduced majoritarian elements in the municipal elections. The mayor has the power to appoint the 
members of the Giunta and annul their appointment. For larger municipalities, members of the 
executive Giunta must renounce their office as councillors (no dual mandate is possible). As argued 
by Baldini and Legnante, the direct election of mayors has contributed, among other things, to the 
isolation of mayors from partisan politics in the local council (Baldini and Legnante 2000). The 
personalisation of political leadership has caused greater autonomy of mayors from partisan politics.
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Regional Variations in Neutralising Strategies
The objective of this third section is to analyse the degree of resistance of political 
elites in three regions, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Lombardy, to implementing 
general management introduced by the 1992 Amato reform as a remedy against 
partitocrazia and in order to reshape the state.78 Each of these regions has responded 
differently to the national elites’ strategy of curbing the emerging influence of 
general managers, but in general the role of the mayor has been a critical issue. Each 
has devised its own organisational and administrative solutions to the mayor's 
participation in formulating health care policy decisions, ranging from nominal 
participation to real management functions. Regions are analysed in turn, 
highlighting the ways in which power was restored to the local political elites.
Emilia-Romagna: Piani per la Salute
In Emilia Romagna, the mayors’ greatest opportunity to participate in the decision­
making process affecting their local communities is represented by the 'Piani per la 
Salute', literally Health Care Plans, which are the products of a negotiation process 
between institutions and actors involved in the provision of local health care services. 
One of the main purposes of this method of negotiation is to open up horizontally the 
otherwise centralised planning process to local organisations and citizens.79 The 
general guidelines issued by the regional Giunta as regards the Piani per la Salute
78 G. Amato makes the case for radically reforming the entire underpinning norms of the public 
administration to resuscitate it from the condition of ‘atrophy’, as cited in Ginsborg (2001).
79 This methodology of negotiated planning is defined as ‘networking’ by official documents, see 
‘Ricerca-intervento: I Piani per la salute come contesti di partecipazione alle decisioni locali,’ Azienda 
Sanitaria Regionale, Regione Emilia-Romagna, March 2003. For comprehensive information also 
see: www.regione.emilia-romagna.it/agenziasan/ppsAndex.htm.
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establish that such local networks must be ‘owned by local institutions, must cope 
with health care problems in a cross-sectoral way, and must encourage informed 
participation by citizens'.80 The Piano is defined as 'the three-year collaborative 
action plan, co-ordinated by local government. The constituting members provide 
human and material resources in order to improve the welfare of local 
communities.'81 The co-ordinating institution of this network is the Conferenza 
Socio-Sanitaria Territoriale, literally the Local Social and Health Care Conference, 
headed by a mayor. It puts together and enacts the Piani per la Salute and is 
delegated by the region with policy and planning powers.82
The Piano per la Salute has administrative and political implications for the 
municipalities’ competencies in welfare services. This policy instrument responds to 
the 1998-2000 National Health Care Plan’s request that co-ordination and 
collaboration be accepted as an alternative to competition between those involved in 
the provision of health care services.83 The aim is to avoid the fragmentation which 
can result from competition between local health care authorities. These are instead 
encouraged to use their technical expertise to support the municipalities because 'one 
of the greatest limitations of mayors’ power is the lack of information and technical 
expertise'.84 However, the Piano has political significance as well, namely 
institutional identification of the level of government which corresponds to 
municipalities as the central co-ordinating mechanism of cross-sectoral policy
80 Deliberation no. 321 issued by the Regional Giunta, Regione Emilia Romagna, 1 March 2000, 
‘Linee guida ai Piani per la Salute’.
81 Deliberation no. 321 issued by the Regional Giunta, Regione Emilia Romagna, 1 March 2000, 
‘Linee guida ai Piani per la Salute’
82 Regional Law no. 419 and no. 153 of 1998 delegated policy and planning power from regions to the 
local social and health care conferences.
83 The 1998-2000 National Health Care Plan proposed the elaboration of ‘Patto di Solidarieta della 
Salute’, literally ‘Solidarity Pact for Health Care’
84 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
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actions, including housing, transport, environment and leisure, all of which have a 
direct bearing on local welfare.
The introduction of general management and pro-market reform ideas in 1992 was 
accused of increasing the ‘democratic deficit’ in the health care sector (Stefanini and 
Zanichelli 2002). This needs to be assessed in the light of evidence of the 
municipalities’ participation in the elaboration of the Piani per la Salute. For 
instance, one interviewee confirmed the centrality of the local council of the city of 
Modena in developing the Piano in that local area.85 The Local Health Care 
Conference of Parma has created a management board, the Gruppo di Direzione, 
which consists of representatives of municipalities, universities and local health care 
authorities, charged with the responsibility to 'promote the information and 
participation of citizens in the elaboration of the Piano, to create a network of 
exchange of information between participants, to foster collaboration between public 
and private citizens, to monitor the stages of each individual project'.86 But the 
technical and operational content of the Piani is often sacrificed to the priority of 
reaching consensus and concerted actions for political reasons. One interviewee 
explained the political salience of this process: 'the Piani per la Salute are only a way 
of achieving political consensus between the actors involved in health care. They are
85 Aldo Taroni, interview with author, Bologna, 22 July 2003. Modena is a province of 650,000 
inhabitants, which comprises 47 municipalities and two health care public enterprises — one is the 
local heath authority and the other is the hospital. Since 1993 intersectoral plans and actions existed 
to foster local welfare, such as the ‘Tavolo di lavoro per la Sicurezza sulla strada’ (1993), or 
‘Campagna per lo Screening dei Tumori femminili’ (1996). The hospital network consists of nine 
local hospitals, and other private hospitals for a total of 10,000 hospital consultants. The voluntary 
sector is represented by 230 associations. The local social and health care conference has adopted a 
methodology of decision-making based on ‘shared values' among actors, such as equity, efficiency, 
sustainability, decentralisation, and based on negotiated plans and intersectoral investments. Among 
the players we find the province, municipalities, local health care authorities, university, high schools, 
non-profit organisations, trade unions, private providers, and individual citizens. Citizens participate 
in the smallest health care administrative unit of the Distretto. For more detailed information on the 
experience of Modena and other cities in Emilia Romagna see: Insieme per la salute. Un nuovo modo 
di programmare le politiche sanitarie. I Piani per la salute nel 2002*, Bologna, Regione Emilia 
Romagna.
86 Aldo Taroni, interview with author, Bologna, 22 July 2003.
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political propaganda.'87
Tuscany: Societa della Salute
A comparable instrument of negotiated planning has recently been devised by the 
Regione Toscana with the Societa della Salute, literally Welfare Societies, created by 
the 2002-2004 Regional Health Care Plan.88 According to the executive proposal 
approved by the Regional Council,89 the Societa della Salute has fully fledged 
organisational, managerial and financial responsibilities for the provision of all 
health and social services in the local area except hospital services. They are charged 
with the management of social care, health care, primary care, specialist medicine, 
ambulatory care, and general medicine. As regards administrative instruments, they 
must adopt a service contract which establishes the relationship between the Societa 
della Salute and stakeholders; a Piano integrato di Salute, literally local integrated
plan; an annual report on the state of welfare in the local community; an annual 
budget; and a virtual budget for controlling demand and allocating resources. 
Therefore, compared with the institutional solution of Emilia Romagna, the welfare 
societies do have financial resources90 and direct management functions. The Piani 
per la Salute in Emilia Romagna do not have additional own financial resources and 
also depend heavily on the local health authority for human resources. The lack of
87 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
88 Deliberation of the Regional Council, no. 6 of 9 April 2002, Regione Toscana, ‘Piano sanitario 
regionale 2002-04 -  Linee Guida per la formazione del Piano integrato sociale 2002-2004’, Section 
3.2.
89 ‘Atto di indirizzo regionale per l’awio della sperimentazione delle societA della salute’, 
Dipartimento alia Salute e delle politiche di solidarieta, Regione Toscana, 19 June 2003.
90 The budget of the Societa is made of the resources provided by the members. An important source 
of income will be provided by the Region during the initial stage only. The Societa is responsible for 
the elaboration of a virtual budget (‘virtual’ because financial resources are individually owned by the 
constituting members). The budget is based upon historical expenditure on health care activities. In 
the case of budget deficits, the SocietA should commit to correct it in the following year. There is also 
a virtual budget regarding the cost of hospital services used by the local community.
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clear financial own resources is listed as one of the major reasons for the lack of 
interest demonstrated in this policy tool as against others (Biocca 2003).
The emphasis on citizens’ participation and involvement of the voluntary sector is a 
similarity between the Societa della Salute and the Piani per la Salute?1 The Societa 
della Salute is an instrument for mobilising political support and consolidating 
political parties’ local power base. The regional Giunta in Tuscany has proposed the 
creation of two consultative committees in each SocietaT2 The Consulta del Terzo 
Settore, consisting of representatives from the voluntary sector only, comments on 
the integrated health care plans before their final approval.93 Participating in planning 
activities does not exclude voluntary organisations from being direct service 
providers, because this function is safeguarded by autonomous quality and efficiency 
indicators. The second consultative committee, Comitato di Partecipazione, is 
composed of members appointed by the Giunta, including representatives of the 
local communities, patients and ordinary citizens. Members are not allowed to be 
health care service providers. The Comitato may evaluate the quantity and quality of 
services, and formulate proposals on the effectiveness of patient information, the 
integration of social and health care services, and the dignity and rights of patients. 
The Comitato is obliged to express an opinion on the local integrated plans and on 
the annual report of the Societa. It has access to statistical information and may 
commission research projects to the director of the Societa. It formulates its own
91 In both regions there is a veiy well developed and active civil society. Associations providing 
charities and health care services abound. For instance in Tuscany ambulance services are mostly run 
by voluntary associations, so-called Misericordie.
‘Atto di indirizzo regionale per l’awio della sperimentazione delle society della salute’, 
Dipartimento alia Salute e delle politiche di solidarieti, Regione Toscana, 19 June 2003.
93 These plans set out the health care and general welfare objectives, establishing quantitative targets 
and the instruments to achieve them. In this way, representatives of the non-profit sector (terzo 
settore) participate during the planning exercise.
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report on the implementation of the integrated plans and on the state of local
94services.
Lombardy has devised similar forms of participation for the voluntary sector, 
emphasising the principle of ‘horizontal subsidiarity’. In the political debate about 
recent constitutional reforms, the President of Lombardy has commented that 
'horizontal subsidiarity is one of the key features of innovation. Co-operation with 
private actors is a traditional feature of the Lombard health care and educational 
system. Since 1997 we have encouraged the entry of private providers and ensured 
freedom of choice for patients.'95 The introduction of this principle in the Italian 
Constitution96 is also praised by the President of the Association of Italian 
Communes, for different reasons and with a different strategy: 'the constitutional 
principle introduced with Article 118 of the Constitution is an opportunity for local 
government because municipalities have been the innovative engine of the 
administrative system'.97 ‘Horizontal subsidiarity’ in the case of Lombardy is less 
geared towards grassroots politics and more towards opening up the health care 
market to private providers, compared with other regions. The marginalisation of 
representative institutions of local communities, such as mayors, is consistent with
Q O
the objective of a different relationship between the State and private sector.
94 ‘Atto di indirizzo regionale per l’awio della sperimentazione delle society della salute’, 
Dipartimento alia Salute e delle politiche di solidarieta, Regione Toscana, 19 June 2003, p.7-9.
95‘Inizia l’era del cittadino protagonista’, II Sole 24 Ore, End Locali &PA, 14 July 2003.
96 The amended Article 18 of the Italian Constitution establishes: The State, Regions, Metropolitan 
Areas, and Municipalities, encourage the autonomous initiative of citizens, individual or associated, 
for activities of general interest, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity'.
97 Leonardo Domenici, Mayor of Florence and President of ANCI, interviewed in II Sole 24 Ore, Enti 
Locali &PA, 14 July 2003.
98 According to the study Toscana e Lombardia: due sistemi sanitari a confronto Osservatorio di 
Economia Sanitaria, Agenzia Regionale di Saniti, Toscana, October 2001, the percentage of private 
hospital beds was 27% of the total number of hospital beds in Lombardy, compared to 14% in 
Tuscany; the percentage of hospitalisation in private hospitals was 22% in Lombardy compared to 7% 
in Tuscany; total private expenditure as percentage of total regional health care expenditure was 11% 
in Lombardy and 7% in Tuscany. It is clear that the Lombardy health care system has expanded the
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Tuscany stands out from the other regions because it is the only one in which the 
commune wins back a substantive policy, decision-making and managerial role, 
beyond formal consultation and planning influence. The management function of 
the Societa della Salute is carried out by a Giunta, or management board, consisting 
of the mayors of the local communes, or their delegated elected officials, and the 
general manager of the Local Health Authority." Most of the board's members come 
from representative institutions. The Giunta appoints the general manager of the 
Societa della Salute, 100 who is not appointed by the regional Minister of Health. 
Therefore, the role of mayors and individual communes is not only institutionally 
and organisationally strengthened in relation to management functions, but also 
safeguarded against a highly monopolistic political trust relationship between the 
regional Minister of Health and general managers. The regional Health Care Minister 
confirmed that 'with the Societd della Salute I am decentralising a lot of power to 
mayors and I am reining myself in. The regional council, however, does not 
understand that I am limiting my power significantly and on the contrary insists that I 
am concentrating power for myself.'101
development of private providers in health care provision. For further details see Table 4.5. and 4.6. 
later in this chapter.
99 The Giunta must: approve the budget of the Societi; vote on the ‘Organo di Controllo’; appoint the 
general manager, approve service agreements; define the guidelines for the elaboration of the 
Integrated Health Plans (Piani integrati di Salute); approve the Piani Integrati di Salute and virtual 
budget; approve the annual report; approve all arrangements regarding the internal organisational, 
management, trade unions relations, participation and consultation mechanisms; deliberate as regards 
contracts with GPs and paediatricians, data protection and privacy, quality standards and cost- 
performance indicators.
00 Managers must have a university first degree and at least five years of managerial experience 
acquired in the public or private sectors. They participate in the meetings of the Giunta without voting 
rights. Their responsibilities are to elaborate the Piani Integrati di salute, literally Local Integrated 
Plans, to elaborate the annual report, to elaborate all acts to be approved by the Giunta, and to 
implement all the decisions regarding the management of the Society.
101 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
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The experiment of the Societa della Salute has been praised because ’it is the only 
example in the countiy of a real attempt to revive local communities and local 
government’s involvement in the provision of welfare services'.102 This new structure 
provides 'a strong institutional role for municipalities and mayors'.103 Moreover, 'the 
manager of the Societa is appointed by mayors. We wanted to weaken the 
technocratic power of the local health care authority in relation to the 
municipalities.'104 Many approve the attempt to extend participation to non-profit 
organisations and voluntary associations.
However, despite the democratic and participatory mechanisms built into the Societa 
della Salute, and the institutional recovery of mayors and communes, there has been 
criticism of fragmented planning and of the diminishing size of territorial units,105 
which runs counter to the increase in the size of administrative and planning units 
necessary to achieve economies of scale and efficient functional planning.106 
Another criticism, raised by the opposition in the regional council, has been the 
insufficient commitment to general management in the Societa della Salute}01 The 
purpose of this has been primarily political, as the Minister of Health Care 
acknowledged when he pointed out that:
Next year we have municipal elections (2004) and I hope that the Societd della Salute will 
pay off. Health care has become a key sector in electoral politics. In the past political parties 
did not worry about health care because it is a sector which requires expertise and is highly 
difficult for professional politicians to understand. But at present health care is a key sector 
and I hope that the regional council will be able to legislate on this policy area, as it is really 
technical for regional councillors. We need to reintroduce politics, "good politics'* because it 
is important to govern health care policy democratically. The national health care system is
102 Maria Grazia Labate, interview with author, Rome, 21 July 2003.
103 Aldo Ancona, Co-ordinatore, Dipartimento del Diritto alia Salute, interview with author, Florence, 
29 July 2003.
104Aldo Ancona, interview with author, Florence, 29 July 2003.
105 Rosy Bindi, interview with author, Rome, 18 July 2003.
106 In practice the Society della Salute represents a return to the size of the old local health authority 
before mergers, as prescribed by the 1992 reform.
107 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
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unfortunately seen by the ruling majority of the centre-right as an evil eye, a bad legacy of 
the First Republic.10
Lombardy: Regional Centralisation
Given that Lombardy has the highest rate of municipal fragmentation and the largest 
health care system in the country -- as shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, which compare 
Lombardy with Tuscany — it would be an ideal candidate for greater decentralisation 
of administrative responsibilities from the regional government to the municipalities 
and, thus, for higher mayoral representation. However, compared with other regions, 
the tension between regional planning and local government has reached a 
problematic level and is clearly confirmed by the most recent 2002-2004 Regional 
Health Care Plan: ’until now the size of communes, especially in regions such as 
Lombardy, with one of the highest levels of municipal fragmentation in the country, 
has hindered the integration of services across sectors, triggering three types of 
solutions: delegation of responsibility by the smallest communes to the local health 
authority which includes them; the desperate search for autonomous municipal 
government by cities; and confused overlapping and duplication of services'.109 
Despite official acknowledgement of this problematic relationship, the role of 
mayors and local government remains extremely peripheral, with no health care 
specific institutional or organisational instruments, such as those found in Emilia 
Romagna and Tuscany, for policy co-ordination. An institutional arena, Tavolo delle 
Autonomie, started to operate in 1998 but was not specific to any sector.110 The 
output of its monthly meetings are non-binding Dichiarazioni di Intesa, literally
108 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
109 Section 7.2. of Piano Socio-Sanitario Regionale 2002-04,‘Liberia e innovazione al servizio della 
salute ’, Regione Lombardia.
110 The Tavolo delle Autonomie is made by the President of the Giunta, the mayors of big cities only, 
the presidents of provinces, and representative of the associations of local government.
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declarations of agreements. Despite this occasional attention to local government, 
the region of Lombardy has used full-blown strong ‘legislative, planning, co­
ordinating, controlling powers in relation to local health care authorities’.111 Whereas 
Tuscany and Emilia Romagna have framed the issue of territorial representation and 
the return of politics in an institutional way, so that the territorial question has been 
addressed through the Societa della Salute and Piani della Salute respectively, 
Lombardy has opted for a centralised regional system which delegates residual 
administrative responsibilities only to local health care authorities instead of 
municipalities.
111 Article 1, comma 3, Regional Law no. 31 of 1997,‘Norme per il riordino del Servizio Sanitario 
Regionale e sua integrazione con le attiviti dei servizi sociali’.
Table 4.5 Regional health care size: compared supply between Tuscany and
Lombardy
Tuscany Lombardy Italy
Ratio Difference
Public hospital beds and % on total beds
1996 15.720 (86%) 37.510 (78%) 0,419 -0,819 ------
1997 14.586 (85%) 36.177 (74%) 0,403 -0,851 ------
1998 13.902 (86%) 34.517 (74%) 0,403 -0,852 ------
1999 13.567 (86%) 34.234 (73%) 0,396 -0,865 ------
Private hospital beds and % on total beds
19% 2.603 (14%) 10.374 (22%) 0,251 -1,98 ------
1997 2.574 (15%) 12.616 (26%) 0,204 -1,322 --------------
1998 2.227 (14%) 12.323 (26%) 0,181 -1,388 --------------
1999 2.175 (14%) 12.799 (27%) 0,170 -1,419 --------------
Total number of hospitals
Public 39 135 0,289 -1,103 906
Private 30 55 0,545 -0,588 537
Hospital beds of 1.000 inab. 1999
Public 3,84 3,78 1,02 0,016 —
Private 0,62 1,41 0,44 -0,778 —
Total 4,46 5,19 0,86 -0,151 -----------
Public and private outpatients* clinics
Total for 100.000 inhab. 27,0 9,9 2,73 0,927 16,2
Public for 100.000 inhab. 17,6 5,6 3,14 1,034 7,4
Private for 100.000 inhab. 9,4 4,3 2,19 0,745 8,8
% public out-patients’ clinics 65,1% 56,8% 1,15 0,136 45,7
%
Emergency departments
Departments 185 234 0,79 0,234 3.036
Departments for 100,000 inhab. 5,25 2,61 2,01 0,672 5,28
Emergency doctors 780 1.353 0,57 0,537 15.37
Emergency doctors for 100,000 inab. 22,13 15,10 1,47 0,378 26,76
Source: Annual Report, 2000, Office of Statistics, Regione Lombardia
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Table 4.6 Regional health care size: compared personnel between Tuscany and
Lombardy
Employees of the National Health Care 
System
Tuscany Lombardy
Ratio and 
Difference Italy
General practitioners and paediatricians
General practitioners 3.109 7.451 0,417 -0,822 47.490
Number for 10,000 inhab. 8,82 8,32 0,1060 0,058 8,26
Paediatricians 385 855 0,450 -0,758 6.664
Number for 10,000 inhab <14 years old 9,50 7,33 1,296 0,258 7,85
Personnel in public hospitals
Total for 100 beds 213,8 226,9 0,942 -0,059 214,3
Doctors and dental surgeons for 100 beds 39,0 35,8 1,089 0,086 37,5
Nurses for 100 beds 101,9 91,5 1,114 0,108 91,7
Health care technicians for 100 beds 15,1 13,4 1,127 0,119 12,6
Rehabilitation personnel for 100 beds 2,7 6,1 0,443 -0,773 4,2
Other for 100 beds 54,9 80,1 0,685 -0,373 68,3
Total personnel in public and private hospitals
Total for 10,000 inhab. 104,0 121,9 0,853 -0,158 109,0
Total per 100 beds 196,4 211,3 0,929 -0,073 195,6
Doctors and dental surgeons for 19,2 19,8 19,5
lO.OOOinhab. 0,970 -0,031
Doctors and dental surgeons for 100 beds 36,3 34,4 1,055 0,054 35,0
Nurses for 10,000 inhab. 48,6 48,2 1,008 0,008 45,6
Nurses for 100 beds 91,8 83,5 1,099 0,095 81,9
Health care technicians 10,000 inhab. 7,0 7,0 1,000 0,000 6,1
Health care technicians 100 beds 13,3 12,1 1,099 0,094 11,0
Rehabilitation personnel for 10,000 inhab. 1,5 3,3 0,455 -0,750 2,3
Rehabilitation personnel for 100 beds 2,8 5,8 0,483 -0,698 4,1
Source: Annual Report, 2000, Office of Statistics, Regione Lombardia
Although the most recent regional health care plan in Lombardy calls for ‘the need to 
strengthen the planning, purchasing and controlling functions of local health 
authorities, by contracting out direct service provision’,112 the region tends in 
practice to negotiate most contracts and agreements with private providers through 
accreditamento, the highly centralised accreditation process, and through the 
definition of supply ceilings for each individual public and private provider. As one 
general manager of a private hospital suggested, 'the local health authority does not 
have any power, which is concentrated in the regional administration. The only 
power that local health authorities have is to delay times of authorisation or to delay
112 ‘D ruolo delle ASL\ Piano Socio-Sanitario Regionale 2002-04,‘Liberty e innovazione al servizio 
della salute’, Regione Lombardia.
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reimbursement and payments to providers, but they do not have any contractual 
weight.’ 113
Contrary to national legislation, Lombardy has excluded mayors from the 
performance review of general managers and has made this function one of its 
exclusive prerogatives in the 2002-2004 regional health care plan. Hence, the 
performance evaluation of local health authorities becomes one of the key strategic 
regional activities.114 Whereas in Emilia Romagna and Tuscany, in accordance with 
the Bindi reform, mayors or their associations are involved in the evaluation of 
public managers, in Lombardy not only do indicators of performance seem to relate 
primarily to economic and financial variables, but the region has also proposed the 
creation of an external and independent body, completely outside the national health 
care system, to evaluate ‘individual public managers’. This provision runs counter to 
the Bindi reform’s indication that evaluation should include the achievement of 
macro policy welfare objectives rather than purely financial and economic figures. 
The region has also demanded new competences, such as employment negotiations 
with employees of the national health care system, with general practitioners and 
with all independent contractors, pharmaceutical policy, training and continuing 
education, and the allocation of resources for covering the national minimum 
standards.115
113 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
114 A new unit will be created in collaboration with universities in Milan and owned by the region, the 
‘Centro Studi per la valutazione dei sistemi sanitari e socio sanitari’, to monitor continuously the 
performance of the health care system. Among the indicators: compliance with standards for 
authorisation as set out by regions; quality indicators of activities, based on customer satisfaction; 
waiting lists indicators; economic and financial indicators referred to average cost of patient for each 
local health authority and cost-benefits analysis. (See ‘La valutazione del sistema e delle aziende,’ 
Piano Socio-Sanitario Regionale 2002-2004, ‘Liberty e innovazione al servizio della salute’, Regione 
Lombardia).
115 ‘Devoluzione’, Piano Socio-Sanitario Regionale 2002-2004,‘Libertd e innovazione al servizio della 
salute’, Regione Lombardia.
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The higher degree of political heterogeneity between regional and local elites in 
Lombardy, compared with the other two regions, is key among the factors which 
discourage decentralisation to local political elites.116 Centralisation is favoured by 
the uninterrupted political leadership exercised since 1995 by a directly elected 
President of the region, Roberto Formigoni, Forza Italia, who has succeeded in 
becoming a nationally relevant political figure and whose personal conflict with 
Minister Bindi brought him unprecedented electoral support.117 Formigoni has used 
health care as a means of pioneering the process of region building, for it amounts to 
approximately 75 per cent of the regional budget.118 Despite this strategy of 
differentiation from the centre and the ‘decentralising’ political rhetoric, the Northern 
League, Forza Italia's major coalition partner, has never been publicly and directly 
involved in health care policy and does not have a distinct programme — unlike 
Forza Italia, whose electoral campaign for the 2001 national elections included a 
fierce attack on the, allegedly, ‘centrist and excessively statist Bindi reform’.119 
When in opposition, Berlusconi had defined the Bindi reform as ‘a tragedy for the 
nation, an attack against individual choice and freedom’.120 In similar tones, 
President Formigoni said: ‘Rosy Bindi is a disgrace for Italy, for democracy, for the 
centre-left coalition in government’.121
116 In the most recent local elections on 25-26 May 2003 (total electorate 11 million, 12 provinces and 
500 municipalities) the centre-left gained the majority of municipalities of over 15,000 inhabitants, 
posing a challenge to the centre-right regional coalition. For instance, in Brescia the centre-left 
incumbent, Paolo Corsini, won at the second ballot See: ‘I primi risultati nei Comuni con oltre 
15,000 abitantf, La Stampa, 27 May 2003.
117 Formigoni won 65% of votes in the 2000 regional elections.
118 According to the most recent data on the regional budget for Lombardy, health care amounts to 
18.109 billion Euros, ‘Bilancio della Regione Lombardia 2002-2004*.
119 Antonio Tomassini, interview with author, 26 September 2002.
120 La Stampa, 22 June 1999.
121 La Stampa, 31 May 1998.
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Conclusions
The three regional cases differ in their strategy of using mayors as ‘political 
counterweight’ against rising managers. There is a regional variation in the degree of 
political resistance to technocracy, and the degree of mayors’ participation in 
planning activities and reviewing the performance of general managers. Regions vary 
from Emilia Romagna, where consultation through formal and institutional channels 
is predominant, to Tuscany, where the recovery of the role of mayor is most 
noticeable, to Lombardy, where the tension between the regional and municipal 
levels of government remains unresolved. Regional elites in Tuscany and Emilia 
Romagna are more willing to use the role of the mayor as a way to counteract 
general managers, whereas in Lombardy the regional executive is more concerned 
with centralising power at the expense of mayors. The different strategies for 
technocratic decision making are consistent with the different types of centralised 
functional planning at the regional level. Of the three, Lombardy is the region in 
which regional centralisation at the expense of mayors and territorial representation 
has been most evident. By contrast, Tuscany has emerged as the case in which 
mayors were effectively given back management functions.
The resistance of local political elites to the emergence of a fully-fledged, 
autonomous, technically- oriented health care administration has been the key factor 
impeding a concrete departure from the predominance of partisanship to functionally 
defined welfare administration. However, the position of general managers of local 
health authorities within the local network of policy actors has changed throughout 
the 1990s, as a result of their relative influence granted by regional implementation 
legislation in fulfilment of the 1992 reform. Managers have gained policy influence
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at the expense of local political elites, who have been marginalised from a regionally 
centralised planning and policy making system.
Regions complied rather promptly with those aspects of the 1992 reform which 
contributed to creating the conditions in which general managers could exercise their 
autonomous functions, not without also devising viable solutions to maintain the 
democratic participation of local interests, such as the distretti. The central role that 
mayors used to play in shaping local decisions was inevitably diminished by the 
merger of local health authorities. Another important contributory factor to facilitate 
the rise of managers was the enterprise formula — the juridical transformation of 
local health authorities into public enterprises, with the subsequent provision of 
private law instruments for the adoption of strategic plans. Given a technocracy- 
averse administrative tradition, the emergence of powerful regional bureaucrats has 
been a remarkable achievement and a noticeable departure from a pattern of inertia.
The creation of opportunities for general managers to fulfil their newly acquired 
powers was partially reversed at the end of the 1990s by strategies such as the 
reappraisal of the central role of mayors in local health care services’ organisation, 
planning, and evaluation. This was a neutralising strategy, pursued primarily by 
national political elites, to reaffirm their centrality by supporting the ‘rivals’ of 
managers, namely mayors. In this respect there is a high degree of variation between 
regions. Overall, the managerial responsibilities of mayors have been re-established 
only in Tuscany. In Emilia Romagna and Tuscany the attempt to curb regional 
managers with such a strategy did not produce the intended results.
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I have suggested that the introduction of instruments and solutions to curtail 
managerial autonomy was only partly justified by the direct challenge posed by 
rising general managers to democratic participation and collegial decision-making 
style. National elites were mostly concerned with having local access points to 
political control. The national elites’ primary objective in reappraising the role of 
mayors in health care policy at the end of the 1990s was not to curtail the power of 
general managers per se, nor to abolish the enterprise formula,122 nor solely to 
improve intergovernmental co-ordination. Bindi was increasingly concerned with 
the political opportunities offered to regional ministers of health care and presidents 
of regions to control the health care sector, ensuring political consensus by the 
system of appointing general managers. She claims that: 'the political control of 
health care is a way to mobilise political consensus. The health care regional 
ministers control the general managers in order ultimately to control the appointment 
of senior consultants in hospitals. This is to mobilise political support. In Lombardy 
it is the President of the Region who controls everything.'123 With such a centralised 
political system controlling the top level of the administration, political parties, in 
particular those in opposition, need to ensure that other access points are preserved in 
the system. I argue that this is the fundamental motivation for reappraising the role 
of mayors.
So far I have concentrated on the concerns of local and national political elites. The 
next chapter analyses how regional elites in particular have established political 
control over general managers of local health authorities and, as such, have entered 
into direct conflict with national elites. The introduction of general management has
122 The enterprise formula was quite clearly confirmed and improved by the provision that local public 
enterprises could use instruments of the private sector, such as the atto aziendale di diritto privato, 
literally acts of private law (Article 3 comma 1-bis of Executive Decree no. 229/1999).
123 Rosy Bindi, interview with author, Oxford, 25 October 2002.
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increased conflict in the relationship between national and regional political elites. 
Chapter 5 concentrates on the power struggle between them as a way of 
understanding the wider implications of the 1992 health care reform on the reform of 
the state, in the direction of greater administrative and political decentralisation.
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Chapter V
The Territorial Struggle for Political Representation and Control of 
the Administration: Regions and Resistance from the Centre
The decentralisation of administrative responsibilities to the regions has resulted in 
increased regional administrative capacity. How has this affected the relationship 
between national and regional elites? In the context of welfare services, it has given 
regional elected officials and leaders crucial resources when bargaining and 
negotiating with the central administration and national elites. Emerging 
technocracy, combined with the regional centralisation of health care policy-making 
and co-ordination, has led to changes in the traditional form of territorial political 
representation. Between 1992 and 1999, regional elites, and particularly regional 
executive leaders, used their administrative responsibilities to gain political 
legitimacy because of their commitment to creating an autonomous regional political 
space. They used a variety of instruments and resources to pursue this objective; 
most prominent among which was political control over local health care authorities 
and public hospitals, which they exercised through their power to appoint general 
managers. But this has caused regional elites to come into conflict with national and 
local elites over the control of administrative resources.
This chapter examines the characteristics of the regional executives' new role and
functions by analysing their opportunities. It also investigates the response, at the
end of the 1990s, of central elites to the increased ability of regional elites to use
their administrative role to gain local political legitimacy for themselves and the
institutions they represent. The 1999 Bindi reform represented an attempt to redefine
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the health care system by regulating competition, and also to reorganise the system 
of territorial politics which there had been pressure to change radically since the 
1992 reform. This chapter analyses the ‘recentralisation’ of the Bindi reform, aimed 
at blocking the regionalisation process, in the context of understanding the centrality 
and prominence of political control of health care administration as the single most 
important resource for establishing political legitimacy and consensus at the regional 
level. Accordingly, it concentrates on aspects of the 1999 legislation and issues 
emerging from the parliamentary debate that most affected the political struggle 
between the centre and the regions.
The intention here is to analyse politics about territorial representation by 
understanding politics about health care issues that are fought across territory and 
different institutional levels of government. After looking at the resources available 
to regional leaders to exercise their political control, the second section focuses on 
the issues at stake in the power struggle between national and regional elites. An 
analysis of the parliamentary debate associated with the Bindi policy reversal reveals 
the neutralising strategies and instruments against the regionalisation of welfare 
services. A detailed and selective investigation of the legislation also offers 
invaluable insights into the instruments used to curb the emerging regional 
administrative autonomy, such as centralisation of control functions and hierarchical 
administrative arrangements. The final outcome of this process of neutralising 
regional autonomous capacity is also discussed, although the purpose here is to 
assess the ways in which those actors threatened by change responded to it.
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Regional Political Capacity
Competition between political parties has never been based in the regions -  which 
were created in the 1970s -  as the party system is nationally based (Dente 1985). 
Consequently, regional elected officials have been subject to the decisions of 
national party secretariats regarding the composition of electoral lists and coalition 
strategies. Like the local elites, regional elites had few incentives to pursue policies 
of modernisation and economic growth because of the predominant system of 
clientelistic networks (Tarrow 1974). Scholarly expectation, based mainly on 
empirical research before the end of partitocrazia, is that the emergence of regional 
government in Italy should be characterised by the survival of clientelistic networks, 
‘since their dissolution would undermine the role of elites in attracting and 
distributing resources from central government and free their clients from 
dependence* (Keating 1998). However, regional experimentation in the health care 
sector in the 1990s has required and produced increasing administrative and ‘political 
capacity*.1 A regionally based autonomous political space -  which enhances the role 
of politics in shaping public policy- is emerging, in part owing to the 1995 electoral 
changes intended to favour strong majorities and stable coalitions. Regional political 
elites are growing in influence and are increasingly carving out a visible and 
autonomous space to shape health care policy. The nature and scope of their power 
are discussed, and the sources of -  and constraints on -  their political opportunities 
explored.
1 ‘Political capacity’ is a feature of regional government defined by M. Keating as ‘the ability of 
regions to mobilise support for their policy initiatives, and to take decisions on policies and priorities’. 
(Keating 1998, p. 120).
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Policy Influence o f the Regional Executive
A regional minister of health asserted: ‘I have spent all my energies and personal 
commitment on this regional health care plan. It is my own creation and I have 
conceived it’.2 Regional ministers have a high degree of personal involvement in the 
process of drafting and elaborating the regional health care plan, which sets out the 
operational details of regional planning. There are two reasons for this. First, the 
regional council does not have the technical expertise to deal with the content of 
health care legislation. One official has expressed concern in relation to the pending 
approval by the regional council of the Atti di Concertazione (concerted planning 
acts) of Tuscany's Aree Vaste because, ‘this is the first time that the regional council 
has been called upon to analyse technical aspects of health care policy’.3 Secondly, 
regional health care plans have been used as political manifestos by the regional 
coalition. Consequently, they help the regional executive to mobilise political 
consensus. For instance, the regional health care plan in Lombardy4 emphasises 
freedom of choice for patients, in accordance with the underpinning neo-liberal 
ideology of the centre-right coalition led by Forza Italia. The plan features the main 
programmes on which Forza Italia campaigned in the general elections of 2001. As
2 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
3 Aldo Ancona, interview with author, Florence, 29 July 2003.
4 The Regional Health Plan 2002-04 of Regione Lombardia contains the following elements:
• ordinary citizen at the centre of the regional health care system, thus making public 
administration increasingly more flexible and user-friendly and abandoning formal, bureaucratic 
management;
• identification of health care priorities;
• combination of integration with competition in a ‘network’ logic;
• experiments with various management models seeking to achieve compatibility between needs 
and resources, thus leading to sustainable development; and
• promotion of projects with a considerable innovative institutional and organisational content, 
aimed at pursuing further devolution in the health and social care.
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one interviewee said: 'regional health care plans are only political propaganda and 
rhetoric for differentiating regional from central policies or from other regions’.5
As well as shaping public policy by personal involvement in and commitment to the 
development and enactment of regional health care plans, regional ministers exercise 
their power by interfering in the daily management of health care activities and the 
decision-making of public enterprises. For instance, as one minister admitted: ‘The 
mayor of Grosseto asked me for a vascular surgery division and I gave it to him.’6 A 
technical decision to install new equipment, which one would expect to be taken by 
the general manager of a public hospital or local health authority, was the result of 
informal negotiations between the minister and the mayor of the city. It could be 
argued that regional leaders intervene on a personal basis and that this type of 
behaviour confirms the continuation of clientelistic practices. But apart from the fact 
that clientelism is based on systemic political exchange rather than occasional 
personal favours, this episode exemplifies ‘the tendency of regions to manage the 
health care sector instead of merely planning health care activities’.7
The management power of regional leaders and their scope to shape public policy is 
a result of the regional centralisation of functional planning activities. But their 
power to appoint public managers of local health authorities and public hospitals is 
exclusive, legally established, and direct. The original procedure, as established by 
Executive Decree no. 502 /1992, indicates the selection of general managers from a 
list drawn up by an experts committee, delegated by the Ministry of Health to assess 
the qualifications of candidates. The entire procedure was simplified and transferred
5 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
6 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
7 Maria Grazia Labate, interview with author, Rome, 21 July 2003.
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to the subnational level by law no. 590 of 17 October 1994. Article 1 establishes 
that, after public invitation to apply, regions appoint general managers with the 
necessary prerequisites from ‘among those who have applied’. The appointment is 
subject to confirmation after 18 months. The public notice for application appears to 
temper the personal relationship, forcing the region to choose from a larger supply of 
candidates. The great discretion left to the regions has led to the issue of ‘motivating 
regional appointment’ being taken up by some administrative courts.8 The Council 
of State has decided that ‘there is no need to motivate administrative acts of 
appointment, nor to explain comparative criteria between candidates’.9 This 
judgement is highly controversial (Gallo 1999) because it legitimises the direct 
relationship between regional government and general managers. However, the 
Council of State has legitimated a de facto direct subordination of the top level of 
health care administration to regional leaders.
Administrative and Political Resources
As far as the power resources of regional elites are concerned, the form of 
government and the electoral system have implications for the legitimacy of a 
political control which is based on the direct appointment of general managers. In 
Italy, given the traditional legacy of clientelism, this has always been viewed with 
suspicion as a threat to democratic government. As Endrici argues, political control 
which reflects the principle of political responsibility (Endrici 2000) should be the 
most vigorous antidote to the distorted use of the power of appointment.10 The direct
8 Administrative Court of Lombardy, Decision no. 1095, 5 September 1995 and Administrative Court 
of Piedmont no. 427,27 July 1995.
9 Council of State, Section IV, Decision no. 1139,1 September 1998.
10 In January 1995, the Minister of Health Costa had to annul the appointment of 59 general managers 
by the Regional Giunta of Lombardy. The entire regional executive received notification of 
impending judicial investigation. The recording of a telephone call proved partisan negotiation in the
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election of the President of the Region, and the introduction of majority elements 
into the electoral system, have both increased the stability of regional coalitions and 
given regional government the same direct accountability as municipalities and 
provinces, where the executive has been directly elected since the 1993 reform. 
Despite regional differences in the exercise of political leadership, direct election of 
the regional executive has increased the scope and legitimacy of the appointment 
system and political control over the top level of health care administration. In the 
case of Tuscany, the Minister of Health is free to appoint general managers, as he 
confirmed: ‘The President of the Region does not interfere in my decisions and 
appointments. I am also jealous of my prerogative to appoint general managers, 
although the Council always puts pressure on me to appoint this and that person.’11 
In Lombardy it is the President of the Region himself who intervenes in the 
appointments. One interviewee said that ‘the Minister of Health in Lombardy does 
not count much. It is the President who has total control over public managers in
order to mobilise political consensus.’12
Regional ministers' power derives from increased administrative capacity as well as 
the effects of the new form of regional government and electoral system. As one 
interviewee suggested: ‘the weakness of mayors is that they do not have information, 
whereas at a regional level we are supported by the administration’.13 For example,
appointment of general managers. Some of the excluded managers appealed to the administrative 
court because the regional executive did not justify its decision. Apparently the regional executive 
had commissioned a private consulting firm, Russell Reynolds, with the task of ranking candidates. 
The three best candidates happened to be the ones sponsored later by political parties. For detailed 
coverage of the appointment scandals see II Sole 24 Ore, 12 January 1995 and 26 January 1995, and 
Mondo Economico, 23 January 1995. At that time Lombardy was not the only region affected by this 
problem. In Piemonte the judiciary was investigating the appointment procedures for general 
managers, which were influenced by a private consulting firm (see ‘Nomine Usl. Inchiesta anche a 
Torino; scelta dei managers', La Stampa, 10 January 1995).
11 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
12 Rosy Bindi, interview with author, Oxford, 25 October 2002.
13 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
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in 1995 Emilia Romagna created a Regional Agency for Health Care, the Agenzia 
Sanitaria Regionale, which has a crucial role in providing technical advice to the 
regional minister.14 The Agenzia provides health care authorities with the 
management tools they need, reports annually to the regional Department of Health 
Care on their economic and financial state, and monitors the costs and revenues of 
public enterprises. The Agenzia, which is directed by a general manager appointed 
by the President of the Region, has expertise in organisation and planning. There are 
no comparable agencies in Lombardy or in Tuscany since this expertise tends to be 
provided by the departments of health. In Lombardy, a regional bill in 1993 
proposed the creation of a regional agency, but was rejected by the regional council. 
As the civil servant who was leading the initiative reported: ‘We did not want an 
agency which was merely a research unit of the administration, but an agency which 
would be responsible for managing health care finances and for managing the entire 
sector independently. Politicians did not want such an agency and I was defeated in 
my attempts.’15
Regional executive leaders derive their power from the increasing relevance of 
regional health care in the national political debate, as well as from institutional and 
administrative sources. In the context of the political debate about ‘federalism’,16
14 Regional Law no. 50 of 1994 has created the Agenzia Sanitaria Regionale, Emilia Romagna. See 
Article no. 39 for detailed functions and structure of the Agenzia.
15 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
16 The political debate about ‘federalism’ in Italy from the end of the 1990s refers to the effects of the 
constitutional reform, as defined in Law no. 3/2001, on the relationship between the central state and 
regional government. Law no. 3/2001 has reconfigured the legislative responsibilities between the 
state and regions in such a way that health care is included in those areas of ‘shared responsibility’. 
Regions retain their legislative functions but minimum service standards are defined by the central 
state (Maino, F. (2003). "La sanita fra Stato e regioni." II Mulino 1: 100-107. For a constitutional 
debate about the new interpretation of regional legislative functions, see Balduzzi and Di Gaspare 
(2002), Falcon (1998). For the relationship between constitutional reform and the risk of challenging 
universal health care, see Mario Pirani, ‘QuelTincrocio perverso tia sanita e federalismo’, La 
Repubblica, 23 June 2002. Bills of constitutional reforms, which confer on regional government 
exclusive legislative responsibilities for education and local police have recently been discussed in
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health care has played a crucial role in differentiating regional from central policies 
and has offered the pioneering opportunity for the transformation of the Italian state 
into one which is highly decentralised.17 For instance, the policy process which led 
to the enactment of Regional Law no. 31 in 1997,18 which introduced equal 
conditions between public and private providers in Lombardy,19 became part of a 
highly partisan and ideological national political debate20 between the centre-right 
Formigoni regional Giunta and the national centre-left government coalition. 
Regional differentiation from the centre has offered a political incentive for regional 
elites to carve out a central role in national as well as regional politics. This 
increases the visibility which is necessary for a national career, but it also puts them
Italy. See for a veiy recent debate about federalism: M.Pera, ‘La buona devolution’, II Sole 24 Ore,
11 September 2004; ‘Riforme, premierato meno forte’, II Sole 24 Ore, 10 September 2004.
17 The regionalisation of health care introduced in 1992 has been pursued throughout the 1990s by
different governments. The Berlusconi Government, which took office in 2001, has consolidated
health care decentralisation by empowering regional governments with control over pharmaceutical
expenditure. Law no. 405/2001 conferred responsibilities for controlling pharmaceutical expenditure
to regions and established a ceiling of 13%. See Roberto Tumo, ‘La dura prova del federalismo', II
Sole 24 Ore, 7 December 2001.
18 The major characteristics of this regional law, which differentiated Lombardy from other Italian 
regions, were: clear-cut division between purchasers and providers; equality between public and 
private providers in order to ensure freedom of choice of patients; the local health authority with a 
minor role of planning and the role of third payer only; mergers of public hospitals into very large 
agglomerates.
19 Article 2, Regional Law no. 31/1997, Regione Lombardia. Equal conditions between public and 
private providers is the condition for the quasi-market, which J. LeGrand defines as ‘the combination 
of free access at the point of delivery, combined with decentralised maiket-like competition between 
providers of services’ (Le Grand, J. and W. Bartlett, Eds. (1993). Quasi-Markets and Social Policy. 
Basingstone, MacMillan. Lombardy has introduced the greatest purchaser-provider split of the Italian 
regions. All public hospitals have been transformed into trusts, detached from their parent local health 
authorities. This was aimed at levelling the playing field for competition because public hospitals 
managed by local health authorities would receive hidden cross-subsidies (Donatini, A  and A. Rico 
(2001). Health care systems in transitions: Italy, European Observatory on Health Care Systems. All 
accredited providers are financed by tariffs and fees-for services, established by the regional 
government (Mapelli, V. (1999). 11 sistema sanitario italiano.
The most important issue of this debate between Minister Bindi and President Formigoni was the 
accreditation and financing of private providers. In January 1997 the regional Giunta issued an 
executive deliberation abolishing the entry barriers to private providers in health care provision. The 
region's argument was that it was still awaiting national regulation of the process of authorisation of 
private providers. Minister Bindi sustained that the deliberation was not constitutional and would 
raise health care expenditure immensely. Institutional accreditation, granted by regions, is a way to 
the regulation of the quasi markets and ensuring quality and an instrument to carry out regular 
assessment of quality and evaluate the value added of the existing regional health care services. 
Accreditation is mandatory for contractual arrangements, negotiated between local health authorities 
and ‘preferred providers’ chosen by the region on a value for money basis among those accredited. 
These agreements describe the amount of services, price, quality and maximum waiting time that a 
provider has to respect.
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into competition with national political elites, who ‘should take a step back to go two 
steps forward and should delegate more power to regional elites’.21
The possibility of representing consultants or their associations, and mediating 
between them and the general managers, is another important source of political 
power for regional political elites. They have a crucial ally in the medical profession 
-  ‘consultants know very well to whom they should refer when they are unhappy 
about general managers’.22 Moreover, ‘senior consultants are enthusiastic about the 
return of politics’, as one regional minister said.23 These comments suggest that 
consultants use political resources and refer to politicians to prevent the direct 
encroachment of general managers on their medical activities. The consultants’ 
greatest concern is the annual performance evaluation, based mainly upon economic 
and budgetary indicators, ‘which are rather frustrating for senior consultants’.24 
Since general management was introduced in 1992, the relationship between 
consultants and general managers, especially in public hospitals, has become very 
confrontational because ‘the possibility of political mediation and understanding by 
politicians is being curtailed. It is widely accepted that doctors, strengthened by their 
social influence, used to bypass managers and directly appeal to the politicians for 
resources’ (Andrion 2003, p. 4).
Channelling consultants’ demands and frustrations is an important political resource 
for regional elites. It derives from the organisational weakness of hospital 
consultants, who lack clear management functions within public hospitals. The 
Collegio di Direzione (Management Committee), established by the 1999 Bindi
21 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
22 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, Milan, 24 July 2003.
23 Enrico Rossi, interview with author, Florence, 28 July 2003.
24 Serafino Zucchelli, interview with author, Rome, 18 July 2003.
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reform, 25 could have been used for mediating between consultants and general 
managers, but it was implemented in a scattered way. According to a study carried 
out by the ANAAO, Associazione Nazionale Aiuti e Assistenti Ospedalieri, the most 
representative national association of hospital doctors, in southern Italy 23.81 per 
cent of total public hospitals activated the Collegio, compared with 44.58 per cent in 
the north, whereas in the centre the percentage was 34.7 and in the islands even 
smaller, 16.67 26
Limitations o f Regional Executive Power
Despite their relative power, regional ministers of health do face considerable 
limitations as far as their ability to make appointments is concerned and, more 
generally, in their control of health care administration. The coalition politics of the 
regional council are the most important constraint on their autonomy in appointing 
managers. Although electoral laws ensure the stability of the ruling regional 
coalition (Pitruzzella 2000; Tosi 2000; Endrici 2001), political parties have a 
tendency to defend their prerogatives to occupy institutions.27 The regional 
minister's political leadership is directly related to the position of his or her party in 
the regional coalition. One interviewee spoke about the possibility that, in spite of 
the formal process, a party-sponsored candidate could be appointed: ‘there is not 
necessarily a trust relationship between the regional Minister of Health and the 
general manager, because the latter responds to his political master and to his
25 Article 17 of Executive Decree no. 229 of 1999 establishes a Collegio di Direzione which supports 
the general manager in the organisation and management of medical activities. The Collegio is 
involved in the performance evaluation of consultants and in the general strategic plan of the health 
authorities.
26 ‘Indagine Anaao Assomed. Dipartimenti gestionali e Collegio di direzione’, April 2001.
27 ‘Manifesto per la rinascita della sanM -  Fuori i paititi, malati al primo posto’, II Corriere della 
Sera, 8 Februaiy 2004; ‘Tangenti a Milano, ricercato consigliere di un viceministro’, II Corriere della 
Sera, 13 Februaiy 2002; ‘Con i primari di partito sanita peggio della Rai’, La Repubblica, 10 Februaiy 
2003.
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political party. The regional minister appoints general managers according to 
partisan politics only.’28
Another constraint on regional leaders is rivalry with other local leaders, such as the 
mayors of big cities, or presidents of provinces. As far as the power of making 
appointments is concerned, mayors and presidents of provinces can exert pressure on 
regional elites. For instance, according to the general manager of the local authority 
of Parma, the mayor of the city intervened in the appointment of senior consultants.29 
It would be wrong to assume that these are instances of clientelism because 
negotiation between local and regional elites regarding the appointment of general 
managers is part of the legal framework. Law no. 81 of 1993 gives mayors and 
presidents of provinces extensive powers in appointing local authorities in their area. 
This rivalry can turn into conflict in the case of opposing political majorities. The 
merger of three local health authorities in Bologna to form a single authority, 
covering about 850,000 citizens, has proved politically sensitive because the centre- 
left regional majority opposed the centre-right municipal one of Bologna.30
The health care reforms at the end of the 1990s revitalised the role of mayors, as 
discussed in Chapter IV. Regional leaders are acquiring a strong hold over health 
care administration and policy. Tension between local and regional elites has been 
increased by the recovery of the mayors and the emergence of regional leaders. For 
instance, early in 1997, during the legislative and political process of Law no. 31 
relating to the reform of the Lombard health care system, its fiercest opponent was 
the Association of Municipalities and Provinces in Lombardy. The Association
28 Renato Both, interview with author, 24 July 2003.
29 Gianni Giorgi, interview with author, 24 July 2003.
30 Aldo Taroni, interview with author, Bologna, 22 July 2003.
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supported central government’s decision to appeal to the Constitutional Court against 
the juridical inadequacies of the regional law.31 Mayors themselves participated in 
street demonstrations in front of the regional offices in Milan on 7 April 1997.32 The 
President of the Province of Milan was particularly concerned about the huge size of 
local health authorities, which included an average of 1,500,000 citizens, and the fact 
that local government was seldom consulted on the mergers of local health 
authorities. The problematic relationship between newly elected mayors and other 
leaders of local government, even between a mayor and a regional minister of the 
same party, is confirmed by an empirical study by Recchi (Recchi 1996).
In the aftermath of the regionalisation of health care policy, regional governments 
have acquired not only administrative responsibilities but also great political 
capacity. Regions define their policy objectives through health care plans, which can 
reorganise health care systems quite differently to the national guidelines. Regional 
executives, strengthened by the direct election of regional presidents, have shown 
policy leadership and steering capacity in their control of the administration, and they 
have the exclusive right to appoint managers. But they also face obstacles, such as 
unstable coalitions, and political rivals, such as mayors. However, regional leaders 
have much greater administrative resources than mayors, and these outweigh any 
obstacles they might face. Besides, following recent electoral reforms, in many 
regions the executive has a clear and stable majority in the council.
31 ‘Bocciata dal Govemo la riforma sanitaria della Regione Lombardia’, II Sole 24 Ore, 1 May 1997.
32 ‘La nuova legge sostenuta dalla maggioranza. Contrari And, Province e ministero; Lombardia: la 
riforma sanitaria al traguardo tra le polemiche’, II Sole 24 Ore, 8 April 1997.
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Administrative Recentralisation
This section looks at how the 1999 health care reform tried to curb the emerging 
power of regional elites and reverse the 1992 change granting administrative 
autonomy to regions in the health care sector. Parliament enacted Delegating Law 
no. 419 on 30 November 1998. This set out the guidelines and principles for the 
drafting of Executive Decree no. 229, which was issued by the Prodi government on 
19 June 1999, and has been labelled ‘one of the more ambitious attempts in Europe 
to produce a detailed regulatory framework’.33 The aim of this legislation was a 
structural review of key issues which had been debated since the 1992 reform, 
including the reform of hospital consultants' employment contracts, the reform of 
private providers' authorisation and accreditation procedures, the creation of new 
agencies and consultative committees, the rationalisation of hospital networks, and 
so on. The 1999 reform recognised that the internal market introduced in 1992 
required careful management and assumed that this could not be left to regions, 
where the pace of implementation varied.34 Our analysis focuses on those elements
33 ‘Country Report: Italy’, Health European Observatory, 2001.
34 Four regulatory measures were launched by the 1999 Bindi reform: to promote strategic planning 
through a hierarchical process of national, regional and public enterprise planning; to regulate 
competition; to assess the quality of care; and to promote co-operation. Two strategies were adopted 
concerning the regulation of competition in the internal market. First, in order to regulate purchasing 
function, comparative evaluation of qualify and cost should be used in selecting the providers allowed 
to provide services with public funding. The 1999 reform established four steps for selecting 
providers: authorisation, needed to build new facilities or to modify old ones, could be granted by 
municipalities; authorisation, needed to deliver health care services, could be granted by regional 
health care departments; institutional accreditation was granted by the region upon a regular 
assessment of quality and after an evaluation of value added, given existing health care services. 
Accreditation was mandatory for contractual agreements, which were negotiated between local health 
care authorities and ‘preferred providers’ chosen by local health care authorities themselves and the 
region on a value-for-money basis among those accredited by the national heath care system. The 
second strategy adopted to regulate competition was to clarify the boundaries between public and 
private practice within hospitals. Bindi’s personal commitment to this aspect of the reform was 
remarkable. Executive Decree no. 229/1999 established that managerial posts within public hospitals 
were to be reserved only to those physicians who chose to work exclusively for the public sector, the 
esclusivitd. All physicians can conduct private care within public hospitals, by paying a proportion of 
their extra income to the hospital. But physicians employed after 1998 cannot work in private 
hospitals.
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which refer to the political role of different institutional levels and the role of the 
territory, as conceptualised by the then Minister of Health (1996-1999), Rosy Bindi. 
In particular, I investigate the extent to which legislative output can be considered as 
a way of neutralising the political power of rising regional elites.
The heavily bureaucratic recentralisation of health care policy and planning was the 
Opposition's strongest objection to the Delegating Bill and the draft Executive 
Decree, as can be seen from the parliamentary debate of both these government bills. 
One senator of Forza Italia declared that:
The draft executive decree under examination is inspired by a bureaucratic and 
centralising principle of administrative function, which contradicts the government 
policy about federalism and administrative decentralisation Moreover, the 
executive decree is unconstitutional when it establishes a hierarchical institutional 
relationship between the Ministry of Health and Regions, in violation of regional 
autonomy.
Not only a member of the opposition, but also the majority rapporteur of the draft 
decree in the XII Permanent Committee of the Italian Senate on health care stated 
that:
the excessive centralisation of the proposed bill is noticeable as regards the 
substitute powers of the Minister of Health in cases of regional lack of compliance 
with national legislation [...] the Committee suggests that the relationship between 
the state and regions be entirely revisited because it is necessary to avoid the risk of 
dirigisme that emerges from the draft executive decree proposed by the 
government36
The 1999 bill was generally resented by the Opposition and parts of the 
parliamentary majority for its heavily bureaucratic interpretation of the 
administrative function. The decision-making process envisaged responds to a 
predominant planning model which pre-supposes that the state will play a strong 
role. This method is used widely for any strategic choice to be made in the area of
35 Senator Tomassini (Forza Italia), XU Permanent Committee on Health Care, Senate, 26 May 1999.
36 Senator Di Iorio, Majority Spokesman, XII Permanent Committee on Health Care, Senate, 26 May 
1999.
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health care policy that involves setting priorities as well as detailing operational 
options. In addition to national and regional health care plans, the bill proposes the 
adoption of local implementation plans (piani attuativi locali) and a local health care 
plan (piano territoriale), all of which ‘are likely to be policy announcements and 
administrative exercises of power, when instead citizens request only efficient 
services’.37 In addition to centralised planning methods, the establishment of new 
administrative structures, joint committees, territorial conferences and such like 
seems to be a response to an attempt to expand rather than streamline the public 
sector. According to a Member of Parliament:
administrative confusion will increase because in addition to strong regional 
planning functions, two new regional institutions will be created: one for the 
evaluation of regional planning and another for the co-ordination and control of 
metropolitan areas! I believe this muddled and bureaucratic management of health 
care policy are only attempts to sabotage the national health care system.38
As far as the centralisation which derives from the changes affecting health care 
planning is concerned, two key issues emerge from the parliamentary debate. These 
are the hierarchical position in which the bill places planning acts, according to their 
institutional levels, and the participation of local government in planning activities, 
discussed in this chapter. Regional health care plans, which had become strategic 
instruments of regional executive power, would need to conform to the national 
health care plan’s objectives. In addition, regions would need to make arrangements 
for local government, volunteer organisations, trade unions and health care 
associations to participate in planning activities.39 From the Senate’s attempts to 
amend the draft executive bill, it emerges that regional ministers of health care were 
extremely concerned, particularly about the participation of local government 
representatives in the regional health care agencies which provide technical support
37 Senator De Anna (Forza Italia), XU Permanent Committee on Health Care, Senate, 11 May 1999.
38 Onorevole Conti (AN), plenary session, Lower Chamber, Italian Parliament, 1 October 1998.
39 Article 13, Executive Decree no. 229,19 June 1999, regarding ‘Norme per la razionalizzazione del 
Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, a norma delTarticolo 1 della legge 30 novembre 1998, no. 419’.
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to the regional administration.40 The executive decree also envisages the central 
administration’s imprimatur of regional health care plans in establishing that ‘regions 
must communicate their draft health care plans to the Ministry of Health to acquire 
an opinion as regards their compliance with national legislation. The Minister of 
Health expresses his opinion within 30 days from receipt of the drafts’.41
A critical issue relating to ministerial intervention in the formulation of regional 
health care plans was the transformation of the Agency of Regional Health Care 
Services {Agenzia per i servizi sanitari regionali, ASSR) from an institution which 
offered technical support to the regions, under the direct supervision of the Ministry 
of Health, to one fulfilling the control and policing functions of regional compliance 
to national legislation and general guidelines. The stated aims of the Agency are: 
monitoring health care expenditure; compliance with minimum standards of care; 
and evaluating organisational and managerial regional experimentations. However, 
some MPs revealed the reform's attempt to use the Agency as an instrument for 
directing and imposing central guidelines on supposedly autonomous regions.42 A 
senator despises the transformation of the agency into ‘an inquisitorial mechanism 
encroaching upon regional autonomy’.43 The executive decree establishes that the 
Minister consults the agency upon various matters, including regions’ lack of 
compliance with national guidelines.44 The decree enacted does indeed suggest 
control functions for the Agency such as those lamented by the Parliamentary 
Opposition.
40 Minister Bindi, XII Permanent Committee of Social Affairs, Lower Chamber, 30 September 1998.
41 Article 14, Executive Decree no. 229/1999.
42 Onorevole C&, Plenary Session, Lower Chamber, Italian Parliament, 1 October 1998.
43 Senator Castellani, XH Permanent Committee on Health Care, Senate, 11 May 1999.
44 Articles 14,15 and 17, Executive Decree no. 229/1999.
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The problem of exercising the administrative control function remains ambiguous in 
the legislation. The Bindi reform is inspired by the principle of subsidiarity as far as 
administrative control is concerned; accordingly, municipalities win back a key 
source of influence on health care authorities. The Delegating Law establishes that, 
in drafting the executive decree, the Government must follow the principle that ‘the 
Government must define guidelines to identify the instruments of control and 
monitoring, to be carried out according to institutional subsidiarity’.45 This aspect 
remains so unclear and ambiguous that many MPs requested clarification from the 
Minister during the parliamentary debate about which institutional level is entitled to 
carry out controls.46 It emerged that the most problematic ambiguity is whether 
regions or municipalities are in charge of controls. The Senate amendments favoured 
regions and not municipalities exercising control functions over local health 
authorities. However, the bill proposed by the Government suggested that 
municipalities should have the power to control local health care authorities. The 
final executive decree gave the power to exercise administrative controls over local 
health authorities to the regions.47
One of the most evident forms of centralisation is the scope for poteri sostitutivi 
(substitute powers) to be exercised by the Minister of Health Care if regional 
compliance with national health care plans is poor. Although these prerogatives are 
primarily concerned with the implementation of national legislation and are rarely 
exercised, they do involve the visible subordination of regions to the central state.
45 Article 2 comma 1 letter (h), Delegatine Law no. 419, 30 November 1998, ‘Delega al Govemo per 
la razionalizzazione del Servizio Sanitario Nazionale e per l’adozione di un testo unico in materia di 
organizzazione e funzionamento del Servizio Sanitario nazionale. Modifiche al decreto legislativo 30 
Dicembre 1992, no. 502’.
46 Onorevole Saia (RC), Conti (AN), XII Permanent Committee on Social Affairs, Lower Chamber, 
29 September 1998.
47 Article 2, comma 2-sexies, letter (e), Executive Decree no. 229/1999.
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The majority spokesman on the Social Affairs Committee of the Lower Chamber 
emphasises the need to ‘rebalance the substitute powers of the Minister of Health 
Care’.48 The executive decree establishes the possibility for the Minister of Health to 
appoint central government commissioners ad acta to put non-compliant regional 
administrations under temporary receivership in the case of lack of adoption of a 
regional health care plan.49 Another case in which the Minister of Health appoints 
commissioners ad acta is when regional objectives to be achieved by general 
managers of local health authorities have not been defined. These provisions are 
aimed primarily at regions that will not implement the national legislation, but, as 
framed, they are underpinned by a more generally applicable punitive component. 
Sanctioning and policing elements are noticeable, for instance, in the case of lack of 
adoption of a regional health care plan, because these regions are banned from 
accrediting any further providers until they issue such plans.
As far as implementing the national legislation is concerned, the 1999 executive 
decree addresses the lack of regional compliance and also specifies the instruments 
of compliance, which are heavily prescriptive and defined by the central 
administration. The executive reform decree establishes the subsequent adoption by 
the Ministry of Health Care of decreti ministeriali (ministerial decrees) for the 
implementation of the executive decree itself50 This contradicts the constitutional
48 Onorevole Buffo (DS), XII Permanent Committee on Social Affairs, Lower Chamber, 12 May 
1999.
4* Article 17, Executive Decree no. 229/1999.
50 According to administrative law, the decreto legislativo, which is issued by a ministry after 
parliamentary discussion, belongs to primary legislation. The decreto ministeriale and the atto di 
indirizzo e coordinamento belong to secondary legislation. These latter instruments are considered 
formally as administrative acts, because they are issued by the executive, but substantially as 
legislation, that is having the force of law. According to constitutional law, administrative acts, such 
as those established by the 1999 Bindi decree, cannot regulate policy areas that the Constitution has 
attributed to national or regional primary legislative functions.
214
prerogatives of regional legislative functions.51 As the majority rapporteur in the 
Lower Chamber points out: ‘this parliamentary committee invites the executive to 
reduce the adoption of secondary legislation’.52 Another MP suggests that the 
executive decree violates the constitutional prerogatives of regions because ‘it is not 
possible for an executive decree to refer to subsequent ministerial decrees when the 
implementation should be left to regional legislation’.53 Minister Bindi responds to 
criticism of the laborious and centralised implementation of the decree by noticing 
that ministerial decrees are issued with the consent of the Conference of State- 
Regions relationship and that their number will anyway be reduced in favour of atti 
di indirizzo e coordinamento, or policy and co-ordinating acts.54
The 1999 Bindi reform was followed by a complex and laborious implementation 
process. The Minister was aware of the upcoming regional elections in April 2000 
and the relatively limited time to issue the administrative acts of implementation. 
For this reason she tried to put on pressure in order to issue the crucial ministerial 
acts without any delay before the end of December 1999.55 But the rebellion of the 
medical profession regarding the negotiation of their employment contract, along 
with the new provision for exclusive service to the public sector,56 complicated 
further the smooth implementation of the Bindi reform. A ministerial decree was 
issued nevertheless regarding the training and continuing education of general
51 A recent Judgement of the Constitutional Court no. 169,14 May 1999, has established that national 
secondary legislation and administrative acts cannot regulate those policy areas reserved to regional 
legislative powers.
52 Onorevole Buffo (DS), XII Permanent Committee on Social Affairs, Lower Chamber, 12 May 
1999.
53 Onorevole Ce, plenary session, Lower Chamber, Italian Parliament, 1 October 1998.
54 Rosy Bindi, Minister of Health Care, XII Permanent Committee on Social Affairs, Lower Chamber, 
12 May 1999.
55 ‘II Ministro Bindi mira ad accelerare l’attuazione; riforma ter per la sanita senza deroghe sui tempi’, 
II Sole 24 Ore, 27 November 1999.
56 ‘La Bindi bacchetta i medici: “Inutile il vostro sciopero”’, La Repubblica, 20 January 1999.
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managers, defining the guidelines and content of the courses.57 In addition, a ‘policy 
and co-ordinating act’ was definitively issued on 20 March 2000 regarding public 
sector consultants' private practices.58 Bindi was determined to pursue her 
objectives, and from November 1999 to March 2000 she tried to push the 
implementation of her reform as fast as possible.
But the 1999 Bindi reform of health care was never implemented because most of the 
implementing administrative acts were never issued. Minister Bindi was replaced by 
the new Amato government, which took office at the end of April 2000, after the 
resignation of Prime Minister D’Alema in the aftermath of the 16 April 2000 
regional elections.59 She was succeeded by an eminent medical researcher and 
oncologist, Professor Veronesi, whose curriculum vitae indicated no previous interest 
in politics.60 It was not surprising that Amato decided to sack Bindi. He had defined 
her 1999 reform as ‘etatiste and dirigiste’, especially for the role of the state in 
encroaching upon regional competencies.61 The new Prime Minister faced a centre- 
left majority extremely divided as to whether to revise the Bindi reform or opt for 
policy continuity. The Democratici di Sinistra and Partito Popolare Italiano were 
against change and defended the four years’ work of ex-Minister Bindi.62 The end of 
the legislature drew close and the ministerial acts and decrees implementing the 1999 
Bindi reform never saw the light of day.
57 ‘Per i manager Asl anivano 120 ore di formazione’, II Sole 24 Ore, 26 March 2000.
58 ‘Per la riforma della sanitd tentativo di accelerazione’, II Sole 24 Ore, 21 March 2000.
59 At the regional elections on 16 April 2000 the governing centre-left coalition lost dramatically, 
especially in northern Italy. Electoral turn over was 76.6%. The centre-right coalition in opposition, 
led by Berlusconi, won eight out of 15 regions. The centre-left coalition kept the traditional ‘red belt’ 
of Tuscany and Emilia Romagna. For electoral data see: cedweb.mininterno.it/ind_elez
60 ‘Italian scientists attack politicians’, Wall Street Journal, 10 April 2001.
61 ‘Sanita, centrosinistra spaccato sulla riforma Bindi: adesso & chiaro perchd mi hanno sostitutito’, La 
Stampa, 12 May 2000.
62 ‘La nota romana scoperto a sinistra’, La Stampa, 13 May 2000; ‘Veronesi per la salute punta su 
formazione e ricerca’, II Sole 24 Ore, 13 May 2000.
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Analysis of the parliamentary debate and legislation related to the 1999 reform has 
revealed an emphasis on centralising measures of health care planning, despite the 
rise of regional administrative and political capacity. The reform envisaged a 
pyramidal and hierarchal decision-making process that would clearly undermine the 
autonomy that the 1992 reform had granted to regions, and that regional executives 
had acquired in its aftermath. With regard to the regionalisation of health care 
services, the Bindi reform tried to reverse the change introduced in 1992, which, 
however, was gradually and steadily realised. Bindi tried to challenge the possibility 
of regional executives becoming independent of central planning, by subordinating 
regional health care plans to nationally set objectives and guidelines. As one MP 
commented:
me reform constrains the discretion of general managers who have to report not to 
those who are responsible for planning activities and financial coverage, but widely 
to a plethora of committees [...] instead of granting managers more power we are 
taking it away from them.63
Bindi also limited the powers of general managers by reinforcing local government 
participation in the planning activities of local health authorities. Finally, she turned 
a technical institution created to support regional government, the Agenzia per i 
Servizi Sanitari Regionali, into a branch of the Ministry of Health aimed at 
supervising regional administrations.
Conclusions
The strategy of national political elites at the end of the 1990s was to curb the 
increasingly autonomous political capacity of regional governments, made possible 
by their newly acquired administrative resources and the regional elites’ commitment
63 Senator Bosi (CCD), XII Permanent Committee on Health Care, Senate, 16 September 1998.
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to use them. The power struggle against regional autonomy was conducted from 
above, through instruments of administrative recentralisation, and from below, 
through political support for mayors. The recentralisation of health care planning 
and control functions would have ensured that regional programmes were supervised 
and co-ordinated by the newly created central agency of regional health care 
services, Agenzia per i Servizi Sanitari Regionali. The role and functions of local 
government, and mayors in particular, were revisited, in so far as they could oppose 
the effects of regional control of health care policy-making, including control of local 
networks and their power distribution.
This chapter has questioned the plausibility of the widely accepted and predominant 
argument that Bindi’s response to the disturbance of traditional patterns of territorial 
politics was an institutional challenge to the institutional process of region building. 
As Bindi suggested: ‘citizens do not vote on institutional models’. Instead, it is 
argued that political control of the health care administration was the underpinning 
logic of the struggle between national and regional elites. This is consistent with the 
findings that, among the different administrative, political and legal resources 
available to the regional executive, the appointment of managers is the most guarded 
prerogative.
Against Tarrow’s argument, referring to the creation of the regions in the 1970s, that 
mayors would utilise their influence as well under different institutional conditions 
(Tarrow 1974), supported by Keating’s prediction that regions would only continue 
old practices (Keating 1988), it is suggested here that the technocratic and 
bureaucratic capacity of regions is slowly increasing at the cost of partisanship. 
Administrators do need the expertise to be able to extract resources from the centre,
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especially if the subnational level of government is increasingly organised in 
functional terms (Dente 1990). Towards the end of the 1990s, regional functional 
centralisation became predominant over the clientelistic exchange, although political 
control continued to be one of the key resources of expanding and consolidating 
political capacity. From being the aim, political control became the means of a new 
pragmatic way of doing politics, in which regional elites are likely to have greater 
resources than other subnational leaders, such as mayors. Trust appointments, aimed 
at political control of the top level of the administration, do not necessarily lead to a 
clientelistic system, nor do they represent a challenge to democracy. Analysed in the 
context of functional demands, political control of general managers reflected the 
necessity to improve ways of policy co-ordination and implementation of political 
strategies regarding the delivery of welfare services. Political control also becomes 
an indispensable resource for the definition of a new and emerging space for 
decision-making, which, far from reflecting only the particular distribution of 
welfare services, would run counter to the more ambitious project of consolidating 
regional political legitimacy.
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Chapter VI
Italian Politics as Usual? New Administrative Resources for New 
Political Aims
Is the Italian state still in crisis? This question recurs constantly in the scholarly 
debate about contemporary administrative reforms, associated as it is with the 
hollowing out of the state and the new ideology of public management (Cammelli 
2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Cassese 2001). It has also long been a favourite 
subject of historians of Italian public administration, since, from its inception, the 
Italian state has lacked some of the fundamental elements of state building and 
development; such as expert, technically trained, and powerful administrative elites 
(Calandra 1978; Ferraresi 1996; Melis 1998). Significantly, the doctrine of 
administrative law was the only basis upon which the Italian state, while still 
relatively young compared with other European states, was strengthened (Giannini 
1970). This doctrine was soon extended to define not only procedural, 
organisational, and sociological aspects of the administration, but the identity and 
administrative culture of public servants (Dente 1990; Dente 1999).
But recent changes studied in previous chapters seem to reveal a new tendency 
towards a ‘technicalised’ and ‘technocratised’ bureaucracy, especially at the top 
level. This is exemplified by the rise of public managers who owe their status and 
success to expertise in a particular sector, such as mastering techniques to evaluate 
the efficiency of blood supply to hospital emergency rooms, rather than to trying to 
explain cumbersome administrative procedures to an uninterested local politician.
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The crisis in the Italian state must be reassessed and discussed with reference to the 
autonomy now granted to managers in the public health care administration. This 
new system of management exemplifies possible change, which could be applied to 
other sectors.
The 1992 reform of health care policy has introduced a radical change -  an 
incredibly ambitious programme to transform the sociological, legal and doctrinal 
underpinning of Italian public administration. Not simply a public management 
reform, in the most restrictive sense of the term, the 1992 legislation aimed to 
provide administrative elites with new instruments to create an entrepreneurial 
modern state. The reform was as much about structure as administrative culture. It 
was intended to redirect the tradition of public authority towards one of public 
service, in which the efficiency of service delivery to users is predominant over legal 
safeguards and constitutional formalism. This intention certainly does not exemplify 
an ‘incremental’ type of change.
Although the enactment of grand changes was nothing new in the context of Italian 
administrative reforms, the Amato reform went through a peculiar parliamentary 
process and legislative stages of redrafting, rethinking and amendments. The 
legislative process was not linear, but marked by iterative attempts at reversal and 
amendments. Previous chapters have shown how obstacles persisted long after the 
introduction of change. These obstacles were not lifted or removed after the 1992- 
1993 changes had been enacted. When the reforms reached the local administrative 
system, it became more evident from empirical analysis that the old interests of local 
notables had mobilised to oppose change. The first part of this chapter addresses the 
question of the type of change exemplified by health care reforms. I reflect upon the
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ambition of the reform programme and the challenge it claimed to pose to the rule 
deriving from the Weberian rational-legal authority (D'Albergo and Vaselli 1997). 
The legitimisation of bureaucratic activity is increasingly based on efficient service 
delivery rather than intrinsic legal and procedural forms of rationality.1
Despite the deja vu aspect of ambitious administrative programmes of reforms, this 
one actually produced real change, as reflected in the emergence of powerful 
regional bureaucrats and an autonomous space for political decision making 
(Bogdanor 1992), namely the regional level of government. But if the reform did not 
sweep aside the blockages that inhibited earlier reforms, how can the real change be 
explained? I argue that the 1992-1993 health care reforms have much wider 
implications for the entire administrative system. The ultimate goal of the Amato 
government was to reform Italian public administration completely.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it explores the impact of the 
combination of entrepreneurialism with decentralisation. Throughout this thesis I 
have separated these two themes for the purpose of the narrative, but in fact it is 
necessary to link them to produce a possible explanation of why change actually 
originated from the reform. Secondly, before elaborating an alternative model for 
explaining the possibility of escaping inertia and implementing radical change and 
departure from the past in Chapter VU, selected theories of policy change are briefly 
applied to the Italian case of health care reform so as to assess the usefulness of their
1 Effectively, bureaucracy is, according to the Weberian ideal type, technically the most highly 
developed form of rule. See Weber, M. (1991). From Max Weber: Essavs in Sociology. London, 
Routledge.. Specialisation is one of the key elements of the ideal type and does not appear to run 
counter to the power of experts, as emerged during the 1990s in Italy. Weber claims that bureaucracy 
expands its power with the weapon of technical and official knowledge. It appears that the 
introduction of new public management ideas in the health care sector in Italy reinforce the Weberian 
ideal type rather than challenging it directly.
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contribution to this inquiry and examine whether the factors fundamental to change 
that they reveal, such as revolutionary crisis, issue expansion or analytical disjointed 
incrementalism, are plausible ways to explain how change became possible for the 
Italian state.
The Amato Reform: Implications for the Modernisation of the State
In political systems that produce a large number of attempts at reform, it may be 
tempting to dismiss the most radical, attributing them to fortuitous circumstances and 
calling them exceptions to the general rule. This would be misleading in the case of 
the 1992 health care reform and would detract from its remarkable significance to the 
reform of the Italian state. Health care policy reform has far-reaching implications 
which go beyond sectoral aims and include reconfiguring the basis for the legitimacy 
of the whole administrative and political system in Italy. From analysis of policy 
ideas informing the Amato government, substantive change, and political parties’ 
response, I conclude that the 1992 health care reform is a clear and consistent attempt 
to modernise the Italian state, despite strategically devised legislative ambiguities 
and blockages which appear to detract from the merits of the reform. The 
government proposed to limit the scope of the state in three ways: by transforming a 
highly legalistic public administration into an efficient and entrepreneurial one; by 
decentralising administrative functions and political power to regional governments; 
and by introducing market type mechanisms to reduce the public-private distinction. 
These three different policy objectives converged on the overall determination to 
reconceptualise the division between politics and administration. This priority 
remained at the core of the 1992 health care reform and, more generally, of 
administrative reforms.
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The 1992 Reform: Technocratic Enlightenment and Paradoxes
The challenges and changes introduced in 1992 are not without paradoxes. 
Entrepreneurialism and managerialism have caused a restructuring of the 
administration of local health authorities which undermines traditional democratic 
mechanisms of territorial representation. The desperate attempt to introduce the 
paradigm of efficiency and expertise into the public administration has resulted in an 
exaggerated reaction against consensual and politically driven decision-making. 
With regards to regionalisation, it has raised problems of administrative and political 
co-ordination between municipal, provincial and regional levels of government. The 
greatest paradox associated with the regionalisation of health care, which will be 
analysed in the second part of this chapter, is this. As the government is trying to 
modernise the state, by overcoming clientelism and the inefficient allocation of 
welfare services and by depoliticising the management of health care, the process of 
regionalisation, as set out in the decree, creates the conditions for a repoliticisation of 
the health care system at regional level, albeit of a different rationale.
These problematic issues are not resolved in the 1992 legislation, but rather 
magnified by its seemingly disaggregated nature. There appears to be no coherent 
and unifying policy objective, given the abundance of subtle ambiguities such as the 
lack of clarity about the method of appointment of managers of reformed local health 
care authorities. These are not the careless by-products of an ill-defined political 
strategy, but blockages built in to mask a radical and controversial change, for which 
there was little consensus and no prenegotiated agreements with interest groups. 
Disaggregation is not the result of the absence of a coherent government strategy or
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homogeneous objectives. Rather the legislation reflects the anticipatory effects of 
the parliamentary debate and is a way of handling forthcoming political opposition. 
Therefore, the introduction of the enterprise formula and regionalisation are less 
empirically detached than first appears. These two reform trajectories are unified in 
the overall aim to restructure local government and local politics.
The reform of the state has been difficult in Italy because parties, for different 
reasons and to different extents, lacked full commitment to change the structure of 
local politics and local government (Della Porta 1999). Chapter II investigated 
opposition to the reform by the majority of political parties. The differences between 
the political parties' positions were due to their varying degrees of ideological 
adherence to the introduction of private sector management practice in health care, 
political views on the concept of the state, political support for the government 
coalition, use of the rhetoric of efficiency and transparency, and expectation of 
policy failure.
The parties’ opposition is determined not only by structural factors, such as the 
fragmented party system, but also by policy content. The problem is not simply one 
of fragmented coalitions and decisional levels, but also of superficial embracement 
of the reform. Italian scholars have always concentrated on the party system as an 
element of policy ineffectiveness and lack of cohesion. However, this type of 
structural explanation needs to be complemented by policy-specific issues and 
content analysis. The structural constraint of the party system alone does not suffice 
in explaining why the reform was opposed by parties in Parliament. The nature of 
party government is not enough to explain the inertia of the Italian public 
administration. Political elites have interests which go against the reform of local
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government. For instance, controlling the appointment of local hospital managers 
ensures the appointment of heads of hospital divisions friendly to partisan interests.
The Amato executive was willing to use all its legislative prerogatives to push its 
legislation through Parliament. The committed effort of the government corroborates 
the thesis that the reform was not only a rhetorical and legitimising discourse to 
regain citizens’ trust in institutions. On the contrary, it aimed to change the 
administrative structure of the health care system. The government refused to 
compromise on the depoliticisation of local health care authorities, on the 
introduction of managerialism and health insurances, on the marginalisation of local 
administration, and on the transfer of responsibilities to regional governments. The 
government ignored most of the amendments by parliamentary committees and did 
not extensively amend the draft decree. The Amato government made a clear 
organisational choice, with juridical, administrative, and political implications for the 
modernisation of the state. An official interviewed said: I t  is now more difficult to 
mobilise staff in local health care authorities because the organisational change has 
been so deep as to change the administrative culture.’2
Health care is not just a sector like all others. It is at the core of the welfare state. 
Choosing this area to pioneer regionalisation transformed regions from mere 
administrative reality into a source of territorially defined political legitimacy, 
deriving from the provision of welfare services. With regard to regionalisation, this 
thesis challenges the claim that the Amato government was effectively centralising 
what had been formally granted to regions by Article 117 and 118 of the Italian 
Constitution, thus disguising the regionalisation process. On the contrary, the 1992
2 Betty Leone, interview with author, Rome, 24 September 2002.
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reform started a process of concrete functional administrative decentralisation, 
beyond rhetoric, and introduced some of the most propitious conditions for regions to 
become a new ‘political locus of power’ (Bogdanor 1986).
Although the government started a process of administrative and political 
regionalisation, the 1992 reform per se is not ambitious to change the form of the 
state in a federal dimension. There are limitations to the process of regionalisation 
and this is not surprising. As some scholars have argued, in non-federal states the 
local level of government, and this can be applied to regions, remains subordinate 
(Page 1991). Thus, the reform should be assessed against its sectoral aims first,3 and 
only at a second stage can we assess its applicability to other sectors. The 
government set a new path because the reform of health care had created endogenous 
possibilities for further development in this direction. By the end of the 1990s, 
health care represented almost 80 per cent of regional budgets and regional 
administrations had developed full-fledged capacity. Regional demands include the 
transfer of similar responsibilities for other sectors, like policing, transport and 
environment. A ministerial official suggested that 'the Ministry of Health should not 
exist any more. The Presidents of the Region decide everything together.' 4 
However, at the moment the debate about federalism is dominated by strong 
resistance from constitutional lawyers.5
The health care reforms are significant beyond the health sector and have 
implications for Italian public administration as a whole. Yet the 1992 reform
3 M. Keating (1988) explains that decentralisation in Italy has occurred primarily through sectoral 
perspectives, because of the bureaucratic interest of the state in keeping the regional administration 
fragmented along policy areas.
4 Claudio De Giuli, interview with author, Rome, 21 April 2001.
5 ‘Le riforme tradiscono la Carta’, La Repubblica, 2 July 2004.
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caused controversy regarding its policy instruments, among which the law was the 
most prominent. Academic criticism of the 1992 reform is fierce and comes mostly 
from economists. Some analysts have criticised the bureaucratic belief that it is 
necessary to introduce new administrative acts, or pass new laws, or adopt new 
administrative procedures to solve the problem of inefficiencies.6 As Rebora argues, 
'the Italian public administration is in a state of malaise and it is not sufficient to 
decentralise because we need to change the "core business” of public administration' 
(Rebora 1999, p. 98).7 He argues that the abstract and framework types of legislation 
and government plans exclude pragmatic solutions. According to my empirical 
findings, the 1992 reform initially did not pay attention to operational details. The 
government was clearly not looking at the operational requirements necessary to its 
effective implementation. When asked about the policy makers’ efforts to improve 
the feasibility of the reform, Nicola Falcitelli, considered the founding father of this 
decree and a national ‘institution’ for his expertise and life-time dedication to health 
care policy, admitted that 'we could not procrastinate. Amato wanted to have this 
decree approved as soon as possible because we could not resist one day longer 
against all the pressure coming from parties. Our approach was to launch some ideas 
and wait to see what would happen.'8
Despite this criticism, it is also necessary to understand the distinctiveness of the 
method by which the Italian public administration produces certain types of 
legislation. The administration is strongly embedded in the rational-legal 
framework, which emphasises organisational change and structure rather than an 
orientation towards output. The administrative reform activity could be called
6 E. Borgonovi, ‘La grigia burocrazia e 1’utopia rinnovatrice’, Mondo Economico, 26 December 1992.
7 Rebora also laments civil servants' fear of discretion. He complains about the role of the Court of 
Accounts that should advise and guide the administration rather than being an inquisitor (1999).
8 Nicola Falcitelli, interview with author, Rome, 23 September 2002.
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‘rationalistic reformism’, which is embraced with commitment by civil servants.9 
The 1992 legislative decree was the product of the technocratic enlightenment of 
senior civil servants in the Ministry of Health, who jealously guarded their 
prerogatives and acted as an isolated community during the policy making process. 
It is well documented that the Ministry of Health became an impregnable citadel 
while the decree was being drafted.10 Had interest groups been offered 
consultation,11 the legislative decree could perhaps have been more operational.
To summarise, unlike many of its critics, I believe that the reform did not consist 
solely of a rhetorical legitimising discourse in support of the moral mission of 
cleaning the Italian administration of corruption and clientelistic practices. These 
policy decisions, formulated in isolation by an enlightened technocratic elite, 
profoundly changed not only the administrative structure and organisation of the 
Italian health care system, but also the traditional institutional pattern of relations 
between centre and periphery. This change was achieved by using traditional 
mechanisms and instruments. Consequently, the government’s proposal is informed 
by managerial ideas, but the policy instruments available to bureaucrats to transform 
these ideas into legislative drafts reflect the Italian public administration’s method 
characterised by the centrality of law and formalism, which will be elaborated in 
Chapter VII.
9 Too often we overlook the fact that administrative reforms’ attempts come from within the 
administration.
10II Sole 24 Ore, 18 November 1992.
11 C. Sizia, President of the Confederation of Hospital Doctors, laments that the government has not 
consulted professional groups during the drafting stage of the decree (La Stampa, 27 December 1992).
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The 1993 Reform: Legislative Amendment and Substantive Continuity
The core innovations of the original Amato reform were not significantly altered by 
the 1993 legislative amendment, despite claims to the contrary. The organisational 
structure of local health authorities and public hospitals did not change. Even the 
ambiguities of the reform relating to the possible politicisation of their general 
managers remained unclear. The enterprise formula and the introduction of general 
management stayed unchanged.
Similarly, the regionalisation process of health care was not reverted, despite the 
claim that the amended legislation made the functions between intergovernmental 
levels of government more clear and explicit. The reform firmly maintained the 
region's central role in planning and organising local health care services, along with 
the marginalisation of mayors and municipalities. On the contrary, the new decree 
showed some degree of resistance to the increasingly powerful executive functions of 
the regions. The control of regional governments over local health authorities was 
indeed formally diluted by changing their status from ‘public bodies of the region* to 
‘public bodies’. Moreover, in an attempt to reduce regional executive power, the 
decree stated that 'the region' appointed the chief executives, rather than the more 
specific 'president of the region', and it strengthened the legislative functions of 
regional councils. Yet this nominal changes did not prevent regional governments 
from controlling the volume and quality of services provided as part of their planning 
powers.
As far as employment contracts of the medical profession were concerned, the 1993 
legislative decree showed the highest degree of discrepancy from the original. As
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noted in Chapter HI, the employment contract of ambulatory care specialists and 
assistant doctors was to be renegotiated in such a way as to include both categories in 
the public sector. Hospital assistant doctors were offered the possibility of access to 
the lowest level of the dirigenza, if certain seniority criteria and qualifications were 
met. Despite these evident changes regarding the supply of doctors, the major 
innovation, namely the ‘privatisation’ of employment contracts, was not 
fundamentally altered. Chief executives and the highest level of hospital doctors 
remained public sector employees, but were employed with a private law fixed-term 
contract, renewable after performance evaluation. Moreover, the process of 
recruitment by public competition was superseded by an interview and an evaluation 
of a curriculum vitae, a procedure previously incompatible with public law.
The two legislative decrees can be considered part of the same reform attempt rather 
than as two different reforms, both in terms of substance and in respect of the 
process. The legislative process of the 1992 and 1993 reforms revealed many 
commonalities. The relationship between the medical profession and the government 
remained problematic, characterised by outbursts of protest, direct action and 
confrontation, although it improved slightly from March to November 1993. During 
the Amato and Ciampi governments, the executive remained generally in control of 
the policy making process, despite the apparent centrality of the legislative work of 
the parliamentary committees.
The most remarkable similarity was the impetus and dynamism with which reforms 
were pursued by different actors, for different interests. Engaging in protest was the 
only way in which interest groups could bypass the government’s exclusion. They 
were forced to lobby parliament, proposing legislative workable solutions in the form
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of legislative amendments, and to mobilise public opinion by organising a 
referendum. A similar campaign was conducted by the parliamentary committees 
whose endless legislative work resulted in an elaborate and complex opinion being 
presented to the government. The legislative office of the Ministry of Health was 
engaged in the amendment for almost a year. The policy-making process of Decree 
no. 517, which maintained unchanged the core aspects of no. 502, was tremendously 
active, eventful, resourceful, and dynamic. However, the outcome was continuity 
and conservatism because the impetus and motion which sustained the process of 
amendment did not translate into a policy reversal.
The Combined Magnifying Effect of the Enterprise Formula and
Regionalisation
As a consequence of the 1992 reform, unprecedented managerial autonomy was 
acquired by the higher level of the administration of local health care authorities and 
public hospitals. This change has affected the power relationship between the parties 
involved in making health care policy at local level. Autonomy has posed a 
challenge to the traditional system of local welfare services. But more generally, it 
has also threatened national political elites and parties. This section aims to establish 
a systematic relationship between the two separate themes of the 1992 reform, 
namely the introduction of general management and regionalisation. In particular, 
the definition of the regional level of government as merely an administrative 
institution (Keating 1998) is revisited and challenged in light of these empirical 
findings. Only when the political interests of regional elites are taken into account is 
it possible to understand how increased administrative capacity was turned into a 
political asset.
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The reform of the state did not only materialise in the formal enactment of legislative 
decrees by the Amato and Ciampi governments in 1992 and 1993. In addition to the 
national reform activity, regions acted promptly and effectively upon the provisions 
regarding the reorganisation of the health care system, especially with respect to the 
increase in size of the local heath authorities and their transformation into public 
enterprises. As a result of the rapid implementation of those administrative 
opportunities, which helped general managers to achieve a prominent position at the 
top of the regional health care administration, concrete change was achieved by the 
end of the 1990s. General managers of local health authorities and of public 
hospitals, especially those granted enterprise status, became central actors in the 
network of health care policy making at the subnational level.
The emergence of managers at the top of the health care administration has been one 
of the most prominent departures from the traditional pattern of Italian 
administration, which has historically been characterised by the lack of an 
established senior civil service, as explained in Chapter I. The organisation of Italian 
administration in a pyramid without a head was one of the main obstacles to state 
reform. This obstacle has been partly removed by putting in place managers 
entrusted with real administrative resources and giving them actual responsibilities. 
These managers are responsible for policy decisions and initiatives at the local level, 
as well as administrative procedures. Managers contribute to the regional planning 
of service provision, such as deciding upon the volume, quality, and distribution of 
services across the territory of the local health authority. Findings suggest that they 
have also gained considerable power over hospital consultants and, more generally, 
human resources. Criticism of their alleged autocracy and excessive concentration of
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power increased exponentially towards the end of the 1990s. There is a growing 
consensus among health care professionals and local political elites that perhaps a 
management board should be reintroduced to counterbalance this concentration of 
power in a single executive post. This is an indicator that managers have posed a 
real and concrete challenge to local political elites.
The effects of the affirmation of regional health care managers go far beyond sectoral 
reorganisation or an exercise in legal institutional engineering. The attribution of 
identifiable responsibility to a single manager was aimed at rationalising and 
improving the efficiency of the decision making process, previously left to a plethora 
of committees and collegiate bodies. At the same time, the most pervasive impact of 
the reform of management arrangements was the immense challenge it posed to the 
old Italian system of territorial politics and political localism. As discussed in 
Chapter I, the system of political control of the bureaucracy at local level was based 
on the political parties’ occupation of administrative offices and related structures, 
such as local health care authorities. Local political elites were political 
entrepreneurs with an extensive network of contacts with national politicians. The 
distribution of resources followed this party channel of integration, as Tarrow 
explained. Towards the end of the 1990s, parties in general were deprived of their 
main instruments for mobilising political and electoral consensus at the local level. 
Not local elites but managers were responsible for negotiating prices and quantities 
with service providers, evaluating human resources, appointing heads of hospital 
departments and top consultants. The extensive patronage system traditionally 
available to local and national elites was crumbling away.
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Therefore, the introduction of general management in Italy, given the traditional use 
of administrative structures for territorial political mobilisation and political forms of 
integration between the centre and periphery, has had tremendous implications for 
the relationship between the centre and the subnational level, both in administrative 
and political terms. The rise of powerful regional bureaucrats triggered a vigorous 
struggle between political elites at different levels of government, primarily between 
emerging regional ones on one hand, and national and local ones on the other. If this 
primary effect of rising bureaucrats is combined with the allocation of administrative 
competencies to regional government, the effect is magnified exponentially. Not 
only did the introduction of general management per se challenge the old system of 
integration between the centre and the subnational level of government, but also 
regionalisation of health care policy ended up consolidating and accelerating this 
pattern.
The interpretation proposed in this thesis counters those who emphasise the 
impossibility of departure from the historical path (Cassese 2001). According to 
Tarrow’s claim, the pervasiveness of clientelism in Italian administration would 
constrain the government’s ability and plan to re-establish the borderline between 
politics and administration (Tarrow 1977). The Amato government, on the other 
hand, supported the view that a clear-cut division between management and policy 
would solve the problem of corruption because, by marginalising local politicians, it 
would remove the possibility of creating clientelistic ties. However, as Tarrow’s 
claim goes, this could lead to underestimation of the pervasiveness of the clientelistic 
system and to parties adapting to find alternative institutional channels of political 
patronage (Dente 2001). Recent corruption scandals suggest that the problem is far
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from being resolved. In May 2002, the general manager of one of the most 
prestigious public hospitals in Turin, Le Molinette, was jailed for fraud and bribery.12
Given the structural incentives to a clientelistic relationship between civil servants 
and local politicians, the introduction of general management is likely to displace the 
clientelistic network from one level to another, thus not reducing its scope and 
pervasiveness. If clientelism is a systemic feature not only of local government itself 
but also of centre-periphery relations (Tarrow 1977), then eradicating it from local 
government, assuming this is possible, will only create the need to promote 
‘clientelistic integration’ at a different level of government (Keating 1988). Most of 
these claims derive from the fierce criticism of the direct appointment of public 
managers by the regional president, which is supposedly a new effort to ‘repoliticise’ 
the health care system (Endrici 2000).
This thesis comes to a rather different conclusion, not because it overlooks the 
structural character of clientelism, or the remaining cases where it persists, but 
because in connecting the two trajectories of reform, that is general management and 
regionalisation, it contends that these are mutually reinforcing. Their combination 
and simultaneous introduction make departure from the status quo both possible and 
irreversible. First, regarding the possibility of change, it is necessary to consider the 
complexity underpinning the system of direct appointment of general managers by 
regional executive. This cannot be simply labelled as a threat to democracy or a 
return to clientelistic practices. By the end of the 1990s, the basis of political 
legitimacy had dramatically changed. Political consensus at regional level is not 
based on particularistic distribution of health care services, but on the efficiency of
12 Corriere della Sera, 3 May 2002.
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their delivery. Increasingly, citizens demand efficient services, and recent ranking of 
major international organisations in the Italian health care system suggests that 
people have good reasons not to lower their demands and standards. The Italian 
health care system was ranked second in the world, after the French, by a study 
carried out by the World Health Organisation in 2000. If political legitimacy 
increasingly derives from service delivery, and if regions have become major 
players, the clientelistic system would not seem to benefit regional governments and 
elites. Conversely, it is likely to increase criticism and citizens’ indignation, as was 
the case with recent scandals.
Regional governments, very differently from what was previously argued about 
Italian local government (Cassese 1991), are becoming service delivery institutions. 
This is a tremendous departure from the traditional pattern of political mobilisation at 
the subnational level in Italy. The increasing centrality of health care politics to 
regional electoral campaigns appears to confirm this new pattern. Hence, the scope 
for the relay of patronage is very limited in those regions analysed where change has 
indeed occurred. The possibility of change does not seem to be limited only to those 
regions with a past record of effective implementation and good institutional 
performance. Policy diffusion from best practices to other regions, especially along 
partisan lines, is possible. For instance, the Regione Puglia tried to import the model 
with which Lombardy experimented, after a centre-right coalition won the regional 
elections.13 The Department of Public Services has developed numerous projects 
and programmes for the transfer of best practice.14
13 See the Regional Health Care Plan, 2002-3004, Regione Puglia, p.4. The preamble refers directly to 
the regional decision to follow the 1992 reform. This is defined as a ‘historical change’ for Puglia.
14 See, for instance, the programme Cantieri, launched in 2002 by the Department of Public Services 
and aimed at policy diffusion of best practices. More information can be found at: 
www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/servizi or the web site of the programme: www.cantieripa.it
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The disturbance to territorial politics has been triggered by the consolidation o f 
managerial autonomy and technocratic decision-making in local health authorities. 
The direct challenge has most directly involved local political elites. The difficult 
process in Lombardy of enacting the 1997 Regional Law, of reorganisation of the 
regional health care system, when mayors protested with direct action against the 
regional centralisation process has been highlighted. In other regions the tension 
between regional and local elites was not as disruptive, partly because new 
participatory tools to ensure mayors’ influence in local health care policy, such as the 
Piani per la Salute, were established, as discussed in Chapter IV. Only in Tuscany, 
where mayors were given managerial responsibilities in the newly established 
Societa della Salute, managers were not able to gain power at the expense of mayors.
The struggle between regional elites -- sponsoring the emergence of regional 
technocracy, including rising managers — and local elites -- defending the old system 
of political localism ~  was not only the result of the managerial revolution. It 
facilitated change. Paradoxically, the reform of the state would have been difficult 
without a power struggle between political and administrative elites at different 
levels, between those committed to use administrative resources to gain political 
support by means of a new legitimacy, and those engaged in resistance. For instance, 
political determination to differentiate the Lombard health care system from the 
national provisions of the 1999 Bindi reform was fuelled by the heightened territorial 
and political struggle between the centre-left national and centre-right regional 
government. This struggle was sustained by highly developed and efficient 
bureaucratic means, but the aim was first and foremost political. Allowing managers
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to emerge and affirm their power against local government was a regional strategy to 
gain control and quell the rebellion of local political elites.
In short, the strategic alliance between regional elites and managers was aimed at 
countering the alliance between national and local elites. Both local and national 
political elites were resisting the change introduced by the 1992 reform, first 
blocking it outright during the parliamentary blockage in 1992 and then reversing it 
in 1999, when change was gaining ground. National political elites and parties were 
concerned by the emergence of a new space for political decision making at the 
regional level in what had been a rather centralised and nationalised arena of party 
competition. In particular, national elites were threatened by the ample influence 
enjoyed by regional ministers of health and the presidents of regions in determining 
policy objectives. Regional health care plans were mainly alternative and diverging 
organisational frames from the nationally set ones. The national health care plan has 
been labelled a book of dreams, whereas the regional ones represented the most 
serious and operational planning. National elites were also marginalised because 
they did not enjoy administrative structures comparable to those of regional 
ministers, supported by newly created regional agencies such as the Azienda 
Regionale Sanitaria in Emilia Romagna.
Points of political access were increasingly precluded to national elites by the strong 
trust relationship between regional executives and appointed general managers. This 
is a solid relationship, not strictly based on party membership, but on trust and a 
personalised bond. National elites found themselves marginalised in asserting their 
influence on and leadership over administrative structures. Although the concerns of 
national elites grew stronger in those regions governed by the opposition, the
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narrowing of political scope for manoeuvring and reduction of possibilities of 
mobilising local civil society was a real and credible threat in most regions. The 
Bindi reform was an illustration of re-establishing political control of the health care 
administration from above, by centralising measures of administrative supervision, 
and from below, by restoring the role of mayors.
Hence the overall nature of the struggle between different levels of government, 
made worse by the introduction of general management, was mainly political and 
only secondly administrative. This is less surprising if examined in the context of the 
traditional relationship between centre and periphery, based on party channels with a 
diffuse administrative system. Because the Italian system was characterised by 
political localism, it was this system itself that was mostly challenged by change, 
rather then the supervisory and co-ordinating power of the central administration, 
which had always been rather ineffective. Moreover, the central administration had 
an interest in relieving itself from responsibility for huge public deficit and shifting 
the blame for soaring costs and mismanagement of welfare services.
Despite the resistance of local elites, supported by national elites, and the medical 
profession, change became not only possible but also irreversible. There were 
significant legislative attempts to reverse the underpinning pillars of the Amato 
reform. The 1999 Bindi reform aimed to re-establish the balance between central 
policy making and co-ordination and regional autonomy. This purpose was pursued 
primarily by administrative means, namely by recentralising administrative controls 
and supervision of the health care system. New centralised agencies were created for 
supervising and policing regional activities and discretion, such as the Agenzia dei 
Servizi Sanitari Regionali (ASSR). The policy co-ordinating function of national
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planning and national standards was emphasised. This reversal exacerbated the 
conflict with regional governments, and never came into effect.
The policy reversal failed not just because of a cabinet reshuffle, but also because the 
administrative culture of public law had been slowly adjusting to new juridical 
categories. These included the aziertda pubblica, or public enterprise, which did not 
previously exist in the doctrine or practices of administrative law, and the 
introduction of instruments used under private law jurisdiction, such as public 
procurement contracts, or the atto aziendale, literally enterprise act. Administrative 
law, contrary to any academic expectations about its incompatibility with other 
juridical traditions, has been self-adjusting by importing instruments from other 
juridical categories. This experimentation and innovation has not threatened 
democratic accountability, nor has it diminished procedural transparency. Managers 
are directly appointed by the regional executive, which is composed primarily of 
members of the regional council. Direct election of the president of the regional 
executive supports direct accountability for health care policy making. 
Accountability might not be self-evident in its formal and procedural implications, 
but it is noticeable at the level of public opinion, which is increasingly demanding 
about the standards and quality of services provided at regional level. This might be 
a different type of accountability, but it is not any less effective. In a sector such as 
healthcare, patients do not vote on institutional models, but when the question is a 
matter of life or death, the quality and delivery of efficient services is a vital source 
of electoral support.
Empirical findings suggest that the Italian state is changing. There is opposition and 
resistance, but this is not unusual for radical reforms. The interests and strategies of
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national and local political elites remained unchanged throughout the 1990s. Change 
is not explained by the removal of this obstacle. The 1990s reform of the Italian 
state, at least as far as the themes analysed in this thesis are concerned, owes much to 
the emergence of a powerful administrative elite at the head of the administration and 
to the commitment of regional elites to alternative models of political mobilisation 
and legitimacy, based on service delivery rather than patronage. The strategies of 
these new regional elites, combined with the administrative tools necessary to pursue 
them, were essential elements of change. Whether this change was the same as that 
originally intended by the Amato government is a rather different question, which 
does not make the final outcome any less significant.
The initial aim of the Amato reform was similar to that of wider administrative 
reforms, namely to separate politics from administration so as to transform the entire 
modus vivendi of administration and liberate it from partisan colonisation. This has 
been curbed by the change analysed in this thesis, although not by virtue of the 
artificial separation of politics from the administration. Change was made possible 
by the combination of increased regional administrative capacity and the autonomy 
of regional managers combined with the political control of health care 
administration by regional elites. Administrative resources were crucial for 
stimulating political demands and sustaining the transformation of a local 
administration concerned only with its own interests into one focused on service 
delivery. The separation of politics and administration did not have an effect at the 
regional level. If it had, it would have defeated the overall reform of the state which 
was based on the alliance and co-operation of powerful regional technocrats and 
regional elites. If national and local elites had understood that separating politics and 
the administration was unrealistic and counterproductive, they would have used more
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effective instruments to curb regional autonomy than restoring the mayor as a rival to 
the manager.
The tradition of central state and public authority seems to be ‘in crisis’, especially 
after the accomplishment of change which could not be imagined ten years ago. The 
central administration has been deprived of its responsibilities and its supervision 
over local authorities. Policymaking has moved away from the Department of 
Health to regional executives and presidents. Managers are not accountable to any 
central institution, only to the regional governments. Managers have ample scope for 
making decisions with regard to agenda setting, financial distribution, management 
of medical staff, and so on. Their power derives from a personal relationship of trust 
with the regional executive -  not from legal formulae, artificially created offices, or 
seniority criteria. Managers are responsible for delivering high quality efficient 
services to citizens. They are publicly scrutinised through the system of direct 
election of those who appoint them.
However, the ‘crisis’ affects the centre, rather than the core, of the Italian state. The 
national administration has been severely challenged by change. The legal doctrines 
underpinning the concept of the state, the state's core, have not. The internal 
mechanisms which allow blockages to be transformed into changes, which are at the 
basis of the theory of dynamic conservatism, proposed in Chapter VII, owe an 
immense amount to the centrality of the law in the political system. The 
administrative culture, and the main role it assigns to the law as a mechanism for 
reform, are still firmly anchored at the core of the Italian state. Change does not 
ensue from the upheaval of a political tradition and administrative culture which 
have been formed throughout history. On the contrary, change would not have been
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possible without the peculiar law-making activities of the Italian administrative 
system which will be elaborated in the next chapter, after having considered 
alternative explanations for policy change which could be applied to the empirical 
findings of the thesis.
Theories of Policy Change and the Italian Policy Reform Process: Limitations
General models taken from the existing literature on policy change can be used to 
determine the outcome of decision-making processes in a given political system. 
The problem with these models, which becomes particularly evident if they are 
applied to the reform of the state in Italy, is that they regard ‘non-incremental’ 
change as a marginal and non-representative feature of policy reforms in advanced 
democracies. Radical change is claimed to be the end result of a temporary upheaval 
of the political and institutional system in any given country. Incremental growth is 
benign and ameliorative, whereas drastic change is associated with disruptions and 
undesirable upheavals of the rules of the game. This could be problematic because it 
prevents focusing on more comprehensive and overly ambitious change as a distinct 
kind of change in its own right. Reformers might embrace large-scale change while 
simultaneously introducing blockages to limit its most disruptive elements in the 
process of reform-making. The Italian case of health care reforms in the 1990s 
illustrates that non-incremental change could be consistent with a peculiar elites' 
strategy, aimed not at ‘revolutionary crisis’ (Crozier 1970) but at conserving the 
status quo by conservatism and at changing the system by dynamism.
Administrative reforms in Italy have characteristically introduced rather ambitious 
and comprehensive change from the late 1970s, as discussed in Chapter I. Policy
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makers embraced ground breaking reforms which would fundamentally transform 
the way in which the Italian public administration operated. Radical change, 
introduced and adopted primarily through legislation, has occurred not only at times 
of institutional crisis, such as during the collapse of the party system in 1992-1994, 
but during routine periods, such as at the end of the 1990s. No radical change has 
been announced without subsequent parliamentary and executive actions. The Italian 
Parliament has been deeply involved in discussing and enacting a large number of 
administrative reforms. The type of change which has occurred and the process 
which has produced it seem different from incremental change. Lindblom’s 
incrementalist15 explanation does not offer a complete understanding of why policy 
makers not infrequently adopt more ambitious and comprehensive reform packages.
Linblom’s theory of incremental change, however, remains useful for our 
explanation of policy change in the context of the modernisation of the Italian state 
for two main reasons. Incrementalism is an analytical model which explains in 
particular how the process of decision making is determined by policy makers’ 
strategy. Lindblom is not so much concerned with the question of the likely 
persistence of incremental change over a prolonged period as with the here-and-now 
choices made by decision-makers. The emphasis on elites’ strategies offers the
15 Lindblom’s seminal work is concerned both with specifying incremental politics and with a specific 
method of analysis, namely disjointed incrementalism. See: Lindblom, C. (1979). "Still Muddling, 
Not Yet Through." Public Administration Review 39(6): 517-26.. Respectively, incremental change is 
political change by small, reversible, and serial steps over a relatively short time. As a method of 
analysis, disjointed incrementalism is the process of decision making characterised by limited 
comparison with familiar policy alternatives, not distant from the existing ones, reflecting the low 
understanding and incomplete analysis of policy makers who ignore the consequences of their actions. 
According to Lindblom’s ameliorative development of the concept of incremental change and 
analysis, incremental politics is more likely to yield a successful outcome: ‘it is because we see reason 
to expect such big attempts to fail that we move incrementally in politics’ (Lindblom, C. (1979). "Still 
Muddling, Not Yet Through." Public Administration Review 39(6): 517-26.. In addition to 
maximising the avoidance of failure, incrementalism also minimises social conflict, for ‘it helps 
maintain the vague general consensus on basic values (because no specific policy issue ever centrally 
poses a challenge to them)’ (Lindblom, C. (1979). "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through." Public 
Administration Review 39(6): 517-26.. A larger scale of change is more likely to reshape more 
drastically policy networks and to determine greater and riskier political conflict
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advantage that no determinism is built into the model, with the benefit of avoiding 
the introduction of metaphysical ‘forces’ that allegedly would account for change or 
stability. For instance, the ambiguities built into the 1992 legislation, which were the 
product of a precise political strategy rather than poor drafting, have been mentioned. 
However, Lindblom’s theory of incremental change is myopic, for it does not explain 
the long-term effects of incremental change on the policy system. Concern for the 
cumulative effect of incrementalism is sacrificed to the study of the strategy at an 
isolated point in time and presumably space.16
The second most useful feature of Lindblom’s model, which can be usefully applied 
to the Italian case, is the dynamic character of the analysis of policy change; the 
scope for revision and revised trial of adopted actions, justified by the limited 
information and low level of knowledge available, allows for the reversibility o f 
change and the possibility of multidirectional deviations. Serial changes do not 
necessarily progress on one predetermined path in the same direction, because errors 
can be corrected or adjustments to new issues made. To avoid the pitfalls of 
analysing a reform episode in isolation, subsequent amendments to the original 
change have also been considered. The policy process of the health care reforms in 
1992-1993 was characterised by iterative attempts to adjust to the opposition of 
dissenting interests, such as civil society or municipalities. Rather than progressing 
in a linear direction, change was the result of a convoluted process of amendments, 
which incrementalism suggests is part of the policy makers’ analytical models.
16 Although Lindblom argues that 'a fast-moving sequence of small changes can more speedily 
accomplish a drastic alteration of the status quo than can only infrequent major policy change' 
(Lindblom, C. (1959). "The Science of Muddling Through.'' Public Administration Review 19: 79- 
88.), it remains unclear how speed and scale can be so directly related in a short time frame.
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Despite these applications to the Italian case, incrementalism fails to explain 
blockages and failures, in reality common during the process of change and probable 
in the conditions that Lindblom sets of low understanding. If policymakers act under 
a ‘veil of ignorance’ regarding future consequences, it is unlikely that they will 
always make changes for the better and that their actions will always result in 
amelioration. Lindblom seems not to apply his assumption of low understanding 
consistently to the different stages of the policy process, but as a justification for 
conservatism. Low understanding and lack of knowledge cannot be considered the 
only conditions for the impossibility of radical change. For instance, Lindblom 
ignores the case of policymakers deciding upon a course of action regardless of the 
high political costs to be paid, in order to overcome the high threshold set by past 
reform failures. Lindblom's veil of ignorance assumption seriously impedes 
understanding of serial radical changes in advanced democracies.
The policy change brought about by the 1992 and 1993 reforms was not the result of 
a revolution or authoritarian regime change. It occurred within a stable and 
democratic framework, despite the emergence of new issues and problems related to 
the legitimacy of the political system itself. Hence, radical change was not the direct 
causal effect of an ‘institutional crisis’, as the managerial ideas informing change had 
been in circulation since 1989. According to Lindblom, large scale change would 
represent only a temporary interruption to the ordinary and steady series of small 
steps. But ambitious change could also be a persistent strategy of reforms reflecting 
the character of a political system and the predominant way of reform, and dealing 
with emerging new problems. Incrementalism remains a theory of change which can 
be applied more readily to old problems which persist or need readjustments rather 
than entirely new situations generating new political demands.
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Other explanations of policy change emphasise the agenda-setting stage and the 
process of new issues arising rapidly and suddenly. This type of change is described 
as ‘big’ change, and seems to fit the empirical findings of health care policy reforms 
in Italy in the 1990s more readily than incrementalism. Political change is the result 
of positive feedback processes, according to the punctuated equilibrium model 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2002)17. New issues move up the political agenda and 
function as catalysts of media and public attention. Borrowing Simon’s thesis of 
‘serial information processing’ (Simon 1985), Baumgartner and Jones suggest that at 
times of change there is a shifting of attention to a few new issues or different 
dimensions of old ones. New ways of understanding issues and new ideas are able to 
break old and established policy monopolies. This is the key element of policy 
change, namely the destruction and creation of policy monopolies, which are more 
fragile than usually conceived. This type of policy change, which reflects an analysis 
of the process of agenda setting, excluding the discussion of any other stages of the 
policy process, has potentially no limits. Once it has taken a direction, deviation 
from the original equilibrium leads inevitably to a new equilibrium. Like the model 
of incremental change, positive feedback change is a story with a happy ending, 
which fails to account for blockages and resistance once the change has been 
implemented.
17 In an attempt to defeat the criticism that the American public policy process is characterised only by 
immobilisme and stability, is conservative and biased around structure and established policy 
subsystems, Baumgartner and Jones have proposed an agenda setting model which accounts for non 
incremental change (Baumgartner, F. R. and B. D. Jones (1993). Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.. The American policy process, they argue, is 
characterised by long periods of policy stability, when government policies appear resistant to change 
and to the reshaping of powerful policy monopolies supported by legitimising ideas and deeply rooted 
structures, and rapid bursts when dramatic change occurs. The type of policy change that they propose 
is drastic, rapid, and a clear disruption from the old system: ‘new problems appear on the political 
agenda; crises require quick government response; new programs are created and old ones are 
terminated’ (Baumgartner, F. R. and B. D. Jones, Eds. (2002). POlicv Dynamics. Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press..
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But this thesis is not only concerned with explaining how and why policy change is 
initiated, but also examining the operational mechanisms that sustain or resist change 
once it has been adopted. An alternative explanation is needed which accounts for 
blockages and resistance in the process, rather than providing ameliorative rhetoric. 
Operational mechanisms are the policy instruments used to push reforms through the 
institutional process and implement them at different levels.
The punctuated equilibrium explanation does not really help to explain how change 
became possible in the Italian case. Baumgartner and Jones offer an ‘issue 
expansion’ explanation of how issue redefinition leads to radical change. This 
explanation is remarkably difficult to fit into any purposive model of change which 
emphasises the interests and strategies of elites. Ideas seem to sweep through the 
American political system with such force that they have no limits.18 The positive 
feedback process which sustains policy change is an exponential one by which 
'seemingly random initial events can lead to a cascade of subsequent events that 
dramatically change the status quo' (Baumgartner and Jones 2002). Ideas do not 
spread in the same was as an infectious disease. I am not refuting the concept of 
issue expansion, but the inevitability and irreversibility of this initial ‘random’ 
trigger, in the absence of strategies and actors willing to utilise them. This reflects 
one of the main problems of using punctuated equilibrium to explain policy change 
in the Italian case.
18 The acceleration of change, that underpins this explanation of policy change, has a bandwagon 
effect as new ideas take hold. Powerful ideas can potentially break policy monopolies, albeit 
temporarily. But I disagree with the emphasis on the independent causal effect of ideas on policy 
change. Ideas cannot be self-propelling mechanisms unless they are directed and transformed into 
decision-makers’ interests. Ideas might be circulating and attractive to policy makers for a variety of 
reasons, but it still takes political will to use them in order to adopt them and push them through the 
old rules of the game.
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Any explanation of drastic policy change needs to take into account power 
relationships and bias and whether some actors or groups control the political agenda 
by excluding certain ideas from the policy process. In the Italian case, the policy 
subsystem of the central administration defined and shaped the policy image with 
very limited input from other directly-affected interests. It was not necessary to 
restructure monopolies to produce change. Radical change was promoted and 
introduced in Italy by the bureaucrats themselves.
Baumgartner and Jones, however, present agenda-setting as a way in which 
policymakers are able to regulate or manage complexity through simplification rather 
than ‘political control’. American subsystems are capable of processing issues by 
lurching from one to the other, although 'we cannot help but note that the American 
political systems seem more devoted to the processing of issues of interest to various 
factions of the middle class than those benefiting the lower classes' (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993).
This framework is less plausible when applied to reform of the European welfare 
states. What may work as an explanation of environmental policy, or regulations 
relating to car safety, may be less convincing when it comes to explaining issues 
which involve the redistribution of resources. Although it is claimed that the 
punctuated model addresses the question of bias in the political system, the aim of 
proving that the American political system is as pluralist as possible is pursued at the 
expense of considering policy sectors where redistributive policies are affected by
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class, power and intrinsic and structural asymmetries, such as health care reforms.19 
There are policy monopolies in these area which are far from fragile.
In addition to its lack of appreciation of the central role played by the interests of 
elites, their strategies and instruments, the punctuated equilibrium theory of major 
policy change, especially in its most recent development, emphasises the endogenous 
role of institutions.20 But decision makers and others involved do not have the 
choice of a wide range of possible institutional venues that is claimed by 
Baumgartner and Jones. For instance, the parliamentary process of enacting 
legislative decrees is cumbersome, rigid and formalistic. The choice of policy 
instruments by decision makers is sometimes constrained by established customs or 
constitutional law, such as reserved areas in which only the law, and not another 
instrument, can regulate the administration. The adaptability of policy venues to 
policy images cannot be applied to political systems in which ‘venues’ have acquired 
a historical legacy and legitimacy beyond temporary contingencies. Therefore, the 
thesis that changes in institutional jurisdictions are common over time is misleading 
when applied to the Italian political and administrative system. Administrative law 
has been adjusting itself to social pressures, but it is far from losing its centrality to 
the administrative process. This is also because certain institutions do not change as 
rapidly as Baumgartner and Jones presume. The system of intermediation between 
the state and interest groups, for instance, does not fluctuate according to ad hoc
19 Baumgartner and Jones apply their model of punctuated equilibrium to the following policy sectors: 
the use of civilian nuclear power, pesticides and tobacco policy, transport safety, urban affairs (1993).
20 (Baumgartner and Jones 2002). The authors seem to argue that the definition of the issue will 
determine to which institutional arena it gets assigned. They suggest that 'just as images may change 
over time, so may policy venues', (Baumgartner, F. R. and B. D. Jones (1993). Agendas and 
Instability in American Politics. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. The punctuated 
equilibrium model does recognise the creation of new institutions as a condition for policy change and 
the establishment of a new equilibrium. Policy venues represent different jurisdictions with the 
authority to make decisions. An issue may be assigned to an agency in the federal government, to the 
private market, to state or local authorities.
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policy issues as much as is claimed, but is influenced by cultural traditions different 
from American value-laden pluralism.
An alternative explanation for the Italian case of policy reforms, which accounts for 
major change under the continuity of established institutions and an inertial 
administrative course, is put forward in Chapter VII. The most crucial question 
addressed is how it became possible to ‘unblock’ what Michel Crozier has defined in 
his seminal study as the societe bloquee (Crozier 1970), which refers to the case of 
France. He suggests that changement par crise 21 is an obvious consequence and 
reflection of the conservatism and immobilisme pervading the French state and 
society in general. The study of administrative inertia is central to the work of 
Crozier, who suggests that the French bureaucratic phenomenon is trapped in a 
‘vicious cycle’ (Crozier 1964).22 He studies the resistance of the French 
administration to reform and ascribes it primarily to cultural and pathological traits, 
claiming that: ‘as soon as one embarks on the study of the pathology of organisation, 
cultural analysis becomes an indispensable tool’ (Crozier 1964).23
21 ‘Change by crisis’. Author’s translation.
22 The four basic elements of a bureaucratic vicious circle are: the extent of the development of 
impersonal rules, the centralisation of decisions, the isolation of the different strata and the 
contributory group pressure on the individual, and the development of parallel power relationships. 
Impersonality excludes any power relationship between public managers and subordinates because 
everything is regulated by law. Centralisation, in Crozier’s view, is the second means of eliminating 
discretionary personal power within the organisation because those who make and interpret rules have 
to be far away from the field and this runs counter to the problem of adjusting to the environment. 
Thirdly, strata isolation implies that each stratum ignores the organisation’s wider goals and is only 
concerned about members’ compliance and group discipline. The fourth element of the vicious circle, 
the parallel power of experts, indicates that the more narrowly the organisation is regulated, the 
greater the independence of experts, because they operate outside the rationalised system of rules and 
they gain their power from controlling areas of uncertainty in a system where everything is 
predictable. These elements are self reinforcing and result in greater bureaucratic rigidity and new 
dysfunctions.
The cultural approach permits the bureaucracy to be analysed in relation to social and cultural 
system of society at large, beyond the internal logic of the system and its internal rules. Typically 
French traits include individual isolation, lack of communication between strata, and avoidance of 
face-to-face relationships. The second merits particular attention. The introverted nature of each 
stratum within the organisation and the coercion on its members have direct implications for 
resistance. Assuming that innovation comes from the top of the organisation, the higher civil servants
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Crozier argues that change of the paternalistic state, and the conservatism associated 
with it, is possible only by crise, which is rupture, reversal, upheaval of the rules of 
the game, radical transformation of administrative and political behaviours. Real 
change is caused by a revolutionary moment rather than an accumulation of 
incremental changes, to which Crozier does not seem to attribute much potential for 
innovation (Crozier and Friedberg 1980). La crise is the French style and method of 
collective action and as such is part of a cultural tradition, namely a tradition 
revolutionnaire2 4 which makes experimentation and negotiation problematic. The 
alternation of long routine periods with short crises, 'that we can observe easily in the 
history of public institutions is the natural consequence of this sociological 
mechanism'(Crozier 1970). The conservative behaviour disappears only temporarily 
during a crisis: 'la crise est une rupture temporaire de 1’ordre bureaucratique, mais 
elle ne le detruit pas' 25 (Crozier 1970). In fact, the outcome of a revolutionary crisis 
seems not to be radical change, but the 'transposition de Pancien a un niveau 
d’adaptation plus adequate'.26 Crozier attributes an ample transformative power to a 
moment of crisis, but its outcome is nothing more than readjustment to the changed 
environment. The rupture is then an attribute of the process of change, sustained by 
revolutionary symbolism and rhetoric. It is a prise de conscience,21 the disclosure of 
a hidden problem, but not necessarily a substantial departure from the status quo 
because new forms of public authority might well resemble the old ones.
are omnipotent because they are at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid, but they are constrained 
because they cannot interfere with lower strata.
24 ‘Revolutionary tradition’. Author’s translation
25 ‘Crisis is a temporary upheaval of the bureaucratic system, but it does not ruin it’. Author’s 
translation
26 ‘Projection of the old system into a more adequate level of adaptation’. Author’s translation
27 ‘To be aware’. Author’s translation
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The mechanism of change through crisis, as Crozier has formulated it, is not entirely 
convincing when associated with the 'extraordinaire capacite a masquer la realite ou 
a la brouiller' 28(Crozier 1970). He offers a characterisation of French society which 
could possibly be applied to other countries with a Napoleonic bureaucratic tradition, 
Italy being among them. In French society, he argues, change is continually 
discussed, but rarely adopted, notwithstanding its revolutionary appeal. One of the 
most powerful weapons, he argues, is an extraordinary capacity to mask reality 
which ends up in blockages. Crozier illustrates the case of complicite 29 between the 
local administration and the mayors, who appear to oppose each other openly while 
actually accepting and sharing the same values of stability and conservatism. 
Opposition becomes a rhetorical tool. In reality rien n *a change. 30
The main problem with Crozier’s revolutionary crisis as an explanation of change is 
the applicability of its type of mobilisation and collective action, peculiar to French 
historical tradition, to the Italian case. The mechanisms he describes as necessary to 
bring about a real transformation of the state are not feasible, and have not been 
pursued by reformers in the Italian political system. It could be argued that a great 
deal of ‘masking’ the reality and ‘conflict’ is endemic in most political systems, as 
political conflict brings risk and responsibility, especially for bureaucrats. On the 
other hand, political systems, including those sharing similar administrative 
traditions, differ profoundly in the methods and style of mobilisation of dissent that 
they incur. In this respect, the Italian political tradition has been characterised by 
trasformismo, which is very far from being a revolutionary practice. Social conflict 
between deep seated subcultures in post-war Italy has been regulated and structured
28 'Exceptional capability to mask the reality or confuse it’. Author’s translation.
29 ‘Complicity’. Author’s translation.
30 ‘Nothing changes’. Author’s translation
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primarily through aiming at an enlarged parliamentary majority. Political parties 
have prevented the system from falling into major institutional crises by pushing the 
Opposition to the extremes of the political system.31 In the absence of a social 
consensus, the practice of trasformismo was a compensatory factor for an otherwise 
divided civil society. For the Opposition, conceived as ‘anti-system’ in Italy and 
thus not entirely legitimate, the model of trasformismo has been an alternative to 
revolutionary crises which would have disrupted the democratic system and stability 
(Musella 2003). In addition to the historical legacy of trasformismo — which has 
hindered a legitimate and open conflict between majorities and opposition, justified 
partially by the consolidation of a democratic system and the development of a 
comparatively young European state ~  some general cultural traits do separate the 
Italians from the French. As La Palombara notices, the instinct of the Italian political 
elites is to avoid direct confrontation whenever possible (Palombara 1987). This 
reflects the deep psychological aversion of Italians to divisive confrontations and 
their willingness to search for consensus and negotiation. No matter how severe the 
conflict, political and administrative elites prefer to work out some form of mutual 
accommodation and distance their strategies from revolutionary crisis.
Conclusions
Italian public administration has been moving along two main trajectories of policy 
reform. First, a technocratic and technical esprit, an extraneous cultural trait for the 
majority of Italian civil servants, has been infused into the Weberian rational-legal
31 The first chapter of this thesis explains in greater detail the Italian version of party government In 
such a system the leaders of the opposition, mainly the Communist Party, were consulted informally 
and were part of the policy making process. This informal practice was aimed at the consolidation of 
democracy in the post-war period and the avoidance of institutional crisis, in the light of the deeply 
divided Italian society.
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paradigm. Second, the process of administrative decentralisation -- or 
regionalisation — of administrative resources and responsibilities has created new 
political pressure and demands which, in turn, have thrived on the development of 
powerful regional administrative capacity, especially the autonomisation of the top 
level of welfare administration. The modernisation of welfare administration in Italy 
has been conceived and triggered from the centre, but has become a reality at the 
periphery.
The emergence of managerial autonomy has challenged the traditional system of 
relationships between civil servants and local political elites on one hand, depriving 
the latter of control of administrative instruments, and between regional and national 
elites on the other. The struggle between political elites at different levels of 
government has been the single most important precipitating condition for the 
implementation of change, as far as the increasing managerial autonomy of top civil 
servants in health care administration is concerned. If the regionalisation process had 
not been introduced at the same time as the introduction of general management, it 
would have been unlikely that the reforms would have achieved the same outcome. 
It is improbable that the old forms of political mobilisation and control will 
reproduce themselves at the regional level, because regional governments have been 
publicly and democratically legitimised as service delivery institutions. This 
represents a radical change from the Italian nature of local government, namely 
political localism.
Reform ideas in 1992 and 1993 were inspired by managerialism and 
entrepreneurialism, but were introduced in a way that could be defined as 
‘technocratic enlightenment’ owing to its poor definition of operational details and
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predominance of abstract analysis, in the legal-formal sense. Yet, rather than 
detracting from the significance of the reforms, technocratic enlightenment leads to 
two main considerations. First, it was possible to achieve change even with an ill- 
contrived national implementation scheme. Secondly, the abstract and formalistic 
legal culture predominated throughout the drafting stage and introduction of 
legislation. This suggests that there is scope for continuity and that the 
administrative culture and tradition are resilient even in the face of change. The 
central legal method of the Italian administration is not simply a defence mechanism 
for bureaucrats, but is the predominant means of adopting change, including the case 
of change which has been analysed here. Against all those who point to the 
incompatibility of managerialism and public law, it can be argued that the centrality 
of the legal and formal process does not have to be dismantled in order to enact and 
accomplish administrative change. The next chapter will analyse in more detail how 
the legal process can allow for change and how blockages can be transformed into 
changes in the administrative process.
An alternative model is needed to understand how blockages in Italian policy 
reforms are handled during the process of reform and how they relate to the impetus 
for change. The theoretical explanations reviewed in the last part of this chapter 
maintain blockages and incentives for change as distinct and separate processes. 
Blockages are primarily conceived as ‘given’ so that it is their lifting that explains 
how change becomes possible. However, the model which is developed in the next 
chapter accounts for the dynamic transformation of blockages into changes during 
the process of reform. Paradoxically, had the blockages been lifted, change would 
not have been possible, or at least it would have been less likely.
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The problem with applying existing theories to the Italian case of the modernisation 
of the state does not only rest in the distinction and separation of the processes of 
blockages and change. It also lies in the definition of non-incremental change as the 
result of either a revolutionary crisis, or an institutional disruption, or an upheaval of 
policy monopolies. In the case of punctuated equilibrium, major change is explained 
as the result of sweeping ideas which exercise a reinforcing effect on the policy 
process, as if no purposeful actor was directing it, or at least influencing it. The 
consequence of conceptualising change which is non-incremental as a ‘crisis’, or 
temporary outburst, is that its cumulative effect, that is the long term effect of serial 
non-incremental changes, does not receive enough academic attention. In the next 
and final chapter of this thesis, I propose an alternative explanation of the pattern of 
administrative reforms in Italy, analysing the non-incremental, recurrent, prolonged 
attempts to introduce change by transforming blockages and inertia conditions into 
factors of dynamism.
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Chapter VII
Dynamic Conservatism: a Model of Change Under Inertia
In comparative terms the Italian state has been too often categorised as inevitably 
destined to paralysis and immobilisme. This is certainly justified given the 
traditional pattern of failed implementation of numerous administrative reforms. 
However, nothing could have more clearly illustrated the fact that the most 
established scholarly categories can become suddenly anachronistic than the 
considerably distinctive approach to managing change we have found in the course 
of the empirical investigation of health care reforms in the 1990s. Change is possible 
and has been impressive, considering the stalled institutional pattern of the reform of 
the Italian State. This type of change has proved to be concrete, thus moving beyond 
political rhetoric and the nominal introduction of novel paradigms, such as those 
offered by new public management ideas. The possibility of big change at the core 
of the welfare state leads to the hope that the Italian state is finally overcoming its 
traditional difficulties. A central issue we propose to explore in this chapter is 
related to the mechanisms by which change became possible in health care and, more 
generally, how the possibility of this distinctive approach to handling blockages can 
be generalised and applied more widely.
The relationship between policy change and exogenous factors of the type associated 
with the transition from the First to the Second Republic has been extensively 
studied. However, these attempts to emphasise the link between the financial crisis at 
the beginning of the 1990s and health care reforms are unsatisfactory (Mapelli 1999;
259
Maino 2001). Little attention has been given to the study of how political and 
administrative elites handle blockages strategically and intentionally, so as to help 
change. The introduction of big change does not need to be merely the result of an 
accidental logic of historical events, but can be the result of careful political 
considerations. If this type of intense, high risk, high cost change is purposive and 
not merely associated with an economic climate, we need to develop an alternative 
explanation for the strategy undertaken by political elites of embarking on large scale 
reforms in spite of the legacy of numerous failed attempts in similar directions. We 
need to move beyond those widely posed questions of how reforms are defeated and 
by what blockages.
We need to ask why policy makers adopt such radical change in the first place. Why 
do they pursue risky reforms under the force of inertia, when it seemingly only 
maximises countermobilisation and social conflict? Policy symbolism, suggesting 
that public policy is about ‘doing something* rather than ‘problem-solving* (Lasswell 
1948; Edelman 1977), does not offer a satisfactory explanation here because ‘words’ 
were not sufficient in the dramatic collapse of the First Republic to legitimise the 
political system. Moreover, the use of policy symbols by elites to ‘dissipate 
hostility*, providing scapegoats and saviours (Lasswell 1948), does not apply to the 
process of health care reforms marked by a high level of public disgruntlement and 
opposition. The significance of the reforms of health care rests in their substantive 
rather than symbolic implications, as intended by the reformers from the outset.
By analysing the mechanics of the process of introducing big change and managing 
subsequent blockages in the case of health care, this chapter aims to elaborate a novel 
conceptual approach to the study of reforms in blocked societies, characterised by the
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historical legacy of administrative and political inertia. Given the blockages, the first 
part of the chapter focuses on what the health care reforms achieved and on the 
features that made them possible. After highlighting the main characteristics of this 
change, we define this new approach to policy reform as ‘dynamic conservatism’ and 
we extract the main elements. In the second part of the chapter, after a brief 
discussion of the origins and conventional usage of the term, I propose to elaborate a 
new general model of change. Of primary importance for this approach are the role 
of the legislative process and the developmental way of managing blockages. 
Finally, the possibility of generalising this novel approach more widely is explored 
by turning to a discussion of the antecedent conditions that enable the operation of 
change and magnify the effects of dynamic conservatism on policy change.
A Distinctive Way of Handling Blockages
The health care case illustrates an impressive break with immobilisme and 
persistence of historically entrenched patterns of administrative reform in Italy. This 
section of the chapter aims to highlight how this was possible and to discuss the 
mechanisms that facilitated such a concrete achievement of change. Above all, the 
first feature of health care reforms that made their departure from traditional patterns 
possible was the high level of intensity and radicalness of change introduced, despite 
the cumulative effect of failed attempts and policy inertia. This initial reform 
impetus was a response to the need to overcome the historical legacy with equally 
forceful instruments. As much as big change triggered policy dynamism, it also set 
in motion a process by which blockages were built into the system in a 
developmental way, as the second part of the chapter will elaborate further. A 
second important feature of the health care case was the relative autonomy of the
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public administration from pressure groups, enabling it to avoid a ‘pluralistic 
paralysis’ (Hayward 1975). This rather state-led system of intermediation created 
societal conflict, which was used to help change. A power struggle was a necessary 
condition for achieving big change. The third feature of the reform process that made 
change possible, besides high intensity of initial change and autonomous 
administration, was the distinctive way blockages were handled by political elites. 
The availability and distinctive usage of the paired legal instruments of an enabling 
law implemented by legislative decrees proved crucial. This legal aspect will be the 
central concern of the second part of the chapter and hereafter will be only briefly 
highlighted, as far as handling blockages to help change is concerned.
The investigation undertaken in Chapter I of the major administrative reforms of the 
Italian State from the introduction of the Giannini Report in the 1970s until the 
present suggested an historical Italian strategy of launching radical reforms to 
overcome the legacy of blockages and failures. This is most remarkable in light of 
the high political, economic and social costs of embarking on big policy change. A 
series of large scale and intense changes involves greater risk than incremental 
change and higher political responsibility for policymakers in terms of the 
implications for the stability of the institutional system and necessary administrative 
adjustments to take account of frequent changes. Intense reforms are also very 
demanding in terms of the resources necessary to push them through the 
implementation stage. The announcement of big change entails providing the public 
with great hopes and expectations, especially for promises of efficient service 
delivery. Citizens’ frustrated expectations, in the case of policy failure, could be 
politically much more detrimental than the option of introducing incremental change. 
Furthermore, comprehensive packages of reforms require a more committed
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coordinating effort, which is notoriously difficult to accomplish by the highly 
fragmented Italian administration. Moreover, big change is likely to mobilise civil 
society, especially when most groups and actors have traditionally been against 
reform. In spite of these various drawbacks, policymakers in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and in particular from the beginning of the 1990s, have consistently pursued radical 
administrative reforms.
This thesis has maintained that the health care reforms in the 1990s were a 
pioneering case illustrating the concrete possibility of transforming the Italian State. 
This remarkable departure from the historically entrenched administrative tradition 
took two main directions. First, the enterprise formula, introduced in local health 
authorities and public hospitals, yielded the intended results by creating at the top of 
the health care administration a powerful executive post taken by powerful regional 
bureaucrats and public managers. This change is impressive given one of the most 
integral features of the Italian administration, namely the lack of a firmly established 
senior civil service until fairly recently. General managers have emerged as the key 
policy actors in regional health care policy, posing a threat to the old centrality of 
local political elites. The significance of the change, however, does not only rest in 
the creation of a new post and the attribution of new formal responsibilities, but also 
in the consolidation of a different type of public administration: more service 
oriented, less anchored in the public authority tradition, increasingly infused by 
private sector management practice and instruments, such as the atto aziendale, more 
open to flexibility in hiring, and performance related pay. These aspects have already 
been discussed in Chapters II and IV.
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The concrete implementation of new public management arrangements in the health 
care sector is most impressive when assessed against the challenge this paradigm 
posed to the traditional relationship between centre and periphery in Italy, based on 
political localism and clientelistic networks of integration. The effects of the 
regionalisation of the national health care system on territorial politics were 
dramatic, as Chapters IV and V have investigated. First, greater regional demand for 
management capacity has facilitated the codification and formalisation of integration 
arrangements between different levels of government and institutions, previously 
based on informal and party channels. This has resulted in the removal of strategic 
sources of political legitimacy and power, as local health authorities were for local 
political elites before the 1992 reform. Clientelism has lost its predominance as a 
way of characterising Italian local health care politics.
The second effect of regionalisation has been the emergence of the regions as the 
most important administrative and political level of government in charge of health 
care policy making. Few responsibilities remain allocated to the central state. 
Among these we find establishing minimum standards of care and monitoring overall 
health care expenditure. Regional political executives became over the course of the 
1990s by far the most important decision makers in the overall formulation of health 
care policy, defining the provision of services, managing administrative structures, 
and mobilising political consensus. Regions have also acquired such extensive 
financial powers that observers have defined this process as ‘fiscal federalism’ 
(Cavicchi 2001). This change is remarkable given the failure of the 1977 regional 
reforms and the difficulty in changing the configuration of local government and 
local politics in Italy (Page 1991). The regional level is, thus, emerging effectively as
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a powerful intermediate institution for the definition and provision of welfare 
services.
The availability at the beginning of the 1990s of a powerful and persuasive paradigm 
of an entrepreneurial administration, capable of revolutionising the deeply seated 
tradition of public authority, was one of the key contributory factors in helping the 
introduction of big change from the outset. This big change was facilitated by the 
insertion into a rational-legal administrative tradition of an external and unfamiliar 
model of public administration, inspired by new public management ideas. This was, 
for instance, echoed in the entrepreneurial formula and transformation of public 
sector health authorities into public enterprises. As Chapter II has considered, the 
then minister of health, De Lorenzo, and Prime Minister Giuliano Amato were 
attracted to this new modus operandi of public administration, which promised 
efficient delivery of public services and cost effectiveness. Against the claim that the 
1992 reform was exclusively financial in nature, owing to the undisputable context o f 
a severe financial crisis, we argued that the attractiveness of the entrepreneurial 
paradigm was paramount. In fact, a bill to introduce new public management in the 
health care system had been discussed in parliament as early as 1989, before the 
collapse of the party system and the implosion of the institutional system in 1992. 
Throughout the 1990s, change continued to be sustained and implemented with some 
success at the regional level, as Chapters IV and V analysed.
Thus, contextual factors of the financial and institutional crisis should not be 
exaggerated in considering why change was adopted in 1992. In 1992 a far-reaching 
transformation of the way the health care administration operated was adopted as a 
result of the conviction of political leaders and their faith in the beneficial effects
265
attributed to the paradigm of the ‘entrepreneurial administration’. This had been 
attractive per se. Although the reforms’ aim was also to resolve the institutional 
deficiencies of the national health care system, such as the high politicisation of the 
local health authorities, and address the issue of soaring budget deficits, the adoption 
of this powerful paradigm became an aim it itself and ceased to be a means, as 
interviews with key informants have confirmed throughout the thesis.1
The power of the paradigm of an entrepreneurial administration is not only the result 
of being an alternative model of public management to the traditional one, but also a 
highly unfamiliar mode of administrative operation. This external paradigm, 
developed in a different jurisdiction, and not based on public law, gave rise to 
political and administrative resistance, as expected. Hence, blockages did not 
disappear and were not removed during the health care reforms in the 1990s. The 
political strategy was to transform their power into instruments of additional reform 
impetus, so as to help change. Blockages were built into the legislation during the 
process of drafting the 1992 reform and the legislative process of its parliamentary 
approval. Chapter II showed how the 1992 legislative decree contained many 
ambiguities in order to build in possible breaches for later administrative 
manoeuvring, such as the unclear demarcation between state and regional 
responsibilities. The process of regionalisation was not clearly and unequivocally 
defined from the outset. The appeal of regions to the Constitutional Court suggested 
that the 1992 reform was not entirely favourable to regional discretion. By contrast, 
and noticeably, the reform was rather clear about the regional responsibilities for 
covering the huge budget deficits of local health authorities and public hospitals.
1 Interviews with Falcitelli in Rome in September 2002 and again in July 2003 have confirmed that 
the paradigm of new public management became the aim in itself and not die means of change.
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During the implementation of the 1992 and 1993 reforms, blockages were built in 
even more obviously and took the form of new administrative regulations or entirely 
new laws. For example, the creation of the Societa della Salute in Tuscany 
illustrated the attempt to challenge the central role o f the general manager by the 
restoration of the mayor and of territorial politics. In Emilia Romagna, the Piani per 
la Salute were designed in part to counterbalance the emerging power of general 
managers and give more policy responsibilities to municipalities and mayors. At the 
national level, the 1999 Bindi reform attempted to re-establish central administrative 
control over regional health care systems, though consolidating the enterprise 
formula. Hence, change and blockages were bounded up intrinsically in the process 
of reforms.2 In the second part of the chapter, I propose to analyse conceptually 
change and resistance as mutually self-reinforcing parts of the same reform process. 
Thus, they are more usefully treated in combination than apart.
What was distinctive about the handling of blockages in the case of health care was 
that they were transformed into instruments of change by not bringing them into the 
open. They did not emerge as a result of direct opposition to general managers or to 
regionalisation, which conversely were largely acclaimed publicly. Blockages were 
not embodied in alternative administrative programmes, different policy options, or 
conflicting political and administrative positions. Instead, blockages were handled 
mainly by keeping resistance covert. For instance, empirical findings have shown
2 As considered in Chapter II, the Legislative Decree no.502/1992 introduced regionalisation as one of 
the major themes of reform. However, certain provisions did not seem entirely consistent with it. For 
instance, the decree recuperated the role of central planning. Another blockage to the regionalisation 
process was the creation of a national list of candidates for the post of general manager of local health 
authority (article 3, section 10). Moreover, the selection of hospitals to be transformed into public 
enterprises rested with the national administration (article 4, section 1). Public employment was also 
regulated centrally (articles 15 and 17). Not only the legislation, but also the Social Affairs Committee 
in the Lower Chamber recognised the excessive number of ministerial decrees necessary to implement 
the reform (10 December 1992). These are just few examples of built in blockages. More details can 
be found in Chapter II.
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that the process of drafting the 1992 legislative decree was a highly secretive and 
closed one, which offered the opportunity to build in ambiguities and contradictions 
to be activated later during the implementation stage.
The predominant mode of administrative opposition and dissent, characterised by 
mainly covert and oblique resistance, brings about the simultaneity of change and 
impediments to it. Blockages to reforms are not necessarily manifested by the direct 
opposition of affected interests, nor by direct countermobilisation, as suggested by 
Truman’s theory of ‘disturbance’ (Truman 1951). Some interests might not want to 
be publicly associated with a conflictual strategy. In the case of administrative 
reforms, which promise to deliver more efficient services, few higher civil servants 
would be willing to bring into the open their reluctance over change, especially at 
times of institutional delegitimisation of the system. The more publicly advocated 
reforms are,3 the greater the possibility that they might trigger covert and oblique 
mechanisms of resistance by those negatively affected.
Hence, the reforms of the Italian national health care system in the 1990s illustrate 
the distinctive decision making process of introducing incisive change into a blocked 
political system, not by removing obstacles or rejecting change outright, but rather 
by finding creative and viable ways to survive in the resulting changed environment.
3 As the literature on the 1992 crisis of the Italian political system argues, the collapse of the First 
Republic was primarily driven by public rebellion against the system of corruption and clientelism 
which characterised it Public advocacy for reforms was central to political change since 1991. Voters 
expressed their discontent over the excessive power of political parties in the 1991 national 
referendum by repealing the system of preferential voting. Italian voters were sending a clear message 
to the political elite that they were dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of the party system. The 
arrogance of the two major parties, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, led respectively by 
Craxi and Forlani, determining the political and institutional distribution of offices regardless of their 
electoral performance in the upcoming 1992 election, was clearly punished. In the 1993 referendum, 
once again, 82.7% of the voters decided to elect 75% of Lower Chamber seats and 25% of Senate 
seats by an electoral system of first-past-the-post in single member districts. See: Pasquino and 
McCarthy (1993).
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For instance, the support of political and administrative elites for the demands of 
civil society, after the 1992 reform was enacted, was symbolic and dissimulated. The 
Ciampi government secured the consent of groups by amending the Amato reform 
along the lines of the suggestions made by parliamentary committees echoing 
doctors’ demands. Political and administrative elites effectively decided to maintain 
radical change against the rebellion of interest groups, as we discussed in Chapter HI. 
This is illustrated by the government’s decision to make concessions to medical 
groups’ requests, on the assumption that it would be unlikely to be able to implement 
them given the financial constraints set out by the 1994 Financial Law and the 
opposition of other ministries, such as the Department of Public Services. However, 
the result of this governmental strategy of handling blockages did not prevent the 
additional launch of a new legislative process.
It was not only the introduction of radical change but also the system of interest 
groups’ intermediation with the State during the reform process that contributed to 
keeping the policy process going and helped to infuse political momentum even 
when blockages appeared to defeat the process of change. One of the facilitating 
conditions for sustaining momentum during the health care policy change was the 
endemic conflict between the state and the medical profession, as Chapter IQ has 
already shown. The effects of civil society’s response to the process of reform were 
important because they triggered another legislative initiative, keeping the process of 
change moving and far from getting stalled again. This was facilitated by the 
existence of the institutional arena of the parliamentary committees, willing to 
channel and aggregate the opposition conveyed by civil society. Otherwise, interest 
groups’ response could have merely contributed to the abrogation of the decree, 
without resulting in new legislative output, a fundamental characteristic of change in
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dynamic conservatism. However, as Chapter ID showed, the impact of interest 
groups was rather limited as far as the thrust of the reform of the national health care 
system was concerned. It is the effect on the process that matters most, as far as the 
mechanisms that allow for change in the case of health care are concerned.
A Pregnant Oxymoron: \Dynamic Conservatism *
The empirical investigation undertaken by this thesis revealed that one of the key 
contributory factors to health care change and, more generally, to the reform of the 
Italian state, was a distinctive approach to handling blockages during the process. 
The distinctive approach towards change that we refer to and elaborate hereafter as 
dynamic conservatism results from the combination of two factors. The first is the 
introduction of big change, exemplified by the adoption of an unfamiliar 
administrative paradigm. This is then challenged from the outset by a more oblique 
type of resistance, with the strategy of overcoming blockages caused by the 
parliamentary process and civil society by a disguised accommodation and meeting 
of these groups’ demands. This refers to a distinctive way in which change and 
blockage, impetus and immobilisme, are bound together during the policy making 
process.
In blocked societies, the cumulative effect of failed attempts is to raise the threshold 
level necessary to infuse renewed impetus for reform into the political system. 
Incremental change is not an alternative way of bringing about change in inertial 
systems because the immobilisme resulting from many attempts at reform needs to 
be contrasted with a process at least as incisive as resistance. As we discussed in 
Chapter VI, Crozier proposed that change by revolutionary crisis was needed to
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unblock French society. Past failures of reforms make it necessary to adopt 
increasingly more incisive administrative reforms to resolve the problems that then 
crowd in. Intensity of change is proportionate, thus, to the effects of the legacy of 
resistance. Therefore, policymakers, with arguably higher understanding of the past 
than of the future, raise the intensity of change in order to overcome the cumulative 
effect of unresolved problems and achieve at least some of their intended high 
expectations. Consequently, they choose the most legally powerful and politically 
legitimising policy instruments available to them, according to the principles of 
administrative law.4
Reflecting upon Schon’s conception that dynamic conservatism is self-reinforcing 
(Schon 1971), the threshold for change rises over time as a direct consequence of 
resistance to individual reformist attempts. The energy required by the system to 
introduce innovation and change is greater from one reform to the next in the 
presence of a process of dynamic conservatism because the opportunity cost of 
abandoning the established equilibrium increases over time. Hence, endemic conflict 
is per se an effective means of triggering motion and inducing dynamism in an 
otherwise inertial political system.
4 According to the Italian administrative law doctrine, there is a formal hierarchy of legal norms based 
on the notion of fan ti\ literally ‘sources’. The plurality of fonti, from which legal norms derive, is 
regulated by three different types of relationship: chronological, hierarchical and competence. The 
chronological principle of establishing the relationship between legal norms is that lex posterior 
derogat legi priori. According to the hierarchical criteria, inferior legal norms (such as administrative 
regulations, ordinances, local government statutes) cannot contradict in any way superior norms, such 
as acts of parliament constitutional laws, decree-law, regional laws, referenda, regional statutes, or 
legislative decrees. The third principle is based on a separation of competencies, according to the 
subject matter being regulated, or to the constitutional preference of one fans' over the other.
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Beyond Terminology: a Theoretical Model of Reforms in Stalled Societies
The purpose of this second and core part of the chapter is to set out an elaborated 
version of dynamic conservatism as an analytical framework for the institutional 
pattern of reforms in those blocked political systems, in industrialised countries, 
characterised by an historical legacy of political inertia and policy failure. In this 
context, the key puzzle to address is how the breaking of immobilisme becomes 
possible, and what operational mechanisms contribute to the triggering and 
development of a dynamic conservative process. Before embarking on a conceptual 
development of dynamic conservatism, we will briefly discuss the origins and usage 
of the term. The purpose is to demarcate our approach from the conventional usage 
of the term, which excludes the possibility of change. The operation of dynamic 
conservatism will be investigated by analysing first the process and then the 
instruments of change. A developmental study of the changing nature and 
differentiated effects of blockages during the legislative stages of reform will then be 
offered. After elaborating this, the final section discusses the significance and 
centrality of Law as the key instrument of change and the most important antecedent 
condition for reforms in blocked political systems. The evolving function of the law 
during the process explains how the system evolves from blockages to change. 
Lastly, the conditions for the operation of this transformation, such as legislative 
fragmentation, legal flexibility of the enabling law, and the peculiarity of executive 
legislative decrees are discussed.
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The Conventional Usage o f the Term: Limitations
‘Dynamic conservatism’ has been used in the literature rather loosely as an attribute 
of policy immobilisme and administrative resistance. The first scholar to coin this 
expression was Donald Schon in 1971 in his work Bevond the Stable State. There he 
defines dynamic conservatism in these terms: ‘The resistance to change exhibited by 
social systems is much more nearly a form of “dynamic conservatism” -  that is to 
say, a tendency to fight to remain the same’ (Schon 1971, p.73). Social systems and 
organisations strive and engage in relentless activism to remain in equilibrium. They 
resist change with opposing energy proportional to the high intensity of the change 
introduced. Thus, dynamic conservatism is recognisable, as an observable 
phenomenon, in the course of a radical attempt at transforming the political and 
administrative systems. Drawing on the work of Schon, Jack Hayward suggests that 
political inertia contains ‘an active sense of resistance to change, although common 
usage identifies inertia with passivity and inaction’ (Hayward 1975).
In the early scholarship of Donald Schon (Schon 1967; Schon 1971), dynamic 
conservatism is used to indicate a universal human condition, the anguish of facing 
uncertainty and the need for individuals and institutions to retain acquired norms and 
values, which he defines as the ‘theory’ of an organisation. The central question 
Schon is addressing is how we maintain ‘belief in the stable state’, which is a means 
of maintaining the illusion of stability of organisations and social systems, when in 
reality they are subject to continuing transformation. The belief in the stable state is 
the bulwark against the threat of uncertainty generated by change and reforms. It is a 
pervasive condition that is only partly rational, according to Schon. Instability is 
indeed a disturbing factor for established human relationships, organisational roles
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and rules. The problem is how we manage to maintain belief in the stable state and 
simultaneously respond to change. The solution to this intractable dilemma, namely 
the evolving character of social systems and the human inclination for stability, is 
‘not a passive or inertial but an active and more or less systematic resistance to 
change’ (Schon 1971).
From Schon’s elaboration of the concept, it remains unclear, however, how 
intentionality is built into the pattern of dynamic conservatism, if at all. He maintains 
that social systems have power over individuals because they provide individuals 
with ‘a framework of theory’ (Schon and Rein 1994). Yet, political systems and 
political mobilisation are the result of conflicts, negotiations and compromises 
between actors. Schon explicitly dismisses this approach because ‘it would be an 
oversimplification to identify dynamic conservatism with vested interests’ (Schon 
1971). The major reason why Schon is not convinced by the element of intentionality 
is that it cannot explain the long-term tenacity and irreversibility of resistance to 
change. However, our empirical findings suggested that the opposition of interest 
groups was necessary to the consolidation of radical change as it helped to renew 
legislative impetus. Conflict was a necessary condition in the health care reforms 
studied here and political elites were capable of leading the policy process so as to 
help change take place.
The silence in his work about bias in the distribution of political power and how this 
affects the relationship between the state and interest groups is one of Schon’s most 
dubious contributions to the study of dynamic conservatism as a political process. In 
his work he did not address the question of the effects of asymmetrical political 
power and conflict in organisations, owing to his conceptualisation of institutions as
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a living organism. Schon suggests that ‘we undertake a continuous and active 
program to maintain the system in which we are involved -  we keep it in being in the 
sort of way that a living organism preserves itself by homeostasis’ (Schon 1971). 
Excessive reliance on biology leaves the problem of exploring political strategy in 
dynamic conservatism under-researched.
He did realise that problem solving required consensus building about the definition 
of problems, but how such consensus is to be created, and whether there is a role for 
social conflict within organisations, was only partially addressed. In this passage 
from The Reflective Practitioner. Schon gets as closest as possible to his interest in 
the political process:
But with this emphasis on problem solving, we ignore problem setting the process by which 
we define the decision to be made, the ends to be achieved, and the means that may be 
chosen. In real world practice, problems do not present themselves to the practitioner as 
givea They must be constructed from the materials of problematic situations that are 
puzzling, troubling and uncertain (Schon 1983, p. 65).
As will become clearer in this chapter, conflict is a central element in our
conceptualisation of dynamic conservatism, drawing upon the possibility that the
impetus towards political reform brings about change. As Hayward observes, ‘the
political problem arises when those who will sustain the central losses and those who
have firm prospects of gain are pitted against each other in the decision for or against
specific changes’ (Hayward 1975, p. 15).
Drawing on Schon’s concept of active resistance, Hayward defines dynamic 
conservatism as a resourceful activity of those dedicated to resistance. He suggests 
that the only changes tolerated are those necessary to preserve the system from crisis. 
The decision making process of political inertia is characterised by incrementalism. 
Incremental adaptations amount to a minimal compliance with the demand for
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change. He claims that ‘when action finally comes it has been too little and too late 
to be really effective’ (Hayward 1975). Hayward attributes political inertia to the 
British propensity to compliance and to ‘rule-fetishism that values institutional 
devices for their own sake’ (Hayward 1975). Therefore, in this model of inertia, 
change is incremental and timid and does not proceed by grand schemes. In his 
approach, Hayward does not hold that dynamic conservatism is distinct from inertia, 
mainly because they are empirically difficult to discern (Hayward 1975). However, 
the study of the operation of the process of dynamic conservatism in the case of 
health care reforms has helped us to assess how blockages were inserted in the 
process and how political impetus was infused.
In contrast to this, other scholars have suggested that inertia can be studied as a 
distinct kind of change. This refers to ‘a uniform rate of motion, that is, a predictable 
series of increments’ (Rose and Karran 1984). This definition of inertia emphasises 
the cumulative effect of incremental changes. Inertia is conceptualised as a ‘force in 
motion’, which Rose describes as a ‘juggernaut’. The model of inertial change is not 
a political strategy model, because the historical legacy sustains ongoing government 
commitments. Despite the legacy of past decisions, incremental changes made by 
governments can cumulatively produce big changes (Rose 1990). Therefore, this 
conceptual definition of inertia emphasises the irreversibility of a series of small 
changes, whereas the scholarly work of Hayward and Schon stresses the stability and 
conservatism produced by political inertia.
The problem with Rose’s model of inertial change is that the mechanisms which 
produce it are not distinguishable from Lindblom’s incrementalism. The final 
outcomes are clearly rather different, respectively big and small change, but the
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process of accumulation does not seem to distinguish itself from the aggregate sum 
of all the small increments. This applies to the growth of public expenditure since 
1951 in major Western nations (Rose and Karran 1984). Yet, there is no 
predictability that the final change will be of the same nature and intensity as the 
initial one. During the process, the elites’ strategies might change in a different 
direction, not directly related to the original one, driven instead by factors such as 
new policy instruments or temporarily pursued objectives. The direction of change is 
neither as obvious, nor as automatically sustained by a ‘juggernaut’, as Rose suggests 
in his inertial model.
In addition to the difficulty of disentangling the mechanisms of the inertial model of 
change from an accumulation over a long time of incremental steps, Rose’s model is 
not much different from the others discussed in the last part of Chapter VI in its 
inadequacy at explaining a series of non-incremental changes which produce change 
and dynamism, including change of a different nature to the original one. Although 
explaining persistence is as relevant as dealing with change, especially when there is 
empirical evidence of a cumulative effect, we still need to address the question of 
why radical change is adopted by governments and what strategy it responds to. 
Dynamic conservatism explores how breaking the path of reforms is made possible 
by analysing the mechanisms of its operation. In as much as accounting for the lack 
of a decision advances our understanding of inertial systems, how certain 
mechanisms, and not others, trigger the decision-making process is a key question 
which we must address.
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The Developmental Process o f Handling Blockages
Having established that blockages are built into the process, this section investigates 
how they punctuate the legislative process and how they impede change at each 
individual stage. Table 7.1. summarises the developmental and cumulative process 
of blockages discussed in this section. The dynamic conservative strategy develops 
along three legislative stages associated with a national framework law delegating 
authority to the executive to legislate, the so-called 1 egge delega. This is a general 
feature of the Italian policy making process, beyond health care specificities. As this 
law aims to provide the executive only with the general principles as they are 
decided in Parliament, it is at the second stage of the process, which is drafting and 
enacting the implementative legislative decrees, that administrative elites are able to 
influence more pervasively the process of reform. At the third stage of the legislative 
process, regional implementation legislation, enacted by regional councils, adapts the 
national general framework to regions’ own specificities and political strategies. 
Regional governments have ample discretion in the so-called leggi di riordino, aimed 
to devise a new institutional and organisational framework for the regional health 
care systems. These three are the main stages of the reform process of legislative 
specification and legislative development of a national enabling law introducing big 
reforms. The relationship between the government and interest groups has also 
changed during the policy process from open conflict to more covert negotiation 
according to the legislative stage and the administration’s strategy.
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Table 7.1. Developmental Process of Blockages
Legislative Stage Type/Nature of 
Blockage Introduced
Aim of Blockage Effects on Radical 
Change Introduced
Delegating Law or 
Legge Delega
General principles Limiting scope of radical 
change and scope of 
executive delegated 
authority
Minimal as principles are 
abstract and broadly 
defined, and executive has 
discretion to legislate
Legislative Decree 
or Decreto 
Legislative*
Neutralising 
ambiguities, that is 
ambivalent 
formulation
Create breaches and 
opportunities for later 
administrative regulations
Very Large in theory and 
practice
Regional 
Implementation 
Legislation or 
Legge di Riordino
Neutralising 
instruments, that is 
operational blockages
Activate neutralising 
ambiguities
Very large in theory, but 
in practice regional 
discretion creates cases of 
large innovation
Source: Author’s Elaboration
The first stage is characterised by the parliamentary approval of an ambitious and 
wide reaching reform. General guidelines in the delegating law are broad and they 
usually contain very limited operational provisions. Resistance is minimal in light of 
the fact that this stage is the most exposed to public and media attention and political 
conflict in the public arena. Blockages to radical change can possibly be found in the 
limitations that parliament places on the authority delegated to the executive. Thus, 
blockages consist in defining the scope of the executive’s power of delegation and 
identifying areas to be excluded from executive intervention. For example, 
Delegating law no. 421 of 1992 established that the post of general manager, to be 
introduced in the health care administration, should not remove the existing 
executive board as a collegial decision making structure. In this way, the majority of 
political parties in parliament attempted to avoid the excessive technocratisation of 
public management and ensure continuity of political control.5 Another instance of 
potential blockage during the first stage of the process was the definition of local 
health care authorities and public hospitals as ‘public enterprises’ in such a way that 
it was not clear which institutions would have supervisory control over them. This
5 Chapter II discussed the attempts of parties in parliament to maintain collegial decision-making in 
local health authorities.
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omission was intended to avoid the possibility, which in fact became reality, of 
regional governments acquiring direct political control over them.6 As we have 
discussed in Chapter n, the Amato government largely ignored the general principles 
of the delegating law. Thus, blockages had a very minimal substantive effect. 
Criticism of the reform, however, resurfaced later on.
The drafting process of legislative decrees takes place at the relevant ministries, most 
often in the legislative offices, so-called uffici legislativi. They coordinate the activity 
of civil servants involved in the process of defining the operational details of the 
reform. At this second stage of the legislative process the skeleton of the delegating 
law acquires concrete relevance. Sector specific requirements and legal 
technicalities necessitate the active involvement of civil servants. Neutralising 
ambiguities in the form of ambivalent clauses or definitions are introduced. This is 
only remotely attributable to ‘bad drafting*. Rather, it reflects the legally driven logic 
of resistance that the administration has at its disposal. Ambiguities leave great 
liberty of interpretation at later stages and can be transformed into obstacles in the 
third stage of the dynamic conservative process.
In the third stage of the dynamic conservative strategy, when the legislative reform 
hits the administrative system, neutralising ambiguities become neutralising 
instruments* purposefully and skilfully designed to conserve the status quo ante, or to 
dilute the big change adopted in the first stage. For instance, the regional legislation 
creating the Societa della Salute in Tuscany permitted the restoration of local elected 
elites to their original role and threatened to constrain the rising authority of the 
managers. Similarly, regional legislation in Emilia Romagna attempted to re-
6 This was discussed in great detail in Chapter V.
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introduce participatory and consultative methods of decision making which required 
a dilution of managers’ authority, considering that local elites were placed at the 
centre of the network realised through the Piani per la Salute, analysed in Chapter 
IV. The blockages, thus, gained visibility at a post-decisional stage but had already 
been debated politically during the parliamentary adoption of the delegating law and 
built in during the drafting of the legislative decree. This shows that political elites 
and bureaucrats are equally involved in blocking change, which is thus more 
encompassing than a merely ‘bureaucratic phenomenon’ (Crozier 1964).
Professional groups became salient actors in the process, only when and how the 
state decided to consult them. Consultation with medical associations was limited by 
the decision of the administration to open up the process of reform only after the 
radical change had been introduced. The legislative stages in Table 7.1. do not only 
correspond to different developmental moments in the evolution of blockages against 
change, but they are also related to the predominant type of mediation between 
interest groups and the administrative system. Any generalisation about the 
relationship between the administration and interest groups has limitations because it 
is issue-specific. As we have investigated, the government was more willing to 
compromise on issues of public employment than the introduction of general 
management. However, empirical findings suggested that, during the drafting of 
Legislative Decree no. 502/1992, the mode of action of interest groups was primarily 
identifiable with endemic conflict and a rejection of cooperation with the 
government. Negotiations between the medical associations and the administration 
became somewhat more prominent only during the parliamentary approval stage of 
the decree. This suggests that conflict was ‘privatised’ and ‘socialised’, to use
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Schattschneider’s terms, with a remarkable degree of flexibility and rapidity, but 
often at the discretion of the administration.
The most significant condition permitting the administration to direct the 
mobilisation of political conflict during the process of reform was its relative 
autonomy from professional groups’ pressure, in comparison with that of 
parliamentary committees. We can improve our understanding of the effects of the 
system of interest intermediation on a dynamic conservative process if we analyse 
the degree of closure and openness of the public administration towards groups at 
different developmental stages of the process rather than considering it as a fixed 
given structure. Rather than conceptualising administrative strategy in terms of static 
policy subsystems and closed policy communities with fixed interests, we need to 
appreciate the remarkable degree of flexibility of the Italian public administration in 
transforming rapidly from a closed and isolated system to one open and responsive to 
groups’ demands. This response varies, depending on whether the strategy is one of 
adopting change or dissimulating it. The bureaucracy might work with a high level of 
isolation and closure when it drafts secondary legislation and needs to adopt radical 
change. Writing good quality legislation and adopting big change take priority over 
gaining political consensus. At later stages groups are granted consultation if gaining 
political legitimacy and political accommodation is necessary for the implementation 
of change. However, this new degree of openness from the public administration 
does still depend on the unilateral decision to grant groups access during the drafting 
stage rather than being beholden to their threatening power. The Italian state is 
vulnerable, but much stronger than presumed.
282
The Central Function o f the Law: From Instrument o f Reform Impetus to Substance 
o f Administrative Activity
The strategy and process of dynamic conservatism proposed so far necessitate the 
activation of peculiar legal instruments and legal conditions. The centrality of the 
‘law’ as the key instrument in enacting the reform of the state is one of the main 
features of the Italian policy making process. Hereafter we discuss the peculiarity of 
the usage of the enabling law and executive legislative decrees in the Italian system. 
This second part of the chapter aims to show how the transformation of the function 
of law during the legislative process, as explained earlier, determines the departure 
from the status quo and the possibility of overcoming blockages. Once parties in 
parliament have approved the enabling law as a political agreement, it is bound to 
lose its initial function and become a self-sustaining administrative activity per se, 
during the drafting of legislative decrees. Legislative proliferation, parliamentary 
hyperactivity, and the fragmentation of the legislative function, which is rather 
diffuse, owing to the dispersal of executive power in Italy, are contributory factors in 
keeping the legislative process progressing, and creating access points for new actors 
and new elites to mobilise support around their interests. Had regional elites not 
found a legislative process in motion already, it would have been difficult for them to 
be able to initiate an entirely new one without fierce opposition and possible defeat. 
After considering how blockages can help change, without being swept away, this 
section offers some brief indications of the applicability of the theory of dynamic 
conservatism to other sectors and countries, thereby assessing its external domain.
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The primacy of Law over other policy instruments in reforming the public 
administration is justified by the administrative law doctrine of the fonti. The 
precedence of the instruments of law over administrative regulation as the main 
vehicle to bring innovation reform to the state is established formally by this 
doctrine. The reform of the Italian state has historically been pursued by laws 
enacted by parliament. Alternative instruments are indeed available, such as various 
types of administrative regulations, so-called regolamenti, but these are not used for 
grand reforms but rather to spell out their operational details. Although there is no 
general legal principle, or constitutional provision, which clearly establishes how to 
choose in practice between law and administrative regulations in Italy according to 
specific policy issues (Giannini 1990), these instruments differ remarkably in their 
‘legal power’. According to Sandulli (Sandulli 1989), law and regulations 
fundamentally differ in the ‘their formal power’, so called forza giuridica. The 
formal power of the law refers to the potential of the legal act to promote innovation 
in the pre-existing juridical system. The power of the law is also measured in terms 
of its capacity to ‘resist’ administrative regulations, which do not have an equally 
forceful innovative capacity. By contrast, the power of administrative regulations is 
to be ‘authoritative’, namely it rests in their capacity to produce unilateral decisions 
(Sandulli 1989).
One of the most direct and concrete effects of the centrality of the law is legislative 
hyperproductivity. This trait distinguishes empirically dynamic conservatism from 
inertia. It does not only derive from the high legal productivity of the Italian 
Parliament (Di Palma 1977), but also from the intrinsic nature of the law, which 
contains provisions for the production of subsequent and related legal acts. For
7 See note no. 4 of this chapter.
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instance a delegating law already determines the number, the scope and timing of its 
implementation decrees. Similarly, a legislative decree contains indications with 
respect to adopting ministerial acts and regulations. Dynamic conservatism shares 
with a legal autopoietic system8 the process of self-reproducing and self-sustaining 
legal norms (Teubner 1993). Law, thus, permits the policy process to be kept 
continually in motion, by ongoing legislative initiatives.
Another important condition for sustaining the process of dynamic conservatism, 
besides internal self-reproduction, is the fragmentation of the legislative function, 
which in Italy permits actors to use various policy venues at different stages, in an 
extremely flexible and polycentric system (Cotta 1994). The executive and the 
legislature co-legislate during the process of delegated legislation, as the case of the 
reform of the national health care system illustrated. The legislative process of the 
enactment of a delegating law and legislative decree unfolds by a unified mechanism 
(Manzella 1991) rather than by a separation of responsibilities. This offers an open 
and flexible method of making reforms, which allows for amendments, changes, and 
reversals, if necessary, given the amending power of parliamentary committees. The 
decision-making process remains in a state of fluidity that contributes towards 
increasing the number of access points and breaches. Then, new elites, new actors or 
new issues can emerge and be inserted in the ongoing legislative process.
8 For a discussion of autopoiesis, see Luhmann (1986), Teubner (1988), Jessop (1990), Morgan 
(1986), Kauffman (1976). An autopoietic organisation is self-referentially closed and perceives its 
environment as a projection of its self-identity. It functions only to survive and regenerate its 
components. The aspects of autopoiesis that are most relevant to our theoretical approach are: the 
regeneration logic which depends on the network of interrelationship between actors in the political 
system which produces these mechanisms; and, the fact that autopoietic systems must produce their 
own components for conserving their organisation. As Kaufinann suggests, the autopoietic model can 
be applied to public administration to describe bureaucracy as a self-reproducing system (Kauffman 
1976).
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Grand schemes of reforms have been increasingly pursued by the paired policy 
instruments of an enabling law9 followed by implementing executive legislative 
decrees.10 The nature of enabling laws in the Italian parliamentary system offers an 
opportunity for ample policy change that is politically legitimated and for which 
political consensus has been achieved. Its necessary parliamentary enactment makes 
it into a suitable instrument for introducing big policy change. An enabling law is a 
piece of primary legislation that establishes the principles and criteria to guide the 
executive in the reform process. Its use by reformers in Italy is hardly symbolic. 
Rather than guidelines for the executive to exercise delegated legislative powers, 
enabling laws impose formal constraints as far as the scope of governmental 
intervention is concerned. This instrument offers the advantage of being sufficiently 
flexible to allow for adjustments at later stages but necessarily restrictive as far as 
compliance with constitutional principles is concerned, such as the ‘right to health’. 
Enabling laws, thus, are adaptive instruments that offer multiple solutions in order to 
address political conflict arising at later stages of the process. They permit radical 
change, and are not fixed once and for all at the beginning of the process.
The fragmentation of delegated legislative functions in Italy and the centrality of the 
Italian parliament (Di Palma 1977) permit the juridification of norms to be constantly
9 An enabling law to delegate legislative powers to the executive has the same formal status of an 
ordinary law enacted by parliament, namely primary legislation, whereas an executive legislative 
decree has a ‘sub primary’ position in the rigid hierarchical system, not a secondary one though, 
which applies only to administrative regulations.
10 Legislative decrees, so-called decreti legislative are executive decrees having the force of law, 
which are issued by the government in accordance with the principles and criteria set out in their 
parent enabling law, enacted by parliament in the form of ordinary legislation. Law no. 400 of 1988 
(article 14) has clarified further the procedures of this instrument of delegated legislation, not to be 
confused with decree-laws. The enabling law must formulate clearly the object, timing, principles and 
criteria of executive legislative authority. If the delegation of legislative authority exceeds two years, 
the executive must get parliamentary approval on the draft legislative decrees before they are issued. 
A parliamentary opinion is formulated by the relevant standing committees after 60 days of receipt of 
the draft document from the executive. Then, the executive must amend the text according to the 
recommendations of the parliamentary committees and send the draft for a second and definitive 
reading to the committees, which deliberate a final resolution after 30 days. There are, thus, two 
readings of draft legislative decrees.
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infused with political conflict, power struggle, and new emerging political issues. 
The iterative policy process allows for the transformation of the law from a means of 
political agreement and consensus to being primarily an administrative activity. This 
is a core element of the dynamic conservative theory offered here. A policy 
agreement is juridified during the drafting process of an executive legislative decree, 
and repoliticised by being returned to the relevant parliamentary committees for 
approval. Legislative decrees are attractive instruments for reform because they offer 
the executive and legislature the possibility of co-legislating and sharing the blame 
for unpopular reforms. Their usage has increased significantly in the 1990s.11 The 
peculiarity of the decreto legislativo is that it is a hybrid instrument, not as powerful 
as primary legislation but potentially suitable for greater innovation than 
administrative regulations.
The Law plays inevitably a fundamental role in the theory of dynamic conservatism 
because it is empirically the predominant instrument through which big change is 
introduced, opposed and again renewed. Neutralising and purposefully built in 
ambiguities at the first stage of the legislative process are transformed into means of 
resistance by the transformation of the Law from an instrument of political change 
and reform impetus in the first stage of the process of dynamic conservatism into the 
very substance and object of the administrative activity during the second stage. As 
one MP defined it, ‘the legislative process responds to a contractual logic, being 
characterised by the need to settle conflicts and disputes so that a legal act fulfils the 
function of political compromise; yet, once a legal act has been created, its function
11 In the Xth Legislature (1987-1992) the total number of legislative decrees issued by the executive 
was 129, and in the Xlllth (1996-2001) it increased to 425 (of which 242 derive from enabling laws 
not connected to the implementation of European directives). See Capano and Giuliani (2001).
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is no longer usefuF. 12 The transformation of the function of a legal act, from being a 
way to settle political disputes and achieve political agreements in parliament into a 
different aim is a crucial factor which explains how the legislative impetus can 
become self-sustaining and eventually driven by new elites, or different actors to the 
ones who initiated it.
The Law therefore becomes the substance of reforms responding to other legal acts 
rather than to new political impetus for change. Having lost its original function, the 
law becomes an administrative mechanism of operationalisation and increasing legal 
sophistication and specification. For instance, in the delegating law no. 412/1992 the 
transformation of local health authorities into public enterprises, so-called 
aziendalizzazione, was aimed at improving the efficiency of public services. Once 
the ministry of health became involved in implementing the reform, the 
aziendalizzazione became an end in itself, so that general managers acquired 
disproportionate powers of discretion against the medical profession.13
As emphasised earlier, the power of the law rests in its capacity to bring innovation 
to pre-existing systems. This should not be underestimated as a result of the 
normative preconception that legislative proliferation produces only paralysis. 
Against most scholars, who have used the term ‘dynamic conservatism’ as a 
characterisation of ‘resistance’ or immobilisme associated with the persistence of old 
rules and procedures, the process of change we have analysed here is far from being 
a reflection of inaction and paralysis. On the contrary, its major trait is impetus and 
continually sustained legislative momentum.
12 Interview with Giorgio Bogi in Rebuffa and Monica (1995).
13 See Chapter IV of the thesis for an account of how managers have emerged.
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The process of juridification does not coincide only with the creation of blockages. 
The legal ‘execution’ of delegating laws14 is not merely a process of self- 
reproduction of old administrative customs and procedures. Drafting implementative 
legislation is associated with the resourceful and imaginative creation of new 
institutional arrangements which, though aimed at blocking immediate change, in the 
longer term offer the opportunity for the mobilisation of a new political process. The 
ongoing legislative process is fuelled by the dynamism of introducing blockages, and 
ultimately this impetus facilitates the creation of opportunities for change rather than 
fossilising the system. For instance, at the end of the 1990s, emerging regional elites 
and regional managers seized the opportunity created by the legislative decree no. 
502/1992 to gain autonomy and create innovative regional health care systems. Yet, 
they have done so in the footsteps of the legislative process originally launched in 
1992, and not by an entirely new policy initiative. Thus, dynamic conservatism is a 
continual process that evolves to exploit the powers that block the system in order to 
help change.
External Validity of the Theory of Dynamic Conservatism
The purpose of this last part of the chapter is to extract the elements of dynamic 
conservatism, as elaborated so far, and to explore the applicability of this novel 
approach to other cases. The discussion of the potential for generalisation is based 
on the consideration of its antecedent conditions. These enable its operation and 
magnify its effects, when they are present. As offered here, the theory of dynamic
14 By ‘execution’ we do not refer to the implementation stage, but to the legal activity of detailing and 
operationalising a general framework enabling law enacted by parliament, so-called legge di delega, 
into an executive legislative decree, so-called decreto legislativo. The latter is further executed by 
implementation legislation, inclusive of regional legislation, or ministerial regulations.
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conservatism advances our understanding of why high intensity policy change is 
adopted in the first place by political and administrative elites, how blockages are 
continually built into the process of reforms, and how eventually the operation of 
dynamic conservatism produces a departure from the status quo ante. In the case of 
the reform of the Italian state, the predominance of explanations for change, heavily 
relying on exogenous factors, has impeded the theoretical advancement of the debate 
about reforms.
Key Elements o f Dynamic Conservatism
In our model, policy change is not by crisis, by incremental steps, by exponential 
issue expansion, or by an invisible hand, but by a dynamic conservative process in 
which political impetus and equally forceful resistance are bound up together during 
a three-stage legislative process. The legislative stages of the reform of the national 
health care system considered in this thesis, namely the enactment of the delegating 
law, the issuing of the legislative decrees, and regional implementation legislation, 
have shown different types of blockages. These were here conceptualised in their 
dynamic developmental evolution because their effects on the process varied 
according to the policy stage and institutional level in which they were built in. 
Against the emphasis of more static models on accounting for ‘given’ impediments 
to change (Crozier 1964), the theory of dynamic conservatism improves the 
understanding of the effects of blockages on the process of reform as it unfolds. 
Actors introduce latent impediments at an initial stage as Trojan horses. These are 
later activated during the implementation of the parent enabling law when executive 
legislative decrees are drafted. The element of the theory of dynamic conservatism 
that explains the relationship between initial radical change and blockages is the
290
‘threshold effect’, that is the need to overcome the cumulative effects of past failures 
by the introduction of very incisive change to counterbalance the historical legacy.
The second most important element of the model of dynamic conservatism is the 
innovative function of the Law as the main instrument in reforming the state and the 
key driver of policy change in Italy. The Law is defined by the process which has 
generated it rather than some abstract and general theory (Giannini 1990). The high 
degree of fragmentation of the legislative function in Italy offers a remarkable 
opportunity for continual amendments and provides multiple open access points for 
new actors, such as regional elites, to intervene in a pre-existing and already ongoing 
process. However, law-driven change is not only associated with new legislative 
initiatives enacted in parliament. It is the transformation of the law from an 
instrument of political change and strategy to the very substance of administrative 
activity that allows finally for a departure from the status quo. When the law loses its 
function of ensuring political agreement and becomes an aim in itself for 
legalistically minded civil servants, then it is possible for new actors to reorient the 
process according to their own new political strategy. The transformation of the 
function of the law from instrument to substance is at the core of the explanation of 
how we move from original radical change to blockages to renewed change.
Whereas the other developmental models of change primarily focus on benign 
growth and ameliorative change, as Table 7.2. shows, dynamic conservatism 
attributes to blockages a key role not only as factors of resistance but also as 
triggering factors of change.
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Table 7.2. Theoretical Models of Change: a Comparison with Dynamic 
Conservatism
Dimensions of 
Change
Incremental
Change
Positive Feedback 
Change
Inertial Change Dynamic Conservative 
Change
Dominant
Characteristic
Small, serial, self- 
correcting and 
reversible steps
Radical change in a 
burst after a long 
period of policy 
stability, change is 
rapid, rare
Change without 
choice. Uniform, 
predictable series of 
small increments of 
institutionalised 
commitments
Drastic change, 
comprehensive reforms, 
breaking traditional patterns of 
blockages. Induced, delayed 
and unexpected final change 
originating from neutralisation 
of original one
Overall Purpose of 
Change
Ameliorative and 
benign change, 
remedial of ills, 
problem-solving, 
avoid big change 
doomed to fail
Break up policy 
monopolies with 
new ideas (fragile 
policy monopolies). 
Change is for the 
better.
Not a purposive 
model Change can 
occur as 
unforeseeable 
consequence of past 
decisions.
Break the vicious cycle of 
cumulative failures, grand 
schemes of overly ambitious 
reforms, pitch high to obtain a 
small proportion
Actors’ Strategy Low understanding 
and low knowledge 
of future 
consequences. 
Keeping afloat 
rather than steering 
goals.
Limited role of 
choice, no group is 
in control of policy 
process. 
Mimicking and 
attention shift 
(centrality of 
media).
Not a model of 
choice, but of forces 
in motion. Past 
decisions sustain 
ongoing
commitments of 
policymakers.
Not a purposive 
model.
Top-down political and 
administrative control of 
policy process. 
Simultaneously embraces big 
change and keeps resistance 
overt and oblique to avoid 
head-on conflict. 
Dissimulation strategy in two 
developmental stages
Drivers of Change Trial and error 
process, here-and- 
now elites choice
Lurching from one 
issue to the other, 
new issues on the 
agenda and changed 
policy images, 
‘random’ trigger.
Persistence and 
regularity, continuity 
of motion and 
inheritance. Non­
decision making of 
policymakers.
Iterative process: consensus- 
driven mobilisation of political 
conflict, followed by formal 
juridification of issues, then 
return to political arena. 
Continual, flexible, and 
adaptive political and legal 
reframing of issues.
Mechanisms of 
Change
Analysis of limited 
comparison with 
familiar alternative 
policies
Issue expansion, 
positive feedback 
process, unlimited, 
bandwagon effect
Accumulation, 
legacy, importance 
of non-decision 
making
Legal evolution and legal 
specification of issues: 
instrument of framework law 
and its execution Creative 
power of law.
Outcome: Change Small deviation 
from status quo
Institutional 
disruption, new 
institutional 
arrangements 
supporting reshaped 
policy monopolies. 
New ideas take hold 
and have no 
constraints.
Consequences are 
unforeseeable, 
unpredictable. 
Likely big change in 
longterm.
High, deviation from the 
original equihbrium, but of 
lower magnitude than 
expected.
Final change is induced rather 
than direct consequence of 
original
Outcome:
Continuity
High degree of 
policy stability and 
conservatism
Very Low High in short-term, 
but low in long-term 
for the cumulative 
effect
High: structures of 
monopolies, and system of 
State- interests intermediation
Time Span Short-term: five 
years
No cumulative 
effect
Long term: fifty 
years
Long-term Short-medium (5-10 years)
Source: Author’s Elaboration
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Blockages are inserted in a dynamic and developmental process of change sustained 
by political strategy, self-reproducing legal activity and also societal conflict. The 
type of activity undertaken by interest groups contributes to renewed legislative 
activism, as was the result of the opposition of interest groups in 1993. Dynamic 
conservatism is a model that simultaneously closes and opens up possibilities. Not 
only a neutralising strategy, it opens up the possibility of reform as a result of the 
developmental and cumulative nature of the legislative process, that is, the 
juridification of political issues, where the law becomes the substance of reform and 
ceases to be its instrument. This brings about a renewed politicisation of legal acts, 
as interest groups bring into the open otherwise covert and oblique administrative 
resistance.
From Particular to General Explanation: Antecedent Conditions
The extent and limits of the applicability of the theory of dynamic conservatism 
depends on the existence of its facilitating conditions. These could be found in other 
sectors or in other countries or both. Therefore, the process of dynamic conservative 
change is not sector specific, but rather determined by the existence of conditions 
which go beyond sectoral rationale. These are linked with three variables: the 
developmental character of the legislative process and associated system of 
blockages; the level of intensity of initial change introduced; and the autonomy of the 
administration in relation to civil society, allowing conflict and power struggle to 
emerge and sustain dynamism. The case of health care reforms represents the policy 
area in which reforms went furthest in challenging and eventually reforming the 
Italian state. However, additional research could be carried out in other policy areas 
to investigate the different conditions that did not allow for a dynamic conservative
293
process to be activated. This could illuminate further the extent and limits of the 
theory developed in this chapter.
This thesis argues that the dynamic conservative process contributed to determining 
the final outcome of the 1992-93 reforms of the national health care system, which 
was change and innovation, mainly evident at the regional level. Education and 
higher education, however, were not immune from legislative initiatives introducing 
new public management ideas.15 For instance, in 1996 and 1997, legislative 
innovations in the higher education sector attempted to devolve power to single 
universities, establish new decision-making processes based on articulation and 
networks, avoid politicisation and emphasise self-regulation.16 These reforms were 
met with high resistance, making them ineffective (Capano 2003). It is widely 
argued that in these sectors the implementation of change has not yielded the 
intended result (Brachetta 2002; Leonardi and Fedele 2003).
We have emphasised how far-reaching change is a crucial condition for the 
activation of the dynamic conservative process. This condition has not been present 
in education reforms. Despite the common themes of reforms across different 
sectors, the change adopted in education was from the start not remotely radical, as 
was the case in health care.17 For instance, the transformation of local health 
authorities into ‘public enterprises’ could not be compared to the greater 
administrative autonomy, broadly defined, of local schools. Collegial systems of
15 Art 21 of Law no. 59/1997 establishes the administrative ‘autonomy’ of schools to be implemented 
by means of decrees to be issued within a period of one year. See for a comprehensive analysis of the 
reform of Italian education in the 1990s Ventura (1998).
16 The higher education reforms were part of the Law n.59 and Law n.127, so-called Bassanini 
reforms, introduced by the Prodi Government in 1996-97.
17 For recent literature on the reform of education in Italy see Brocca (1995), Ferroni (1997), Brachetta 
(2002), Brocca and Frabboni (2004), Mottinelli (2004).
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decision-making were not done away with in schools, as was the case with the 
administration of health care services. One of the most important reasons for this 
different degree of legislative innovation in these two sectors was the different level 
of institutional deficiencies of the two administrative systems, such as the 
pervasiveness of clientelism, more prominent in health care than education, and 
consequently the differentiated intervention to eradicate the problem.
Besides the more diluted legislative innovation, the missing legislative stage of 
regional implementation in the case of the reform of education was another crucial 
factor that prevented a process of dynamic conservatism, as we have discussed 
earlier in the chapter. The transfer of competencies and control of local health 
authorities from the central state to the regional governments did not have any 
equivalent in education.18 Although schools were made more autonomous, they 
would still be under the closed supervision of the field services of the central 
administration, or the Ministry of Education itself. Far from arguing that 
modernisation coincides only with the regional management of policy areas, I 
suggest that, in contradistinction to the case of health care, the legislative process 
associated with the reform of education was not sufficiently articulated in 
differentiated stages of legislative development to trigger a dynamic conservative 
change.
The key factor generating change in the dynamic conservative process is the 
existence of many breaches and access points for fostering differentiation and ample 
flexibility. In the case of education the reform remained quite fixed from the start
18 In the case of higher education, for instance, Law no. 341 of 19 November 1990 and Law no. 127 of
15 May 1997 (Article 17, sections 95 to 101) have devolved down autonomy to universities. 
However, it refers only to discretion to organise their own courses and teaching rather than managerial 
freedoms comparable to the process of ‘aziendalizzaione’ in health care.
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and did not allow for regional discretion. It is outside the aims of this thesis to 
discuss in depth the characteristics of the reform of education, but as far as the 
application of dynamic conservatism is concerned, the conditions emphasised in this 
chapter for its activation in this case were either not present or minimal. This does 
not exclude the possibility that a dynamic conservative process might unfold in other 
policy areas, including education. Dynamic conservatism is a process helping a 
political strategy that can be activated under certain conditions, such as initial radical 
change in order to benefit from the threshold effect and an articulated and flexible 
developmental legislative process, offered by an enabling law, legislative decrees, 
and regional legislation. The more polycentric the legislative function the greater is 
the scope for dynamic conservative change.
Another important area of further comparative study could be the applicability of the 
dynamic conservative model to the process of the modernisation of public services in 
other countries. It is likely that similar bureaucratic blockages might be found in 
countries like France, for instance, although they may be handled in a different way. 
A dynamic conservative process is more likely to be at work in blocked societies, 
where blockages represent complex political and sociological processes in their own 
right. Crazier’s work suggests that the French case might offer a promising suitable 
case for comparison (Crazier 1970). On the contrary, it is unlikely that dynamic 
conservatism could be in operation in countries where societal conflict is not part of 
the political culture and predominant structure of the state, such as Britain. A cultural 
disposition towards ‘conflict’19 might provide suitable cases for the application of 
dynamic conservatism. Moreover, dynamic conservatism is more likely to be found
19 Jack Hayward characterises the British political tradition, in comparative terms with the French one, 
as ‘relatively free from conflict, frictionless’ and lacking the ‘bitter clashes that precede almost every 
innovation’. On the contrary French society managed to escape the Third Republic’s immobilisme by 
‘crisis’ and conflict See Hayward (1974).
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in political systems where the legislative function is more dispersed and fragmented 
rather than structured around closed and stable policy communities. Ample 
flexibility of legal instruments, allowing for multiple open access points, is a crucial 
condition for dynamic conservatism. They are unlikely to be found in legislative 
systems sustaining policy processes controlled firmly by few actors or few central 
institutions. Political systems that show a greater dispersal of institutional and 
political power seem more suitable for the application of a dynamic conservative 
process.
Conclusions
The model of dynamic conservatism suggests that non-incremental change is not 
necessarily the outcome of a crisis or disruption of the institutional and political 
system, as it has been widely held. Our model o f dynamic conservatism liberates us 
from explaining policy change in terms of revolutionary crisis. It responds to a 
specific policy process to introduce grand schemes of reform, possibly over a rather 
prolonged timescale, by achieving two objectives: breaking the level of threshold 
established by the legacy of past failures, which requires embracing path-breaking 
change, and simultaneously mitigating with neutralising instruments the possible 
disruptive effects of change on traditional institutional patterns. The latter are 
activated at the later stages of the developmental process of reform when new 
institutional arrangements and policy solutions emerge. Owing to the transformation 
of the function of the law from instrument of political will to self-contained 
administrative activity, these neutralising instruments which were devised as 
blockages trigger new political impetus and turn into factors of change as a result of 
the mobilisation of political conflict over issues previously juridified. The Law does
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not ossify the state, but facilitates the flexibility of an otherwise homeostatic and 
conservative system.
Dynamic conservatism, as it was developed in this thesis, advances the debate on 
policy reforms in advanced industrial democracies by considering how blockages are 
transformed into triggering factors of change. Blockages and changes are bound up 
with each other in a blend of old and new. Blockages are not given, or exogenous, 
but they are built in purposefully during the process of reform by those actors who 
mobilise against the introduction of change. Closure is maintained by the process of 
resistance, but openness is also ensured by the dynamic conservative process in 
which neutralising instruments trigger political mobilisation when new political 
impetus is infused in order to bring an end to immobilisme. The infusion of impetus 
from groups magnifies the effect of the system of blockages and sets the system on a 
new policy path. The cumulative effect in the long run of this motion in spirals rather 
than circles remains rather unpredictable, but it does offer opportunities for departure 
from the status quo ante.
The modernisation of the welfare state is certainly not only an Italian problem, but 
also a European challenge. The type of resistance, the process of reform, and the 
instruments used for policy reform vary across countries and make any generalisation 
a speculative endeavour. The type of resistance that Crozier described in the French 
administration, that is the tendency for civil servants to mask their opposition in an 
oblique way, is remarkably similar to the way latent impediments were built in the 
1992 case. Thus, in terms of bureaucratic behaviour there are similarities between 
the resistance of the Italian and French public administrations. As regards the 
instruments used for the modernisation of the state, decentralisation of welfare
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services has been discussed in other countries for some time. The current reform of 
the British National Health Care System is driven by the creation of foundation 
hospitals with great scope for autonomy from the central administration. As for the 
process of reform, dynamic conservatism could be applied to countries which show 
similar conditions to the Italian administrative and political systems, such as a public 
law administrative tradition, or at least a highly legalistic administrative culture, a 
moderately state-led system of intermediation with pressure groups, and a 
polycentric policy process where power is not concentrated at any one institutional 
level of government or at any stage.
The Italian state has found a possible way to change. The reforms of the national 
health care system have introduced in the Italian public sector unfamiliar and new 
arrangements for the efficient management of welfare services and for the 
reallocation of responsibilities between different levels of government. For the first 
time in the republican history of Italy such a far-ranging and structural reform has 
produced concrete change and has challenged the traditional bureaucratic patterns 
entrenched in the historical development of the State. Among the various factors 
contributing to this pioneering change, the combined effect of the managerial 
autonomy of rising regional managers of health care authorities and public hospitals, 
and the strengthening political capacity of the regions has been crucial for countering 
the combined resistance of national and local elites against the rise of powerful 
regional bureaucrats. The opposition was primarily motivated by the demands of 
preserving the old system of territorial politics. Regional welfare administration has 
developed to represent a new and alternative form of political legitimacy, based on 
service delivery rather than particularistic distribution through party channels. 
Augmented administrative and political capacity is unlikely to permit the
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reproduction of the old patterns of the Italian welfare system at this level of 
government.
The modernisation of the Italian State is far from being complete because blockages 
persist and are continually built in the process of reforms. They are rarely swept 
away. However, the case of health care reforms has showed the possible way to 
diffuse the reform process, now it has been launched, into other sectors. For once, 
Tommaso di Lampedusa’s widely quoted fragment from the Gattopardo, ‘everything 
changes for nothing to change’, which has characterised for so long the conventional 
wisdom about Italian politics and captured the empirical reality of the Italian state, 
can be converted with some confidence into, ‘nothing changes for everything to 
change’. Paradoxically, it is the operation of resistance and the development of 
blockages that has offered opportunities to reform in practice the Italian state.
As an explanation for change, dynamic conservatism could be the way of possible 
change in stalled societies. As we have shown, the unrealistic scenario of 
revolutionary crisis in the context of the Italian political culture of consensus 
building and accommodation and improbable weakening of policy communities of 
public lawyers makes dynamic conservative change more suitable than other types of 
change. The second stage of the policy process, where neutralising instruments 
become opportunities for change, was facilitated in the case of health care by the 
mobilisation of regional policymakers. At present, this possibility is still inhibited by 
the centralisation of other welfare sectors, such as education and pensions. If  
regionalisation affects also these areas, the reform of the state may become a more 
widespread phenomenon.
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